But there is a Heideggerian supplement to the abground not found in Bohr: the event of lighting-up or dis-closure, an appearance of the everyday world. Heidegger problematizes “world,” rather than taking it for granted.
What Heidegger seems to want to teach us is not either how to become philosophers or how to be with one another in a concrete manner but, rather, how to remain in dialogue with ourselves while being with others or how to become philosophers in the company of others.
Mary-Jane Rubenstein on metaphysics and ontotheology.
Richard Capobianco on Heidegger on Hölderlin on 'Nature's Gleaming'.
Heidegger and 'The Greek Experience' of Nature-Physis-Being.
Translated by Richard Rojcewicz
Das Ereignis, Heidegger's notebook from 1941-2 (GA 71).
In situating where and how works of art, carry, disclose, or open up truth, we come to recognise that the work of art posits the question of man. As Heidegger submits: "Being needs man and is not without man."
Though Heidegger never escapes the Kantian correlation between thought and world, both composing half of any situation we can talk about, he would not treat the orange as simply an enduring core within the visible realm. For Heidegger there is always withdrawal (Entzug) behind all presence, and the name of what withdraws is Being.
A video presentation.
When Heidegger speaking to the heart of the charge of nihilism argues that “Only from the truth of being can the essence of the holy be thought” he suggests that one must hear language beyond logic in a mode that hearkens to melody, interval, the spirit of the word.
"Overcoming Metaphysics" provides the jumping off point for a wide-ranging critique and deconstruction of Western Metaphysics.
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Journal review.
Given the inherently subjective nature of modern politics, the most appropriate response would seem to be withdrawal from the political realm altogether. Sure enough, much of Heidegger‘s work counsels the abdication of the political realm.
This crossing from technical knowing to erotic understanding is the experience of enowning itself, which recoils, at least in fantasy, into erotic enslavement of another. Ownership of another Self was seen as the primally erotic by Plato in the Phaedrus and Symposium at the beginning of metaphysics but lost in the swapping of the erotic horizon for the thanatic, particularly in Christianity, which from the beginning betrayed the erotic experience of life as love in its focus on death.
Hermeneutics is not to be construed as a form of theoretical comprehension or as a theory about interpretation. It is itself an interpreting, an announcing, a making known, and, as such, it is an interpreting that is also self-interpreting – hermeneutics is “the announcement and making known of the being of a being in its being in relation to…(me).”
Sinn is a socially and historically constituted conceptual scheme, which functions as the background of all understanding.
[B]y comparing the sublime to an ontological mood of disclosure, rather than understanding it as an aesthetic experience, one is able to give an account which overcomes some—if not all—of the concept's metaphysical baggage bequeathed by Kant.
Clarifying phenomenology by looking at the phenomenon of life.
Heidegger derives his main point about the temporality, the “subjectivity” of the pure subject in Kant: it is not some fixed (innate) a priori transcendental unity, contained in a consciousness. Rather, it is the open temporality of relating to being that “affects our concepts and representations”.
Similar to all of Heidegger’s terms, Ereignis gestures to the possibility that the name has come, has become flesh in an experimental sense and one that cannot be reduced to the Pentecost of Christianity or the Shavuot of Judaism. That a spiritual-linguistic epiphany accompanies the creation of the word is suggested by the poetic context to which Heidegger’s key word for authentic experience—Ereignis—belongs.
Let us also acknowledge that one cannot read Heidegger without a kind of drunkenness, that particular drunkenness which German philosophical wines of the best vintage give.
Exploring the factical life through Heidegger's early courses.
For Heidegger in looking-toward being requires a looking-away-from coming-into-being and passing-away. As Heraclitus would say the harmonious structure of the world depends upon opposite tension like the bow and lyre. For Heidegger, "this is possible only if something is set above being, something that being never is yet but always ought to be." Being is the power that emerges and discloses.
[S]ocial man has no criterion by which to judge his behaviour other than that of society. This may seem like a good thing – in general - but its cash value is that the individual has given himself up to anonymous instrumentality, allowing it to govern his existence as an investment, or a managerial project.
