The Essence of Philosophy and the Question of Truth
3Chapter One Preliminary Interpretation of the Essence of Philosophy
3§ 1. Futural philosophy; restraint as the basic disposition of the relation to Being [Seyn]
4§ 2. Philosophy as the immediately useless, though sovereign, knowledge of the essence of beings
6§ 3. Questioning the truth of Being, as sovereign knowledge
Chapter Two The Question of Truth as a Basic Question
8§ 4. Truth as a "problem" of "logic" (correctness of an assertion) distorts every view of the essence of truth
12§ 5. Discussion of truth by asking the basic question of philosophy, including a historical confrontation with Western philosophy. The need and the necessity of an original questioning
13RECAPITULATION
131) The question of truth as the most necessary philosophical question in an age that is totally unquestioning
142) What is worthy of questioning in the determination of truth hitherto (truth as the correctness of an assertion) as compelling us toward the question of truth
14§ 6. The traditional determination of truth as correctness
16§ 7. The controversy between idealism and realism on the common soil of a conception of truth as the correctness of a representation
18§ 8. The space of the fourfold-unitary openness. First directive toward what is worthy of questioning in the traditional determination of truth as correctness
19§ 9. The conception of truth and of the essence of man. The basic question of truth
19a) The determination of the essence of truth as connected to the determination of the essence of man
20RECAPITULATION
211) The relation between question and answer in the domain of philosophy
222) The customary determination of truth as correctness of representation, and the fourfold-unitary openness as the question-worthy ground of the possibility of the correctness of representation
23c) The question of truth as the most questionable of our previous history and the most worthy of questioning of our future history
Foundational Issues in the Question of Truth
Chapter One The Basic Question of the Essence of Truth as a Historical Reflection
27§ 10. The ambiguity of the question of truth: the search for what is true—reflection on the essence of truth
28§ 11. The question of truth as a question of the essence of the true: not an inquiry into the universal concept of the true
30§ 12. The question of the legitimacy of the ordinary determination of truth, as point of departure for a return to the ground of the possibility of correctness
32§ 13. The foundation of the traditional conception of truth in the return to its origin
32a) The historiographical consideration of the past
34b) Historical reflection on the future, the future as the beginning of all happenings
35RECAPITULATION
351) The ambiguity of the question of truth. The essence is not what is indifferently universal but what is most essential
362) The problematic character of the obviousness of the traditional conception of truth, and the question of its legitimacy
373) Toward the foundation of the customary conception of truth through a historical reflection on its origin . The distinction between a historiographical consideration and a historical reflection
39c) The acquisition of the beginning in the experience of its law. The historical as the extension from the future into the past and from the past into the future
41§ 14. Return to the Aristotelian doctrine of the truth of the assertion as a historical reflection
42§ 15. The Aristotelian foundation of the correctness of an assertion as the essence of truth
43§ 16. The turning of the question of the essence of truth into the question of the truth (essentiality) of the essence. The question of the Aristotelian conception of the essentiality of the essence
45RECAPITULATION
451) Rejection of three misinterpretations of the distinction between historiographical consideration and historical reflection. Science and historical reflection
512) The path from the question of the essence of truth to the question of the truth (essentiality) of the essence
Chapter Two The Question of the Truth (Essentiality) of the Essence
53§ 17. Historical reflection on the Aristotelian-Platonic determination of the essentiality of the essence
54a) The four characteristics of the essentiality of the essence in Aristotle
55b) The essence as the whatness of a being. Whatness as ἰδέα: the constantly present, what is in view in advance, the look (εἶδος)
57RECAPITULATION
571) Four characterizations of the essentiality of the essence in Aristotle. The whatness in Plato: the ἰδέα as what is sighted in advance, the look
592) How to understand the essence sighted in advance
60§ 18. The Greek determination of the essence (whatness) in the horizon of an understanding of Being as constant presence
60a) The determination of the essence (whatness) as the "beingness" (οὐσία) of beings. The understanding of Being as constant presence is the ground for the interpretation of beingness (οὐσία) as ἰδέα
61b) The Greek understanding of the ἰδέα
§ 19. The absence of a foundation for Aristotle's essential determination of truth as the correctness of an assertion. The question of the meaning of foundation
