It is only ‘properly speaking’ (eigentlich) that dao can be said to refer to Weg. This means that only when interpreted in the particular manner, or thought in its proper nature as Heidegger may ascribe to it, can dao come into relation with Weg. Weg is the standard against which dao is measured. The same consideration applies to the relation between Ereignis and dao.
As for the transformation into “pure luminosity” which Heidegger refers to as the goal of Indian thinking, this “pure luminosity” is a translation of “reine Helle” - a phrase not only resonant of but also an etymon of the English phrase ‘pure hell’. For both the German Hellen and Hallen, and the English ‘hell’ share the same root - though the German adjective hell means simply ‘bright’ or ‘light’.
If we distinguish the conceptions of nothing into three basic types, namely, privative, negative, and original nothing, then Heidegger's and Daoism's conception of nothing can be characterized as -original nothing.
The unhiddenness of beings in their Being which for us is an aspect of the dao is given in each and every form of transfinite experience and cognition. Every center of activity perceives, interprets, and appropriates itself to the dao in its own way and within the experiential givenness of its own perspective.
[T]here are moments-only moments, for Heidegger-of authentic being-in-the-world, of relating with the awareness of one's own being toward death, of finitude, that awakens us to true discourse, of recognition of the "event of Being," the "event of appropriation" as the happening of the truth of Being.
Heidegger's attempt to gather things together in the Ereignis may be incompatible with the intrinsic pluralism of language, and the Ereignis may reflect a Greco-Germanic sense of being which is but one historical possibility among others, even within Western culture. His effort to step back from Western philosophical tradition to uncover its fundamental bearings, by a phenomenological bringing into view of matters that this tradition occludes, may suffer from a narrow purism in its focus on the being-question.
what [Heidegger] means by Being is thoroughly different from that found in ontology. As we know, Being in ontology is the most universal con-cept or the most general category. But for Heidegger, Being is neither a category, nor even a concept. To put it more clearly, for Heidegger Being is not "what" it is, but that what which "is".
Aside from having fundamentally different structures of understanding, and from elaborating on them towards significantly different ends, these works have a notable fundamental commonality. Both of these works disclose a pattern of being fallen into the world, of being lost amongst the actions and ways of others.
I conceive this as a Heideggerian turn in Lyotard's development. The all-encompassing necessity of the Ereignis however is changed into a less stringent 'Arrive-t-il?' and 'Y-a-t-il?': Does it happen and does it take (a) place?
What Heidegger is after in Being and Time is ontological authenticity, which Dasein can only achieve after becoming aware of its thrownness, divorcing itself from the They, and understanding its own possibilities as well as their unavoidable end. However, Watsuji's project has little to do with ontology, nor with authenticity in the Heideggerian sense. He wants an ethic.
[E]arly Heidegger insists that "Being well exists (west) without beings." But the later Heidegger rejects this thesis and declares that "Being never exists (west) without beings." Such an essential change can be regarded as a consequence of his adoption of a positive doctrine of "Ab-grund".
[W]hat could we conceivably mean when we say “To the things themselves!” in the face of Being? What kind of approach could we even take to such a question?
Psychological Aspects of Confucian Moral Philosophy, with an Excursus on Heidegger's Later Thought
Being is not any single being, but is a process of human being toward the authentic (appropriate, ereignete: ereignen) openness (Erschlossenheit). This happens only through true temporality, namely through an authentic resoluteness, not through any logical thinking.
'If Being is the source of beings (accounting for the ontological difference), what then is the source of Being and Nonbeing? Of truth and untruth? Of freedom and unfreedom? Heidegger's answer is Ereignis.'
'The Appropriation, bearing a striking affinity to the Buddhist doctrine of "dependent origination" and the Taoist originating-returning "Way" (Tao), is the natural conclusion of a horizontal thinking. Non-representational, non-dualistic and non-substantial, Being has to stand "outside-of-itself" but still "in and for itself". This is possible only in a horizon or region, that is essentially appropriating. That means, there must be a being that is not ontologically different from the pure horizon (openness) of Being (Sein) but still, because of its status as a being, leaves "room" and "space" for this hermeneutic dance and appropriating game. This being can only be a "Da-sein" (there-being), who possesses nothing representable but the opening "Da" as the disclosedness of Being.'
'Attention to Heidegger's writings, I believe, can rescue these statements from opacity or contradiction, thereby enhancing the persuasiveness of Nishitani's work--just as the latter can serve to elucidate Heidegger's exploration of being-sive-nothingness as an ontological happening (or Ereignis).'
'If one of the philosophical tasks left to us in the late twentieth century is the appropriation of Heidegger's thought, we would do well to look to Nishitani, for he shows that Heidegger's call for planetary thinking has not gone unheard. I wish here to continue the conversation between Heidegger and Nishitani and to explore this meeting of traditions in Nishitani's recently translated work, Religion and Nothingness.(9) My conviction, which I hope to make persuasive, is that Nishitani's presentation and development of a contemporary philosophy of "emptiness" (`suunyataa) not only address Heidegger's key concerns, but provide the space in which dialogue among civilizations and planetary thinking become possible.'
A Review of Heidegger and Asian Thought, Graham Parkes, ed.