goods”—as they lie at the basis of the fundamental discussions. Meaning of being as being present; being: being-there in the present. In the context of the fundamental discussion, the meaning of being as being-present receives a more precise elucidation, insofar as we manage to show what the there means for the Greeks: having-come-into-the-there, and specifically through pro-duction; pro: there, pro is toward a determinate there; pro-ducing, bringing into the there, into the present. That is the genuine sense of ποίησις. Being-there is, in the genuine sense, being-pro-duced: being-there-completed, having-cometo-the-end. Τέλος = πέρας. These are clues for the basic sense of Greek ontology, as it was then later effective in the legacy of the Greeks, such that the originary sense of being conceals itself and becomes a matter of mere words. The primary sense of οὐσία, being, from which we have proceeded, is “possessions and goods”: that which is produced from wood, stone, and set upon the ground (which also is φύσει ὄν), is τέχνῃ ὄν: (1) thus πράγματα and χρήματα, with which I have something to do, what is at my disposal, what is in use in practical life; 2. the φύσει ὄντα as γινόμενα; 3. the φύσει ὄντα as ἀεί. The being-character can be made intelligible only from the sense of being-there as being-produced. The πράγματα are there insofar as they are produced in τέχνη. The φύσει ὄντα are that which is there in the producing of itself, what does not require production by others. They are there precisely as the πράγματα are. But their γένεσις has, once again, the character of the there: a plant grows up and brings forth another. And, finally, there is that which is there, being φύσει ὄν as ἀεί, which does not require production, which is there in such a way that it does not need to be produced. It is there in the genuine sense, but is intelligible only from the standpoint of production. The ground of beings is producing. What is to be seen is how λόγος is the possibility for obtaining access to being in this sense of being-there-completed, having-come-to-an-end.
The consideration that Aristotle carries through, here, begins with a division of ἕξις: (1) concrete knowledge, (2) assurance of the methodical treatment of a determinate being through research: παιδεία. It employs deliberations that do not touch upon concrete knowledge, which stand for themselves, which are separate from the question, πῶς ἔχει τ’ ἀληθές, “how beings comport themselves in their being-uncovered.” Apart from this question, we should discuss the right mode of access to a being with which research genuinely should begin, and what is the ordering of its individual steps. Aristotle orients this reflection schematically through two questions: (1) whether, above all, the φαινόμενα should be brought into view and then the διὰ τί; (2) if the διὰ τί, then which in-what-manner: in what respect must I primarily posit the being thus made present? We know of two respects: the οὗ ἕνεκα and the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. The question as to which of these two respects is more originary is to be decided on the basis of beings themselves. I cannot answer the question by thinking up something systematically. I can only decide it on the basis of the matter itself. The discussion of, and the proof that, the οὗ ἕνεκα is the primary respect, that it is the aspect that takes precedence, is to be fulfilled only in such a way that