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The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings [189–191]

mode of “resolving oneself.” It belongs to action that it arise in each case out of a resolution. Action itself has its τέλος in the καιρός. Therefore, it belongs to action that it proceed by way of deliberating and as such be fulfilled. In ὀρθότης, the action is fulfilled in the “correctness” of deliberation. With training, the possibility of action is put out of play, deliberating and resolving, the how of action—precisely that on which it depends. Therefore, to be able to be brought into the possibility of right action does not mean to appropriate a completedness. The manner and mode of habituation, in the case of action, is not practice but repetition. Repetition does not mean the bringing-into-play of a settled completedness, but rather acting anew in every moment on the basis of the corresponding resolution .

Cultivating ἕξις never depends on an operation, a routine. In an operation, the moment is destroyed. Every completedness, as settled routine, breaks down in the face of the moment. Appropriation and cultivation of ἕξις through habituation means nothing other than correct repetition. Therefore, in Chapter 3, Aristotle also sharply distinguishes ἀρετή and action from τέχνη, although he initially groups them together, when demarcating them in opposition to ἐπιστήμη. To appropriation ἐκ διδασκαλίας belong ἐμπειρία and χρόνος.230 For Aristotle, “science,” ἐπιστήμη, is a determinate ἕξις, a determinate being-positioned toward the matter that is there as such, in such a way that I have information about it. This ἕξις carries in itself a measure for concrete knowing. According to its content, this concrete knowing can only be brought forward little by little. It is dependent upon the extent of knowing. It requires in itself a fully determinate duration. By contrast, πράττειν, “action,” as well as “completing,” ποιεῖν, must be cultivated as such in πρᾶξις and τέχνη. They do not take up a definite material, but rather cultivate the how of dealing itself. The distinction lies in the fact that πρᾶξις depends on the how. The how is only appropriated in such a way that the human being enables himself to be composed at each moment ; not routine but holding-oneself-open, δύναμις in the μεσότης. All of human living cannot be there constantly. The possibilities that a human existence has at its disposal are not constantly there within the stretching of being- there; it loses itself. The possibility deteriorates, and being-there requires ever new and constantly repeated appropriation. The peculiarity of that upon which it depends in repetition as a determinate practice can be characterized by the fact that all action, and all non-action, is oriented toward the μεσότης. Aristotle emphasizes, again and again, that the μέσον is hard to find and easy to miss; errors are easy. To fly off the handle is easy, but to be angry at the right moment is difficult. This requires the possibility of being able to seize the moment as a whole. Therefore, acting seldom occurs on the basis of the μεσότης and in the μεσότης.231


230. Eth. Nic. Β 1, 1103 a 15 sqq.

231. Eth. Nic. Β 9, 1109 a 26 sqq.: οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον [ . . . ]· τὸ δ᾽ ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν.


Martin Heidegger (GA 18) Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy