[D]espite Heidegger’s rejection of resistance as an argument for the self-existence of the external world, Dilthey’s notion of resistance is appropriated and transformed in Heidegger’s thinking of life’s phenomenality and facticity.
Returning to the Greek beginnings of philosophy in a manner more radically than Hegel's provides one way out of the encapsulation of the mind within the subject which consequently has to communicate with the world through re-presentations in its consciousness. Heidegger practises precisely such a return to Parmenides in some of his late and latest writings, which will be tapped here to consider whether, in comparison to Kant, Parmenides was in his right mind.
Digital ontology concerns our understanding of Being. We believe that we understand something in its being when we are able to re-make digitally. Within the digital casting of Being we look at humans as they are online instead of embracing the digital within the "life-world" (Husserl).
I introduce a hermeneutics of laughter and contend that the event of Ereignis receives its meaning from Gelotopoesis—the poetic act of laughter. Moreover, I claim that the echo of Gelotopoesis becomes the possibility of the transmission of tradition and is attested by a hypertonic boastfulness and a hypotonic irony.
Merleau-Ponty’s and Freeman’s account of how we directly pick up significance and improve our sensitivity to relevance depends on our responding to what is significant for us given our needs, body size, ways of moving, and so forth, not to mention our personal and cultural self-interpretation. If we can’t make our brain model responsive to the significance in the environment as it shows up specifically for human beings, the project of developing an embedded and embodied Heideggerian AI can’t get off the ground.
In the Ister lectures, Heidegger presents poetry as the primary linguistic means for allowing beings to emerge into appearance—not for purposes of usefulness or manipulation, but simply to let beings be. This includes the realization that what it means to be German remains rooted in the ground of what it once meant to be Greek. These issues of autochthony, for the poet and his people, allow Heidegger to revisit related concepts from Sophocles' Antigone.
[T]he present for Heidegger stands under the fate of the forgetfulness·-of-Bei11g. Nations do have a relation to objects in their wide-ranging activities and productions, but they have I011g since fallen from Being itself. Therefore we are "reeling, " when seen metaphysically.
Contrary to Heidegger's own view, both Hegel and Heidegger are, I shall claim, anti-Cartesians. (According to Heidegger, Hegel was the greatest Cartesian).
László Tengelyi has recently developed the idea of Sinnereignis (meaning-event) as a way of capturing the emergence of meaning that does not flow from some prior project or constitutive act. As such, it might seem to pose something of a challenge to phenomenology: the paradox of an experience that is mine without being my accomplishment.
While Heidegger recognizes that his thesis is an improper delimitation on the animal, at the same time he claims for the time being we will have to make do with this statement insofar as we do not have an “explicit metaphysical understanding of the essence of world” that could allow us to properly delimit the animal and its relation to world.
In the case of Heidegger's Parmenides, which presses a philosophical argument, it will be meanings to come, rather than events proper, that will be implicitly promised, predicted, hinted at, -- meanings rather than events in that the emergence, revelation, fulfillment of meaning is the philosophical "event" par excellence.
School of Philosophy at The Catholic University of America
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philsophy's entry on
The purpose of the present article is to argue that it is not worth the time and effort to become familiar with Heidegger's life and writings for the purpose of learning how to argue the case for antianthropocentrism. Heidegger does not succeed in developing a convincing case for bis type of antianthropocentrism.
Heidegger maintains that while mourning rituals are necessary and may follow particular forms, mourning is a uniquely personal experience and one that only those who have had the experience can understand. The loss itself is indicative of the relationship we have with others and for Heidegger, this is what makes the loss so significant and impossible to understand until it has been experienced.
We know, or we think we know, what it means for something to be. But we find ourselves facing an impasse, an aporia, and an insurmountable difficulty now that the time has come for us to inquire about what it means that something, precisely, is.
Two recent books from
The naming of what Heidegger here called the “place of arrival,” or the naming of Ereignis, the “event of appropriation,” still presents a puzzle since it is not clear—even with our understanding of poetic “calling”—exactly how one might name something that is itself a process, an originary event, by whose occurrence (always partially veiled) naming is first made possible. And further, as we have already been told, the task of poetic language is not “naming” as such, but instead it is the figuring of the call of being as the play of lethe and aletheia.