[B]eing, time and space need human being for their eventuation. Hence, modern science's postulation of and insistence on the 'objective reality' of space and time is an illusion insofar as there is (i.e. It gives) objectivity only for subjectivity, and human being cast as subjectivity is only one particular historical casting of human being that still holds sway in our own epoch.
What we want to explore is never the fate of questioning in the wake of technology, that is: we do not ask how it fares with questioning in today’s technological world nor and indeed how to put technology as such in question (as if it could be) but and much rather we are concerned with the how, the practical know-how, of remedying or fixing whatever may be the untoward consequences of technology and just so that we can continue along as we are and have been.
It is only ‘properly speaking’ (eigentlich) that dao can be said to refer to Weg. This means that only when interpreted in the particular manner, or thought in its proper nature as Heidegger may ascribe to it, can dao come into relation with Weg. Weg is the standard against which dao is measured. The same consideration applies to the relation between Ereignis and dao.
New directions in hermeneutics and new possibilities for “the life of understanding” and “the understanding of life.”
The Collegium Phaenomenologicum will convene for its thirty-eighth annual session in the Umbrian town of Città di Castello from July 8–26, 2013.
Bret Davis, Dennis Schmidt, Daniela Vallega-Neu
[I]f the current state of history is characterised by Seinsvergessenheit, it is impossible to ask directly after the Sinn of being, since our current conceptual scheme does not allow that question. And this explains Heidegger’s general philosophical strategy of creating a new conceptual repertoire, or, by reemploying an old conceptual repertoire, in order to give a more accurate description of Dasein and the world.
It was Heidegger in the twentieth century who argued that the metaphysical quest for presence was in fact irrational and based on a distorted understanding both of the Greek concept of being and of the way we engage with the world, which in its emphasis on reflection tends to sideline the pre-reflexive and physically embodied aspects of man’s—or Dasein’s—opening onto the world.
Translated by Andrew Mitchell
The transition from B&T and Heidegger's later thinking in plain language.
The risk run by dialectical thinking, whether utopic or negative, can be avoided only if one relates Heidegger's radical recovery of the question of Being to the critique of metaphysics as an ideology committed to insecurity and the domination that stems from it.
The Blind Brain Theory actually possesses the resources to reinterpret a number of the early Heidegger’s central insights, thrownness and ecstatic temporality among them. The focus here, however, is the Ontological Difference, and the kind of hermeneutic logic Heidegger developed in an attempt to mind the distinction between being and beings, and so avoid the theoretical sin of reification.
Was cybernetics the height of metaphysical humanism, as Heidegger maintained, or was it the height of its deconstruction, as certain of Heidegger’s followers believe?
The new translation
Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu
The transition from B&T and Heidegger's later thinking in plain language.
Heidegger’s tool‐analysis holds good for even the most stupefied forms of inanimate causation. But this means that the linguistic turn and all other forms of the philosophy of human access are shattered by Heidegger in a single blow. The relation between humans and the world is now merely a subset of the general relations between one withdrawn object and another.
It is of course highly significant that Being is now displaced as the transcendens schlechthin—"the absolutely transcendent"—in favour of the Es gibt. The giving and sending of both Being and Time and their mutual relations are now referred to by Heidegger as Das Ereignis which now becomes the focal concern of the essay.
This understanding-interpretation relationship having the notion of being-in-the-world in background is circular in the sense that all interpretations require the fore-structure of understanding and again all understanding is developed or projected through interpretation. This is what Heidegger calls the ‘circle of understanding’ denying any possibility of its being vicious.
Granted that Heidegger allows for the possibility in Being and Time of an authentic human community, the ontological analysis of this authentic community is nonetheless enunciated in its distinction from a public world that would be capable of serving as an authentic ontological foundation for the political realm.
In Heidegger’s view, the danger of technology, including biotechnology, is not that something might go terribly wrong, but, quite the contrary, that everything will actually function smoothly.
