L’affaire Faye: Faut-il brûler Heidegger? 
A Reply to Fritsche, Pégny, and Rastier

THOMAS SHEEHAN

Abstract: L’affaire Faye: Johannes Fritsche’s bizarre Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1999) mistranslates every key term in Sein und Zeit §74 and distorts the entire book. Gaëtan Pégny’s justification of Emmanuel Faye’s mistranslations of Heidegger is beyond irresponsible. François Rastier’s “Open Letter to Philosophy Today” lends uncritical support to Faye’s dubious “scholarship.”

Key words: L’affaire Faye, Heidegger, Nazism, anti-Semitism, Emmanuel Faye, Johannes Fritsche, François Rastier, Gaëtan Pégny, Julio Quesada, Livia Profeti, Sidonie Kellerer, Richard Wolin, Tom Rockmore

Contents
Introduction: Five Points
1. Johannes Fritsche: The Drama of Historical Dasein
   1.1 An Overview of Fritsche’s Reading of SZ §74
   1.2 Fritsche Mistranslates Every Key Term in §74
      1.2.1 Fritsche Mistranslates überliefern and Überlieferung
      1.2.2 Fritsche Mistranslates wiederholen and Wiederholung
      1.2.3 Fritsche Mistranslates das Gewesen
   1.3 Fritsche Misinterprets the Whole of §74
      1.3.1 What Heidegger Actually Says in §74
         1.3.1.1 Five Preliminary Remarks about Translation and Content
         1.3.1.2 The Trajectory of Resolve and Retrieval in §74
         1.3.1.3 The Climactic Paragraph on Resolve
      1.3.2 What Fritsche Claims Heidegger Says in SZ §74
         1.3.2.1 Fritsche Reverses the Trajectory of SZ §74
         1.3.2.2 The Four Stages of Germany’s Redemption
            1.3.2.2.1 Nul-point: Inauthentic Weimar Society

ISSN 0031-8256 481–535
I’ll begin by laying my cards on the table.

1. Datum et concessum: There is no question in my mind—and I hope in no one else’s—that Heidegger was a contemptible anti-Semite throughout his entire life and, for a good number of years, a crass and entirely culpable champion of Hitler and National Socialism.

2. But at issue in this dispute are three things:
   • Whether Heidegger’s *philosophy* is imbued with anti-Semitism and Nazism.
   • If so, in which texts, to what degree, and for how long.
   • Whether his works should be read and taught (if taught at all) as Nazi ideology rather than as philosophy.
3. Resolving this dispute responsibly and professionally requires, at a minimum, that the interlocutors have a demonstrated competence in Heidegger’s philosophy.

- By that I mean a reasonable record of published work, in peer reviewed journals and presses, that demonstrates a scholarly ability to understand, articulate, and criticize Heidegger’s philosophy. Amateur scholarship will not cut the mustard.
- No matter how keen and well developed one’s knowledge of German history, language, and culture may be, it will not suffice if one consistently makes fundamental mistakes about Heidegger’s philosophy. In fact, such mistakes will disqualify the interlocutor.

4. If we include the main signer of “An Open Letter to Philosophy Today,” 12 September 2015, the reader will note that, of the three respondents in this current debate,

- one is a quondam director of research at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique in Paris, an internationally renowned scholar in semantics: François Rastier;
- one is a translator who got his doctorate two years ago with a thesis on the a priori in Bolzano and German Idealism: Gaëtan Pégny;
- only one is a professor of philosophy: Johannes Fritsche of Boğaziçi University, Istanbul.

5. All three respondents have written widely on Heidegger as an anti-Semite and a Nazi. Not one of them, however, has demonstrated professional competence in Heidegger’s philosophy—not François Rastier, not Gaëtan Pégny, and certainly not Johannes Fritsche.

That’s a strong claim, and it needs to be backed up by strong evidence. In what follows I provide that evidence.

1. **JOHANNES FRITSCHE: THE DRAMA OF HISTORICAL DASEIN**

Johannes Fritsche received his doctorate with a dissertation on Book I of Aristotle’s Physics, which he published first in 1982 and again in 1986. But in the 1990s, in the wake of books by Richard Wolin and Tom Rockmore, he decided to wade full-body into the Heidegger/Nazi controversy. Fritsche claims his writings make the strongest case in the literature that Heidegger’s philosophy leads directly to National Socialism.²

---

1. Philosophy Today 59(4) (Fall 2015): 713–17. (For abbreviations used in the present text, see p. 532 below.)
2. See bibliography for Fritsche’s books. A monograph entitled “On Aristotle’s Physics, Books II and VIII,” announced in 1999 as forthcoming (Graduate Faculty Philosophy
Fritsche’s articles on Heidegger, including those published in this journal, all derive, often verbatim, from his book, *Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time* (1999). That work is focused centrally on *SZ* §74 and has had a profound influence on Emmanuel Faye’s own interpretation of that section. Since Faye’s interpretation of *SZ* §74 is demonstrably false, Fritsche has a personal stake in defending Faye’s errors. If Fritsche is wrong about §74, his entire argument collapses, and along with it much of Faye’s *Heidegger: The Introduction of Philosophy into Nazism*.

Anyone who understands *SZ* and who has read Fritsche’s book or his synopsis of it in Fritsche-2012, can see that his interpretation of §74 is the product of a creative and very fertile imagination. His reading of those six pages of *SZ* is, one must say, entirely original—and utterly bizarre.

But for all its ominous Wagnerian undertones, Fritsche’s book is quite a howler and can’t be taken seriously as a piece of professional philosophy.—But do not take my word for it. The antidote to Fritsche’s wacky book is to actually *read* it. But you must also read his 123 pages of endnotes, which, in the spirit of David Foster Wallace, often run from four to nine pages each in small print.³

One reason for reading the notes is that you might find them entertaining—if, that is, your taste in humor runs to (reader discretion advised) the German slang for having a hard-on, a woody, or a drooper (310.30–311.36) or for defecating and urinating in your pants (192.13).

A more important reason for reading them is that in those notes Fritsche often lets his hair down and rambles on about this and that (for example, how Rick’s best line in *Casablanca* comes out in the dubbed German version). But in loosening up and having some fun in those notes, Fritsche makes scores of philosophical mistakes and reveals how little of *Sein und Zeit* he understands.⁴

---

3. E.g., Fritsche-book 243–250n33; 274–279n25; 289–292n66; 295–301n5; 323–327n60; 332–337n72; 338–343n5; 343–352n24, etc.
4. *Casablanca*: Fritsche-book 331.31–35. See also: streetwalkers (235n11); ads in *The New Yorker* (261.9–38); *Evita* and Bloomingdale’s (334.16–26); his odd fixation on Erwin Szymanski (309–332: notes 10, 29, 31, 70, and 72), and his truly weird cathexis on the essay “Anschwellender Bocksgesang” by right-winger Botho Strauß (*Der Spiegel*, 8 February 1993) at x.43; 37.11; 39.27; 60.32; 66.9; 67.1; 205.5; 219.28–29; 255n15; 265.37–38; 268.18; and 328.43. Sometimes Fritsche’s errors are amusing, as when he says that *SZ* 382.31–32 = 434.20 is an allusion to 1 Corinthians 13:12 (ibid., 329.43–45) or when he tries to link a passage from Ovid with one from Homer (ibid., 312.15–18).
1.1 An Overview of Fritsche’s Reading of SZ §74

Like Rockmore and Wolin before him and Faye after him, Fritsche claims that SZ is not about individual Dasein but rather about the German Volk. But Fritsche adds a new dynamic to this scenario. The real sub-text of SZ, he says, is not Dasein or the meaning of being, but the Manichean struggle between society and community that had been raging in Germany since the 1800s—that is, the battle of inauthentic Gesellschaft (= Evil) vs. authentic German Gemeinschaft (= Good).5

Fritsche claims that for Heidegger this struggle took a catastrophic turn with Germany’s defeat in 1918, followed by the liberal, social-democratic, Jew-dominated Weimar Republic of the 1920s. At that point German Fate-and-Destiny issued a “call for help”—here Fritsche claims to be voicing Heidegger—demanding that Germans destroy Weimar society, return to their Teutonic past, and construct a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft as Hitler projected it in volume 2 of Mein Kampf.6

Never mind that volume 2 of Mein Kampf was first published on 10 December 1926, a week after Heidegger had sent off his manuscript of SZ to the printers, and that Heidegger read volume 2 only four years later. Nonetheless, Fritsche claims, “Heidegger’s concept of historicality [in SZ §74] is identical to Hitler’s.”7

In Fritsche’s telling, Heidegger’s SZ dramatizes this struggle of authentic Gemeinschaft against inauthentic Gesellschaft, and the battle reaches its climax in ¶6 and ¶9 of §74. Those two paragraphs constitute nothing less than Heidegger’s nine-step program for destroying Weimar society and creating a fascist polity.8

---

5. “In some ways, Heidegger’s Being and Time has the same structure as all the literature on Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft” (Fritsche-book 126.7–9). Note that Fritsche does not italicize German words in his book.

6. Weimar: Fritsche-book 4.9; 15.22 (which Fritsche connects with SZ §§35–37); 190.40–41; 221.39; 287.35. Volksgemeinschaft: Fritsche first admits that “Volksgemeinschaft” appears nowhere in SZ (Fritsche-book 139.37–31; 217.42–218.1; 218.14–16) but then claims SZ does use that term: Fritsche-book 190.32–33; Fritsche-2012 258A.1. But then notice Fritsche’s legerdemain at Fritsche-book 217.28 and 218.24–26! To my knowledge the first appearance of “Volksgemeinschaft” in any text by Heidegger is at GA 16: 97.25 (6 May 1933). Fate-and-Destiny call out for help: Fritsche-book 22.23; 83.20. I capitalize “Fate” and “Destiny” to bring out the Wagnerian tones of Fritsche’s reading, and I often write them as “Fate-and-Destiny” since Fritsche treats them (incorrectly) as virtually synonymous.


To pull off this reading, as Fritsche proudly announces, he has had to “choreograph” SZ §74 as a play entitled “The Drama of Historical Dasein.” This imaginative rewriting of Heidegger’s §74 is spread out over the 390 pages of Fritsche’s book and spills over into his many articles on the subject.\footnote{I’ve adapted the title “The Drama of Historical Dasein” from Fritsche’s more lapidary “the drama of Dasein’s historicity”: Fritsche-book x.27–28; 29.8; 30.3; 31.11–12 (“the drama of historicity”); 58.7 (“at the end of the drama”). Also Fritsche-2012 266B.16–17 (“from a dramaturgical point of view”); 271A.1–2; 271A.15; 271A.45 (“the drama of historicality”). Choreography: Fritsche-2012 272A27; Fritsche-response 443n8.}

The following pages discuss Fritsche in some detail, followed by Pégny’s “Reply” and Rastier’s “Open Letter.” In Appendix 1, I respond to specific problems in all three of those texts. I begin with Fritsche for two related reasons:

1. His interpretation of SZ §74 is the foundation of his claim that SZ is a piece of Nazi ideology disguised as philosophy.
2. His reading of SZ §74 has profoundly influenced Emmanuel Faye and other members of Faye et Cie., among them François Rastier and Gaëtan Pégny.

I take Fritsche as \textit{pars pro toto}, a central example of the botched philosophical readings that are cycled and recycled through Faye’s circle of disciples. In demolishing Fritsche’s mistranslations and misinterpretations of SZ §74, I destroy one of the foundational pillars holding up the canard that is Faye’s \textit{Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy}.

1.2 Fritsche Mistranslates Every Key Term in §74

I begin by spelling out the most egregious errors in translation that Fritsche and his friends share in common. These are fundamental mistakes that undermine the Fritsche-and-Faye position on §74 and expose both of them as the incompetent readers of Heidegger that they are.

Like most of his Anglophone colleagues, Fritsche when writing in English mistranslates every one of Heidegger’s technical terms in SZ §74: \textit{Schicksal, Geschick, das Gewesen, dagewesen, überliefern, Wiederholung, erwidern, Widerruf,} and the list goes on.

It is a given in the scholarship that virtually none of Heidegger’s technical terms keeps the conventional meaning it has in ordinary German. For example:

\begin{tabular}{llll}
\textbf{Zeit} & is not & “time” \\
\textbf{Sein} & is not & “being” \\
\textbf{Da} & is not & “there” \\
\textbf{Dasein} & is not & “existence” \\
\textbf{Wahrheit} & is not & “truth” \\
\end{tabular}
Ereignis is not “event”
die Welt is not “the world/universe.”

And pace Fritsche’s claim that Heidegger’s notion of Schicksal “is completely in line with the everyday one,”

Schicksal is not “Fate” (fatum, sors)
Geschick is not “Destiny” (supervening, necessary, and inevitable)
überliefern is not “to hand down”
wiederholen is not “to repeat”
das Gewesen is not “what has been.”

Yes, the current English translations (Macquarrie-Robinson and Stambaugh-Schmidt) do render those German terms as above, but in so doing they have misled scholars for over fifty years.

Having German as one’s native tongue is not always an advantage with Heidegger’s philosophy, and it can even be a disadvantage. Over and above a command of German, one must also have a philosophical understanding of what Heidegger’s technical terms denote when they diverge from their ordinary German meanings. And that understanding is precisely what Fritsche lacks.

1.2.1 Fritsche Mistranslates überliefern and Überlieferung
In line with MR and SS, Fritsche mistranslates these two technical terms as “to hand down” and “handing down” (cf. tradere), and by so doing he betrays their philosophical meaning. Überliefern in SZ §74 and elsewhere in Heidegger’s work does not mean “to hand down” but “to free up, to liberate.”

- “Überliefern, délivrer, ist ein Befreien, nämlich in die Freiheit des Gespräch-es mit dem Gewesenen.” (GA 11: 10.34–35 = 35.1–2)

---

10. And “zeitigen/Zeitigung” most definitely is not “to temporalize/temporalizing” (Fritsche-book 35.1; 36.4; following MR and SS) or any of the following: “temperer” (Vezin); “temporaliser” (Martineau); “temporalizzare” (Chiodi-Volpi); “temporizzare” (Marini); “temporizer” (Rivera); “temporaciar” (Gaos); “temporalizar” (Picotti, Aportes a la Filosofía = GA 65); “temporaliza” (Liiceanu-Cioabă); temporalizaçao (Schuback); χρονίσει (Tzavara); 到时 / dàoshí, literally “arrive” + “time” (Chen-Wang). For Heidegger’s meaning of “zeitigen,” see Zollikon Seminare 203.7–8 = 158.10–11. Notice that “zeitigen” at SZ 152.28–29 is correctly translated by MR (“bring to maturity,” 194.16–17), SS (“produce,” 147.44), Schuback (“produzir,” 209.31); Liiceanu-Cioabă (“produçă,” 156.7); Tzavara (να παράσχει, 1, 255.26); Chen-Wang (使 / shǐ: bring about, cause, enable; 178.19).

