Ereignis
Ereignis
Punktmannigfaltigkeit
Welcome to my Heidegger site.
It contains information on the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976)
and links to related web pages in English.
Information at this site
The rest of this page has all the links ordered chronologically, with the most recent
additions at the top.
“Meaningful presence from out of this origin” (which Heidegger elsewhere calls “being with regard to its essential origin”) refers to the core element of Heidegger’s phenomenology: the search for “the thing itself,” that is, the origin of meaningfulness. The phrase implicitly affirms that the thrown-open clearing is the fundamental presupposition and groundless ground of our need and ability to make sense of everything we encounter.
We can understand Being in this context as the self-withdrawing basis for the presencing, gathering, and ordering of beings, which must be heeded. What is key is that for Heidegger, we can participate more or less fully in this gathering; for it is not a collection of objects, or a highest genus, but rather essentially involves effort and force, which is characterized in terms of a standing and holding that holds beings in readiness, a stillness in which things are held in a tension.
[O]bject-oriented ontology establishes the domain of philosophy as a province of indifference, and anywhere that Heidegger would broach the subject of Dasein’s care or responsibility, any sign of a relation between the philosopher and the object of philosophy, Harman must convert such traces of philosophical praxis into an ontological logic to which Dasein has no significant relation. Object-oriented ontology thus entails the duplicitous thesis that the philosopher is indifferent to the object of philosophy.
Two recent papers from
[T]here is a depth to every “thing” that cannot be exhausted by the word, even the poet’s word. Every being is always more than what we can say or think about it; every being is always more—it exceeds or overflows—sense or meaning.
and
[T]he essential unfolding of kosmos/world/Being is structurally and temporally prior to the gods and human beings and in no way dependent on them.
The Alltäglichkeit in Being and Time and its outriders is the proto‐version of the Ge-stell in Heidegger's post‐war corpus. The everyday comportment of Dasein scaled up to higher levels of organization shows up in the later work as positionality, das Ge-‐stell, "the essence of technology."
from International Journal of Philosophical Studies (25.2)
If Heidegger’s ‘Nazi anti-Semitism’ was neither ‘Nazi’, in the orthodox sense, nor ‘anti-Semitic’, in the biological-racist sense, as Trawny establishes, is it then correct to stigmatize his thought as ‘Nazi’ and/or ‘anti-Semitic’? But if Heidegger was, in some sense, a ‘Nazi anti-Semite’, as Trawny’s argument also suggests, is it acceptable to excuse his flagrant errors and egregious denials, as Trawny does, as simply examples of an ‘an-archistic’ freedom of thought?
New from Rowman & Littlefield
A proper return to myth and art as a means by which the transcendental realities that constitute the phenomenology of our embodied existence may be better understood, and also the means by which we may come to truly dwell .
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Heidegger thus sees in Dionysus a blending of opposites as well, a coexistence of contradiction, even that between presence and absence. For this reason, he is the god of neither presence nor absence, Dionysus is the god of the trace, of that which lies “between” presence and absence.
[I]t is Heidegger's allegiance to reunification-within-the-origin which is most distressful-and most demanding of deconstruction. The same allegiance is revealed in the continual Heideggerian recourse to words prefixed by 'ge-', which connotes a gathering or grouping: e.g., Geviert, ge-eignet, Ge-stell, Gemiit, Gedichtnis, Geschick
You can now watch Margarethe von Trotta's bio-pic online at Amazon.
New in paperback
Winter semester 1925 lecture course on the meaning of truth in psychologism, Aristotle, and Kant.
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In thinking about the being of the entities discovered in the sciences, we do not think about something else. Being is not itself an entity, but only the disclosure of entities as intelligible. Philosophical reflection would not take us away from the subject matter of the sciences, but would instead aim to bring one back afresh to “the things themselves” in their essential disclosedness.
Indexes, audio, and more.
Summoning her out of her loop, her programming, Alltäglichkeit. “All lives have routines, mine’s no different,” she says. She regularly recites the script of her Grundstimmung, her fundamental attunement: “Some people choose to see the ugliness in this world. I choose to see the beauty. To believe there is an order to our days, a purpose.” But Dolores did not make that choice, it was programmed into her, a literal Stimmung, a calibration; it’s part of her thrown constitution, Geworfenheit.