An investigation into the theme of homelessness in Heidegger’s discourses.MORE
Heidegger suggests that for modern eyes, the “political” is the way in which history is accomplished, and as such is itself unquestioned. The failure to question the “political” belongs with its totality. The totality of the political is not simply based on the arbitrary wilfulness of dictators, but in the metaphysical essence of modern actuality in general.
The common threads in both thinkers and how to understand them together.MORE
[T]here is an incipient distinction between ‘place’ and ‘location’ in Heidegger's late work. Heidegger articulates a relationship between the opening that allows an event of appropriation (Ereignis), which defines an epoch in the history of Being, and the dwelling of mortals in place (Ort), or among places, in which language plays a mediating role as the way in which Being speaks mortals.
Huebner’s critique of learning in social efficiency ideology is linked directly to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Cartesian world of objects, for if we are perceiving the classroom in such impoverished terms, focusing only on the objective features of the things we deal with, their present-at-hand attributes, their abiding presence, educators are missing the fact that things and people always reveal themselves in a larger context, within a context of meaningful relations, which cannot be reduced to the knowledge of things available to us by way of thematizing the world.
Heidegger shows that pathos is not an incidental concept or a mere “byproduct” of other concepts, such as substance (ousia) or being (to einai). Instead, Heidegger pulls pathos out of the (traditional) shadows and shows its intricate connection with the groundbreaking concepts of being, movement, disposition, embodiment, and logos.
The place of topology in Heidegger's thinking.MORE
[A]rt opens and readies Dasein for its authentic communal and historical Being . . . in the “work-being” of the great work of art as the Ereignis, the lighting and clearing event of truth’s happening (aletheia), the temporal event of appropriation of the historical destining of Being, which is facilitated by Dasein’s participation in and preservation of the great work of art.
Droysen defined history as the constant increase of the ethical world, an assumption Heidegger did not share and which, in his view, lacked any proof.
In order to avoid the epistemological preconceptions built into the traditional terminology of thinghood and to overcome the temptation to discuss entities as pieces of inert matter, Heidegger introduces a set of new concepts, the most important of which are the concepts of dealing (Umgang), concern (Besorgen), and equipment (Zeug) .
What Heidegger misses in his description of the Hegelian "experience" as the path of despair (Verzweiflung) is the proper abyss of this process: it is not only the natural consciousness that is shattered, but also the transcendental standard, measure, or framing ground against which natural consciousness experiences its inadequacy and failure - as Hegel put it, if what we thought to be true fails the measure of truth, this measure itself has to be abandoned.
As time passes, so do our possibilities. The passing of time and indeed such restrictions are thus meaningful only for a being that lives with an understanding of a limit.
The more important thing to consider today is that in this age of modern mobility, worlds are more frequently reshaped and transformed than ever before. This should make us recognize that we are indeed standing on groundless grounds, for our worlds, we now realize, are not only mobile and malleable but temporary, because in fact they are entirely temporal. This, in the end, is what Malick’s Heideggerian cinema—as both a product and an investigation of cultural mobility—puts on display.
[D]espite Heidegger’s rejection of resistance as an argument for the self-existence of the external world, Dilthey’s notion of resistance is appropriated and transformed in Heidegger’s thinking of life’s phenomenality and facticity.
Returning to the Greek beginnings of philosophy in a manner more radically than Hegel's provides one way out of the encapsulation of the mind within the subject which consequently has to communicate with the world through re-presentations in its consciousness. Heidegger practises precisely such a return to Parmenides in some of his late and latest writings, which will be tapped here to consider whether, in comparison to Kant, Parmenides was in his right mind.
Digital ontology concerns our understanding of Being. We believe that we understand something in its being when we are able to re-make digitally. Within the digital casting of Being we look at humans as they are online instead of embracing the digital within the "life-world" (Husserl).