Überliefern, deliver, is a freeing-up, specifically into the freedom of a conversation with das Gewesen.¹²

- “. . . weil die Überlieferung eigentlich, was ihr Name sagt, ein Liefern im Sinne des liberare, der Befreiung ist. Als ein Befreien hebt die Überlieferung verborgene Schätze des Gewesenen ans Licht. . . .” (GA 10: 153.7–9 = 102.6–7)

  . . . because Überlieferung is a freeing-up in the sense of liberare, to set something free. As such a freeing-up, Überlieferung brings to light the hidden treasures of das Gewesen. . . .¹³

- “[. . . das Sein], wohin uns die Überlieferung der Philosophie ausliefert, d.h. befreit.” (GA 11: 20.2–5 = 71.7–11)
  
  [. . . das Sein], to which Überlieferung de-livers us, i.e., for which it frees us.

This freeing-up is what Heidegger means in such related texts as:

- “Das vorlaufende Freiwerden für den eigenen Tod befreit von der Verlor-enheit . . . .”
  Becoming free for one’s own death by way of anticipation frees [Dasein] from its lostness . . . .” (SZ 264.7–9 = 308.25–27)

- “[die] Befreiung des Daseins für seine äußerste Existenzmöglichkeit.” (SZ 303.5–6 = 350.19–20)¹⁴
  [the] freeing-up of Dasein for the uttermost possibility of its ex-sistence.

  . . . the sole and central issue in philosophizing must be this liberating of the Dasein in human beings.

- “Philosophieren als Geschehenlassen der Transzendenz ist die Befreiung des Daseins.” (GA 27: 401.19–20)
  As letting [Dasein’s] transcendence come to pass, philosophizing is the liberating of Dasein.

- “. . . die Menschheit des Menschen, d. h. das Wesen des Menschen befreien, das Dasein in ihm wesentlich werden lassen. Diese Befreiung des Daseins im Menschen . . . .” (GA 29/30: 248.25–28 = 166.35–37)

---


...to liberate the humanness in human beings, i.e., to liberate the essence of the human being, to let the Dasein in him or her become essential. This liberation of the Dasein in the human being, ...

- “...[es handelt sich] um die Befreiung des Daseins im Menschen. Diese Befreiung ist zugleich die Aufgabe, sich das Dasein selbst wieder als wirkliche Bürde zu geben—Befreiung des Daseins im Menschen, die jeder nur je für sich aus dem Grunde seines Wesens vollziehen kann.” (GA 29/30: 255.5–9 = 172.8–12)

... [it’s a question of] the liberation of the Dasein in human beings. At the same time this liberation is the task of once again giving to oneself one’s own Dasein as an actual burden—freeing up the Dasein in [oneself], something that in each case only the individual Dasein, from out of the ground of its essence, can do for itself.

Given his ignorance of these clear statements, Fritsche mistranslates “Die auf sich zurückkommende, sich überlieferende Entschlossenheit” (SZ 385.23–24 = 437.18–19) as [Resolute Dasein] comes back to itself and hands itself down . . . whereas Heidegger is saying:

[Resolute Dasein] returns to itself and frees itself up. 15

Whatever “handing oneself down” might mean in any language, it is not the meaning of Sichüberliefern in §74. That term refers to freeing oneself up to choose an authentic possibility in light of one’s mortality. Miss that and you miss the core of SZ §74. 16

1.2.2 Fritsche Mistranslates wiederholen and Wiederholung

Ever since William J. Richardson published Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought in 1963, attentive scholars have known that Heidegger’s wiederholen does not mean “to repeat” something or someone. It is closer to “fetch” (cf. holen), as in the British “to fetch someone.” In American English that means “to go get somebody,” to pick them up, perhaps in your car, to take them somewhere (cf. jemanden abholen). Thus, as Richardson points out, when it comes to the philosophical meaning of Wiederholung, the English word “retrieval” or “retrieve”

---


16. Re “choose a possibility”: One is freed up to “retrieve” a possibility, whether in one’s own life (SZ 385.25 = 437.21–21) or, for example, in a philosophical text (GA 3: 203.3–16 = 143.4–15). See immediately below.
seems more faithful to the sense of Wiederholung than the possibly misleading “repetition” from the Latin repetere.17
And misleading it certainly is. Fritsche’s insistence on translating wiederholen/Wiederholung as “repeat/repetition” destroys any possibility of comprehending SZ §74. For example, he claims that Heidegger would have Germans “repeat” their Teutonic Fate-and-Destiny—their past socio-political-cultural heritage—by “rerealizing” a new Volksgemeinschaft.18
There are three distinct issues here, and they lead one to the other:

- Fritsche’s ignorance of the philosophical meaning of Wiederholung in the three crucial paragraphs at SZ 385.19–386.35 (¶¶9–11) . . . leads to:
- the groundlessness (Bodenlosigkeit) of his staging of §74 as a bad Wagnarian opera in which Fate-and-Destiny issue a “call for help” and demand that German Daseins forge a new völkisch community19 . . . , which in turn leads to:
- the utterly bizarre meaning he has to torture out of erwidern/Erwiderung at SZ 386.4–6 = 438.1–4 (submitting to Fate-and-Destiny!) to get them to dance to the choreography of his “Drama of Historical Dasein.”20

1.2.3 Fritsche Mistranslates das Gewesen
Many scholars find it difficult to understand Heidegger’s key term das Gewesen, but for an expert in Aristotle like Johannes Fritsche it should have been a piece

18. Fritsche-book 128.27–28. It gets even more weird at 285.35 where Fritsche claims—in Heidegger’s name—that the past “repeats’ us [!], . . . [i.e.,] calls upon us to come back”; and at 285.41–42: “We ‘repeat’ the inauthentic Daseine, that is, we demand . . . that they ‘repeat’ the past.” See also Fritsche-2012 270B.4: “we have to repeat the Greeks.”
20. See Fritsche-book 327.36; see ibid. ix.32–x.26; 7–13; 21–27; 273.29–31 (Scheler’s “zurüktönen” = Heidegger’s “erwidern” [!]); 309–10n7; 327n70. Fritsche-2012 276A.1–40 (n21); etc. Fritsche’s “translation” of erwidern as “submitting to Fate-and-Destiny” is quite unique. Compare it with MR, “makes a reciprocative rejoinder” (438.1); SS, “responds” (367.18); Vezin, “réplique” (450.28); Martineau, “ren-contre” (266.4); Chiodi-Volpi, “replica” (454.21); Marini, “replica” (540.13); Rivera, “responde” (399.12); Gaos “replica” (416.27); Liiceanu-Cioabă, “răspunsul” (396.21); Schuback, “controverte” (191.42); Tzavara, “αντιτάσσει” (II, 634); Chen-Wang, 对答 / duòdá: “answer,” “respond” (436.20).
of cake. Recall that Heidegger once advised his listeners “to first study Aristotle for ten or fifteen years” as he himself had done.  

Heidegger gives away the secret in SZ §18: To understand das Gewesen, he says, you first have to understand Aristotle’s τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. In crafting that central term of his philosophy, Aristotle, faute de mieux, used the imperfect tense (ἡν), since εἶναι has no present-perfect form. But even with the imperfect tense, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι does not refer (à la Fritsche) to a thing’s “has-been,” much less its “past.” Rather, it means

“das jeweils schon voraus Wesende,” das Gewesen,

i.e., that which, in every case, is already always operative. Das “Gewesen” is what and how an entity always already is—in a word, its essence.

Heidegger applies this to Dasein in SZ §65 on temporality—a pivotal section that Fritsche never analyzes—namely: Dasein’s essence is to ex-sist, to be thrown ahead as possibility into possibilities, right up to the final possibility of its own death. That thrown-aheadness is Dasein’s ineluctable way of being, its Wesen-als-Gewesen. Thus, in a transparent paraphrase of Aristotle’s τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (note the quotation marks around the first phrase), Heidegger says Dasein’s essence is

“wie es je schon war,” das heißt sein “Gewesen.”

That crucial paraphrase refers not to Dasein’s past in any sense but to its existential aheadness, its Zukünftigkeit or futurity. Dasein’s essence is to be always becoming itself, coming-to (zu-kommen) what it always already is: its mortal thrown-aheadness unto death. It is in this sense that Heidegger cites Pindar’s γένοι’ οἷος ἐσσί μαθών, “Learn and become what you already are.”

To understand those three crucial terms—Überlieferung, Wiederholung, and das Gewesen—Fritsche would have had to diligently read SZ in the way that Sartre suggested to Lukács: word by word, sentence by sentence, rather than viewing it

21. GA 8: 78.9 = 73.33.


23. SZ 326.1 = 373.17–18. In SZ “Wesen” refers not to what-Dasein-is but to how-it-is, its structural aheadness as ex-sistent possibility.

through his brown-tinted opera glasses. Absent such a reading, Faye’s so-called “findings” have nothing to do with what is actually written on those six pages of SZ. The rule is: Primum legere, deinde philosophari.25

1.3 Fritsche Misinterprets the Whole of §74

Fritsche does not just make a great number of mistakes about §74—he misreads the entire section. He literally gets nothing right. To support that claim I will first present what Heidegger actually says in §74, followed by what Fritsche claims Heidegger says.

1.3.1 What Heidegger Actually Says in §74

Note: At this point please refer to the sentence-by-sentence outline and paraphrastic translation of SZ §74 in Appendix 2 below, p. 525.

SZ §74 is comprised of thirteen paragraphs spread over six pages. The topic is Dasein’s essence as historical: its “historicity” or “historicality” (Geschichtlichkeit). The section unfolds in four steps, of which “II” (in the outline below) is the core, while “III” discusses retrieval as a specification of resolve.26

Table 1: SZ §74: Dasein’s Historicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¶1 Topic: Historicity is based on care and temporality</td>
<td>SZ 382.17–28 = 434.5–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¶2 Review of resolve: The whence of authentic possibilities</td>
<td>SZ 382.29–383.19 = 434.16–435.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¶3 Thrownness; the crowd’s self-understanding; resolve</td>
<td>SZ 383.20–30 = 435.4–14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¶4: Resolve described; Schicksal as authentic Geschehen</td>
<td>SZ 383.31–384.14 = 435.15–36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¶5 Schicksal in relation to “the blows of fate”</td>
<td>SZ 384.15–23 = 436.1–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¶6 Schicksal (individual) and Ge-schick (communal)</td>
<td>SZ 384.24–385.3 = 436.9–25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¶7 Schicksal is grounded in care and temporality</td>
<td>SZ 385.3–10 = 436.26–437.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¶8 Schicksal is living one’s authentic temporality and historicity</td>
<td>SZ 385.11–18 = 437.6–12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III. Retrieval: ¶¶9–10</th>
<th>SZ 385.19–386.26 = 437.13–438.21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¶9 Thematized resolve is retrieval; how it functions</td>
<td>SZ 385.19–386.9 = 437.13–438.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¶10 Summary of resolve, retrieval, Schicksal, historicity</td>
<td>SZ 386.10–26 = 438.8–21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV. Summation and transition: ¶¶11–13</th>
<th>SZ 386.27–387.28 = 438.22–439.25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¶11 Summation of the whole of §74</td>
<td>SZ 386.26–35 = 438.8–21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¶12 A new question: connectedness of an individual life</td>
<td>SZ 386.36–387.19 = 438.36–439.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¶13 A new topic: an individual’s inauthentic historicity</td>
<td>SZ 387.20–28 = 439.20–25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


26. Fritsche is uncertain how many parts §74 has: Fritsche-2012 257A.15 (“two parts”) vs. ibid. 257B.14 and Fritsche-book ix.20 (“four parts”).
1.3.1.1 Five Preliminary Remarks about Translation and Content

_Geschehen_. This technical term refers to the personal (= existentiell) act of “living historically,” in the sense of living out one’s own history. The current English translations of _Geschehen_ miss the point: “historicizing” (MR) says nothing, and “occurrence” (SS) is wrong.

_Geschichtlichkeit_ (“historicity”). This term bespeaks the essential (= existential) fact that Dasein’s very being is historical (_geschichtlich_) in a sense that §74 will go on to define.\(^27\)

_Schicksal_ (individual). As William J. Richardson pointed out, this does not mean “fate” with its “lugubrious overtones” of a predestined or pre-determined future. Rather, it refers to the future that the individual freely and resolutely chooses for him- or herself, whether or not that future works out as planned. Thus, Richardson: “The term merely transposes into terms of history what is meant by resolve,” that is, the resolve of an _individual_.\(^28\)

_Geschick_ (communal). Far from meaning “destiny” as Fritsche would have it, this term refers to the common future, the _Ge-schick_, that a community freely chooses for itself (for example, in ratifying the U.S. Constitution of 1789), whether or not things work out the way they were originally projected. We note that Fritsche and Faye erroneously use these two quite distinct terms—the _Schicksal_ of an individual and the _Geschick_ of a community—as virtually synonymous.

_Gemeinschaft_. Even a cursory glance at the outline of §74 reveals that the vast majority of that section—186 out of 198 lines of print—is devoted to _individual_ Dasein, whereas community (_Gemeinschaft_) gets a mere twelve lines, not even one full paragraph. Heidegger uses the word _Gemeinschaft_ only once in the entire book—at SZ 384.32 = 436.17–18.\(^29\)

---

27. See also SZ 393.32–34 = 445.30–32, where Dasein as “geschichtlich” is defined as “auf Grunde der ekstatisch-horizontalen Zeilichkeit in seiner Gewesenheit offen.”
28. Richardson, 91.5–6, with 91n187 (“lugubrious overtones”).
29. Heidegger uses _Gemeinschaft_ in a different and irrelevant sense at two other places: SZ 28.16 = 50.31 (“Wissenschaft … von der Gemeinschaft”) and SZ 320.27 = 497.11 (Kant’s “Gemeinschaft der vernüftigen Wesen”).
Like Wolin and Rockmore before him and Faye after him, Fritsche claims that §74 is entirely about community. He thinks that the topic of Gemeinschaft and its Geschick (with its mere 114 words and twelve lines in ¶6) continues on through ¶¶7–10. But not so. Those four paragraphs deal with individual Dasein and its Schicksal, not with the community at all.

