veritable in the being of a being as that which itself truly is, so that the ideas, as constituting the actuality of the actual, are for Plato himself the properly and truly actual.
The look, eidos, and the form, morphe, each encloses within itself that which belongs to a thing. As enclosing, it constitutes the limiting boundary of what determines the thing as finished, complete. The look, as enclosing the belongingness of all the real determinations, is also conceived of as constituting the finishedness, the completedness, of a being. Scholasticism says perfectio; Greek it is the teleion. This boundedness of the thing, which is distinctively characterized by its finishedness, is at the same time the possible object for an expressly embracing delimitation of the thing, for the horismos, the definition, the concept that comprehends the boundaries containing the reality of what has been formed.
In summary, the result relative to the characteristics of realitas is that they all develop with regard to what is configured in configuring, formed in forming, shaped in shaping, and made in making. Shaping, forming, making all signify a letting-come-here, letting-derive-from. We can characterize all these modes of action by a basic comportment of the Dasein which we can concisely call producing [Herstellen]. The characters of thingness (realitas) mentioned above, which were fixed for the first time in Greek ontology and later faded out and became formalized, that is, became part of the tradition and are now handled like well-worn coins, determine that which belongs in one way or another to the producibility of something produced. But to pro-duce, to place-here, Her-stellen, means at the same time to bring into the narrower or wider circuit of the accessible, here, to this place, to the Da, so that the produced being stands for itself on its own account and remains able to be found there and to lie-before there {vorliegen] as something established stably for itself. This is the source of the Greek term hupokeimenon, that which lies-before. That which first of all and constantly lies-before in the closest circle of human activity and accordingly is constantly disposable is the whole of all things of use, with which we constantly have to do, the whole of all those existent things which are themselves meant to be used on one another, the implement that is employed and the constantly used products of nature: house and yard, forest and field, sun, light and heat. What is thus tangibly present for dealing with {vor-handenJ is reckoned by everyday experience as that which is, as a being, in the primary sense. Disposable possessions and goods, property, are beings; they are quite simply that which is, the Greek ousia. In Aristotle's time, when it already had a firm terminological meaning philosophically and theoretically, this expression ousia was still synonymous with property, possessions, means, wealth. The pre-philosophical proper meaning of ousia carried through to the end. Accordingly a being is synonymous with an at-hand