I introduce a hermeneutics of laughter and contend that the event of Ereignis receives its meaning from Gelotopoesis—the poetic act of laughter. Moreover, I claim that the echo of Gelotopoesis becomes the possibility of the transmission of tradition and is attested by a hypertonic boastfulness and a hypotonic irony.
Merleau-Ponty’s and Freeman’s account of how we directly pick up significance and improve our sensitivity to relevance depends on our responding to what is significant for us given our needs, body size, ways of moving, and so forth, not to mention our personal and cultural self-interpretation. If we can’t make our brain model responsive to the significance in the environment as it shows up specifically for human beings , the project of developing an embedded and embodied Heideggerian AI can’t get off the ground.
In the Ister lectures, Heidegger presents poetry as the primary linguistic means for allowing beings to emerge into appearance—not for purposes of usefulness or manipulation, but simply to let beings be. This includes the realization that what it means to be German remains rooted in the ground of what it once meant to be Greek. These issues of autochthony, for the poet and his people, allow Heidegger to revisit related concepts from Sophocles' Antigone.
[T]he present for Heidegger stands under the fate of the forgetfulness·-of-Bei11g. Nations do have a relation to objects in their wide-ranging activities and productions, but they have I011g since fallen from Being itself. Therefore we are "reeling, " when seen metaphysically.
Contrary to Heidegger's own view, both Hegel and Heidegger are, I shall claim, anti-Cartesians. (According to Heidegger, Hegel was the greatest Cartesian).
László Tengelyi has recently developed the idea of Sinnereignis (meaning-event) as a way of capturing the emergence of meaning that does not flow from some prior project or constitutive act. As such, it might seem to pose something of a challenge to phenomenology: the paradox of an experience that is mine without being my accomplishment.
While Heidegger recognizes that his thesis is an improper delimitation on the animal, at the same time he claims for the time being we will have to make do with this statement insofar as we do not have an “explicit metaphysical understanding of the essence of world” that could allow us to properly delimit the animal and its relation to world.
In the case of Heidegger's Parmenides, which presses a philosophical argument, it will be meanings to come, rather than events proper, that will be implicitly promised, predicted, hinted at, -- meanings rather than events in that the emergence, revelation, fulfillment of meaning is the philosophical "event" par excellence.
School of Philosophy at The Catholic University of America
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philsophy's entry on
The purpose of the present article is to argue that it is not worth the time and effort to become familiar with Heidegger's life and writings for the purpose of learning how to argue the case for antianthropocentrism. Heidegger does not succeed in developing a convincing case for bis type of antianthropocentrism.
Heidegger maintains that while mourning rituals are necessary and may follow particular forms, mourning is a uniquely personal experience and one that only those who have had the experience can understand. The loss itself is indicative of the relationship we have with others and for Heidegger, this is what makes the loss so significant and impossible to understand until it has been experienced.
We know, or we think we know, what it means for something to be. But we find ourselves facing an impasse, an aporia, and an insurmountable difficulty now that the time has come for us to inquire about what it means that something, precisely, is.
Two recent books from
The naming of what Heidegger here called the “place of arrival,” or the naming of Ereignis, the “event of appropriation,” still presents a puzzle since it is not clear—even with our understanding of poetic “calling”—exactly how one might name something that is itself a process, an originary event, by whose occurrence (always partially veiled) naming is first made possible. And further, as we have already been told, the task of poetic language is not “naming” as such, but instead it is the figuring of the call of being as the play of lethe and aletheia.
Heidegger’s project is to get back to the original question of Being that was asked by the Greeks and to ask it in a more primordial way, which means that he must begin his investigation of Being in a “pre-theoretical” way. The traditional theoretical approach to the question of Being, according to Heidegger, regards the thinker and the object of its thought as being indifferently detached from one another.
The two sentences say the same thing: only in concrete existentiell appropriation of oneself as the act of questioning does questioning find its answer, namely, that the meaning of being is questionableness itself. Only in resolve does one enter Ereignis; only by taking up personally one’s own movement does one authentically discover the movement that is being itself.More Heidegger articles .