Heidegger’s project is to get back to the original question of Being that was asked by the Greeks and to ask it in a more primordial way, which means that he must begin his investigation of Being in a “pre-theoretical” way. The traditional theoretical approach to the question of Being, according to Heidegger, regards the thinker and the object of its thought as being indifferently detached from one another.
The two sentences say the same thing: only in concrete existentiell appropriation of oneself as the act of questioning does questioning find its answer, namely, that the meaning of being is questionableness itself. Only in resolve does one enter Ereignis; only by taking up personally one’s own movement does one authentically discover the movement that is being itself.More Heidegger articles.
Heidegger writes that any experience, object, emotion or event can be understood within its context. Because There-being has a world and is its world, all innerworldly beings, all that exists for There-being, is in that world - in a particular way. Because There-being has the ability to understand any person or event as a sign, as meaning something, within the context of the referentiality of all persons and some things.
Heidegger criticizes all previous attempts to articulate the meaning and structure of the given, the life-world: they have all failed to reach the primordially given, the pragmata, the fundamental objects of human concern. This failure, to put it in non-Heideggerian terms, is the failure to articulate the fundamental attitude of religiosity permeating the perspective of the life-world.
[F]or now it suffices to see that the concept ‘land’ originally bore a trace of the ontological meaning revealed in Heidegger’s understanding of earth. Indeed, one merely need recall J.S. Mill’s declaration that land is a gift to all when he writes, ‘No man made the land. It is the original inheritance of the whole species.’
Heidegger acknowledges that for Aristotle the zóon politikon is a speaking animal, but he is quick to project the teaching of Plato onto the speech of the zóon politikon. The speaking citizen does not overcome the inauthentic preoccupation that pervades the rule of the They in everydayness, and his deliberative speech in the public space of the polis is, Heidegger claims, trapped in ‘habits’, ‘fashion’, ‘immediate vogue’, ‘idle talk’.
There is thus for Foucault a fourfold shift, the question is no longer that ‘of truth, but of being; not of nature, but of man; not of the possibility of understanding, but of the possibility of a primary misunderstanding;’ and finally and with respect to science the shift has been ‘from the possibility of a science of nature to the possibility for man to conceive of himself.’ Thus Foucault has all along been speaking of Heidegger if indeed by way of Nietzsche and Hölderlin.
Heidegger calls his own way of philosophical speaking an unfolding (Entfaltung) of the guiding question of Nietzsche in view of his fundamental metaphysical position (Grundstellung). This unfolding stands under the sign of a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with the fundamental metaphysical position of Nietzsche, with his answer to the guiding question of philosophical thinking.
Heidegger provides in a clue in one of the rare passages in Being and Time in which he uses the word action (Handeln) explicitly. Here Heidegger brings up the term ‘action’ merely to express his reservations about using the term, as he says that action “must be taken so broadly that ‘activity’ will also embrace the passivity of resistance”. For Heidegger, the term ‘action’ must be understood so broadly that it includes passivity as well.
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, described in his Bremen lectures and discussed further at his seminar in Le Thor, in many ways paints a dark picture of our current mode of living in this world. We have become dependent on technology and now only relate to the world for the sake of how it can be applied.
[W]ithin the ontological ordering of Ge-stell, IT reveals the earth as the globe. The globe, nowadays both a ready-to-hand entity and a constitutive element of being-in-the-world, is a technological being in that literally and ontologically it is an outcome of the IT apparatus.
How does the god enter philosophy? he explains, “leads back to the question, What is the origin of the ontotheological essential constitution of metaphysics?” [...] God’s entering—or perhaps we ought to say his being dragged—into the ambit of human thinking is the determining event in the Western metaphysical tradition.
Jay Bernstein, Simon Critchley, Daniel Dahlstrom, Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, Matthias Fritsch, Dimitir Ginev, Lawrence Hatab, Don Ihde, Leslie MacAvoy, Eduardo Mendieta, Yujin Nagasawa, Anne O'Bryne, Kelly Oliver Robert Scharff, Hugh Silverman, Peter Paul Verbeek
The very supposition that there is (or even could be) a single meaning of being in general is something that the later Heidegger argues we should transcend as part of the ontotheological legacy of Western metaphysics—along with the very idea of a creator God who stands outside the secular world, implicitly unifying the meaning of exis- tence (that is, both the meaning of the universe and of our own lives) from his God’s eye perspective or “view from nowhere”.
We are not beings, who are in a world, but always already in a world in our being, being-in-the-world. Similarly, the world is not constructed along mathematical, scientific lines, but encountered through experience and living.