When an object is “ready to hand”, it becomes the exact opposite of explicit knowledge with various attributes that must be consciously grasped: More like a hammer in use by a skilled carpenter or a screen when a programmer is debugging, the tool itself becomes invisible by virtue of being thoroughly integrated into the practical activity itself. It was this insight that ended up transforming AI and machine learning more than any other insight from Heidegger, even if the insight was perhaps altered beyond recognition to Heidegger himself in transmission.
Our hypothesis is that Heidegger’s concept of holding-to-be-true is a necessary condition for the “original stance of inquiry of philosophy”, because only in a philosophical questioning that is characterized by faith as holding-to-be-true, the “truth of being” can originally resonate.
has published
Translated by Ullrich Haase and Mark Sinclair
Seminar winter semester 1938-39 (GA 46).
New in paperback
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“Occurrence” is an appropriate translation of the word Zusammenvorkommen in Heidegger’s phrase “Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte,” but as a translation of Geschehen in Hei-degger’s determination of Geschick (“occurrence [Geschehen] of the community [der Ge-meinschaft], of {the} people [des Volkes]” it is probably too pale (Macquarrie and Robinson have “historizing”).
The withdrawal of things from all access is not some quirky existential/psychological feature of humans, but infects even the most rudimentary forms of inanimate causation. Veiling and unveiling are ubiquitous: even between billiard balls, even between fire and cotton, and even when humans are not observing, do not yet exist, or exist no longer.
[T]hrown-open or appropriated ex-sistence, as the clearing, is responsible for all forms of the meaningful presence (the being) of things. Es gibt Sein because Ereignis gibt Sein, that is: The reason why there is “being” (the meaningful presence of something) at all is that the appropriation of ex-sistence to its proprium as the clearing makes that possible.
Time-space takes on a particularly privileged role in the Beiträge, as "originally the site for the moment of propriation [Augenblicks-Staätte des Ereignisses]". Although this is perhaps more important for Heidegger scholarship than for geography, we should note that this is the way to understand the notion of Da-sein, as "the site for the moment of the grounding of the truth of beyng".
James Bahoh Larry Berger Robert Bernasconi Peg Birmingham Scott Campbell Richard Capobianco Daniel Dahlstrom Sean Driscoll Jessica S. Elkayam Jesús Adrián Escudero Gregory Fried Wayne Froman Jennifer Gammage Matthew Girson Rico Gutschmidt Peter Hanly Rebecca Longtin Hansen Lawrence Hatab Julia Ireland Khafiz Kerimov Theodore Kisiel Adam Knowles María del Rosario Acosta López Brendan Mahoney Eduardo Mendieta Andrew J. Mitchell Ian Moore David Nowell-Smith David Pettigrew Richard Polt Jeffrey Powell François Raffoul Joel Reynolds Karen Robertson Elizabeth Rottenberg John Sallis Thomas Sheehan Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback Dennis Skocz Peter Trawny Daniela Vallega-Neu Kate Withy David Wood
Arab philosophers read Heidegger as a critic of metaphysics in and through language and they, in addition, go beyond this by applying it in the frame of their own philosophical projects.
[W]e can say that Enframing does not primarily concern the content [Gehalt] of phenomena called human-technology relations, but concerns a relation [Bezug] that we already enact [Vollzug] in encountering these phenomena. Understood on this ontological level, Enframing means a reciprocal setting-upon [stellen] of being and thinking with regard to function, which is technical inasmuch as utility marks the main trait of the horizon toward which all experiential correlations are oriented.
In the entire scope of what is classified fundamentally, everything exists without conscious linguistic naming or self-conscious, reflective consideration; instead every thing is known in terms of its use, its purpose, its teleology – everything appears in terms of how it will matter for us.
from Marx & Philosophy Review of Books
and
from International Journal of Philosophical Studies (24.2)
Trawny’s essay ventures into those obscure passages in Heidegger’s works where most Heideggerians have feared to tread, because, he argues, it is on these sinister, darksome pathways of errancy where “the controversy surrounding the name of Heidegger [is] gathered” in its blackest light.
Die Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens (Vortrag in der Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste in Athen 4. April 1967), GA 80
Translated by
[W]hat is the reason for this discussion of cybernetics, futurology and industrial society? Have we not, in so doing, strayed too far away from the question of the provenance of art? Indeed, it would appear so — and is, yet, not the case.
Das Wohnen des Menschen, GA 13
A new translation by
That region’s overall inclination ought to be termed a clearing: a clearing in which the heavenly ones incline towards Earth’s mortals in a manner both foreign and generous, and where those on earth incline to the heavenly by way of gratitude and cultivation.
From Architecture Philosophy Volume 2 Number 1.
Interview by
In order to understand Heidegger correctly, we need to share the basic anti-modern position that explains the main direction of his thought. He cannot be understood by liberals or communists (new leftists). They will criticize him or pervert his thought.
From
Essays from Alain Badiou, Lee Braver, Daniel Dahlstrom, Charles Guignon, Graham Harman, Karsten Harries, Ted Kisiel, Denis McManus, Eric S. Nelson, Richard Polt, François Raffoul, Thomas Sheehan, Iain Thomson, Kate Withy, Julian Young
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[T]o think this beginning in a way that captures its originary, inceptive dimension is to come to understand being in a way different from yet underlying the Greek beginning and its understanding of being (Sein) as φύσις. It is, in other words, to understand be-ing (Seyn) as the historical grounding of the meaning of being and its difference from beings, i.e., as the ground that constitutes and thus appropriates to itself the essential correlation of that meaning and human understanding of it.
Dasein’s dealing with beings, its comportment with the world, from out of an understanding of the structure of sterēsis sees Dasein demonstrating a particular vision. This vision is the vision of the Kairos.
Heidegger's concept of work in Being and Time prevents access to being, while the concept of work in the thirties provides exactly access to being.
Snow White is still struggling with the fallenness of following a role assigned to her by society or the “they-self” and has not reached the point of making an authentic choice of her own future.
Am Ende stiller Hüttentage 12 September 1931, GA 16, translated by Timothy Lavenz.
Of course Faye may be subjectively convinced that the claims he makes are both exact and true. But philosophy demands more than mere assertion of strongly held convictions without evidence to support them. And above all, philosophy demands intellectual honesty in advancing one’s claims—and in retracting them after one has been shown in considerable detail why those claims are unsupported and unsupportable.
[I]t seems that it is being that is “between” man and things. It founds their ontological kinship. Being is not therefore limited only to a man, but being embraces also other beings making them “appropriate for themselves.”
Heidegger and Shiva agree, then, that modern science and technology together constitute a reductive and violent assault that limits knowledge. Where they part ways, further analysis does not uncover disagreement, but shows that each has something to contribute to the thinking of the other.
[Updated]
According to Heidegger's own statements (which of course do not have to be taken as the final source of evidence), from 1937 on, at the time of writing the Contributions to Philosophy - From Enowning , the word 'propriation' or 'enowning' assumes a position as principal word in his thinking. The essence of technology is also thought through in the 1940s under the aura of propriation. In an unusual text from the fifties, Identity and Difference, [...] Heidegger talks of a twisting of the set-up into propriation, of the "sudden flash of propriation" within the set-up. In this text there is a sort of toggle relationship between the most extreme consummation of metaphysics and the twisting of metaphysics into propriation, a 'getting-over-metaphysics', in which humans would "lose" their determination of essence which metaphysics has "lent" them.
When we, through transhumanism, (attempt to) turn the organic into more mechanical technology, we lose that orientation – not just the world, but the self, our very identity, is given over to enframing. When our own bodies become enframed through a technology that defies even death, we are not freed for genuine individuality.
The publication of unpublished texts changes published texts but above all invites us to a reflection upon the working history or reception of those same texts. This Heidegger is at pains to indicate in his reading of Nietzsche but in the Schwarze Hefte he points to Hölderlin and Hegel too. The notebooks themselves illustrate Heidegger’s thesis on the backward working effects of the Nachlaß.
The task therefore becomes not one of specifying a primordial level of temporal existential projection, but of developing a reflection that may somehow do justice to the enigmatic giving—the Es gibt—in which both time and being are given to man. This attempt eventually culminates in the account of Ereignis as an event of truth, as αλήθΕΐα. However, it is also an attempt for which a whole range of "historical" concepts are activated: being is here designated as "history," as "sending," and as "happening" (Geschichte, Geschick, Geschehen).
From
Translated by Richard Rojcewicz
Lecture course summer semester 1932 (GA 35).
Heidegger‟s retrospective commentary on his reconceptualization of the work of art underscores clearly the need to understand the setting-into-the-work of truth as Ereignis, specifically because the truth of being transpires solely as event. While the double, true and false, etymology of Ereignis that links it to manifestation and propriation is well known, the publication of the so-called private manuscripts, including the most recent volumes 73 through 76, makes clear the significant degree to which Heidegger inflects the valence of the term Ereignis through the prism of singularity (Einzigkeit).
The action of the no-thing is no ordinary event. It pushes us back and directs us toward the things that are slipping out of meaning, and in so doing it discloses these things in their full and heretofore hidden strangeness as the radically other, i.e., as other than the no-thing. In the clear night of the no-thing experienced in dread, there occurs the original revelation of the meaningfulness of things: the fact that things are meaningful and are not the no-thing.
Shared, meaningful contexts consistently invite the presence of others without demonstrating that this very openness functions by perpetuating an attitude towards others that is characterized by a blindness to particularity and contingency. An appropriate response to others would involve a sensitivity to their implicit participation in our projects by way of our shared contexts.
This is surely one of the vanities of philosophy – that philosophy can guide politics, that it can provide the ground for political decision. If, however, we take the recognition of the failing character of thinking as lying at the heart of philosophy, as perhaps it ought, then perhaps the proper and only role for philosophy in relation to politics can be one, not of decision, but precisely of constant questioning
The oddest part of Heidegger's account of Dasein is the body. He admits its kinship with animals yet denies that it is an animal body. He thinks the meaning of the body comes from openness to being; handicraft, gesturing, dancing, etc. are what they are due to openness to being.
has published
by
How the uncanny reveals the limitations on our ability to make sense of ourselves, and why this finitude is constitutive for being human.
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[A]t the most basic level of lived experience, absorbed coping is about meaning and meaningful activity, which finds structure in the fore-the-sake-of-which we do things, and "its constituents are 'in-order-to' realize some possible way of being". To reinforce this notion, Heidegger describes walking across a room as a field experience: "My encounter with the room is not such that I first take in one thing after another and put together a manifold of things in order to then see a room. Rather, I primarily see a referential whole".
Heidegger insists that the phenomenological question of method is not a question of the appropriate methodological system, but of access, how to find the way to a “factical” life experience. A phenomenology of religious life, he writes, should not be a theory about the religious, conceived of as an object of study in the standard mode of a science of religion, but rather as a way of entering in understanding the religious as a form of meaning-fulfilment or enactment.
Heidegger also came to grasp autochthony as the name for an understanding of history as a destiny [Geschichte als ein Geschick] to which we primordially belong and through which we are appropriated by the gift-giving power of being (what he would term Ereignis).
Heidegger proceeds to assign an ontological status to the relation between people and state: that is, what it means for a particular people to be must be established through its state. While he leaves open the question of what a people in general is, he claims that the state is not just ‘grounded in the Being of the people’ but is the Being of the people
Dying understood as that essential proneness to collapse just is the preciousness of life.
From
Translated by William McNeill and Julia Ireland
Lecture course winter semester 1934-35 (GA 39).
In improvising from latent possibilities, those that are dormant in Greek mythology may be as relevant for Heidegger's thinking of Ereignis as is the violence he does to Greek etymologies. Heidegger doesn't posit some “golden age” in which aletheia, for example, was actually experienced as unconcealment, but that interpretation can be exchanged for our usual understanding of truth in such a way that adequatio gives way to an improvised having-been where a latent possibility becomes an actualizable potential.
This can be couched in the following terms: philosophy is all right, but in this intellectual marriage demanded by Wheeler, it is science the one with preeminence when it comes to the postulation of existing objects. Escaping the Cartesian mindset does not impose on us an obligation of forsaking the grounds of a scientifically informed philosophy. We are, after all, Muggles, and must abide by nonmagical methods and by the constraints they impose.
Influenced heavily by Dreyfus’s pragmatization of Heidegger, Agre too understands Sein und Zeit as providing a phenomenology of ordinary routine activities, and believes Heidegger’s Analytik des Daseins can provide useful guidance for the development of computational theories of interaction.
has published
Six essays on the primacy of Being in Heidegger's thinking, continuing the case for the overarching importance of Being for Heidegger begun in Engaging Heidegger.
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I claim that the notion of Anwesen only came to express Heidegger’s own positive conception of being around the mid-forties and after a complex and relatively long process correlative, on the one hand, to the evolution of his use of the term ‘Wesen,’ and to his reappropriation of the Presocratics, on the other
Heidegger’s reflection on the essence of technology cannot claim to be already an alternative way of bringing forth, but is primarily concerned about the right way to come into the hermeneutic circle, to move in the circular course of the challenging of man and nature in the technological age and at the same time to hold back in order to experience the essence of technology.