Heidegger writes that any experience, object, emotion or event can be understood within its context. Because There-being has a world and is its world, all innerworldly beings, all that exists for There-being, is in that world - in a particular way. Because There-being has the ability to understand any person or event as a sign, as meaning something, within the context of the referentiality of all persons and some things.
Heidegger criticizes all previous attempts to articulate the meaning and structure of the given, the life-world: they have all failed to reach the primordially given, the pragmata, the fundamental objects of human concern. This failure, to put it in non-Heideggerian terms, is the failure to articulate the fundamental attitude of religiosity permeating the perspective of the life-world.
[F]or now it suffices to see that the concept ‘land’ originally bore a trace of the ontological meaning revealed in Heidegger’s understanding of earth. Indeed, one merely need recall J.S. Mill’s declaration that land is a gift to all when he writes, ‘No man made the land. It is the original inheritance of the whole species.’
Heidegger acknowledges that for Aristotle the zóon politikon is a speaking animal, but he is quick to project the teaching of Plato onto the speech of the zóon politikon. The speaking citizen does not overcome the inauthentic preoccupation that pervades the rule of the They in everydayness, and his deliberative speech in the public space of the polis is, Heidegger claims, trapped in ‘habits’, ‘fashion’, ‘immediate vogue’, ‘idle talk’.
There is thus for Foucault a fourfold shift, the question is no longer that ‘of truth, but of being; not of nature, but of man; not of the possibility of understanding, but of the possibility of a primary misunderstanding;’ and finally and with respect to science the shift has been ‘from the possibility of a science of nature to the possibility for man to conceive of himself.’ Thus Foucault has all along been speaking of Heidegger if indeed by way of Nietzsche and Hölderlin.
Heidegger calls his own way of philosophical speaking an unfolding (Entfaltung) of the guiding question of Nietzsche in view of his fundamental metaphysical position (Grundstellung). This unfolding stands under the sign of a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with the fundamental metaphysical position of Nietzsche, with his answer to the guiding question of philosophical thinking.
Heidegger provides in a clue in one of the rare passages in Being and Time in which he uses the word action (Handeln) explicitly. Here Heidegger brings up the term ‘action’ merely to express his reservations about using the term, as he says that action “must be taken so broadly that ‘activity’ will also embrace the passivity of resistance”. For Heidegger, the term ‘action’ must be understood so broadly that it includes passivity as well.
[W]ithin the ontological ordering of Ge-stell, IT reveals the earth as the globe . The globe, nowadays both a ready-to-hand entity and a constitutive element of being-in-the-world, is a technological being in that literally and ontologically it is an outcome of the IT apparatus.
How does the god enter philosophy? he explains, “leads back to the question, What is the origin of the ontotheological essential constitution of metaphysics?” [...] God’s entering—or perhaps we ought to say his being dragged—into the ambit of human thinking is the determining event in the Western metaphysical tradition.
Jay Bernstein, Simon Critchley, Daniel Dahlstrom, Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, Matthias Fritsch, Dimitir Ginev, Lawrence Hatab, Don Ihde, Leslie MacAvoy, Eduardo Mendieta, Yujin Nagasawa, Anne O'Bryne, Kelly Oliver Robert Scharff, Hugh Silverman, Peter Paul Verbeek
The very supposition that there is (or even could be) a single meaning of being in general is something that the later Heidegger argues we should transcend as part of the ontotheological legacy of Western metaphysics—along with the very idea of a creator God who stands outside the secular world, implicitly unifying the meaning of exis- tence (that is, both the meaning of the universe and of our own lives) from his God’s eye perspective or “view from nowhere”.
We are not beings, who are in a world, but always already in a world in our being, being-in-the-world. Similarly, the world is not constructed along mathematical, scientific lines, but encountered through experience and living.
A new translation
Translated by Phillip Jacques Braunstein
Heidegger's last public university lecture before the end of World War II.