66RECAPITULATION
661) The conception of the Being of beings as constant presence: the ground for the determination of the essence (ἰδέα) as whatness
672) The absence of a foundation for the positing and for the characterization of the essence of truth as the correctness of an assertion. The meaning of foundation
Chapter Three The Laying of the Ground as the Foundation for Grasping an Essence
69§ 20. The absurdity of attempting to found an essential statement about truth as correctness by having recourse to a factual statement
71§ 21. Grasping the essence as bringing it forth. First directive
72§ 22. The search for the ground of the positing of the essence. Ordinariness of an acquaintance with the essence—enigma of a genuine knowledge of the essence (grasping of the essence) and its foundation
74§ 23. The bringing of the essence into view in advance (the grasping of the essence) as the bringing forth of the essence out of concealment into the light. The productive seeing of the essence
77§ 24. The productive seeing of the essence as the laying of the ground. ὑπόθεσις as θέσις of the ὑποκείμενον
78RECAPITULATION
781) Renewed reflection on our procedure as a whole: the necessity of a historical relation to the history of the essence of truth
812) The succession of the steps made up to now from truth as the correctness of an assertion to the positing of the essence as a productive seeing and a laying of the ground
84§ 25. The unconcealedness of the whatness of beings as the truth pertaining to the grasping of the essence. The groundedness of the correctness of an assertion in unconcealedness (ἀλήθεια)
87§ 26. Unconcealedness and the openness of beings. The process of the submergence of the original Greek essence of truth in the sense of the unconcealedness of beings
92RECAPITULATION
921) The productive seeing of the unconcealedness of beings as the ground of the essence of truth as correctness
922) The Greek ἀλήθεια as openness. The transformation of the concept of truth from unconcealedness to correctness
Chapter Four The Necessity of the Question of the Essence of Truth, on the Basis of the Beginning of the History of Truth
95§ 27. The turning of the critical question of truth toward the beginning of the history of truth as a leaping ahead into the future. Ἀλήθεια as experienced by the Greeks though not interrogated by them
98§ 28. Truth as correctness and its domination over its own ground as an essential consequence of the absence of a fathoming of the ground. The question of openness as the question of ἀλήθεια itself
102§ 29. The Greeks' experience of unconcealedness as the basic character of beings as such and their lack of inquiry into ἀλήθεια
104RECAPITULATION
1041) The ground of the necessity of the question of the essence of truth
2) Ἀλήθεια as primordial for the Greeks yet unquestioned by them
107§ 30. Their fidelity to the destiny meted out to them as the reason the Greeks did not ask about ἀλήθεια. Non-occurrence as what is necessarily detained in and through the beginning
108§ 31. The end of the first beginning and the preparation for another beginning
108a) Our situation at the end of the beginning and the demand for a reflection on the first beginning as a preparation for another beginning
109b) The experience of the end by Hölderlin and Nietzsche and their reflection on the beginning of Western history
111§ 32. The destiny meted out to the Greeks: to begin thinking as an inquiry into beings as such and in terms of an experience of unconcealedness as the basic character of beings (ἀλήθεια, φύσις)
114RECAPITULATION
1141) The lack of an inquiry into unconcealedness on the part of the Greeks and the necessity of their task
1152) Nietzsche and Hölderlin as end and as transition, each in his own way
1183) The task of the Greeks: to sustain the first beginning
119§ 33. The beginning of thinking and the essential determination of man
119a) The sustaining of the recognition of beings in their beingness and the essential determination of man as the perceiver of beings as such (νοῦς and λόγος)
121b) The transformation of the primordial determination of the essence of man, as the perceiver of beings, into the determination of the essence of man as the rational animal
123§ 34. The need and the necessity of our inquiry into unconcealedness itself on the basis of a more original understanding of the first beginning
125RECAPITULATION
1251) The rigor and inner order of questioning in distinction to the systematization of a system
1262) Historical reflection on the necessity of the first beginning; acquisition of the norms for the necessity of our own question of truth
1283) The origin of the apprehension of man as the rational animal out of an inability to sustain the first beginning
Chapter Five The Need and the Necessity of the First Beginning and the Need and the Necessity of an Other Way to Question and to Begin
131§ 35. The distress of not knowing the way out or the way in, as a mode of Being. The untrodden time-space of the between
