the mode of being-in-the-world is, as such, determined by the μεσότης. Correspondingly, it must be noted that there is no μέσον in accordance with this way of being that would be ἕν and ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν.221 On the other hand, with a πρᾶγμα καθ’ αὑτό, for example, a line or two numbers, one and the same μέσον remains, just as four is always the double of two, and is equally distant from two and six. In this sense, there is no μέσον for the being of human beings because everything human is μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς. For our being, characterized by particularity, no unique and absolute norm can be given. It depends on cultivating the being of human beings, so that it is transposed into the aptitude for maintaining the mean. But that means nothing other than seizing the moment. It depends on ὅτε [δεῖ] καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ.222 In relation to this manifoldness of being-determinations, maintaining the mean is what counts—not an arithmetical or geometrical mean, but mean now taken in the sense of ἕξις as τάξις, the “being-apportioned” of that which comes up for a decision. Apportioning is a matter that arises from the resolution itself: the mean is, here, not a fixed property, but is a way of comporting oneself in the world. Aristotle designates ἀρετή as τοῦ μέσου στοχαστική;223 it “aims” as what maintains the mean, as being-oriented to the right apportioning, the right seizing of the moment. Μεσότης: ἕξις βλέπουσα,224 the “being-composed that sees” and is open to the situation. In this sense, the mean must be understood on the basis of the being-character of that for which it comes into question as mean; in this sense, it is related to the being of human beings as being-oriented to something.
In Book 2, Chapter 11 of De Anima, in his interpretation of αἴσθησις, Aristotle characterizes αἴσθησις itself as a μεσότης, that is, perception as a μέσον with the character of κριτικόν, of the “ability-to-separate” one thing from another.225 This conception arises from the fact that Aristotle recognizes that the seeing of colors is always separating one definite color from another. The ability-to-see must be a possibility that is not related to one object in its vicinity, but a possibility that can see both ends, dark-light, and therefore the entire range of the color manifold. It is a being-positioned toward possible objects, which is a δύναμις in the sense of κριτική. Perception is related to objects in the peculiar position of being-open to them. In this being-open, there is a definite beingoriented with regard to both ends. On the basis of this application of the μέσον, it becomes clear that we are not dealing with a precisely defined property, but with that which is primarily related to being-oriented in the world.
γ. The Orientation of ἀρετή toward the Moment (καιρός)
ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ
221. Eth. Nic. Β 5, 1106 a 32.
222. Eth. Nic. Β 5, 1106 b 21 sq.
223. Eth. Nic. Β 5, 1106 b 28: στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου.
224. Eth. Nic. Β 5, 1106 b 9.
225. De an. Β 11, 424 a 4 sqq.