Human beings can only make music through being attuned to and listening to the quivering that grants attunements. That is, it is the originary quivering that enables human beings to be musical, thus being used by propriation (Ereignis) to allow music itself to make way to music.
The matter itself, the matter of philosophy, is already decided from the outset of Hegel’s thinking. The matter of philosophy is determined as metaphysics, as the Being of beings in the form of subjectivity. The matter of philosophy as subjectivity is already presupposed.
Heidegger is concerned to get back behind this state of affairs to a thinking attuned to the being that abandons it. While his style (not to mention his vocabulary) makes a number of dramatic shifts, Heidegger is looking in each of his writings for a mood that might place thinking back into being’s furious withdrawal and hold it there.
Because language as naming wasn’t always here; we weren’t always here. One or maybe two aspects of the fourfold (depending on your view of gods) were not always here, and there is no guarantee that we will always be around.
That Ereignis is a typical term in Heidegger's philosophy attests to the extent to which he has appropriated the ordinary Japanese word koto ba. Obviously, Heidegger interprets koto ba in an idiosyncratic manner in accordance with his intonations on the nature of language, the nature of language as the house of Being, the nature of language as the Heideggerian dialogue.
Heidegger's point is that if the ego is understood to be the Being of beings, the material world is dominated by the subject's arbitrary will for more power. As a result, the highest values are those related to the freedom and autonomy of the ego—the transhuman vision follows suit by seeking to fulfill these goals through the radical alteration of material existence, including human bodies and brains.
As for the transformation into “pure luminosity” which Heidegger refers to as the goal of Indian thinking, this “pure luminosity” is a translation of “reine Helle” - a phrase not only resonant of but also an etymon of the English phrase ‘pure hell’. For both the German Hellen and Hallen, and the English ‘hell’ share the same root - though the German adjective hell means simply ‘bright’ or ‘light’.
Making the implicit lead understanding of being for the ancient Greeks as standing presence explicit allows Heidegger to break with the metaphysical casting of human being, in order to recast it as exposed ex-sistence (standing-out) in the temporal clearing of truth, the Da. Truth is now not a property of statements, but the disclosedness of beings to Dasein in the clearing.
[H]umans have always strived to develop “modern” technology and to become truly “modern” in the Heideggerian sense. The danger stemming from the rule of das Gestell is thus not only transient and solely directed toward contemporary Western society, but also I will argue that humans can only be humans as the ones challenged by the rule of das Gestell.
[S]ince there can be non-symbolic, non-linguistic worlds, what Heidegger calls 'world' in Being and Time is not identical with any recognizable sense of 'language', including Heidegger's own later use of that term.
If the topology of being is the said but unthought difference that sustains the logic of truth (alētheia), if it is the open clearing (Lichtung) of self-concealing sheltering, then the tautology of being is the said—with the word auto, which is why ‘authenticity’ will always be the most suitable translation of Eigentlichkeit—but unthought event (Ereignis) of that matter, of it-itself in its self-withholding. And if Heidegger’s topology is essentially also a tautology, then we need to free ourselves of the tendency to think the topology of being from the aesthetics and metaphysics and even poetics of time-space. The derivation goes rather the other way, from the unthought correlation of Lichtung and Ereignis, a correlation not thought through even by Heidegger himself.
When Heidegger defines evil on the day after Germany’s surrender as a hidden, self-disguising “uprising”, he is evading or repressing the fact that he saw the evil at the time of the uprising of 1933 and explicitly endorsed it. But perhaps these very acts of evasion and repression confirm Heidegger’s definition: dishonesty is part of the concealment that belongs to evil.
Heidegger envisages truth as the ongoing (in a way that is history- or epoch-making) and irreducible strife between the essence of truth as un-truth, or concealment, and the event of truth as unconcealment.
Version 3.0 The revised, emended and extended e-book edition on artefact
With an appendix reinterpreting quantum mechanical indeterminacy phenomenologically.