A new translation
Translated by Phillip Jacques Braunstein
Heidegger's last public university lecture before the end of World War II.
Human beings can only make music through being attuned to and listening to the quivering that grants attunements. That is, it is the originary quivering that enables human beings to be musical, thus being used by propriation (Ereignis) to allow music itself to make way to music.
The matter itself, the matter of philosophy, is already decided from the outset of Hegel’s thinking. The matter of philosophy is determined as metaphysics, as the Being of beings in the form of subjectivity. The matter of philosophy as subjectivity is already presupposed.
Heidegger is concerned to get back behind this state of affairs to a thinking attuned to the being that abandons it. While his style (not to mention his vocabulary) makes a number of dramatic shifts, Heidegger is looking in each of his writings for a mood that might place thinking back into being’s furious withdrawal and hold it there.
Because language as naming wasn’t always here; we weren’t always here. One or maybe two aspects of the fourfold (depending on your view of gods) were not always here, and there is no guarantee that we will always be around.
That Ereignis is a typical term in Heidegger's philosophy attests to the extent to which he has appropriated the ordinary Japanese word koto ba. Obviously, Heidegger interprets koto ba in an idiosyncratic manner in accordance with his intonations on the nature of language, the nature of language as the house of Being, the nature of language as the Heideggerian dialogue.
Heidegger's point is that if the ego is understood to be the Being of beings, the material world is dominated by the subject's arbitrary will for more power. As a result, the highest values are those related to the freedom and autonomy of the ego—the transhuman vision follows suit by seeking to fulfill these goals through the radical alteration of material existence, including human bodies and brains.
As for the transformation into “pure luminosity” which Heidegger refers to as the goal of Indian thinking, this “pure luminosity” is a translation of “reine Helle” - a phrase not only resonant of but also an etymon of the English phrase ‘pure hell’. For both the German Hellen and Hallen, and the English ‘hell’ share the same root - though the German adjective hell means simply ‘bright’ or ‘light’.
Making the implicit lead understanding of being for the ancient Greeks as standing presence explicit allows Heidegger to break with the metaphysical casting of human being, in order to recast it as exposed ex-sistence (standing-out) in the temporal clearing of truth, the Da. Truth is now not a property of statements, but the disclosedness of beings to Dasein in the clearing.
[H]umans have always strived to develop “modern” technology and to become truly “modern” in the Heideggerian sense. The danger stemming from the rule of das Gestell is thus not only transient and solely directed toward contemporary Western society, but also I will argue that humans can only be humans as the ones challenged by the rule of das Gestell.
[S]ince there can be non-symbolic, non-linguistic worlds, what Heidegger calls 'world' in Being and Time is not identical with any recognizable sense of 'language', including Heidegger's own later use of that term.
If the topology of being is the said but unthought difference that sustains the logic of truth (alētheia), if it is the open clearing (Lichtung) of self-concealing sheltering, then the tautology of being is the said—with the word auto, which is why ‘authenticity’ will always be the most suitable translation of Eigentlichkeit—but unthought event (Ereignis) of that matter, of it-itself in its self-withholding. And if Heidegger’s topology is essentially also a tautology, then we need to free ourselves of the tendency to think the topology of being from the aesthetics and metaphysics and even poetics of time-space. The derivation goes rather the other way, from the unthought correlation of Lichtung and Ereignis, a correlation not thought through even by Heidegger himself.
When Heidegger defines evil on the day after Germany’s surrender as a hidden, self-disguising “uprising”, he is evading or repressing the fact that he saw the evil at the time of the uprising of 1933 and explicitly endorsed it. But perhaps these very acts of evasion and repression confirm Heidegger’s definition: dishonesty is part of the concealment that belongs to evil.
Heidegger envisages truth as the ongoing (in a way that is history- or epoch-making) and irreducible strife between the essence of truth as un-truth, or concealment, and the event of truth as unconcealment.
Version 3.0 The revised, emended and extended e-book edition on artefact
With an appendix reinterpreting quantum mechanical indeterminacy phenomenologically.
Behind the interface there is merely a numerical representation of the beings shown along with the network which is physically spread over the entire globe without the geographical scattering being sensuously experienceable as such, and without the user having to understand anything at all about digital code. Nevertheless, Dasein knows that it is approximating beings from all over the world and thus appropriating them.
In Slaughterhouse-Five, Billy Pilgrim’s experience of his world is very much a phenomenological one. Instead of interpreting his world through the lens of an overarching theory and accepting the narratives given by others, he simply takes in the sensations as they come. Being unstuck in time and transported back and forth, he really has no other choice.
[Heidegger] brings to the fore precisely what the philosophical tradition had ignored or withheld--the moment of call over against that of form, of mission over against presence, of being grasped over against surveying, of event over against object, of response over against concept, even the humility of reception over against the pride of autonomous reason, and generally the stance of piety over against the self-assertion of the subject.
A new translation
Two lecture courses from 1933-4.
Being a container, the jug gathers by taking and holding, but it further reveals the fourfold by pouring forth. Its out-pouring is a gift which regenerates the interplay of the fourfold. How is the fourfold gathered in the jug?
It is possible that Heidegger would be dismissive of the results of the scientific discovery of mirror neurons and the social neuroscience opened up by fMRI research.Yet an alternative reading is that he leaves a place for the results of scientific research, albeit as a derivative form of being-in-the-world, knowledge.
As an Event, being is essentially ‘ecstatic’: when the epochal sense of reality changes, so does a new ground of unfolding come forth. Altogether, the Event does not signify infinite permanency and duration of a ground, but a becoming of being in the fangs of time; that is, a becoming of the finite grounds of being. Such unity of being and becoming in Ereignis shows how the ground changes through the history and hence how the realm of being is not permanently durable, but finite and ecstatic.
Translated by Richard Capobianco and Marie Göbel
Is not this talk about the clearing also only a metaphor, read off from the forest clearing? Nevertheless, this forest clearing is itself something present in the presencing forest. The clearing, however, as the granting of the free for presencing and lingering of what-is-present, is neither something that is present nor a property of the presence.
Four Seminars. February-November 2011. Universities of Southampton, Oxford and Essex.
Philosophers have tried to enclose and to reduce us to a formal concept, when our basic mode of existence contains an irreducible movement of becoming. In this sense, our mode of existence lies in a movement not between actuality and possibility as philosophers have assumed, but between necessity and possibility.
Ereignis is covered up by τέχνη and Platonism. The question is whether this event is at play in Plato’s dialogues, so that there would be already in Plato’s thinking a trace of the ‘crossing.’ I will interpret Plato from Ereignis, and find in his thought moments of enactment in thinking that trace out the ‘crossing’ that Heidegger calls for at the end of Platonism.
We can clearly understand that light, molecular structure, pens and Macbook chargers, flip between Zu and Vorhanden. It refuses any distinction we can apply; Immaterial vs. Material, Natural vs. Artificial, any object can withdraw and refuse to be present, but it can also enter our awareness at any time. To make the invisible things visible, we even have to rely on the Zuhanden of instruments.
The theoretical attitude imports an unexamined assumption into phenomenology: the assumption that the human being is primarily a knower, that is, a subject who relates to objects through a cognitive faculty. If phenomenology is to give an account of life as it is lived, it must first dislodge this assumption. The human being is primarily one who lives, that is, projects herself upon existential possibilities for being-in-the-world.
Propriation grants the free openness of the reverberant, temporal clearing into which an attunement can reverberate and from which a fading mood can fade and in its withdrawal preserve its whiling. What propriation grants through quivering is never the effect of a cause, never the consequence of a determining reason. Propriety which brings anything into its own, i.e. propriation, is more granting than any effectiveness, making, producing or grounding.
Heidegger’s fourfold of earth, sky, gods, and mortals had several problems. But one that has rarely been mentioned is that he used them for names of the four poles, when what is more interesting are the seismic fault-lines between them. All he did was place them on diagrams marked with diagonal lines, without ever naming them—except to speak of mirror-plays, weddings, dances, and songs, all of them interchangeable metaphors not correlated with any of the four specific rifts. But we now have a powerful new fourfold structure of time, space, essence, and eidos.
[A] pronounced caesura separates contemporary philosophies from the ontologies of Hegel or Heidegger. What is at stake in Deleuze and Badiou’s philosophical projects, and even in Derrida’s, is precisely the necessity to exceed the idea of the unique event, of a Final event, Absolute or Ereignis, which suppresses and/or re-installs the order of being. Inversely, here it is question of a multiplicity of events, which interrupt the order of being and which consequently constitute an alternative regime, irreducible to the order of being.