The claim of Wolin-Rockmore-Fritsche-and-Faye that SZ §74 is focally centered on the community is utterly bogus, bodenlos, lacking any foundation in the evidence. They can make this senseless claim only by ignoring—or as in Fritsche’s case, being ignorant of—the crucial distinction between individual Schicksal and communal Geschick.

**1.3.1.2 The Trajectory of Resolve and Retrieval in §74**

Heidegger employs a crucial if paradoxical phrase throughout SZ: der vorrufende Rückruf, the appeal of conscience that calls Dasein forward by calling it back to its aheadness. The German phrase does not appear in §74 but nonetheless is the key to understanding the entire section.³⁰

Heidegger had already laid out Dasein’s fundamental “trajectory” when discussing care (§41) and temporality (§65), two cardinal sections of SZ that Fritsche fails to analyze. Table 3, on page 495, illustrates Dasein’s essence as a structural movement of ahead-and-return.³¹

---

³⁰ Fritsche cites this phrase at Fritsche-book 285.33 and immediately shows he doesn’t understand it: 285.33–37.

³¹ Re §41: In Fritsche-2012 he devotes four lines to this crucial section at 261B.19–23, where he gets the threefold structure of care wrong. (The three moments are not Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and Rede.) Re §65: He devotes eight lines to the whole of that section at ibid., 265B.3–10, and immediately gets it wrong: “the gate to the past,
This pattern of ahead-and-return underlies everything Dasein is—care, temporality, historicity—and everything Dasein does, including acts of resolve and retrieval. Miss that pattern, and you miss everything in SZ. And miss it Fritsche certainly does.

First, what Dasein is. Whether Dasein is authentic or not, its very essence—its existential structure—is made up of two moments: aheadness and return. As Heidegger puts it,

\[ \text{this being-ahead-of-itself as a returning} \]
\[ \text{is a characteristic movement that Dasein constantly makes.} \]

This two-pulse structure (= how Dasein existentially is) makes possible Dasein’s two-pulse activities (= what Dasein existentially does), whether that be making something (\( \piοίησις \)) or doing something (\( \piρ\dot{\alpha}ξίς \)).

Second, what Dasein does. In the case of resolve (choosing to become person-ally what one always already is structurally) Dasein redoubles, i.e., personally reenacts, its essence as aheadness-and-return by heeding der vorruftende Rückruf.

---

32. Re “always already returning from”: GA 9: 115.1–3 = 91.2–5 (where it is mistranslated): “...kommt es als solches Dasein je schon aus dem offenbaren Nichts her.”
That Ruf is the “call of conscience” to move forward (vor-) from one’s fallenness to one’s aheadness. That is, this call forward (Vorruf) is a call to return back to the mortal aheadness that one already is: precisely as a Vorruf it is a Rückruf. And from that resolute aheadness Dasein then returns to its present circumstances to choose the possibilities in terms of which it will strive to vivere moriendo, to “live mortally.”

This pattern is easily understood—although not by Fritsche. There are two different kinds of return: a return ahead, and a return from that aheadness back to the present. The first return is from one’s fallenness back to one’s essential aheadness or futurity (in the diagram, the movement from zero through no. 1 to no. 2). The second return occurs when Dasein, having resolutely “owned” its finitude, returns to its present moment (no. 3 above). There, from among its “inherited legacy” (Erbe) of possibilities, Dasein chooses one or another of them that it will endeavor to live out authentically in the light of its radical mortality. In Goethe’s phrase, Dasein will consciously choose the ideal it seeks to emulate (its “hero”). But in being faithful to that ideal, Dasein is being loyal to nothing other than itself, its own ex-sistence.

Resolve constitutes Dasein’s fidelity to its own self. Ever prepared for the experience of dread, such resolve is one way Dasein can respect the only authority a free ex-sistence can accept, namely, the very possibilities of ex-sistence that it itself is able to retrieve.

1.3.1.3 The Climactic Paragraph on Resolve
Heidegger pulls together the above discussion of individual Dasein in the climactic ¶8 of §74. I paraphrase it in Table 4.

35. Re “hero”: See Goethe, Iphigenie auf Tauris, Act I, scene 1, lines 203–205, with SZ 385.28–29 = 437.23.
36. SZ 391.9–13 = 443.8–11, my emphasis to show that “the struggle of faithfully following” the path of its chosen possibility (SZ 385.31 = 437.25–26) is Dasein’s fidelity to its own ex-sistence and not (pace Rockmore, Wolin, Fritsche, and Faye) to some authority ab extra.
Therefore, in answer to Fritsche’s central—and false—claim: Yes, SZ §74 does touch on the topic of community, but very briefly, in a mere twelve lines. The whole of §74, as indeed all of SZ, is focused on the individual Dasein:

- its own act of resolve in confronting and embracing its mortality
- its personal choice in forging its own future
- its individual retrieval in actualizing a personal and/or social possibility currently available to it (its “legacy”).

37. Cf. GA 29/30: 255.5–9 = 172.8–12: “Befreiung des Daseins im Menschen, die jeder nur je für sich aus dem Grunde seines Wesens vollziehen kann”; my emphasis. Re “currently available”: Heidegger’s “dagewesen” refers to what has-been-and-still-is-available. See Stephanus’s ἐνεστὼς συντελικός below at note 100.
1.3.2 What Fritsche Claims Heidegger Says in SZ §74

In the amazingly creative mind of Johannes Fritsche, SZ becomes something quite different. He claims that “one can hardly imagine a philosophical work that leads into National Socialism more directly than Heidegger’s *Being and Time*.”

That “one” who “can hardly imagine” is, of course, Fritsche himself. And the text he has in mind is §74, specifically those 114 words about community in ¶6. To that he wrongly adds the 222 words of ¶9 as if they applied to communal Dasein, whereas they are strictly about an individual Dasein’s *Schicksal* and *Wiederholung*. To shore up his hapless thesis, Fritsche first has to destroy Heidegger’s ¶6 and ¶9 and then recreate them in the image and likeness of his own perfervid imagination.

1.3.2.1 Fritsche Reverses the Trajectory of SZ §74

The fundamental mistake that Fritsche makes—thereby wiping out any possibility of understanding §74—is to reverse the trajectory of Dasein’s temporality and historicity and therefore of resolve and retrieval. For Heidegger, resolve is about the individual Dasein authentically confronting its individual mortal future—in Heidegger’s rereading of Aristotle: its own *wie-es-je-schon-war* or *Gewesen*.

But ignorant of that, Fritsche advances a twofold fallacy: first he *reverses* the trajectory of §74; and then he *rewrites* the entire section to make it seem that Heidegger is talking about *corporate* rather than individual Dasein.

![Diagram of Fritsche Rewrites Heidegger, SZ §74](image)

Oblivious of the fundamental pattern that Heidegger had laid out in §§41 and 65 and that he builds on in §74, Fritsche makes resolve into its exact opposite. It is no longer a matter of confronting one’s mortal *future* and returning to the *present* to free up an available possibility. Instead, Fritsche claims that Heidegger

---

38. Fritsche-book 140.23–24; also 218.23–24. Rastier repeats this absurdity in his little book, with the qualification that only Heidegger’s inner circle saw this back then: “ne reconduit que les élus à son intention nazie”: *Naufrage* 81.18–19.
“affirms the primacy of the past”: Fate-and-Destiny “call out” from the Germanic past, appealing to Dasein to step back from the future, dominated as it is by liberal, Jewish Gesellschaft and its alienating “progress.” In Fritsche’s choreography of §74, the trajectory now moves from right to left, from future to past. It begins with the nul-point of the Weimar Republic (“0” in the diagram above), then regresses (in no. 1) to its Teutonic past (no. 2), where Fate-and-Destiny give collective German Dasein its mission of pressing forward into the present (no. 3) to “repeat” its storied past by forging a new Reich, a pure Volksgemeinschaft à la Hitler.39

1.3.2.2 The Four Stages of Germany’s Redemption
The easiest way to present Fritsche’s misreading of §74 is to walk through his fanciful choreography of ¶¶6 and 9. I do that only schematically here, while referring the reader to the complete script of this gripping melodrama as it is laid out in the 390 pages of his book. To adopt François Rastier’s bon mot, Fritsche’s drama is little less than “une progression qui rappelle celle des romans fantastiques.”40

“For those who are able to read and listen,” Fritsche says,41 Act One of his imaginative mise en scène covers the first 371 pages of SZ (§§1–71) and depicts the lugubrious tale of tortured, alienated, and often lonesome Daseine.42

Dasein realizes that there is no meaning in its life, no wholeness, and no Ständigkeit.43

But then suddenly—precisely at SZ 372.10—the curtain goes up on Act Two! The skies open! The sun breaks through! And like a deus ex machina Salvation enters from Stage Right. In Fritsche’s fractured prose,


40. Rastier’s bon mot: Naufrage 91.13–14. Fritsche divides the “drama” that is SZ is into three acts (Fritsche-book x.27: “Being and Time . . . a drama in three acts”), which I compress into two.


43. Fritsche-book 286.47–287.1, where Fritsche refers the reader to SZ 375.12 = 427.19, even though Heidegger’s text bears no resemblance to the lines that Fritsche footnotes.
there steps out of the “obscure” [Dunkel: SZ 372.21 = 424.16] das Volk and das Völkische and presents itself as the one and only substance of the individual Daseine that will redeem them.\(^{44}\)

It hardly matters to Fritsche that

- *das Dunkel* at SZ 372.21 does not have the meaning he assigns to it;\(^ {45}\)
- the one and only time that *das Volk* appears in SZ (384.32 = 436.17–18) it means any people, not the Germans as “the” people;
- the noun *das Völkische* and the adjective *völkisch* never appear in SZ.

Unfazed by what the text actually says, Fritsche segues into his next sentence with a brilliant *non sequitur*:

> Those who regard this suggestion as infamous should keep in mind that, given his love for the Greeks, Heidegger might have had reasons to adopt techniques of initiation from antiquity in his pedagogy.\(^ {46}\)

Whatever *that* might mean, Act Two of Fritsche’s script provides a spellbinding orchestration of ¶¶6 and 9 of SZ §74 into Heidegger’s step-by-step program for toppling Weimar society and forging the Nazi state. The redemption of Germany is outlined in Table 5, above, and spelled out here below.\(^ {47}\)

**1.3.2.2.1 Nul-point: Inauthentic Weimar Society**

In Fritsche’s staging of §74, the historic “turning point” (*Wende*) is the same for Heidegger as it was for Hitler: the Great War followed by the Weimar Republic. These two events marked the nadir of the German Volk, the point at which modern Gesellschaft finally crushed traditional Gemeinschaft. The 1920s witnessed the triumph of *das Man*, that inauthentic mass of city-dwellers, liberals, social democrats, and Jews. As in *The Waste Land* (“so many, / I had not thought death had undone so many”), post-war Germany had resigned itself to the drab monotony of an abject future of gesellschaftlich “progress” and “business.”\(^ {48}\)

\(^{44}\) Fritsche-book 340.39–41. Presumably the verb and object should be in the plural (“present themselves”), while the word “that” apparently modifies not Daseine but the “substance” that is *das Volk* and *das Völkische*.

\(^{45}\) It does not refer to the obscurity of Weimar society but rather to “the many structures of Dasein that still remain unclear [thus far in SZ] as regards their particulars.”

\(^{46}\) Rastier repeats this gem throughout *Naufrage*: 28.7–9; 29.7; 36.13; etc.

\(^{47}\) For simplicity’s sake I compress Fritsche’s *nine*-step program (!) into a mere four: see Fritsche-2012 257A.18–277B.13.

\(^{48}\) *Turning point*: Fritsche-book 83.15–17: “It has already become clear that the logical structure of Hitler’s concept of history and the ‘turning point’ is identical to that of Heidegger’s concept of historicality”; cf. ibid., 130.35–37. *Gesellschaft crushes Gemein-
1.3.2.2.2 Rückruf: Return to the Past

But at a Kairos-like moment there suddenly sounds The Voice! demanding that Germans refuse that future and turn back to the legacy of their national past.49

But who is calling? Where does The Voice come from? Heidegger had spoken of “the call of conscience,” the δαίμων-like appeal that one’s mortal essence makes to one’s fallen self to return forward to its groundless aheadness. But by trawling through §74, Fritsche manages to dredge up an undifferentiated tangle of faux-Teutonic entities that become The Single Voice calling the German people to return to and embrace their past. That Voice is the aggregate of the following—all ex aequo, all without distinction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schicksal</th>
<th>Fate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geschick</td>
<td>Destiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Vergangene</td>
<td>The Past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eine vergangene Welt</td>
<td>A Past World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Dagewesene</td>
<td>What-has-been-there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>die Erwiderung</td>
<td>The Disavowal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbe</td>
<td>The German heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Volk</td>
<td>The German Volk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>das Volksgemeinschaft</td>
<td>The Community of the German Volk.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following Fritsche’s lead, we may allow “Fate-and-Destiny” to stand for that undifferentiated chorus of callers. The only concession Fritsche makes to Aristotle’s διορίσκομεν (“Let’s make some distinctions”: Metaphysics 1048a26) is to claim, falsely, that Heidegger understands “Destiny” as the genus, of which “Fate” is the species. Geschick, he says, is “all embracing,” while Schicksal refers to “the different individual slots [!] allotted by Geschick to each individual.”51

---

49. Kairos is one of Fritsche’s favorite and most overused terms: Fritsche-book xv .37; 67.36; 130.38; 132.41; 133.14; 134.1; 162.19; 169.5; 191.16; 307.23; 322.16; 324.41; Fritsche-2012 262A.37; 282n128; 282n152; etc.


51. Fritsche-book 218.24–25; 141.1–2. For more on the “slots” assigned to Dasein, see ibid., 52.23; 64.25; 263.47; 264.14; Fritsche-2012 267A.22–23: “the slot provided by heritage for Dasein.”
Contra Heidegger, the Fate-and-Destiny team in Fritsche becomes a supervening force that is ontologically prior to and in fact predates both individuals and community, with the sole proviso that in order to be socially and politically effective, Fate-and-Destiny require “Dasein’s proper listening and successful fighting.”

1.3.2.2.3 Redemption: Resolve, Authenticity, and the End of Thrownness

Still speaking for Heidegger, Fritsche claims that the Voice-of-Fate-and-Destiny, in calling out for help, demands that Germans do two things: disavow Weimar Gesellschaft and return to the past. Complying with those two demands, he tells us, is what Heidegger means by resolve and authenticity.

And once Dasein becomes resolute and authentic, what form does its redemption take? Nothing less than losing its own thrownness. Authentic Dasein “realizes that, now, it is no longer geworfen, thrown, but geschickt, sent . . . to realize Gemeinschaft.” Far from Geworfenheit being Dasein’s very essence, its ineluctable way of being, it is now a dead skin that Dasein sheds when it authentically embraces Germanic Fate-and-Destiny.

1.3.2.2.4 Regeneration: Repetition of a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft

Having returned to and embraced its German past, and having been fit into its schicksalhaft “slot” by Destiny, authentic, resolute Dasein is ready for its “mission” (Fritsche takes the term from Mein Kampf and uses it to translate Geschick). That mission is to “repeat” (cf. wiederholen) its Teutonic past in the form of a Nazi community of authentic Germans.

Geschick has sent it [ = Dasein] to realize the Geschick, the mission, namely, to rerealize Gemeinschaft. In addition, Geschick has provided Dasein with the necessary Geschicklichkeiten [!], has made Dasein geschickt.

---

53. For the theme of “redeem/redemption” (another favorite trope of Fritsche’s) see Fritsche-book 155.3; 101.26; 203.4; 340.41; with “soteriological” at 265.22; 344.22; Fritsche-2012 266B.34; 268B.45.
54. Disavowal of Weimar Gesellschaft is Fritsche’s madcap interpretation of “Widerruf” at SZ 386.6 = 438.4: see Fritsche-book 24–28; 154.25–32 (with reference to transubstantiation!); 265.32. Re calling out for help: ibid., 22.23; 83.20.
57. Fritsche-book 287.4–7. Apart from making no sense, the word “Geschicklichkeiten” appears nowhere in SZ. In his next sentence (287.7–8), Fritsche admits that “in Sein und Zeit Heidegger does not use the adjective ‘geschickt.’”
Heidegger says that authentic Dasein will bring back or restore the Volksgemeinschaft . . .

The regeneration of the German Volk means the end of the social-democratic, Jew-dominated world of das Man and the institution of an ideal fascist state where only the authentic will live.

At the end of the drama authentic Dasein even cancels the world of the “they” in order to rerealize the past or the Erbe.

1.4 The Final Bow

What to make of this mesmerizing melodrama, this spellbinding saga?

Who could have guessed it would take over seventy years before the true meaning of SZ would finally be conjured out of the shadows by the magic wand of Johannes Fritsche? Think of how many diligent scholars during all those years went to their graves clueless about what SZ §74 really meant, simply because they didn’t live long enough to see this Aryan Athena spring fully formed from the forehead of Professor Fritsche.

There will still be doubters, of course, scholars who for whatever reason cannot find Fritsche’s elaborate drama unfolding in the actual words of §74. But as Fritsche might say, such doubters will only be “those who are unable to read and listen.”

Nonetheless, the jury is still out. One side argues that Fritsche’s book is the product of a keen X-ray vision that can read through the palimpsest that is SZ to the secret Nazi narrative lurking beneath its surface. The other side, the skeptics, say that Fritsche-and-Faye’s claim—that SZ §74 is a crypto-Nazi screed disguised as philosophy—is unvarnished malarkey, a hackwork house of cards that collapses in on itself,

in seinem Fugen kracht und in sich zusammenstürzt, und alle Kräfte in die Verwirrung reißt.

Those skeptics might be forgiven for thinking that Fritsche “has not understood anything of section 74” and that in trying to plant a bomb under Sein und Zeit, he has been hoisted by his own petard.

58. Fritsche-book 327.35–36. This whole paragraph has to be read to be believed. And do not miss Fritsche’s jaw-dropping exegesis of Heidegger’s λόγος in GA 40 (ibid., 200–03). Priceless.


Nonetheless, we should all be thankful to Professor Fritsche and his extraordinary imagination for two things. First, for spelling out in over 390 pages of English what Emmanuel Faye would later condense into a stingy ten pages of French. With Fritsche’s elaborate narrative we are at last upstream at the pristine source of the rushing torrent that is sweeping Heidegger’s books off library shelves the world over. 63

And secondly, with his book and articles Johannes Fritsche has given us a front-row seat in his Magic Theater (“For Madmen Only. Price of Admission Your Mind”) where we can see, close up, the entire cast of his elegantly choreographed spectacle as they take their final bows, with all their stage props and carnivalesque regalia, their costumes, make-up, bells, whistles, painted feathers, plastic beads—the whole shambolic Mardi Gras parade of “The Drama of Historical Dasein.”

I, for one, am grateful to Professor Fritsche for that.

2. GAËTAN PÉGNY: IN DEFENSE OF FAYE’S MISTRANSLATIONS

As wrong-headed as I think Fritsche’s book and articles are, they at least make an attempt at philosophical argumentation, something that is difficult to find in the 16,899 words of Gaëtan Pégny’s “Reply.” 64

From this turgid, scattershot text, written in the highest of high dudgeon, it is clear that M. Pégny is upset, chiefly because he doesn’t like having his ludicrous claims called “ludicrous.” It is also clear that Pégny wants to defend himself as well as M. Faye, although he tends to blur the two until we’re not sure which is which.

But it’s clear whom he’s upset at. After a bit of fatuous throat-clearing in section 1, he focuses his choler on my exposé of Faye’s (and his own) harebrained translations of

• zureichend in Faye’s doctored translation of the Spiegel interview
• Schicksal and Geschick in SZ §74
• Bodenlosigkeit in SZ §77
• Deckname in Heidegger’s 1943 letter to Kurt Bauch.

In “Fraud” I’ve already detailed Faye’s switcheroos, omissions, and phoney translations, including his silent rewriting of Heidegger’s Spiegel interview. And the question of Schicksal and Geschick has already been covered in my response to

63. See Faye 513.11–12 = 319.9–10: “[Heidegger’s] work cannot continue to be placed in the philosophy section of libraries; its place is rather in the historical archives of Nazism and Hitlerism.”

64. I am counting the words in Pégny’s original French version that was published at Philosophy Today online: https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openfor m&fp=philtoday&id=philtoday_2016_0999_2_12_110. I understand that Pégny may have mercifully shortened it a bit for the English translation.
Fritsche. Here I will take up only the last two items in Pégny’s list, while leaving his other misprisions, grievances, and complaints to Appendix 1 below.

### 2.1 Pégny Defends Faye’s Mistranslation of Bodenlosigkeit and bodenlos in SZ §77

Recall that the dispute in “Fraud” was over Faye’s ludicrous translation of *Bodenlosigkeit* in §77 as “absence de sol.” It is clear to anyone who can read that the word means “groundlessness.” In the present case (SZ 401.2 = 452.28–29), *die Bodenlosigkeit des Denkens* means “the groundlessness of thinking” (not “the absence-of-soil of thinking”). All the translations known to me render *Bodenlosigkeit* that way.65

The one exception is Faye’s compatriot Emmanuel Martineau, who for reasons unknown invented the “translation” of *Bodenlosigkeit* as “absence de sol” (at *Être et temps*, 274.31). Seizing on that hapax legomenon, Faye came up with the bright idea that *Bodenlosigkeit* in §77 had to be an anti-Semitic slur—in fact one that Heidegger had uttered. And so the canard began.

Faye made three senseless mistakes. First, he embraced Martineau’s bizarre translation of *Bodenlosigkeit* as “absence de sol.” Second, he misread it as an anti-Semitic slur. And third, he attributed that alleged slur to Heidegger.

- Sloppily (as is this wont) Faye puts the words *Bodenlosigkeit* and *bodenlos* into Heidegger’s mouth when they are obviously quotations taken from Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg. The quotation marks throughout §77 make that abundantly clear. How could Professor Faye have missed that?66
- But even in Yorck’s mouth, *bodenlos* and *Bodenloskeit* in §77 are not anti-Semitic slurs. In the one case Yorck is speaking of “the groundlessness of thinking” in the von Ranke school of historiography; and in the other he is referring to the “groundless” relativism and “groundless thinking” of that same school.67

66. The terms are found at SZ 401.2 = 452.28–29; 401.38 = 453.24; and 402.27 = 454.13, always within quotation marks.
67. Would Faye translate these as “the absence-of-soil of thinking,” “absent-of-soil relativism,” and so on?
Finally Faye claims that Heidegger took from Yorck the requirement of a \textit{Boden} for philosophy, which Faye then translates as “a soil” for philosophy.\textsuperscript{68}

Regarding that last point, Faye is wrong on three counts:

1. He does not and cannot offer any evidence for this absurdity—because there is none. The word \textit{Boden} does not even appear in §77.
2. The use of \textit{Boden} that Faye is referring to comes from GA 18: 4.13–14 = 4.9, which has nothing to do with Yorck. The same goes for \textit{Boden} at GA 17: 277.3 = 212.37.
3. The word \textit{Boden} in both GA 17 and 18 means a “basis” for philosophy, not a “soil”—and certainly not “the earth as arable soil” (!) as Fritsche would have it.\textsuperscript{69}

As obvious as Faye’s error is, it gets endlessly recycled among his disciples and friends. In the collection \textit{Heidegger, le sol, la communauté, la race}, his then graduate student Jaehoon Lee took Faye’s absurd position one step further by claiming that in 1924 Heidegger declared his intention of tracing all of the thirty technical terms in Aristotle’s \textit{Metaphysics} V back to “Greek soil.”\textsuperscript{70}

Yes, Heidegger did say, “We have to see the \textit{Boden} from which these basic concepts have arisen”—but by \textit{Boden} he did not mean Attic “soil.” To see that, Mr. Lee would only have to read the next five lines, where Heidegger says exactly what he means by \textit{Boden}:

that is to say, the basic concepts are to be considered in their specific conceptuality so that we may ask \textit{how we should view the very things that these concepts refer to, in which context they are spoken of, and in which way they get their definitions.} [Heidegger’s emphases throughout]\textsuperscript{71}

\subsection*{2.1.1 Coda: The Soil (\textit{Boden}) of Dr. Jaehoon Lee’s Thesis on Heidegger}

On 16 September 2015, the same Jaehoon Lee, his dissertation directed by Emanuel Faye, was awarded a doctorate in philosophy on the strength of his thesis that the “fulcrum” Heidegger used in his critique of Descartes was . . . Nazism. Lee alleges that Heidegger saw in the Nazis the political power that he could harness to destroy the rationality of Descartes.\textsuperscript{72}

Lee and Faye are apparently unaware that Heidegger’s critique of Descartes pre-dates (1) the Nazi take-over by nine years, (2) the publication of volume 1 of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[68.] Faye 25.19–21 = 12.16–16.
\item[69.] Fritsche-response 438.39.
\item[70.] \textit{Heidegger, le sol, la communauté, la race}, 39.4–5 and 39.15 with note 2.
\item[71.] GA 18: 4.13–18 = 4.10–14.
\end{footnotes}
Mein Kampf by over a year, and (3) the publication of volume 2 of Mein Kampf by three years. In his Marburg lecture course “Introduction to Phenomenological Research” Heidegger began his Descartes lectures on 8 January 1924 as a core element of his critique of Husserl, and he concluded the lectures on 19 February 1924 with a final tie-in of Descartes to Husserl (see GA 17: 106–253 = 76–207). If Lee and Faye would actually read those pages, they would see that Heidegger’s nine lectures on Descartes had nothing to do with the “destruction of rationality,” much less with Nazism.73

2.1.2 Coda: On Fritsche’s Mistranslation of Bodenlosigkeit
Fritsche devotes more than half of his response to telling us what he thinks Boden and Bodenlosigkeit, entwurtzeln, and other words might mean in various contexts (philosophical or not) and at various times (under Nazism or not). But nowhere does he face up to the issue that is in dispute here: whether Faye’s claims about bodenlos and Bodenlosigkeit in SZ §77 are true or false.

I have shown those claims to be utterly false. Nothing in Fritsche’s article changes that. There is absolutely no evidence

- that Heidegger used Bodenlosigkeit at all in §77;
- that Heidegger used Bodenlosigkeit anywhere in SZ to mean “absence of soil”;
- that Heidegger—a known anti-Semite—used Bodenlosigkeit anywhere in SZ as a slur against Jews;
- that Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg—himself a convinced anti-Semite—used either Bodenlosigkeit or bodenlos in §77 as a racial slur directed at Jews for their alleged lack of “rootedness in the soil.”74

Fritsche and Faye are irredeemably wrong. Their case rests on two slippery slopes: Faye’s citation of an anti-Semitic remark that Yorck made to Dilthey in 1887 (a half-century before SZ was written) together with Faye’s ventilation of his misdirected feelings when he read §77:

It is difficult not to be reminded of these words of Count Yorck when Heidegger [!], in §77 of Being and Time, in turn attacks what he inelegantly calls

73. The publication dates of Mein Kampf are: Volume I, 18 July 1925, and Volume II, 10 December 1926: Hitler, Mein Kampf, I, 16.50 and 18.2. For the dates of Heidegger’s lectures on Descartes, see Stanford University Special Collections: Helene Weiss, Heidegger lecture notes, 1920–1949, Box 1, Folder 3, “Handschriftliche Mitschriften von Martin Heideggers…‘Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung,’ 1923–1924”: http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/ft0h4n974f/entire_text/.
74. Fritsche goes so far as to say “the soil [!] of Being and Time is völkisch”: Fritsche-book xv.29.
“absence of soil” (!) (Bodenlosigkeit) and alludes positively on that occasion to the letters of Count Yorck.\textsuperscript{75}

End of argument. Faye cannot read the words on the page. Why, then, would Pégny and Fritsche (not to mention any responsible philosopher) be motivated to defend Faye’s ignorance?\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{2.2 Pégny Defends Faye’s Mistranslation of \textit{andeutend}}

A rule of thumb that we follow on this side of the Atlantic is: “When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.” But the irrepressible Dr. Pégny doesn’t know when to hang up his shovel.

Recall that the issue raised in “Fraud” was Faye’s bizarre mistranslation of the word \textit{andeutend} in Heidegger’s note to “Identität und Differenz” (1957). In that note Heidegger remarks that

\begin{quote}
[der Brief des Humanismus], der überall nur \textit{andeutend} spricht . . .
\end{quote}

But instead of consulting Heidegger’s German text, Faye relied on a wildly incorrect French “translation” of that phrase as

\begin{quote}
[La Lettre sur l’Humanisme,] qui ne parle jamais qu’à mots couverts. . . .
\end{quote}

The topic of Heidegger’s 1957 note was \textit{Ereignis}, the key term of his later thought. What he said in that note is that the “Letter on Humanism” (1946) actually did deal with \textit{Ereignis}, not \textit{nominatim} but \textit{nur andeutend}, only indirectly, only by way of implication. However, Faye, ignoring the German text and relying on the absurd French “translation,” goes to work: he proclaims to the world—an absolute scoop in the history of Heidegger scholarship!—that in 1957 Heidegger publicly confessed to two stunning deceptions:

\begin{itemize}
\item[75.] Faye 25.31–26.3 = 12.26–29.
\item[76.] Fritsche goes so far as to say that Faye’s mistranslation of “sich zusammensetzen aus” as “reposer sur” is “in no way inappropriate” and “might even be better than Heidegger’s own formulation”: Fritsche-response 444.1–2.
\item[77.] GA 11: 81.22–23 = 75.16–76.1.
\item[78.] Martin Heidegger, \textit{Questions I}, 310.10. As Rastier might say: Faye “s’appuie sans recul sur des éditions contestables,” and “Cette herméneutique . . . instrumente et réécrit le texte” such that “la convergence des distorsions, voire des manipulations accréditent l’hypothèse d’un montage”: \textit{Naufrage}, respectively 62.20–21; 63.7–8; 66.13–15.
\end{itemize}
Heidegger revealed that the “Letter on Humanism” was nothing but a crude fraud. He announced to the global philosophical community that his now famous text was not about philosophy at all. It was really about Nazism!

Heidegger likewise revealed to all those deceived scholars that he had cleverly disguised his Nazi message behind “mots couverts.”

Faye doesn’t bother to tells us

- why Heidegger would choose to expose his renowned “Letter on Humanism” as an outrageous fraud that had fooled scores of philosophers for over a decade; or
- why Heidegger, a full twelve years after World War II, would “out” himself by announcing to the world that, yes, back in 1946 when he was suspended from teaching at Freiburg University, he still was a convinced, if concealed, Nazi.

Nor does Faye point to any actual words or sentences in the “Letter on Humanism” that Heidegger used to camouflage his Nazism. The reason is simple: there are none. Faye’s allegation is bogus.

Faye’s mindless gaffes are so glaring, and the conclusions he draws from them so transparently absurd, that one wonders why Pégny didn’t quietly pass over Faye’s foolish mistakes and move on. But no, Dr. Pégny—himself an expert translator—justifies Faye’s error by taking it a step further. And in so doing, he digs himself deeper into his hole. That is:

### 2.3 Pégny Defends Faye’s Mistranslation of Deckname

Pégny justifies Faye’s clumsy mistake about andeutend by stretching that same mistranslation to cover yet another of Faye’s mistranslations: “Deckname” in Heidegger’s letter to Kurt Bauch on 1 August 1943. And for this brilliant idea of stretching one mistranslation to cover another, Pégny thanks none other than the world-renowned scholar of semantics, François Rastier: “On a ici repris la traduction de Deckname par ‘mot couvert’ proposée par François Rastier.”

Faye’s daft translations of andeutend in GA 11 and of Deckname in the 1943 letter have already been exposed in “Fraud,” pp. 387–391, and I needn’t repeat that here. But what is truly amazing (dare I say ludicrous) is how Pégny tries to

---

79. Having invented the cretina of “mots couverts,” François Rastier repeats it endlessly throughout his screed *Naufrage*: 28.18; 34–39; 35.8; 36.23; 44.13; 55.15; 73.17–18; 74.29; 100.17; 107.5; 110.5; etc.; also “Deckname,” passim. He also parrots Faye’s torturing of Heidegger’s “Seyn” to get it to refer to the Nazi Vaterland: *Naufrage*: 34.14; 41.23; 74.29; 96.12; 108.16–17; etc. On this see “Fraud” 390.6–391.7, with note 76.

80. See Pégny-2014 220.19; also https://lareviewofbooks.org/contributor/gaetan-pegny/.

81. Pégny, “Vérité et mythe dans *De l’essence de la vérité*,” in *Heidegger, le sol, la communauté, la race*, 212n2, carried over from p. 211; and Pégny-reply 5.7–9 = 451.1–3.
justify Faye's blunders by way of an astonishing exegesis of Heidegger's lecture on \( \psi\varepsilon\delta\omicron\omicron \) in GA 36/37: 226–29. I will first lay out what Heidegger actually says in that text, and then what Pégny claims Heidegger says.

2.3.1 What Heidegger Actually Says at GA 36/37: 226–29
In those four pages of his lecture Heidegger is spelling out for his students the meaning of \( \lambda\heta\eta \) (from \( \lambda\heta\theta\omega / \lambda\alpha\nu\theta\alpha\nu\omega \)). He does so by first explaining three other Greek terms: \( \psi\varepsilon\nu\delta\omicron \), \( \psi\varepsilon\nu\delta\varepsilon\sigma\omicron\omicron \), and \( \lambda\gamma\omicron\omicron \psi\varepsilon\nu\delta\omicron \). Heidegger begins by distinguishing two meanings of \( \psi\varepsilon\nu\delta\omicron \):

- covering up or distorting something that is actually there;
- falsely presenting X as if it were Y, when there's no Y there.

To bring out the first meaning, Heidegger uses the example of a loan-word in German: \textit{Pseudonym}, the Greek etymons of which are \( \psi\varepsilon\nu\delta\omicron \) and \( \omicron\nu\omicron\mu\alpha \). The outline of Heidegger's text on p. 511 goes into considerable detail precisely because Pégny does not. He simply trashes the passage. Please see Table 6.

2.3.2 What Pégny Claims Heidegger Says at GA 36/37: 226–29
Like Faye, Pégny finds that Heidegger “outs” himself—in this case in front of a classroom of students. I refer the reader to Pégny’s “Reply” (10.20–27 = 456.1–8) for this amazing claim.

Pégny correctly notes that at GA 36/37: 228.14 = 173.39, Heidegger says: “ich bin, ich bleibe verborgen.” Pégny then interprets that sentence for us:

Heidegger insistant sur la dissimulation comme partie intégrante de son être . . .

Heidegger, insisting on concealment [or dissimulation] as an integral part of his being . . . \textsuperscript{82}

But Pégny has to know that neither “\textit{mon être}” nor anything like it appears in the German text; and if it did, it would not refer to Martin Heidegger. Heidegger is not insisting that concealment or dissimulation is intrinsic to his being. He is not saying that his position as a philosopher is only a disguise (Pégny’s “\textit{Deckname}”) to camouflage what he really is: a Nazi. —Yes, Heidegger did say:

ich bin, ich bleibe verborgen

I am concealed, I remain concealed. \textsuperscript{83}

But in doing so, he was simply translating for his students the first person singular, present tense of the verbs \( \lambda\heta\theta\omega \) and \( \lambda\alpha\nu\theta\alpha\nu\omega \), which do indeed mean “I am / I remain concealed.” But incredibly Pégny turns that classroom exercise in Greek

\textsuperscript{82} Pégny-reply 10.25–26 = 456.5–6. This embarrassment is repeated in Rastier, \textit{Naufrage} 36.13–18.

\textsuperscript{83} GA 36/37: 228.14 = 173.39.
L’aïfaîre Faye: Faut-il brûler Heidegger?

Table 6: GA 36/37: 227.4–229.16 = 172.42–174.24

The meaning of λήθη explained via the meanings of ψεῦδος, ψεύδεσθαι, and λόγος ψεῦδος

1. First meaning of ψεῦδος: covering up something that's there

   Example: "pseudonym" (ψεῦδος + ὄνομα)

   227.4–24 = 172.42–173.16

   1.1 A pseudonym is not a false name,
   i.e., one that does not correspond to the thing,
as in calling a piece of chalk a sponge.

   227.4–9 = 173.1–4

   1.2 Rather, it is a "cover-name," a Deckname.
It covers/hides an author [e.g., Samuel Clemens]
behind another name ["Mark Twain"]
which does correspond to the author ["Twain is Clemens] 
but covers up the author with another name ["Mark Twain"].
Thus a pseudonym is not a false name but a name [e.g., "Mark Twain"]
that covers/hides something real [Samuel Clemens].

   227.10–15 = 173.4–8

   1.3 Applying this to ψεῦδος: Its first meaning is:
covering up, hiding, or distorting something
that is actually there.

   227.16–18 = 173.9–11

   1.4 Coda: the contrary of ψεῦδος
is ἀτρεκής from τρέπω (to turn).
It means "undistorted."

2. Second meaning of ψεῦδος: presenting an illusion

   227.25–30 = 173.17–23

   2.1 Review of the first meaning: covering up what lies behind it
   (the way a pseudonym does) and thus dis-torting it.

   227.25–28 = 173.17–20

   2.2 Now its second meaning: presenting an illusion
   that something is hiding behind it
when there's no such thing there.

   227.28–30 = 173.20–23

3. Hence ψεύδεσθαι and λόγος ψεῦδος

   227.31–228.2 = 173.23–28

   3.1 ψεύδεσθαι (middle voice) means
making something into nothing;
explaining it in a way that is null and void.

   227.33–35 = 173.13–25

   3.2 λόγος ψεῦδος:
a discourse that is null, contains nothing,
or that passes off something as what it is not; a lie.

   228.1–2 = 173.26–28

4. Conclusion: Those are the two meanings of ψεῦδος.

   228.3–4 = 173.29–30

5. Λήθη and ἀλήθεια refer to an objective condition of things

   228.5–16 = 173.31–174.24

   5.1 For the Greeks ἀλήθεια is primarily
   objective: the un-hiddenness of things,
   not subjective: truth as correspondence.

   228.5–12 = 173.31–37

   5.2 Its opposite is Λήθη: the hiddenness of objective things,
from λήθω / λανθάνω: "I am / remain hidden."

   228.13–15 = 173.38–40

   5.3 An example of Λήθη in Thucydides, Historiae II 49.8:
λήθη τῶν πάντων ἔλαμβαν [νοτόιος]: the hiddenness
of everything overcame them objectively from without——
with the subjective result that they forgot who they were.

   228.16–229.5 = 173.41–174.14

   5.4 The gradual subjectivization of Λήθη turns it into "forgetting,"
whereas λανθάνω ἤκων ("I remain hidden as I arrive") shows
that hiddenness characterizes the objective being of the one arriving.

   229.6–14 = 174.15–24

   5.5 Conclusion: Λήθη / ἀλήθεια are primarily objective:
they apply first of all to things,
not subjectively to truth and forgetting.
grammar into a self-indictment by Heidegger, as if he were saying: “I am and remain under cover. What I really am is a Nazi!”

Why would Heidegger need to conceal his Nazism in February of 1934—the heyday of Hitler’s Gleichschaltung—when he himself was the thoroughly gleichgeschaltet Nazi rector of Freiburg University? And if he were hiding his Nazism in 1934, why would he announce that to a classroom full of students? Pégny doesn’t bother to enlighten us on these obvious questions.

The above is only one example of Pégny’s outstanding work, but it does raise a question. To use his own words, is Pégny able to read “what is in front of his eyes”? Is his claim about Deckname, both in GA 36/37 and in Heidegger’s letter to Bauch, a λόγος ἀληθής, a true statement? That is, does it correspond to what is actually written on the page? Or is Pégny’s claim a λόγος ψεῦδος?—a falsehood in the second sense of ψεῦδος: presenting the illusion that something is in the text when that “something” simply isn’t there.

Could it be that Pégny is unable to recognize a freshman-level translation of two Greek verbs?

As with his allegations about Heidegger’s letters to Jaspers, Pégny’s claim about Deckname is ludicrous on the face of it. Or to borrow the French terms he offers up in his “Reply,” it is—take your pick—“ridicule, absurde, insensé.”

To invoke Xenophon’s Antisthenes, Pégny’s rhapsodic defense of Faye’s mistranslations is simply ἠλίθιος, silly.

### 2.4 Taking a Bullet for a Friend

Need I go further? Pégny’s “justification” of Faye’s mistranslations of andeutend and Deckname doesn’t even pass the laugh test.

Nonetheless, ever digging himself in deeper, Pégny desperately tries to salvage Faye’s errors by racing from one letter in the Heidegger/Bauch correspondence to another (from 24 November 1939, to 13 July 1943, back to 24 November 1939, forward to 25 November 1941, then back to 9 August 1935) without ever facing up to the issue at hand: Faye’s embarrassing inability to read a text, much less translate it correctly. Yes, we all know that Heidegger was a despicable Nazi and anti-Semite. But when it comes to what he was actually talking about in his letter of 1 August 1943—the relation of the clearing to the ontological difference—Faye and his rhapsode Pégny have absolutely zero philosophical understanding. Worse yet, they are impervious to the philosophical evidence that refutes their claim.

---

84. Pégny–reply 12.18–19 = 457.32: “ce qui se trouve sous nos yeux.”
86. Not to be confused with ἰλαρός (cf. “hilarious”) but yes, cognate with γέλοιος (“ludicrous/ridiculous”) in Aristotle’s discussion of comedy: Poetics I 5, 1449a34.
87. See, for example, “Fraud” 388–392.
Instead of just moving on in the spirit of Dante’s *guarda e passa*, Gaëtan Pégny elects to take a bullet for his friend. In so doing he only digs himself deeper into a hole that will turn out to be the final resting place of Faye’s and Rastier’s (and his own) fantasies about “*mots couverts*” and “*Deckname*.”

### 3. The Twenty-One: *La patrie en danger!*

The “Open Letter to *Philosophy Today*,” signed by The Twenty-One with François Rastier at their head, pulsates with the slow burn of French indignation disguised as a lecture on “academic deontology.”

#### 3.1 Lèse majesté in the Halls of Academe

*The nerve* of someone declaring that the emperor has no clothes! *The effrontery* of someone (especially an American) exposing “a globally recognized specialist” as an “*ignoramus*” (Rastier’s word)\(^\text{88}\) who can’t muster even a minimum of competence in Heidegger’s philosophy! *The very idea* of someone calling out Faye for his loopy translations, false quotations, changings of syntax, and rewritings of texts!

Or is it why The Twenty-One call Faye only “a specialist” and not “an expert”?

It’s obvious that Faye is no expert in Heidegger’s philosophy. (He wouldn’t pass a midterm on *SZ* in any American university.) But he certainly is a specialist in finding Nazism lurking in every nook and cranny, every interstice of Heidegger’s works. And if he can’t find it there, he just might, well, wedge it in. Fraudulently? Not at all. Instead, *ignorantly*—as he amply demonstrates in his cockamamie interpretations of:

- GA 48: 205.19–24 = 117.3–8 (“Es bedarf eines Menschentums”)
- GA 48: 211.28–212.10 (“Selbsttheit”)
- GA 48: 333.15–22 (“Motorisierung’ der Wehrmacht” as “ein metaphysischer Akt”)
- GA 50: 56–57 = 230.39–231.9 (which he calls a “cold-blooded legitimation of racial selection”)

and the list goes on.\(^\text{89}\)

---

\(^{88}\) Rastier, “Open Letter,” 1.22.

\(^{89}\) For the texts from GA 48, see Faye 438.1–438.11 = 270.34–271.2; 435.23–436.19 = 269.14–270.3; and 438.12–24 = 271.3–14. For the text from GA 50, see ibid., 395.9–11 = 244.4–5 (where Faye misquotes Heidegger); and 440.1–5 = 271.37–272.2. For another typical case, see Faye’s carefully thought-out comment “*daß Heideggers zentrale Begriffe wie ‘Boden,’ ‘Welt’ und ‘Geschichtlichkeit’ unmittelbar politisch zu verstehen sind*” (Faye-2013).
What’s even more amazing is that Faye’s cretinous readings are followed over the cliff, lemming-like, by Professors Rastier, Fritsche, Rockmore, and presumably all the scholars who lent their good names to Rastier’s “Open Letter”: Kellerer, Wolin, Norton, Ferraris, Azzarà . . .

3.2 Is Emmanuel Faye a Fraud?

What, then, to make of the steady stream of distorted quotations, skewed interpretations, and flagrant rewritings of Heidegger’s texts that Faye grinds out page after page? Is it the result of a conscious effort on his part to hoodwink his readers? That is, as Pégny so elegantly puts it: Is this “globally acknowledged specialist” a fraudeur? No, I don’t think Faye is a fraud, certainly not in the legal sense (which was never at issue in “Fraud”) and not even in an academic sense (the kind that gets tenured professors fired). No, the countless philosophical and editorial errors that Faye serves up are so obvious that surely he would not have risked his reputation by intentionally trying to bamboozle his readers. It seems, rather, that his ceaseless production of bad translations and exotic interpretations has to be chalked up to something else—specifically to two things:

First of all, Faye is severely undereducated in Heidegger’s philosophy. He’s way out of his depth here, and he would do better to stick to the canon of the French lycée and university system in which he was raised: Montaigne, Descartes, et al., along with the minor Renaissance figures on whom he is the unchallenged world-expert: the theologian Ramón Sibiuda (d. 1435) and the mathematician Carolus Bovillus (d. 1566).

Secondly, Faye is a sloppy scholar. He is in dire need of a good editor at Albin Michel and Beauchesne—or maybe two: one who knows something about German philosophy and another to fact-check his “quotations” and “translations.”

90. Rastier repeats Faye’s inanities about the “motorization of the Wehrmacht” and “racial selection” at Naufrage 53.12–15, and he underwrites Faye’s scandalous distortion of Heidegger’s words in the Spiegel interview at ibid., 67.6–9. Such professional irresponsibility raises the question: What would motivate any self-respecting scholar to faire le trottoir for M. Faye?

91. Pégny–reply 3.29 = 449.29.

92. See Faye’s brilliant discussion of those figures in his Philosophie et perfection de l’homme.

93. I recommend this in the name of what Rastier calls “la déontologie éditoriale,” Naufrage 60.8–9, and as a bulwark against what Fritsche calls “sloppy standards of providing evidence and arguments for his statements and the complete absence of any reasoning at crucial points”: Fritsche–book 103.3–5.
Finally one must ask: Do Faye et Cie. realize that they are unwittingly working against what they want to achieve?

I take it that the goal (which I strongly support) is to expose Heidegger’s Nazism and anti-Semitism wherever it lurks, whether in his personal life or, more importantly, in his philosophy. In that regard we are all indebted to researchers like Theodore Kisiel, Julia Ireland, and Sidonie Kellerer for ferreting out the doctored texts ensconced behind the walls of the Marbach Archives and in god-knows-what secret cabinets in the Heidegger household.

But then Faye, his rhapsodes, and acolytes go on to discredit themselves and the important task they have shouldered by proving themselves utterly incompetent at reading (much less understanding) the philosophy. The upshot is Faye’s proclamation—as ἥλιθιος as it is bodenlos—that all of Heidegger’s works should be pulled off the library’s philosophy shelves.

At the 2014 conference in New York I presented Faye with a list of twenty-eight volumes of Heidegger’s books, lectures, and articles from 1915 to the summer of 1931—that is, from the beginning of his academic career up to two years before he joined the Nazi party. I asked Faye which of them contained any anti-Semitic or Nazi or proto-Nazi elements, and on which pages. He did not respond.

Out of the 7500+ pages and 2.6 million words of those twenty-eight volumes, Faye has contested only fifty-two pages, and as I demonstrated in “Fraud,” he is wrong in every case. I doubt he has even read many of the other 7448 pages, and yet he lays claim to an amazing philosophical competence that lets him condemn all of Heidegger’s GA to the historical archives on Nazism and Hitlerism.

At the very least Faye’s gesture is an act of philosophical arrogance grounded in demonstrable ignorance. At the worst it puts one in mind of the bonfires of 10 May 1933, a racial and cultural horror that not even the craven Nazi and anti-Semite Martin Heidegger would permit at Freiburg University.

But finally, as M. Pégny suggests, why don’t I stop “nitpicking” over Faye’s screwy interpretations and bad translations, and instead join him and his circle in the estimable task of bringing to light the racism and Nazism in Heidegger’s philosophy?94

I would be happy to—but only on the condition that Faye-and-Friends first agree to take off their brown-tinted spectacles and start to actually read the philosophy.

94. See Pégny-reply 3.30–31 = 449.29–30. Also on “pinailler,” see Faye’s Open Letter (20 September 2015) to the panel members of “Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: A Conference,” line 190: Stanford University Heidegger Archives; and “Fraud” 397.3–8 (with n. 93) and 398.1–3.
Meanwhile, in reflecting on the exemplary way that Faye et Cie. go about their business, it is difficult not to be reminded of the words of Comte Boulay de la Meurthe (or was it Joseph Fouché?):

*C’est pire qu’un crime, c’est une faute.*

“It’s worse than a crime—it’s a blunder.”

---

APPENDIX 1: NOTES ON FRITSCHE, PÉGNY, AND RASTIER

1. Re Johannes Fritsche
1.1 Fritsche-response (by page and line number)

430.29–30; 430.35–36; 432.5–8: Wrong in each case. (1) SZ 384.31–32 refers to the historical living of any community, any people. (2) No, there definitely is a significant difference between “Volksgemeinschaft” and “das Geschehen der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes”: the last four words are in apposition to each other. (3) “Gemeinschaft” at SZ 384.32 is not Hitler’s “Volksgemeinschaft.” (4) Note how Fritsche at 431.15–16 backs away from the claim he made at 430.35–36: he now says “[Heidegger] seems . . . to equate” (my emphasis). (5) Note how Fritsche changes the wording of SZ 384.32 at 433n4 and in Fritsche-book at 132.39–40; 140.12–16; 217.41–218.2; and 218.24–26.

431.23–24: Wrong. Faye’s rewriting of Heidegger’s “Gemeinschaft” as “Schicksalsgemeinschaft” is not “reasonable” but utterly irresponsible.

432.19–20: Wrong. Heidegger’s use of “Schicksal” is entirely different from the usual meaning it has in German.

433.20–434.32: Wrong. After wasting buckets of ink on the topic, notice how far Fritsche-and-Friends will go to hide their embarrassment at not knowing that Heidegger at SZ 385.28–29 is referencing not Hitler in Mein Kampf but Pylades in Goethe’s Iphigenie auf Tauris, Act I, scene 1, lines 203–205.

437.23–442.7, re Bodenlosigkeit: Muddled-headed at best. Is Fritsche claiming that SZ 401.1–2 (“die Bodenlosigkeit des Denkens”) should be translated as “the absence-of-soil of thinking”? or perhaps “the soillessness of thinking”? Would he translate SZ 401.38–39 (“bodenlosen Relativismus”) as “soilless relativism”? or SZ 402.27 (“bodenlosen Denkens, bodenlos erscheinend”) as “soilless thinking, appearing soilless”? As an antidote to Fritsche see the translations of “Bodenlosigkeit” at n65 above.

440.20–21: “Sheehan does not tell us what Harries said about the meaning of Bodenlosigkeit.” The conversation took place between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. on Friday, 11 September 2014, as four of us made our way east on E. 34th Street, from dinner at “Stella 34 Trattoria” (151 W 34th St.) to the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. The group was composed of Professors Karsten Harries (native speaker of German) and Emmanuel Faye (not), with Peter Trawny and me as silent listeners. (See Stanford University Heidegger Archives: “Professor Emmanuel Faye, “Open Letter of 20 September 2014,” lines 60–65.) Professor Harries pointed out to M. Faye at some length that his translation of Bodenlosigkeit (SZ 401.2) as “absence de sol” is completely wrong and that the correct translation is “groundlessness.” That notwithstanding, in his lecture the next day (12 September) Faye continued to insist on using his mistranslation.
For further details Fritsche might want to contact Karsten Harries, Howard H. Newman Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, 344 College St., New Haven CT 06511–6629.

440.25: Wrong. The word Bodenlosigkeit at SZ 401.25 does not refer to “the soil of the earth and its absence [!]” It means “groundlessness.” See the note above re 437.23–442.7.

443n2: Wrong. Faye’s book does collapse because of his bogus interpretation of SZ. See Faye 31.19–26 = 16.23–30, with: 15.24–30 = 4.29–34; 19 (titre) = 8 (title); 24.4–7 = 11.16–19; 31.395.8–9 = 243.9–19; 513.9–12 = 319.8–10; etc.

443n7: In terms of how Heidegger uses the word “Schicksal,” the first three lines of this endnote are nonsense.

443n8 (= 444.12–14): No, not “most interpreters.” Or would Fritsche oblige us by naming four or five of the interpreters he has in mind—excluding the amen corner of Faye et Cie?

444nn14–15: These factoids are utterly irrelevant to the way Bodenlosigkeit and bodenlos are used in §77. See above re 437.23–442.7.

1.2 Further notes

(1) Fritsche’s certainties—that not all of us share: Often wrong but never in doubt, Fritsche finds (or promises to render) an extraordinary number of philosophical issues quite “obvious” and “clear,” whereas they are hardly obvious or clear, at least to this reader. Philosophers use the terms “obvious/ly” and “clear/ly” only with considerable caution, but these two are among Fritsche’s favorite tropes: Fritsche-response: 432.19; 432.21; 432.31; 433.30; 434.1; 437.35; 440.1; 440.5; 441.38; Fritsche-2016: 588.32; 589.5; 590.15; 590.30; 590.38; 591.26; 592.35; 593.7; 594.11; 594.39; 600.34; 601.37; 607n19 (= 607.37). Fritsche-book: xi.12; xi.21; xii.7; 6.22; 18.1; 20.5; 21.9; 22.24; 24.12; 30.32; 31.11; 37.27; 44.8; 46.25; 53.16; 58.40; 59.7; 60.18; 63.22; 64.39; 66.3; 67.29; 125.29; 127.3; 129.29; 132.42; 142.11; 149.8; 181.33; 203.1; 240.27; 255.38; 272.29; 292.17; 323.37; 333.45.

As Mark Twain didn’t say, “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.”

(2) On Fritsche’s philosophical method: Fritsche-response; “Heidegger might have thought” (430.37); Heidegger “seems, like Hitler” (431.15 and 438.12); “most probably” (436.11; 439.8); “perhaps” (436.14); “may well be” (445n19); “normally” (443n3). Fritsche-book: “probably” (191.37); “it might be the case” (217.39); “[Heidegger] inferences” (and how does Fritsche know that? 259.46); “an association comes to mind that [Heidegger] would probably not have objected to [!]” (260.23); “Perhaps Heidegger wrote section 74 intentionally in such a way that . . .” (340.22); “Heidegger may have meant the passage on ‘erwidert’ as . . .” (340.35).
(3) Some major errors: Fritsche-2016: 586.13–18 (Ereignis); 589.22–24 (Gewesenheit); 590.16–20 (erwidert/Widerruf); 591.4–13 (destruction); 591–92 (history of being); 606n16 (Kehre). Fritsche-2012: 260A.3–8 (SZ §27 is not about capitalism); 261B.19–23 (wrong on Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and Rede); 262A.3–5 (the existentials are not characteristics of "modern life and modern philosophy"); 263A.21 (Geschick is not "the center of historicality"); 264A.12–13 (Heidegger does not appropriate Kant's notion of the will and autonomy); 265A35–37 (wrong on "Authentic Dasein . . . into the past"); 265A.43–47 (wrong: the Rück- of Rückruf is not a call into the past); 265B.6–7 (wrong on "to the past, to having-been"); 266B.9-9-11 (wrong on "Anxiety . . . back into the past"); 266A.30–32 (wrong: the call of conscience does not come from destiny); 266A.43 (wrong on "the return of the past"); 266B.1 (wrong on "the decisive sentences"); 266B.18 (wrong: the main player in SZ §74 is not Geschick). With Gertrude Stein in mind ("A real failure does not need an excuse. It's an end in itself"), I leave the next eighteen pages of Fritsche's article to the tender mercies of the reader.