[I]nsofar as all language is historical, the objectification of language itself at any particular time imposes a stasis in an historically fluid phenomenon. The "loss of Being" incurred when it becomes the object of representing means restriction of a genuinely historical manifold to what has been spoken or imagined to have been spoken in a particular language.
From Yale University Press
A new edition of
Translated by
Taylor Carman on Image and Shadow: Heidegger on the Limits of Scientific Representation.
Against the current English favorite of “enframing,” I therefore propose an etymological translation of Ge-Stell from its Greek and Latin roots as “syn-thetic com- posit[ion]ing,” where the Greek-rooted adjective ‘synthetic’ adds the note of artifactuality and even artifi ciality to the system of positions and posits.
Heidegger’s account of his fundamental concept, the Ereignis, the opening of the Open (Sheehan, 2001: p. 5; Wheeler, 2011: § 3.1, 3.2.) provides a far better model of Wittgenstein’s point in Z608 [p. 608 of Wittgenstein’s Zettel]. The paper argues, first, that Z608 is not making a sudden inexplicable venture into verboten neural theorizing, but is describing something akin to Heidegger’s Ereignis, and, second, that comparing Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s respective views illuminates them both.
Speakers: Peter Trawny (Bergische Universität Gesamthochschule Wuppertal), Bettina Bergo (Université de Montréal), Robert Bernasconi (Pennsylvania State University), Martin Gessmann (Hochschule für Gestaltung, Offenbach am Main), Sander Gilman (Emory University), Peter E. Gordon (Harvard University), Michael Marder (University of the Basque Country, Vitoria-Gasteiz), Eduardo Mendieta (Stony Brook University), Richard Polt (Xavier University), Tom Rockmore (Peking University)
Heidegger remained silent about sex but this silence reveals itself as a moment of interruption: an interruption which, if we will have the patience and the acumen to hear Heidegger’s silence, will work to announce a certain “non-said” that takes on many forms and determinable contours – a non-said that has been omitted, repressed, denied, foreclosed and even unthought.
[B]ecause of the central role that Heidegger grants to mood (disclosive affectivity) as a primordial way of disclosing Being-in-the-world, and because it is impossible to think mood without also thinking the lived body, Heidegger has actually placed the latter at the very center of Dasein’s disclosedness. Heidegger’s account of mood thus entails and highlights, rather than neglects, the ontological significance of the body
Heidegger is unequivocal in indicating that human activity cannot address Ge-stell’s danger. Yet, he says that the piety of thinking which is questioning and the reflection on art may save us from it. In this regard, Heidegger does not anymore advocate a restraint in the human use of technology
[T]he turn consists in grounding our understanding of Being in a realist manner. For this purpose Heidegger introduces the concept of destiny (Geschick), which simply means that we each find ourselves in what is ultimately a completely groundless and thus arbitrary understanding of Being, which is simply there. The event (Ereignis) has no source, no agent – this is Heidegger’s interpretation of the death of God.
Ereignis is much more than an event: it is a fact, that which is always already done (factum). Appropriation is that which “is already operative in our case, even before we were.” What is more, it is the fact, the “Urfaktum” or “thing itself,” without which there are no other facts, events, or happenings in the human realm.
From Bloomsbury Academic
A new book of essays
Edited by
With contributions from François Raffoul, Eric S. Nelson, Ted Kisiel, Dermot Moran, Thomas Sheehan, Richard Polt, Robert Bernasconi, Françoise Dastur, Alfred Denker, Sean Kirkland, Holger Zaborowski, Emilia Angelova, Frank Schalow, Peter Trawny, Ullrich Haase, Leslie MacAvoy, Peter Gordon, Peg Birmingham, Andrew Feenberg, Scott Campbell, P. Christopher Smith, Dennis Schmidt, Gregory Schufreider, Gregory Fried, William McNeill, Andrew Mitchell, Lee Braver, Andrew Bowie, Anne O'Byrne, Kevin Aho, Daniela Vallega-Neu, John McCumber, Gregory Schufreider, Iain Thomson, Ben Vedder, Patricia Glazebrook, John Russon, Kirsten Jacobson, Hans Ruin, Daniel Dahlstrom, Wayne Froman, Iain Macdonald, Jill Stauffer, Leonard Lawlor, Janae Sholtz, Leslie MacAvoy, Tina Chanter, Robert D. Stolorow, Bret Davis, and Alejandro Vallega.
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In general, Heidegger’s concept of Gelassenheit is interpreted as ‘indifference’ to ethical duties, as a quietism that withdraws from the world. What these authors fail to see, is that Heidegger does not embrace quietism, but puts into question this whole distinction between active and passive.