Heidegger and Levinas both understood themselves as struggling to articulate the requisite ethical response to the great traumas of the twentieth century, and [...] if we compare their thinking at this level, we can better understand the ways in which Levinas - like all other important post-Heideggerian thinkers - genuinely diverges from Heidegger even while building on his thinking.
We find Heidegger emphasizing this hermeneutic character of Nachfolge when, rather than understanding religion in terms of doctrines or systems of teaching, he insists that what one follows in being religious are the words of the founder—that the words alone are what is decisive.
To “save the earth” by “setting it free into its own essence”—to radically repudiate the centuries old ethic of its exploitive use—this message is the one that would reverberate with great urgency; it’s just this relationship that is observed in the case of the animal.
Ereignis is independent of the existence of Dasein. This is because the earth is independent of it.
Heidegger's thesis is that the very first beginning with the thinking of φύσις itself contained an ambiguity, a negation, so that the essence of φύσις, because it was left ungrounded, could degenerate into a prevailing of power. In tracing back the philosophical tradition to this first Greek beginning, Heidegger sees the task for thinking in grounding an Other Beginning as a grounding of what remained ungrounded in the first beginning.
The philosophy of Heidegger was applied for the conversion of the transcripts that were taken through the interview process with women who had experienced a miscarriage into academic language where subcategories were formed. By interpreting the subcategories we can more accurately describe the essence of a complex event.
According to Heidegger, what is special about the specifically human capacity of using language for communication is its world-disclosing function. By virtue of sharing a natural language, speakers do not just share a system of conventional signs. More importantly, they share the same way of talking about (i.e., articulating, understanding, describing, conceptualizing) everything that can show up within their world. Thus, understanding a language is never just a matter of hearing noises, but of understanding ways the world is or may be. Knowledge of the language and knowledge of the world are inseparable.
Three dialogues from the mid-forties.MORE
The overall objective of Heidegger’s preliminary discussion of herme neutics is to show that originary philosophy today requires a return to Ar istotle. That is, by turning to Aristotle we can free philosophical inquiry for the possibility of genuine questioning that constitutes it as philosophy.
In Heidegger’s ontology there is no will. Instead, one finds a dissimulated subject in the form of a system of relationships finally structured by time. What determines the movements or actions of Dasein is the system of inclinations in which it stands, structured by the disclosure of meanings within its existential horizon.
Heidegger would argue that the difference between normal and crisis-provoking difficulties is due not to features of the problem, but to the disposition (BefindlichKeit) or mood of the practitioners.
The coup de grace to this evolution occurs in an article by F.-W. von Herrmann published in December 1982, which proclaims that what Heidegger in fact really wanted — a wish reported over six years after his voice had been stilled — was an “edition without interpretation”. One would have to imagine that the pan-hermeneutical Heidegger had in his dotage lapsed into senility even to utter the words, let alone to express the wish for an “edition without interpretation”.
[W]hen Heidegger says that the way of life always appears to a person as "its other," as its world, then we can maybe see how tyche speaks precisely of a being's tendency to be, always in relation to, and emergent from, everything else.
Thinking the relationship between bodies and space through sculpture.MORE
Heidegger pauses to remind us that his account of Aristotle does not reach the true origin of metaphysics. For, we must see that we have still not clarified the difference between Being as such and beings, between presencing itself and those that are present. This difference precedes and underlies the distinction between beings understood as what they are and that they are.
[T]hough many were masterful readers of the philosophic and religious traditions, none of the thinkers in the community of thought around Heidegger to which Strauss and Arendt belonged devoted their efforts to a critical reading of the tradition of political thought for the sake of rethinking, and if possible, reviving political philosophy.
The fear of death is the fear of the event, of the instant that is impossible to experience. In this sense death is always sudden, always a disruption and interruption. This death is truly deadly. Anxiety, on the other hand, as a consequence of the indefiniteness of death’s “when”, presents dying as being (Being-towards-death) where death is no longer compacted into the terminal instant but lived as “care”.
Sometimes all these seachanges converge in a single philosophical work, particularly in the case of Martin Heidegger. The very starting point of Heidegger’s philosophy—his formulation of human existence as being-in-the-world—places him at odds with Cartesian metaphysics by inserting the “thinking ego” immediately into a world context composed of societies, fellow beings, and nature. He explicitly described the method he adopted in Being and Time as a “hermeneutical phenomenology,” that is, as an interpretive study of human world-experience.