(4) Does Fritsche have a problem with Americans? Fritsche-response: 429.11 ("the usual 'American' interpretation"); 431.31–32 ("In the footsteps of so many other American interpreters"); 432.41 ("the proverbial American self-made man"); 434.1 ("obviously a confirmation of his American interpretation"); 443n8 ("Löwith's . . . deleterious [deleterious] influence on the American scholarship"); 444n8 ("[Sheehan's] American interpretation of §74"); Fritsche-book: 207.25; 261.11 ("Since Americans don't have traditions"); 265.28 ("the 'American' understanding"); 284.1–2 ("American idol of the self-made man"); 331.13–14 ("American texts on . . . historicality"). Fritsche-2006: 32.33n18 ("the prototypical USA-self-made-man"—re John Sallis and "some 'Heideggerians' in the USA"); Fritsche-2012: 275n21 ("fits nicely into the US-American They"); 276.42–43 ("alien to average readers in the USA"); 282n146 (re an American student of John Sallis); 282n148 (re John Caputo and "the American idol of the self-made man").

Fritsche taught in the United States—but did not receive tenure—at the New School for Social Research and Pennsylvania State University.

2. Re Gaëtan Pégny

Pégny's mistranslations

Passim: re Deckname, mots couverts, andeutend:

As Tony Soprano would say: "Waddayagonnado?" Pégny just doesn't get it. See 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, above.

20.3–22.29 = 464.38–467.16: re zureichend:

If one allows Pégny his insistence on "satisfaisant" (which I do not), would he please declare himself on Faye's rewriting of Heidegger's Spiegel text? (See GA 16: 17–21 and "Fraud" 391–395). Faye calls his subtle editing of
Heidegger’s words a “short-cut [racoursi].” I call it—at the very least—a scandal: irresponsible, unprofessional, not worthy of a philosopher.

15.33 = 460.39 re SZ 385.27–28:

Pégny—offering his own extraordinary translation of Heidegger’s German—destroys this crucial sentence by rendering “Die eigentliche Wiederholung einer gewesenen Existenzmöglichkeit” as “La répétition authentique d’une possibilité existentielle ancienne [!]”—that is, “an ancient existentiel possibility.”


• Would Pégny translate that as “the absence-of-soil of thinking”?
• Does he still maintain that the phrase in §77 is an anti-Semitic slur?
• Is Pégny claiming (18.41–19.2 = 464.1–4) that the von Ranke school of historians were all Jewish?
• Does Pégny follow Faye’s blunder in attributing the phrase to Heidegger?

Re libel, defamation, insult, scam, rip-off, cheating, fraud (passim); and “irrationality of the researchers” (n10): (1) In English the terms “libel” and “defamation” apply to statements that are false. But my statements about Faye’s errors are true—and thoroughly documented as such. (2) Is it an insult in France to point out the gross errors of a “specialist” in Heidegger’s philosophy—or even an amateur? (3) Retractatio: I should not have used the word “scam” with reference to Pégny in “Fraud” 390n74. I should have said “Pégny faithfully parrots Faye’s error at. . . .” (4) I do not think Faye rips off or cheats his reader, and I do not think he is a fraud. I think he is simply a sloppy scholar who is utterly incompetent in Heidegger’s philosophy. (5) Re n10: No, not “irrational,” just seriously undereducated.

2.5 = 448.4 and 23.3–4 = 467.27–28: Faye, “an internationally renowned scholar” who is “translated into five languages and internationally discussed”:

Yes, and so what? Mein Kampf was translated into eighteen languages, and internationally discussed. (Cf. Hitler, Mein Kampf, II 1761–62.) See Aristotle, Metaphysics IV 5, 1009b2–3.

23.9–10 = 467.27–28: “[Faye] discredits himself…discredited as a philosopher”:

Yes, it is Faye who discredits himself. I’ve provided the evidence of that in “Fraud,” passim.

14.13–16.12 = 459.22–461.17: Goethe: As above (re Fritsche-response 433.20–434.32), so too here: Notice the length Pégny will go to cover up his embarrassment at not knowing that SZ 385.28–29 was referencing not Hitler in Mein Kampf but Pylades in Goethe’s Iphigenie auf Tauris, Act I, scene 1, lines 203–05.
3.34–37 = 449.33–36: “Sheehan does not mention numerous other scholars,” e.g., Fritsche, Tugendhat, Rastier, Profeti, Quesada, Givsan:

1. **Re Johannes Fritsche:** see above.

2. **Re Ernst Tugendhat:** He is simply wrong about “opposition to logic”; “notorious . . . destiny of the people”; and SZ 384 (not “284”): there is no “völkisch struggle” to be found in the text. (Pégny lifts the Tugendhat reference from Hassan Givan: “La première guerre mondiale.” See below.)

3. **Re François Rastier:** “one of the most eminent French linguists” (3.31–32 = 449.30–31); renowned for “his spirit of sharpness in linguistic analysis” (n16):


   But do not miss Rastier’s eye-opening interpretations of Heidegger as (1) using *das Man* and *das Verfallen* as forms of anti-Semitic trash talking; (2) perversely putting the concealment practices of persecuted medieval Jews at the service of the Nazis; (3) “ontologizing anti-Semitism”; (4) interpreting technology as “enjuivée”; and—honestly, I’m not kidding—(5) using the Latin “commercium” ( = a subject’s relation to objects at SZ 62.36, 132.10, and 162.22) to refer to Jewish business practices. See *Naufrage* 33.7; 37n4; 87.1–93.7, with 90n7.

4. **Re Livia Profeti:** Her “L’être-jeté dans un monde : le fondement raciste du Dasein” is a failed attempt to apply the Fritsche-and-Faye thesis to Geworfenheit. And in the process she shows, among other mistakes, that she does not understand the fundamental distinction of existentiel / existential in Heidegger.

   See http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE = CITE_061_0147:

- Wrong: “il n’existe pas un seul ‘monde’ que tous les êtres humains partagent.” No, that one *existential* world is called “Bedeutsamkeit” aka λόγος: SZ 87.17–18; GA 18: 300.16; GA 64: 23.33; 24.3; 25.14; 65.19; cf. GA 21: 151.4–5.


- Wrong: “la notion d’être-jeté, de la Geworfenheit, qu’implique la disparition de l’idée d’égalité entre tous les êtres humains. . . . la base . . . sur laquelle n’importe quel racisme peut se fonder.” No, *Geworfenheit-Faktizität* is what makes each human being both unique and equal to all others.
Thomas Sheehan

522

• Misses the point: In GA 94: 84.23–29 (which she wrongly cites as “118,” the page number in the margin) Heidegger is saying the lived body in se is intentional, vs. Profeti’s “L’être jeté irrationnel-animal du nouveau-né devient actif dans l’adulte.” She may want to check the Italian translation: Martin Heidegger, Quaderni neri, 1931–1938 (Riflessioni II–VI) (Milan: Bompiani, 2015), 202.1–10 (where “ohne ihn als Tier” is mistranslated).

• Bad misstep: Much of Profeti’s misunderstanding of Geworfenheit derives from her unfortunate reliance on Italian psychiatrist Massimo Fagioli (see “l’être jeté” . . . l’irrationnel’ corps animal”)

5. Re Julio Quesada: Professor Quesada, a paid-up member of Faye et Cie., cannot translate, much less understand, Heidegger’s texts. See his Heidegger de camino al Holocausto, here abbreviated as “Q”:

(1) At Q 104.1–105.33, in commenting on GA 62: 367.24–369, Quesada turns Dasein’s “possibility of coming into possession of itself at its roots, i.e., the possibility to be itself in radicality” into “the self-affirmation of German life” with the possibility of an “inherent racism and anti-Semitism.”

(2) At Q 111.24–35, Quesada misreads and mistranslates Heidegger’s discussion (at GA 62: 373.7–24) of Sein and ποίησις in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VI 4, 1140a 1–23. Quesada claims it reveals Heidegger’s preference for a world “de la producción, de la ejecución y del uso de los objectos producidos.”

(3) At Q 118.34, “die Lichtung der Wahrheit des Seins vor das Denken bringen” (GA 9: 349.28–28) comes out as: “traer . . . el espejo [!] de la verdad del ser ante el pensar,” which Quesada then limns as part of Heidegger’s “humanismo ‘völkisch.’”

(4) At Q 142.33–34: At SZ 46.16–19 Heidegger says his goal is to show “the ontological origin” of “the reification of consciousness, so that we can ask how to positively understand the non-reified being of the subject, the soul, consciousness, spirit, person.” But Quesada rewrites Heidegger so that now his text calls for the destruction of the “ego cogito de Descartes, el sujeto, el yo, la razon, el espíritu y la persona.” Where does he get this stuff? His bibliography references the translations of SZ by both Gaos (1988) and Rivera (2003), but here Quesada provides his own (mis)translation of the German. Mistranslating Heidegger is one thing, but Quesada’s rewriting of Heidegger’s text (in the spirit of Emmanuel Faye) is utterly irresponsible.

(5) On a minor (but typical) point: Q 142n148 refers to the Spanish “Ser y Tiempo, pág. 46” —which is wrong for both Gaos and Rivera—when he means the German page 46 of Sein und Zeit.
(6) Q 143.20–23 cites SZ 382.20–23 in the Rivera translation ( = 396.5–8, which Quesada writes as “398”). However, Quesada reads this and all of SZ §74 as “dedicated to the ontological-hermeneutical dismantling of the philosophical, historical, and political foundations of civil society” (Q 143.9–11).

(7) Q 166.19–20 translates GA 3: 136.1 (“Die transzendente Einbildungskraft ist heimatlos”) into Spanish as “La imaginación transcendental no tiene patria.” Heidegger is saying that the transcendental imagination is without a home in the transcendental aesthetic of KrV, where it properly belongs, and is housed instead in the transcendental logic, where it doesn’t belong. But Quesada interprets that sentence as part of Heidegger’s strategy to turn Kant the cosmopolitan into “a disciple of Dasein’s nationalism” (Q 166.23–24).

(8) Q 167.2–12 interprets Part Four of GA 3 (“Die Grundlegung der Metaphysik in einer Wiederholung”) as the place where “Heidegger’s political position—anti-modern, anti-liberal, anti-Enlightenment, anti-parliamentarian—illuminates his philosophy, and vice versa.”

(9) At Q 263.15–17, GA 40: 100.19–20 “Allein, die Frage enthüllte sich uns zusehends in ihrer Fragwürdigkeit” becomes “Pero la interrogación se despoja de su cubierta cuando somos testigos de la jerarquía [!] de la misma,” and Quesada interprets his gross mistranslation of the text as: “Heidegger presents himself, therefore, as a witness of the metaphysical or spiritual-historical importance that the racial delimitation, as achieved by the Third Reich, has for the question of being in his own days” (ibid., 262.20–23).

I could go on, but perhaps one gets the point about Quesada’s degree of competence in understanding Heidegger, whether in German or in his native Spanish.

6. Re Hassan Givsan:

- I find his Heidegger—das Denken der Inhumanität (1998) to be, at every turn, a serious philosophical work that Fritsche, Quesada, and Pégny (not to mention Faye) would do well to study and try to understand. Even when one disagrees with Givsan on important points (among them his thesis at 205.29–31; his reading of Ereignis at 438–443; and his “in der Luft” conclusion at 479.33–480.17), it is clear that—in contrast to those just named—one is disagreeing with a philosopher who has studied the texts thoroughly and professionally.

- However, his “La première guerre mondiale, ou comment la mort fit son entrée en philosophie” (translated by Gaëtan Pégny) is quite another matter: (http://www.cairn.info/revue-le-philosophoire-2013-1-page-191.htm).
• Part II of the article is, generally speaking, a decent primer on SZ, except for “l’angoisse anéantit l’être-dans-le-monde”; and he is quite wrong about the following:

• “Ce qui veut dire que la mort . . . est nécessairement la mort de l’autre Dasein”;

• “Heidegger pense l’être comme faire advenir à maturité de ce qui est dans le temps [als Zeitigung des zeitlichen]” This is skewed even if even if one factors in a typo, along with translator Pégny’s endnote 46: “Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit’ (ici rendu par ‘faire advenir à maturité de ce qui est dans le temps’).”

• “un autre commencement de l’Occident, c’est-à-dire un autre commencement de l’histoire”;

• “la question fondamentale de Heidegger est la question de l’être.” No, Heidegger’s focal topic is der Sinn / Wahrheit / τόπος des Seins: cf. GA 9: 200.30–33; also GA 15: 335.11–20 = 41.5–12 and 344.18–345.34 = 46.43–47.38.

• his repetition of the Fritsche-and-Faye thesis: “l’être le plus propre et authentique du Dasein comme advenir est l’advenir de la communauté, du peuple, et cet advenir est l’advenir fondamental de l’histoire au sens de Heidegger”;

• I would argue that Jünger had much greater influence on Heidegger’s Technik-theme than did Spengler.

Passim: One could go on picking apart Pégny’s document line by line, but life is short.

Finally: May Gaëtan Pégny continue to work! Pégny concludes his “Reply” with the courageous declaration: “Mr. Sheehan will not prohibit me from working.” — But of course not! I want to encourage M. Pégny to keep working. (Samuel Beckett: “Fail again. Fail better.”) One day he may even get the philosophy right.

3. Re The Twenty-One

No doubt M. Faye will be heartened by The Twenty-One’s statement of bold and unqualified support for his philosophical “scholarship.” Their letter will certainly help salvage Fayé’s reputation given the eminent philosophical expertise of the signers:

5 professors of language and literature
2 professors of semiotics and semantics
2 professors of Jewish and/or Holocaust studies
1 post-doc researcher (in Nicolas of Cusa)
1 khâgne professor (Machiavelli, Lyotard)
2 intellectual historians
2 post-docs or assistants in philosophy
1 professor of psychoanalysis
1 emeritus professor whom I cannot identify
4 professors of philosophy
Some of these signers have written on Heidegger as a Nazi and an anti-Semite, but to the best of my knowledge, not one of them has published a *philosophical* monograph on Heidegger, i.e., a book that would pass muster as philosophy. The closest that Wolin comes is “*Being and Time: A Failed Masterpiece,*” in his *Heidegger’s Children,* although *caveat lector:* 230.14–20 ("The trend toward a direct meditation on Being unmediated by the habitudes of Dasein … ‘truth of being’") is one example of his profound misunderstanding of Heidegger’s project.

From among the four philosophy professors, Fritsche and Quesada have already been discussed, and neither Ferraris nor Azzarà has a book on Heidegger that I or WorldCat could find. (My apologies if I missed any.) Professor Robert Norton’s huge book, *Secret Germany,* discusses Heidegger in exactly six banal, biographical lines (628.26–31) out of 847 pages.

