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§21. Φόβος [251–253]

to me thus and so, a λυπηρόν that can bring me out of composure. Not every κακόν is an object of fear.352 The κακόν must be one that drives at my being-there, so that I am led-by-another. In the preceding chapter, Aristotle says that the λυπηρά, what brings me into the peculiar disposition in which I recoil from myself, are αἰσθητά. I follow the track of this being-what-matters, so I am then led-by-another in relation to which I do not really fear an impending injustice that touches me, or the possibility that I may become an imbecile. Rather, I hate it to the highest degree.353 With it, I am not led by another; such an impending thing leaves me cold, cold in the chill of hate. To fear belongs this peculiar type of encounter, which arouses that which leads one into fear.

That which is encountered must be further determined as σύνεγγυς,354 that which is not very far away; it must be “in proximity.” “We have no fear before that which is in the distance. Indeed, everyone knows that they will die, that death is imminent; but since it is not near, they are not at home with it in their φρόνησις. They do not turn toward it; they do not look around and see it after them.”355 That before which I am led into fear must have the character of the near, something impending that, as such, forces itself into proximity. This definite way of encountering the environing world is constitutive of the possibility of being-afraid. That which is encountered in the environing world must have the character of threat. That which has this way-of-being-in-the-world is a being-threatened. Here, it should be noted that being-threatened is not already being-afraid. In every fearing lies a being-threatened, but not vice versa. Fear is, precisely, a definite finding-oneself, a behaving with respect to oneself in being-threatened.


c) The Threatening (φοβερά) and the Encounter-Characters
That Announce (σημεῖα) It


From there, Aristotle proceeds to the characteristic of φοβερά and of σημεῖα. We will briefly summarize the three aspects of the “threatening” under the title of threateningness:

1. φαίνεται,356 it must “show itself” as thus and so, and yet as not genuinely there. The fearsome is characterized by possibility, being-possibility, but in the sense of the indeterminate. The aspect of indeterminacy enhances, in particular the possibility, that it can with regard to the possible disposition of fearing. The indeterminate also enhances the threateningness.


352. Rhet. Β 5, 1382 a 22 sq.: οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται.

353. Rhet. Β 4, 1382 a 9 sqq.: ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ ἥκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἡ παρουσία τῆς κακίας. καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δ᾽ οὐ μετὰ λύπης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὔ.

354. Rhet. Β 5, 1382 a 25.

355. Rhet. Β 5, 1382 a 25 sqq.: τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σπόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται· ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

356. Rhet. Β 5, 1382 a 29.


Martin Heidegger (GA 18) Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy

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