[T]emporality is implicitly conceived in similar ways in computational ontology as it is in digital ontology. Both digital ontology and computational ontology hold time to be an entity within the domain of temporality. In the case of digital ontologists, if they remain in line with Heidegger, time is the everyday ordinary understanding of time that is in some sense a present-at-hand entity.
[T]echnology, as a type of revealing, cannot simply be understood as instrumental. The tool connects up with nature and humans only to the extent that nature and humans are already within this realm of the technological: nature and humans already have machine like aspects— the extent to which we recognize this is due to the type of organizing which technology calls forth.
Every age needs an introduction to Heidegger appropriate for its epoch.MORE
Such knowing has little to do with seeking or finding answers. Rather it is most purely expressed in the act of creative questioning itself. Heidegger frequently says that knowing is an ability to learn, and this ability to learn means an ability to inquire. Heidegger also says that knowing is willing to know, and willing to know is questioning. Indeed, the kind of knowledge Heidegger seeks is only possible through “creative questioning and shaping out of the power of genuine reflection.”
The essential self-masking feature of word processing fits into the logic of Enframing unveiled by Heidegger. Language turned to information within this concealment brings about the danger in the way Enframing is the danger. But where danger lies so does salvation. The forgetting of being, slipped away from this surface of continuous textuality, can be undone by the essential questioning of this technology.
[W]hen Heidegger describes resonance as (foregoing enowning) an “enstrifing of the strife into the strife itself,” he is discussing the ceaseless struggle of wills to power that have as their consequences the signs we cannot help but use; he is discussing the face of a language and not one of its masks.
According to Heidegger, light can therefore be seen as illumination, as “brightness,” but it can also be understood with regard to its relationship to truth, to unhiddenness, to liberation, and to freedom. Light is more than just brightness, than illumination; it is what (if we may be allowed to create our own Heideggerian turn of phrase) “lets-things-be-seen-in-their-unhiddenness.”
The clearing, as I imagine and describe it, connects with a larger‐scale clearing in which a literature of settler indigenisation appears, literature that is concerned with theorising memory, concealment and place in local, national and transnational contexts.
Translated by Greg Johnson
Nihilism, in Heidegger’s eyes, represents the consequence and the accomplishment of a slow trend toward the oblivion of Being, which begins with Socrates and Plato, continues in Christianity and Western metaphysics, and triumphs in modern times. The essence of nihilism “rests in the oblivion of Being”. Nihilism is the oblivion of Being in realized form. It is the reign of nothingness.
A guide to Heidegger's Basic WritingsMORE
So—to make this long story short—Heidegger proceeds over the years, guided especially by Aristotle’s insight into the kinetic character of things, to unfold his understanding of Being itself—that is, the fundamental, unifying, and originary meaning of Being—as the Being-way wherein and whereby beings emerge, linger in their full ‘look’ or ‘presence’ (eidos), wane, and pass away.
The relation between all these factors radiates a uniqueness of presence, which engages different dimensions of human interest. This engagement is not that of the appropriation of resources, but rather a care for the work in its own character as sculpted being. Through this character an horizon of reverence and insight constellates around the sculpture. The sculptural work is, accordingly, an elemental place-instituting entity, which occupies a distinctive location amongst other things, by creating a relational space of display and interpretative contexts around itself.
What does it mean to suggest that the answer to the question of ‘who is Dasein?’ is the ‘they’ signify, however? From the perspective of everydayness, human existence is heteronomously constituted and manifested not as the ‘I’ assumed by accounts of modern subjectivity, but as ‘anyone’.
Throughout ‘Heidegger’ the sole objective is therefore a Wiederholung or Ereignis, a “retrievingrepeating” of the propriativity that is (human) being. It is a process of re-petition (reseeking) by which one becomes what one is, an appropriation of the movement of appropriation that gathers together Entschlossenheit and Gelassenheit, resolving to release oneself to the projecting that we must do in order for beings to be.
In Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology there is no special meaning attached to the word Ereignis. When he comes to the Philosophy of Revelation, however, the word does take on a special meaning. In Heidegger's Beiträge the word is often hyphenated (Er-eignis), to indicate that he wishes it taken in its deeper etymological sense. Thus, the event is an eye-opener (er-äugen, open up one's eyes to). The word is also made to relate to an-eignen and zu-eignen, which mean make one's own, take to oneself, ap-propriate. In this connection he uses the neologism Er-eignung to indicate that Seyn determines that human beings should become the property (Eigentum) of Seyn as a result of their encounter with (Ent-gegnung), and decision for (Ent-scheidung), Da-sein, the "being" that is very much "there."