Behind the interface there is merely a numerical representation of the beings shown along with the network which is physically spread over the entire globe without the geographical scattering being sensuously experienceable as such, and without the user having to understand anything at all about digital code. Nevertheless, Dasein knows that it is approximating beings from all over the world and thus appropriating them.
In Slaughterhouse-Five, Billy Pilgrim’s experience of his world is very much a phenomenological one. Instead of interpreting his world through the lens of an overarching theory and accepting the narratives given by others, he simply takes in the sensations as they come. Being unstuck in time and transported back and forth, he really has no other choice.
[Heidegger] brings to the fore precisely what the philosophical tradition had ignored or withheld--the moment of call over against that of form, of mission over against presence, of being grasped over against surveying, of event over against object, of response over against concept, even the humility of reception over against the pride of autonomous reason, and generally the stance of piety over against the self-assertion of the subject.
A new translation
Two lecture courses from 1933-4.
Being a container, the jug gathers by taking and holding, but it further reveals the fourfold by pouring forth. Its out-pouring is a gift which regenerates the interplay of the fourfold. How is the fourfold gathered in the jug?
It is possible that Heidegger would be dismissive of the results of the scientific discovery of mirror neurons and the social neuroscience opened up by fMRI research.Yet an alternative reading is that he leaves a place for the results of scientific research, albeit as a derivative form of being-in-the-world, knowledge.
As an Event, being is essentially ‘ecstatic’: when the epochal sense of reality changes, so does a new ground of unfolding come forth. Altogether, the Event does not signify infinite permanency and duration of a ground, but a becoming of being in the fangs of time; that is, a becoming of the finite grounds of being. Such unity of being and becoming in Ereignis shows how the ground changes through the history and hence how the realm of being is not permanently durable, but finite and ecstatic.
Translated by Richard Capobianco and Marie Göbel
Is not this talk about the clearing also only a metaphor, read off from the forest clearing? Nevertheless, this forest clearing is itself something present in the presencing forest. The clearing, however, as the granting of the free for presencing and lingering of what-is-present, is neither something that is present nor a property of the presence.
Four Seminars. February-November 2011. Universities of Southampton, Oxford and Essex.
Philosophers have tried to enclose and to reduce us to a formal concept, when our basic mode of existence contains an irreducible movement of becoming. In this sense, our mode of existence lies in a movement not between actuality and possibility as philosophers have assumed, but between necessity and possibility.
Ereignis is covered up by τέχνη and Platonism. The question is whether this event is at play in Plato’s dialogues, so that there would be already in Plato’s thinking a trace of the ‘crossing.’ I will interpret Plato from Ereignis, and find in his thought moments of enactment in thinking that trace out the ‘crossing’ that Heidegger calls for at the end of Platonism.
The theoretical attitude imports an unexamined assumption into phenomenology: the assumption that the human being is primarily a knower, that is, a subject who relates to objects through a cognitive faculty. If phenomenology is to give an account of life as it is lived, it must first dislodge this assumption. The human being is primarily one who lives, that is, projects herself upon existential possibilities for being-in-the-world.
Propriation grants the free openness of the reverberant, temporal clearing into which an attunement can reverberate and from which a fading mood can fade and in its withdrawal preserve its whiling. What propriation grants through quivering is never the effect of a cause, never the consequence of a determining reason. Propriety which brings anything into its own, i.e. propriation, is more granting than any effectiveness, making, producing or grounding.
Heidegger’s fourfold of earth, sky, gods, and mortals had several problems. But one that has rarely been mentioned is that he used them for names of the four poles, when what is more interesting are the seismic fault-lines between them. All he did was place them on diagrams marked with diagonal lines, without ever naming them—except to speak of mirror-plays, weddings, dances, and songs, all of them interchangeable metaphors not correlated with any of the four specific rifts. But we now have a powerful new fourfold structure of time, space, essence, and eidos.
[A] pronounced caesura separates contemporary philosophies from the ontologies of Hegel or Heidegger. What is at stake in Deleuze and Badiou’s philosophical projects, and even in Derrida’s, is precisely the necessity to exceed the idea of the unique event, of a Final event, Absolute or Ereignis, which suppresses and/or re-installs the order of being. Inversely, here it is question of a multiplicity of events, which interrupt the order of being and which consequently constitute an alternative regime, irreducible to the order of being.
Heidegger and Levinas both understood themselves as struggling to articulate the requisite ethical response to the great traumas of the twentieth century, and [...] if we compare their thinking at this level, we can better understand the ways in which Levinas - like all other important post-Heideggerian thinkers - genuinely diverges from Heidegger even while building on his thinking.
We find Heidegger emphasizing this hermeneutic character of Nachfolge when, rather than understanding religion in terms of doctrines or systems of teaching, he insists that what one follows in being religious are the words of the founder—that the words alone are what is decisive.
To “save the earth” by “setting it free into its own essence”—to radically repudiate the centuries old ethic of its exploitive use—this message is the one that would reverberate with great urgency; it’s just this relationship that is observed in the case of the animal.
Ereignis is independent of the existence of Dasein. This is because the earth is independent of it.
Heidegger's thesis is that the very first beginning with the thinking of φύσις itself contained an ambiguity, a negation, so that the essence of φύσις, because it was left ungrounded, could degenerate into a prevailing of power. In tracing back the philosophical tradition to this first Greek beginning, Heidegger sees the task for thinking in grounding an Other Beginning as a grounding of what remained ungrounded in the first beginning.
The philosophy of Heidegger was applied for the conversion of the transcripts that were taken through the interview process with women who had experienced a miscarriage into academic language where subcategories were formed. By interpreting the subcategories we can more accurately describe the essence of a complex event.
According to Heidegger, what is special about the specifically human capacity of using language for communication is its world-disclosing function. By virtue of sharing a natural language, speakers do not just share a system of conventional signs. More importantly, they share the same way of talking about (i.e., articulating, understanding, describing, conceptualizing) everything that can show up within their world. Thus, understanding a language is never just a matter of hearing noises, but of understanding ways the world is or may be. Knowledge of the language and knowledge of the world are inseparable.
Three dialogues from the mid-forties.MORE
The overall objective of Heidegger’s preliminary discussion of herme neutics is to show that originary philosophy today requires a return to Ar istotle. That is, by turning to Aristotle we can free philosophical inquiry for the possibility of genuine questioning that constitutes it as philosophy.
In Heidegger’s ontology there is no will. Instead, one finds a dissimulated subject in the form of a system of relationships finally structured by time. What determines the movements or actions of Dasein is the system of inclinations in which it stands, structured by the disclosure of meanings within its existential horizon.
Heidegger would argue that the difference between normal and crisis-provoking difficulties is due not to features of the problem, but to the disposition (BefindlichKeit) or mood of the practitioners.
The coup de grace to this evolution occurs in an article by F.-W. von Herrmann published in December 1982, which proclaims that what Heidegger in fact really wanted — a wish reported over six years after his voice had been stilled — was an “edition without interpretation”. One would have to imagine that the pan-hermeneutical Heidegger had in his dotage lapsed into senility even to utter the words, let alone to express the wish for an “edition without interpretation”.
[W]hen Heidegger says that the way of life always appears to a person as "its other," as its world, then we can maybe see how tyche speaks precisely of a being's tendency to be, always in relation to, and emergent from, everything else.
Thinking the relationship between bodies and space through sculpture.MORE
Heidegger pauses to remind us that his account of Aristotle does not reach the true origin of metaphysics. For, we must see that we have still not clarified the difference between Being as such and beings, between presencing itself and those that are present. This difference precedes and underlies the distinction between beings understood as what they are and that they are.
[T]hough many were masterful readers of the philosophic and religious traditions, none of the thinkers in the community of thought around Heidegger to which Strauss and Arendt belonged devoted their efforts to a critical reading of the tradition of political thought for the sake of rethinking, and if possible, reviving political philosophy.