The Event, in contrast to the Framework, is thus in noway a ‘violent’ mode of revealing, but allows things to come forth in theirdifference and unity, in their distance and their nearness. Unlike the Framework,the Event allows the fourfold to appear in terms of the mirroring interplay, the‘round-dance’, of the elements that are brought to appearance within it.
Hölderlin's poetry holds the potential to determine the possibility and manner in which Dasein appropriates its historical "essence," and enacts its destiny, which first manifests as authentic possibility in the Ereignis, as Dasein's historical relation to Being is first "spoken" and inaugurated through the language of poetry.
[P]osthumanist theory is both inspired by Heidegger and pushes off from him. In other words, what links the various posthumanisms is a common, Heideggerian-inspired attempt to overcome the logic of binary oppositions of humanistic anthropocentrism that departs from Heidegger’s insistence that doing so requires and must emanate from a primordial inquiry into the question of the meaning of being.
Ereignis would be Being as the revelation of Being to itself qua the thinking of Being by human beings (i.e. the region of itself which is clear to itself). Heidegger’s rendering of Being as Ereignis is antihumanistic inasmuch as it configures human beings as the place of Being qua event, but not as the conceptual/ethical centre of the universe and/or history. Simply put, Being in itself transcends human beings.
Of this event, in which both being and the human are appropriated each to the other, Heidegger writes that it “is that realm, vibrating within itself, through which man and being reach each other in their nature”—making clear that this event is indeed a realm, a bounded domain, a topos, rather than purely and ex-clusively temporal.
In: Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology
According to Heidegger, memory, in its original sense, is not just a thinking or recalling of past events as we are used to taking it. Moreover, it is a thinking and at the same time a thanking of past, future and now, a meditative state of heeding that which is gathered and compressed in the living present.
For both, philosophical investigation is a way of bringing what we already prereflectively understand into the light of thematic explicitness. And what both philosophers bring into thematic explicitness are aspects of our context-embeddedness and of our finitude.
Call for papers
8-11 May, 2014
St. Petersburg, Florida
And it’s that strange combination of esoteric, almost mystical texts (like “Die Kehre”) with scathingly direct political texts (like “Das Gestell”) that makes Einblick in das, was ist (along with, say, “Überwindung der Metaphysik” and “Zur Seinsfrage”) among the most important (and most neglected) of Martin Heidegger’s post- Kehre texts. And also among the most difficult to translate.
From Philosophy Today, Fall 2013
The word Ereignis, which becomes the keyword of Heidegger‘s thinking from the mid-1930s on, is here appropriated from Hölderlin‘s hymn "Mnemosyne," which speaks of the sich ereignen, the "coming to pass," of the true
Call for papers
22-25 May, 2014
Meßkirch
Heidegger argues that we must attempt to determine the concept of poverty in world insofar as it relates to the "phenomenon of world," but not in a manner that would hierarchise this relation.
[W]e must Be-with—that is, attune to—the other’s existentialanxiety and other painful affect states disclosive of his or her finitude, thereby providing thesefeelings with a relational home in which they can be held, so that he or she can seize upon his or her ownmost possibilities in the face of them.
To relinquish a traditional Christian account of being and assert a kind of visionary naturalism in its place, which is what I think Heidegger achieved, he needed a philosophy that could speak for the beauty and truth of an immediate experience of being not mediated by intellect.
A philosophical investigation of the shamanic drum.
by
An adventure in thought.
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The very aim of exercise is, according to Heidegger, to cancel deliberation as to the realization of the desired result. Since it is the result that is decisive in τέχνη, the delivery of the result demands the smoothest procedure of the process of production, which is implied to be without deliberation, mechanically following rules or principles.
The difficulty for Heidegger, in attempting to assimilate Aristotle’s philosophical terms into his historical worldview, is that Aristotle’s ontology is not just unhistorical, but anti-historical. History was not deemed philosophically significant by the Greeks, as they did not believe that being resided there.
A new book of essays
Edited by
With contributions from Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Walter Brogan, William McNeill, Richard Polt, John Sallis, Krzysztof Ziarek, Daniela Vallega-Neu, Robert Bernasconi, Dennis J. Schmidt, Jeffrey L. Powell, David Farrell Krell, Françoise Dastur, Peter Hanly and Christopher Fynsk.
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Created 1995/04/18
Last updated 2017/6/28
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