Heidegger identifies our purposes as themselves structured within a significance whole that begins at its most basic with what he calls a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’. We do things for the sake of something, some purpose, the ultimate purpose being for-thesake- of our own well-being.
Winter semester 1925 lecture course on the meaning of truth in pschologism, Aristotle, and Kant.MORE
The development of Heidegger’s thought can thus be understood in terms of the way he switches the reference of the term ‘Being’ from the unifying structure of entities qua entities to the structure of the givenness of entities as a whole. This is a move from the Being of entities to Being as such, from Sein to Seyn, or from Sein to Ereignis.
Now, we must reject Heidegger’s position both early and late, insofar as in both cases it collapses back into some form of correlationism.
[T]he later Heidegger will use the term Ereignis for the man-meaning bond. That technical term refers to the fact of meaning-giving insofar as it “requires” human being (brauchen) to belong to (zugehören) and sustain that fundamental fact. However, Ereignis is said to “appropriate and own” (ereignen) man as Sein’s own “property” (Eigentum), while in turn making possible man’s proper authenticity (Eigentlichkeit). Do all these metaphors mean that Ereignis is a Super- Something with power to act on human beings? If such a monstrosity is to be avoided at all costs, what then about the later Heidegger’s own quasi-hypostasization of Sein? William J. Richardson answers that question with exquisite délicatesse, “Only truly great philosophers should be indulged for their obscurity.”
Following Kant, Heidegger concludes that the pure intuitions are space and time, and as pure intuitions space and time are not intuitions in the sense of ontic beings that can be taken-in-stride by the human, but they appear, rather as the horizon on and in which beings-as-such can be encountered. What is intuited in space and time as pure intuitions is not therefore a being-at-hand, but Being itself.
Heidegger holds that, because we speak of binary oppositions, they exist in some sense and are, therefore, merely a particular form of being. Because being is that which is common to the two terms of the binary opposition and that which makes it possible to speak of a binary opposition in the first place, being cannot be reduced to one of the terms of a binary opposition; being grounds and so escapes the constraints of binary logic.
Eight essays across the whole of Heidegger's project.MORE
If we distinguish the conceptions of nothing into three basic types, namely, privative, negative, and original nothing, then Heidegger‘s and Daoism‘s conception of nothing can be characterized as ―original nothing‖.
What can we infer from this for the being of digital beings? A digital being is, in the first place, a finite sequence of binary code, consisting perhaps of billions and billions of bits, that is interpreted and calculated by the appropriate hardware in sequences of nested algorithms to bring about a foreseen effect. As binary code, i.e. a string of zeroes and ones, a digital being is nothing other than a finite rational number. And yet, this binary code, interpreted as commands to be processed by a digital processor, brings forth change and movement in the real world of real, physical beings.
It is fitting that Heraclitus, in his day, was referred to as the "dark" one. In many ways he remains dark, but his darkness opens a thinking possibility for us.
To speak of the last God is not disparaging, nor is it blasphemous, nor does it mean the cessation of God. Such interpretations arise only when we think ‘calculatively’. Far from being blasphemous, in speaking of the last God we are addressing the question of the essencing or mode of be-ing (Wesung/Wesen) of the God, indeed we are raising it, Heidegger tells us, to its highest form.
Martin Heidegger famously contends, "Our ordinary perceptual awareness of things is itself interpretive." This contradicts the usual view of modern science—namely, that all knowledge is acquired by objective observation. However, empirical, scientific data has a long history of necessary, and sometimes unfortunate, subjective interpretation. One such case is the hapless tale of the Martian canals.
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This book contains the lectures from two courses at Freiburg, Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion from winter semester 1920 and Augustine and Neoplatonism from summer semester 1921.MORE
As a sudden insight, as it was described in conversa- tion with Boss, Ereignis has the character itself of revelation. Since the revelation of Ereignis appears to be a requisite for understand- ing the discourse of the later Heidegger. the Beitrage would be the revealing of revelation itself.
translated by Charles T. Wolfe
My own growing rigid, in this context, has to do with the determination of the origin and the dawn. The Greek morning which Heidegger arranged for us is monomaniacal and kleptomaniacal. It robs an entire array of texts and possibilities so that they may fit under the aegis of Parmenides’ poem.
