fearing rises up in ourselves; the possibility of fear and of anxiety is co-given in our being. But that shows that, in fact, corporeality also speaks in the γένεσις of πάθη. “If that is so, then it is clear that the πάθη are λόγοι ἔνυλοι.”257
d) The Double-Type of Consideration of πάθος according to εἶδος and ὕλη, and the Question Concerning the Task of the φυσικός
The addressing of this phenomenon, which should hit upon the πάθη as to what they are, must proceed toward that on the basis of which the πάθη are, that wherein they are found. Their ὕλη is nothing other than σῶμα, the corporeality of the human being. Therefore, since the investigation of the πάθη is of this sort, the ὅροι that circumscribe in themselves the phenomenon at each moment must, accordingly, fall out.258 Thus the ὅροι is of the ὀργή. “Being-angry is something like a being-in-motion of the body constituted thus and so, of a corporeality that finds itself in a fully determinate mode, or a body part, and thus it is a fully determinate motion under pressure from this and that, from definite circumstances because of this and that occasion.”259 At once, the ὕλη is seen; it lies in τοιουδὶ σώματος. At the same time, the εἶδος is in the being-so of being-of-concern: ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε.260 With that, λόγος is simultaneously addressed. From this, a fundamental epistemological definition follows, for Aristotle: “Therefore, it is already a matter of the φυσικός to take into view that which lies within the thematic circle of the being of living things.”261 Φυσικός: he who examines nature in the widest sense. In the phenomenon of πάθος, σῶμα is co-constitutive, specifically as something that carries in itself the possibility of being-in-a-world. There, σῶμα characterizes a fully determinate ὕλη that makes living possible. It thus follows, for Aristotle, that the φυσικός considers the πάθη in a different mode than does the διαλεκτικός. They “circumscribe the πάθη in ever different modes, for example, anger. The one [the διαλεκτικός, who deals with rhetoric] considers anger as ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως, being after pay-back [a certain implacability as a mode of being-toward-others]; the φυσικός defines anger as a determinate boiling up of blood in the heart and of the temperature.”262 The first λόγος yields the genuine εἶδος,263 that which genuinely is. But, as determination of the being of human beings in the world, it is necessarily co-determined by the fact that it is a ζέσις, a “boiling up” of the blood.
257. De an. Α 1, 403 a 24 sq.: εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν.
258. De an. Α 1, 403 a 25.
259. De an. Α 1, 403 a 26 sq.: τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε.
260. Ibid.
261. De an. Α 1, 403 a 27 sq.: διὰ ταῦτα ἤδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς.
262. De an. Α 1, 403 a 29 sqq.: διαφερόντως δ᾽ ἂν ὁρίσαιντο φυσικός τε καὶ διαλεκτικὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργὴ τί ἐστιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ.
263. De an. Α 1, 403 b 2.