Unfortunately, there is not space here to discuss François Rastier’s little effort, *Naufrage d’un prophète. Heidegger aujourd’hui,* although I hope to do so elsewhere. But I urge everyone to read it. It’s one thing, as Pégny does, to take a bullet for a friend. It is quite another to commit intellectual hara-kiri in public.

**APPENDIX 2**

**SZ §74: The Structure of Historicity**

A Sentence-by-Sentence Analytic Outline and Paraphrastic Translation

**SZ §74: THE STRUCTURE OF HISTORICITY**

I. INTRODUCTORY REVIEW: ¶¶1–3

**SZ 382.16–383.30 = 434.5–435.14**

**SZ 382.16–27 = 434.5–15**

**A. Thesis**

1. I can existentielly have a “history” only because I existentially am historical.

2. We will justify this thesis by showing that the *ontological* problem of history is an *existential* one.

**B. Procedure**

3. The being of ex-sistence is care.

4. Care is grounded in temporality.

5. We examine temporality to find historical living and historicity,

6. and will show historicity to be an extension of temporality.

**C. Authentic temporality, authentic historicity**

7. Authentic temporality is “living mortally” by resolutely anticipating one’s death.

8. Question: Does authentic temporality entail authentically living one’s history?
2 Resolve. The “whence” of authentic possibilities

A. Review of resolve
1. Resolve is one's silent self-understanding as “guilty” (i.e., thrown), and as prepared for the experience of dread.

2. Resolve gets its authenticity by anticipating death.

3. Resolve is understanding oneself as mortal possibility and taking over one's thrownness.

4. Taking over one's mortal openness entails resolve about one's situation.

B. What SZ §74 does not discuss
5. SZ §74 does not discuss concrete choices in particular situations

6. Or the structural-existential projection underlying a concrete possibility.

C. But SZ §74 does discuss the source of authentic possibilities
7. This section will discuss the “whence” of the concrete possibilities that resolve can choose from and understand itself in.

D. Where do ex-sistence's authentic possibilities come from?
8. Anticipation of death guarantees only the wholeness and authenticity of resolve.


10. even when I actually return to my mortal openness rather than just speculating about death.

11. Thesis: The place whence I get those possibilities is disclosed as I take over my thrownness.

12. I cannot get behind my thrownness.

13. So before deciding whether I get my authentic possibilities from thrownness, I need a full conception of thrownness as an element of care (Sorge).

3 Thrownness. The crowd's self-understanding. Resolve.

A. The everyday
1. I am delivered over to [= thrown into] myself as possibility, as being-in-the-world.

2. I am thrown into a specific “world” with others.

3. Mostly I am lost in the crowd (das Man).

4. Mostly I understand myself in the public and “average” ways of the crowd.

5. Although ambiguity has clouded these possibilities, I am quite familiar with them.

B. Resolve and the everyday
6. Authentic self-understanding is never completely free from the crowd's understandings of the self. Rather, resolve chooses in terms of that understanding, for it or against it.
II. RESOLVE, SCHICKSAL, GE-SCHICK: ¶4–8

¶4: Resolve described in three ways.

A. First way
1. I return to my mortal aheadness,
   open up an authentic possibility of ex-sistence
   from my legacy, and take it over.
2. Hidden in the resolute return to thrownness
   is the freeing up of authentic possibilities
   (but I might not see them as inherited).
3. The “good” is an ontological thesaurus, a legacy
   that empowers authentic ex-sistence,
   i.e., makes it possible.
   Resolve is what frees up that legacy.

B. Second way
4. Resolute anticipation of death—
   i.e., understanding myself as mortal—
   lets me find and choose an authentic possibility
   unequivocally rather than accidentally.
5. Resolute anticipation of death
   drives out accidental/provisional possibilities.

C. Third way
6. Becoming free for my death gives me my goal:
   it pushes me into my finitude.
7. That finitude pulls me back from
   remaining comfortable, indecisive, irresponsible,
   and brings me to the simplicity of my Schicksal.

D. Summary: Schicksal is authentic Geschehen
8. Schicksal is living my history resolutely,
   that is, freeing myself for myself
   in an available possibility that I choose.

¶5 Schicksal in relation to “the blows of fate”
1. I can be buffeted existentially by the “blows of fate”
   only because I am, existentially, Schicksal.
2. Resolute, freed for myself, and living my Schicksal,
   I see that as in-the-world I am open to both
   the beneficial and the harmful.
3. But such events
   do not bring about Schicksal.
4. Both the resolute and the irresolute
   are buffeted by such events,
   (the irresolute even more than the resolute),
   but the irresolute can “have” no Schicksal.

¶6 Schicksal (individual) and Ge-schick (communal)

A. Schicksal
1. In resolve I let death become powerful in me.
   But in the choice to take over the powerlessness
   of my thrownness
   I gain the superior power of finite freedom
   and get an insight into what may happen
   in the now disclosed situation.

---

96. Legacy, thesaurus: Τὸ ἀγαθόν, the good, is the “verborgene Schätze des Gewesenen” (GA 10: 153.8–9 = 102.7), which enables and empowers authentic ex-sistence. Cf.: “τὸ ἀγαθόν bedeutet, griechisch gedacht, das, was zu etwas taugt und zu etwas tauglich macht”: GA 9: 227.32–33 = 174.35–36.
B. Ge-schick

2. As historical-schicksalhaft,
   I am also in-the-world-with-others.
   Thus my Geschehen is also
   a co-Geschehen, i.e.,
   a Ge-schick.

3. A Ge-schick is the living of a common history
   by a community, a people.  
4. A Ge-schick isn't the sum total of individual Schicksals
   (just as social existence isn't the gluing together
   of individual subjects).

5. Rather, individual Schicksals are already guided by
   our social existence:
   our living together in the same world of meaning
   and choosing certain possibilities together.

6. The Ge-schick of a community gets freed up
   only as we communicate with one another
   and struggle together.

C. Schicksal and Ge-schick together

7. Full, authentic living of one's history is made up of
   the individual-communal schicksalhaft Ge-schick
   in and with my "generation" (in Dilthey's sense).

¶7 Schicksal is grounded in care and temporality

A. Care and temporality make Schicksal possible

1. Schicksal, as resolute living, is the powerless power of
   [Rede:] silently
   [Verstehen:] understanding oneself
   [Befindlichkeit:] as thrown and ready-for-dread.
   Hence, care and temporality make Schicksal possible.

2. Care includes
   thrownness, finitude, death, conscience, and freedom
   and thus makes me able to ex-sist as Schicksal,
   i.e., makes me existentially historical.

¶8 Schicksal: living temporality/historicity authentically

A. My existential aheadness lets me be free for my death

1. Existentially I am ahead. Thus existentially, in resolve,
   I can become free for my death ("shatter against it"),
   and be thrown back into my present world of meaning.

B. That is, my existential aheadness lets me free up a possibility

2. I am always-already ahead, ex-sistent, and thus
   can free up a possibility for myself from my legacy
   and live with insight "in my time."

C. In short, temporality makes authentic historicity possible

3. Finite, authentic temporality makes possible
   Schicksal, i.e., my authentic historicity.

97. See John Adams: “… a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.” Preamble to the Constitution of Massachusetts (1780): http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm.

98. See Dilthey’s “Novalis” (1865) in Gesammelte Schriften XXVI, 173–222. For recent work on Dilthey’s notion of generation, see Makkreel, “The Continuing Relevance and Generative Nature of Dilthey’s Thought,” esp. 26–28.

III. RETRIEVAL ¶9–10

¶9 Retrieval: how it does and doesn’t function.

A. Resolve can become retrieval

1. In resolve I needn’t know explicitly the origin of the possibility I choose.
   SZ 385.19–20 = 437.13–14

2. But temporality makes it possible for me to bring to light explicitly the existentiel possibility I’ve liberated from traditional notions of ex-sistence.
   SZ 385.20–23 = 437.14–18

3. Resolve, i.e., returning to my aheadness, and freeing myself up, can become the retrieval of an already-available possibility. 100
   SZ 385.23–25 = 437.18–20

4. Retrieval is explicitly freeing up— that is, thematically returning to— existentiel possibilities that are already available.
   SZ 385.25–27 = 437.20–21

5. Resolute anticipation makes possible the authentic retrieval of an already-available possibility of ex-sistence, i.e., choosing one’s hero. 101
   That is, in resolve I choose that which will free me for the struggle of following the direction of what can be retrieved, and remaining faithful to it. 102
   SZ 385.27–31 = 437.22–26

B. What retrieval is not

6. Retrieval frees up an already-available possibility of ex-sistence but not in order to reactualize it.
   SZ 385.32–34 = 437.26–28

7. not in order to “bring back the past” 7. not in order to bind “the present” to “the by-gone.”
   SZ 385.34–386.1 = 437.28–31

8. Retrieval arises from a resolute understanding of oneself, and is not persuaded of what is “past,” nor does it seek to bring back what once was.
   SZ 386.1–3 = 437.31–438.1

C. What retrieval is

9. Retrieval is a considered response to an already-available possibility of ex-sistence.
   SZ 386.3–5 = 438.1–2

10. It is made in a moment of existentiel insight that, as such, repudiates [the linear notion of] “the past” working itself out in “the present.”
    SZ 386.5–7 = 438.4–5

11. Retrieval neither surrenders to the past nor aims at future progress.
    SZ 386.7–8 = 438.5–6

12. In its moment of existentiel insight, ex-sistence is indifferent to both.
    SZ 386.8–9 = 438.6–7

100. “Already-available”: dagewesen. Cf. Stephanus’s comment on the present-perfect tense as Dionysius Thrax presents it in his Τέχνη γραμματική, viz., as ἐνεστώς συντελικός: that is, already completed yet still operative, still having an impact on the present. Stephanus, in Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, I iii, 251.4.

101. An implicit quotation of the words of Pylades, Orestes’s cousin, as in Goethe, Iphigenie auf Tauris, Act I, scene 1, lines 203–05.

102. Cf. SZ 391.9–13 = 443.8–11: “Resolve constitutes Dasein’s fidelity to its own self. Ever prepared for the experience of dread, such resolve is one way Dasein can respect the only authority a free ex-sistence can accept, namely, the very possibilities of ex-sistence that it itself is able to retrieve.”
A. Resolve and retrieval
1. In resolve ex-sistence frees itself up as Schicksal. Retrieval is explicit resolve: in retrieval ex-sistence ex-sists explicitly as Schicksal.

B. Geschichte: rooted in aheadness (the "future")
2. Ex-sistence is historicity/Schicksal, and Geschichte is rooted not in the past not in the present-in-connection-with-the-past but in authentic historical living, which arises from one’s aheadness (“future”).

C. Geschichte and what-has-been-and-still-is
3. But as ahead-onto-death, ex-sistence is pushed back by death into its own particular thrown situation. This is what gives Gewesenheit its peculiar priority in the historical.

D. Finitude/mortality as the basis of historicity
4. Authentic finite temporality—living authentically as mortal—is the hidden basis of ex-sistence’s historicity.

E. Historicity (not historiography) enables retrieval.
5. Retrieval is not what makes ex-sistence historical. Rather: as temporal, ex-sistence is historical, and historicity makes possible retrieval, i.e., taking over one’s history.
6. For that, no science of history is required.

IV. SUMMATION AND TRANSITION ¶¶12–13
11. Summation of the whole of §74
A. Resolve and Schicksal
1. Schicksal is resolve, that is: resolute anticipation of my death as freeing me for existentiel insight into the present situation.

B. Schicksal and Ge-schick
2. Individual Schicksal is the basis for communal Ge-schick, that is, for living a communal history with others.

C. Retrieval
3. Acts of retrieval let me see explicitly that both Schicksal and Ge-schick are bound up with our already-available legacy of possibilities.
4. Acts of retrieval are what first show me my history.

D. Temporality as the basis
5. Temporality as ex-static openness is the existential basis for living historically, for the disclosedness that goes with that for the appropriation of that disclosedness.

103. Pushed back to its current situation, ex-sistence is amidst das Dagewesen/Gewesenheit. Here Heidegger uses “Gewesenheit” in its traditional sense of what-has-been-and-is-still-operative. See note 100 above: dagewesen and ἐνεστὼς συντελικός.
12 Question: the connectedness of an individual life

A. Brief résumé

1. Authentic historicity is: living my history in resolute anticipation.

2. My acts of freeing-up and retrieving (rooted as they are in my aheadness) show that living my history authentically (i.e., authentic historicity) is weighted towards Gewesenheit.104

B. Problems remain about the continuity of an individual's life

3. But how does living one's history authentically ( = Schicksal) constitute the continuity of a person's life from birth to death?

4. Can resolve shed any light on this?

5. Isn't resolve only one experience within a continuous life?

6. Or is authentic living a continuous sequence of resolves?

7. Why do we have no satisfying answer to: “What constitutes the connectedness of a life?”

8. We have focused too much on the answer without first testing whether the question is legitimate.

C. Problems of method in this regard

9. We must eschew the ordinary understanding of Sein.

10. Rather, we must determine the source and ontological horizon of the seemingly obvious question: “What constitutes the connectedness of a life?”

13 A new topic: an individual's inauthentic historicity

A. Both authentic and inauthentic ex-sistence are historical

1. Because our very being is historical, even inauthentic existence is historical.

B. The need to study inauthentic historicity

2. Inauthentic historicity has guided the inquiry into life's connectedness and blocked access to authentic historicity and how it functions in the connectedness of life.

3. Therefore, a complete study of historicity requires that we study inauthentic historicity.
**References**

**Abbreviations**


SZ  Heidegger, Martin. *Sein und Zeit*, 11th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967). Cited as: SZ page.line = ET page.line. The section symbol § + number (e.g., §74) indicates one of the eighty-three sections of SZ. The paragraph symbol ¶ + number (e.g., ¶6) indicates the paragraph within a section.
The Twenty-One

http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday20159780

Tzavara


Vezin


Other Works Cited

Fritsche, Johannes. Form und Formmangel im ersten Buch der Physikvorlesung des Aristoteles (Berlin: J. Fritsche, 1982).
Fritsche, Johannes. Methode und Beweisziel im ersten Buch der “Physikvorlesung” des Aristoteles (Frankfurt am Main: A. Hain, 1986): Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, Bd. 239.