Dasein, in being exposed to the future, remains essentially un-finished and has to start perpetually anew, Sisyphus-like, in resolving the strife of togetherness. This is a matter of gaining clear insight into the predicament of shared-but-individualized human being situated in the open timespace of being's truth, rather than of ethical appeals or prescriptions. It is timely that we think about this aspect of our propriation by beyng.
Heidegger’s critique of the (robust) correspondence theory of truth places him in a certain proximity to defenders of minimal CT. Heidegger’s primordial truth (aletheia)–not correspondence but revelation, is the removal of a veil (lethe)–defers falsifiability to a penultimate level of discourse.
My claim that phenomenology, and especially the phenomenology of Heidegger, could be used to develop ethical arguments will come as a surprise to some scholars, since Heidegger himself denied ever having such a goal in view. One should not, however, let oneself be misled by Heidegger’s self-characterizations.
Together these experiments show that a smoothly coping participant-tool system can be temporarily disrupted and that this disruption causes a change in the participant's awareness. Since these two events follow as predictions from Heidegger's work, our study offers evidence for the hypothesized transition from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand.
Translated by Charles H. Seibert
Sculpture would be the embodiment of places. Places, in preserving and opening a region, hold something free gathered around them which grants the tarrying of things under consideration and a dwelling for man in the midst of things.
A new book on crossing to the other beginning with the Beiträge
"An authentic deep concern and reverence for the natural world can only come from a transformed conception of how we see our place and role within the earthly relationship...rooted in an ontological soil in which the experience of existence, of 'being as such', can grow."MORE
The Invental as the ground of the event. Threads of the past are gathered from within that temporal horizon and projected in a unified manner upon what one is practically involved with towards the futural temporal horizon. This projection towards the futural horizon together with the gatheredness of the past creates the unified temporal moment of presencing.
I wanted to spur him to an unguarded opinion about the situation in Germany. I turned the conversation to the controversy in the Neue Ziiricher Zeitung and explained that I agreed neither with Barth's political attack [on Heidegger] nor with Staiger's defense, insofax as I was of the opinion that his partisanship for National Socialism lay in the essence of his philosophy. Heidegger agreed with me without reservation, and added that his concept of "historicity" was the basis of his political "engagement." He also left no doubt about his belief in Hitler.
Imagine this: a home without cheddar cheese, Marmite, baked beans and tea bags. Not homely enough? Well try and imagine the following: ‘what if man’s homelessness consisted in this’, that ‘he’ was not able to think of homelessness itself as a kind of home, that ‘he’ was not able to dwell within ‘his’ homelessness?
The four quadrants that result are the same edscribed by Heidegger’s infamous fourfold, as I have discussed at length in print. But since Heidegger’s Geviert of earth, sky, gods, and mortals can feel so painfully pseudo-poetic, let’s offer a more respectable quartet of names: space, time, essence, and eidos. All four of these dimensions belong together, since all arise from the tension between unified objects and their tangible qualities.
Ideology by contrast tends to discourage questioning of the facts so as to promote belief or faith in its system of ideas, and is correspondingly reluctant to engage in dialogue that might put into question the origin of those ideas. The neo-Marxist scholarship on the politics of the Kyoto School thinkers and their relation to Heidegger is a perfect example of this latter syndrome.
To understand Heidegger's critique of aesthetics, it will help first to sketch his positive view of art's true historical role. Heidegger's own understanding of the work of art is resolutely populist but with revolutionary aspirations. He believes that, at its greatest, art “grounds history” by “allowing truth to spring forth”.
A large portion of Heidegger’s philosophy boils down to this simple opposition between Zu- and Vorhandenheit. His break with Husserl hinges entirely on his rejection of Husserlian phenomena as a form of presence-at-hand. And this harsh treatment goes far beyond Husserl, since Heidegger holds that the entire history of philosophy is guilty of reducing reality to some form of presence.
[F]or Heidegger constituting the self is only possible through the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity. Dasein cannot however install itself in authenticity once and for all. As selftranscendence, Dasein's being is given to him as a task, as each time having to be etc., all these do not allow objectification and a supposed continuity of authenticity: Dasein's being is born each moment from its confrontation with its modalities and possibilities of being.