ÿþ<html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=unicode"/> <meta name="COPYRIGHT" content="Copyright © 2007-2008 Pete Ferreira"/> <meta name="AUTHOR" content="Pete Ferreira"/> <meta name="Viewport" content="width=device-width"> <title>Becoming Heidegger</title> </head> <body> <h1 style="center">Becoming Heidegger</h1> <p> <a href="http://nupress.northwestern.edu/title.cfm?ISBN=0-8101-2303-7"> <b>Becoming Heidegger</b></a> On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927. Edited by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 2007.</p> <p>Contains: <ul> <b>Part 1. Student Years, 1910-1917</b> <li>Curricula Vitae (1913, 1915, Recollective 1957)</li> <li>Two Articles for <i>The Academician</i> (1910, 1911)</li> <li>The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy (1912)</li> <li>Recent Reseach in Logic (1912)</li> <li>Messkirch's Triduum: A Three-Day Meditation on the War (1915)</li> <li>Question and Judgement (1915)</li> <li>The Concept of Time in the Science of History (1915)</li> <li>Supplements to <i>The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus</i> (1917)</li> <li>On Schleiermacher's Second Speech, "On the Essence of Religion" (1917)</li> <br><b>Part 2. Early Freiburg Period, 1919-1923</b> <li>Letter to Engelbert Krebs on His Philosophical Conversion (1919)</li> <li>Letter to Karl Löwith on His Philosophical Identity (1921)</li> <li>Vita, with an Accompanying Letter to Georg Misch (1922)</li> <li>Critical Comments on Karl Jasper's <i>Psychology of Worldview</i> (1920)</li> <li>Phenomenological Interpretation with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation (1922)</li> <br><b>Part 3. Marburg Period, 1924-1928</b> <li>The Problem of Sin in Luther (1924)</li> <li>The Concept of Time (1924)</li> <li>Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle (1924)</li> <li>Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview (1925)</li> <li>On the Essence of Truth (Pentecost Monday, 1926)</li> <li>Letter Exchange with Karl Löwith on <i>Being and Time</i> (1927)</li> <li>"Phenomenology," Draft B (of the <i>Encyclopedia Britannica</i> Article</i>), with Heidegger's Letter to Husserl (1927)</li> <li>"Heidegger, Martin": Lexicon Article Attributed to Rudolf Buttmann (1928)</li> <br><b>Appendixes. Supplements by Heidegger's Contemporaries</b> <li>Academic Evaluations of Heidegger by His Teachers and Peers</li> <li>Husserl and Heidegger</li> <ul> <li>Correspodence to and about Each Other, 1914-1934</li> <li>For Edmund Husserl on His Seventieth Birthday</li> </ul> <li>Karl Löwith's Impressions of Husserl and Heidegger</li> </ul> </p> <p> This is a welcome collection of writings that are not a part of the official collected works, the <i><a href="gesamt.html">Gesamtausgabe</a></i>. It gathers essays of Heidegger's up to the publication of <i>Being and Time</i> that have been translated and published in various journals and books, and documents discovered in various archives that appear here for the first time. Most of the earlier translations are revised in this volume, and some lectures are paraphrased from contemporary transcripts. This book has much many reference materials on Heidegger's pre-<i>Being and Time</i> writings, beyond just the texts included; several indexes, bibliographies, glossary, notes, introductions to all the texts. As a reference, it is a useful supplement to Denker's <a href="hbmisc.html#denker">Historical Dictionary</a>, now sadly out of print. </p> <p> There's some content overlap with <a href="hbheid.html#Supplements">Supplements</a>, published five years earlier. An <a href="hbheid.html#ConceptofTime">earlier translation</a> of the lecture <i>The Concept of Time</i> was published in 1992. The new translation here weaves together transcripts subsequently discovered in various archives. </p> <p> The earlier material from Heidegger's student days is juvenalia, but by the end of the First World War his thinking is focusing on the problems that will lead to <i>Being and Time</i>, and concern him for the rest of his life. In the 32 page review of Jasper's book (another translation appears in <i><a href="hbpathmarks.html">Pathmarks</a></i>), Heidegger uses formal indication on the problem of existence. </p> <blockquote><p> In keeping with the specific aim of this comentary, we wish only to call the reader's attention to a few things which point to <i>the existence of a problem</i>. </p></blockquote> <blockquote><p> An initial approach to the problem (which in accord with its sense will later have to be <i>deconstructed [abbauen]</i>) can be provided in <i>formal indication (a particular methodological level of phenomenological explication</i> that cannot be treated any further here, though some understanding of it can be gleaned from the following): "Existence" is a determination of something. If one wants to characterize it regionally, though in the end this characterization proves to be a misleading digression away from the actual sense of existence, it can be taken as a certain way-to-be, as a particular sense of "is," which "is" essentially the sense of the (I) "am." We have this "am" in a genuine sense not in a theoretical intetion, but in the very actualizing of the "am," the very be-ing of the self has the formally indicative sense of existence. This gives us a clue pointing to the source out of which the sense of existence, as the particular how of the self (or of the I), must be drawn. What provoes to be crucial here is the fact that I <i>have myself</i> [in a fore-having!], the basic experience in which I encounter myself as a self, so that I, laiving in this experience, and <i>responding</i> to <i>its</i> very sense, can ask about the sense of my "I am." "Having-myself" is ambiguous in many different respects, and this divesity found in its sense must be made comprehensible by the varying diversity of <i>specifically historical</i> contexts rather than to [generic] contexts of classification that assume that the status of regions within an autonomous system. In the archontic sense of the <i>properly</i> actualized basic experience of the "I am," an experience that properly concerns just me myself purely and radically, we find that this experience does no experience the "I" as something located in a region, as an individualization of a "universal," as a [generic] <i>instance</i> of something. Rather, this experience experiences the "I" [in its proper sense] as a self [i.e., myself, yourself, ourselves, <i>je nach dem</i>]. The sheer persistence of the actualizing [event!] that brings this experience to complete fulfillment experientially demonstrates how foreign any region or objective realm is to the "I". Any attempts to give a regional determination to the "I" (a determination that stems from a preconception that regards the I as a stream of consciousness or a nexus of experience) "extinguishes" the sense of the "am" and turns the "I" <i>into an object</i> that can be fixed and <i>classified</i> by putting it into a region. <i>It follows from this that we need to develop a radical suspicion against all preconceptions that objectify by regions, the contextures of concepts that arise from such preconceptions, and the various ways in which they arise.</i> </p></blockquote> <blockquote><p> Pp. 137-138 </p></blockquote> <p> The two Aristotle papers have succint expositions of the critical issues in ontology. Here, in the first paper, Heidegger wraps up his interpretation of being as truth as unveiling. </p> <blockquote><p> The »s³µ¹½ gives the being in itself, which now means that it gives the being in its unveiled "as what," to the extent that a what is put forward that is not deceptive, merely passing itself off as the what in question. ȵ洿 as self-veiling has sense only on the basis of a meaning of »·¸s that is originally not related to »Ì³¿Â. Remaining concealed, being veiled, is expressly specified as that which defines the sense of ȵ洿 and therefore the sense of truth. Aristotle regards being concealed as in itself positive. It is not by chance that the sense of "truth" for the Greeks is in its sense, and not just grammatically, defined privatively. The entity in the how of its possible "as-what determinations," is not simply there, it is a "task." And the entity in the how of its being unveiled, C½ a »·¸­Â, is that which must be taken into custody for safeguarding against possible loss. That is the sense of the habits, ¾µ¹Â, in which the soul possesses truth. The highest authentic habits are ÿƹ± and ÆÁ̽·Ã¹Â, which hold the ÁDZ¯ in trust and safeguard their truth, each within its own field of being. The C½ a »·¸­Â is no proper being or field of being of true judgements, but rather the entity itself in the how (aÂ) of its unveiled being-intended. It is ½ ´¹±½¿¯± as ½¿·Ä̽: "in the 'intellect' as the toward-which of its apprehending." This interpretation of »·¸s and »·¸µÍµ¹½, which circumvents a series of artificial difficulties that have arisen in the exposition of their sense, will be concretely documented by an in-depth phenomenological analysis of <i>Met</i>. VI, 4 (being as truth), <i>De anima</i> III, 5-6 (productive and passional mind), <i>De interpretatione, Met</i>. V, 29 ("false") and above all, <i>Met</i>. IX, 10 (being as truth). </p></blockquote> <blockquote><p> P. 177 </p></blockquote> <p> The correspondence shows how Heidegger was seen by his contemporaries. The final appendix has fictionalized portraits of Husserl and Heidegger by Karl Löwith. </p> <p> <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0810123037/ereignis/"><img height=100 width=65 src="http://mysite.verizon.net/res0o31p/hb/imgs/0810123037.jpg" alt="book"></a> </p> <br> <p> <b>N.B.:</b> This is the first time I use unicode for the Greek words. All the other Greek words on bibliography pages use the symbol font. In the past the symbol font was the most likely to be available on visitors' machines, but unicode is probably more prevalent today. And it allows me to use diacritics. If you want to vote one way or the other, or have some wisdom to pass along about using Greek on the web, let me know. </p> <hr> <p>Send additions, corrections or whatever to that_pete (at) yahoo.com or <a href="http://www.beyng.com/msgform.html">mail a msg from this form</a>. Don't forget to put your comments in context (what page, what your going on about, etc.)! Include your email address so that I can reply. </p> <hr> <p>Back to <a href="../hbooks.html">Heidegger books page</a>. </p> <hr> <p>Back to <a href="../ereignis.html">Heidegger home page</a>. </p> <hr> <div class="center"> <iframe marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" src="http://rcm.amazon.com/e/cm?t=ereignis&o=1&p=15&l=st1&mode=books&search=heidegger early&=1&fc1=&lc1=&lt1=&bg1=&f=ifr" width="478" height="250" border="0" frameborder="0" style="border:none;" scrolling="no"></iframe> </div> <hr> <address> Created 2007/11/25<br> Last updated 2007/11/25<br> <a href="http://www.beyng.com/pete.html">Pete</a> </address> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/s/link-enhancer?tag=ereignis"> </script> <noscript> <img src="http://www.assoc-amazon.com/s/noscript?tag=ereignis" alt="" /> </noscript> </body> </html>