133§ 36. The need of primordial thinking and how this need compels man dispositionally into the basic disposition of wonder (θαυμάζειν)
136§ 37. The ordinary concept of wonder as guideline for a reflection on θαυμάζειν as a basic disposition
136a) Amazement and marveling
137RECAPITULATION
1371) The negativity of the distress as a not knowing the way out or the way in. The whence and whither as the open "between" of the undifferentiatedness of beings and non-beings
1392) The compelling power of the need, its disposing as displacing man into the beginning of a foundation of his essence
1403) θαυμάζειν as the basic disposition of the primordial thinking of the Occident
142b) Admiration
143c) Astonishment and awe
143§ 38. The essence of wonder as the basic disposition compelling us into the necessity of primordial thinking
144a) In wonder what is most usual itself becomes the most unusual
144b) In wonder what is most usual of all and in all, in whatever manner this might be, becomes the most unusual
144c) The most extreme wonder knows no way out of the unusualness of what is most usual
145d) Wonder knows no way into the unusualness of what is most usual
145e) Wonder as between the usual and the unusual
145f) The eruption of the usualness of the most usual in the transition of the most usual into the most unusual. What alone is wondrous: beings as beings
146g) Wonder displaces man into the perception of beings as beings, into the sustaining of unconcealedness
147h) Wonder as a basic disposition belongs to the most unusual
147i) Analysis of wonder as a retrospective sketch of the displacement of man into beings as such
148j) The sustaining of the displacement prevailing in the basic disposition of wonder in the carrying out of the necessity of the question of beings as such
149RECAPITULATION
1491) The basic disposition of wonder versus related kinds of marvelling
1502) Sequence of steps in the characterization of wonder as a way toward the necessity of the primordial question
151k) The carrying out of the necessity: a suffering in the sense of the creative tolerance for the unconditioned
153l) Τέχνη as the basic attitude toward φύσις, where the preservation of the wondrous (the beingness of beings) unfolds and is established. Τέχνη maintains the holding sway of φύσις in unconcealedness
155m) The danger of disturbing the basic disposition of wonder in carrying it out. Τέχνη as the ground for the transformation of ἀλήθεια into ὁμοίωσις. The loss of the basic disposition and the absence of the original need and necessity
156§ 39. The need arising from the lack of need. Truth as correctness and philosophy (the question of truth) as without need and necessity
158§ 40. The abandonment of beings by Being as the concealed ground of the still hidden basic disposition. The compelling of this basic disposition into another necessity of another questioning and beginning
161§ 41. The necessity held out for us: to bring upon its ground openness as the clearing of the self-concealing—the question of the essence of man as the custodian of the truth of Being
Appendices
167THE QUESTION OF TRUTH
168FROM THE FIRST DRAFT
168I. Foundational issues in the question of truth
1681. The compelling power of the need arising from the abandonment by Being; terror as the basic disposition of the other beginning
1692. The question of the essence of truth as the necessity of the highest need arising from the abandonment of Being
1703. The question of truth and the question of Being
170a) The unfolding of the question of truth as a reflection on the first beginning. The reopening of the first beginning for the sake of another beginning
171b) The question of truth as a preliminary question on behalf of the basic question of Being
172II. Leaping ahead into the essentialization of truth
1724. The question of the essentialization of truth as a question that founds history originally
1735. Indication of the essentialization of truth through critical reflection and historical recollection
173a) Preparation for the leap by securing the approach run and by predelineating the direction of the leap. Correctness as the start of the approach run, openness as the direction of the leap
174b) The experience of openness as unconcealedness (ἀλήθεια) in the first beginning. The unquestioned character of unconcealedness and the task of a more original experience of its essence on the basis of our need
1756. The abandonment by Being as the need arising from the lack of need. The experience of the abandonment of beings by Being as need in the coming to light of the belongingness of Being to beings and the distinction of Being from beings Directive sketch of the essence of truth on the basis
1777. Directive sketch of the essence of truth on the basis of the need arising from the abandonment by Being
177a) Openness as the clearing for the vacillating self-concealment. Vacillating self-concealment as a first designation of Being itself
179b) The clearing for self-concealment as the supporting ground of humanity. Man's grounding of this supporting ground as Da-sein
180c) The question of truth, and the dislocation of humanity out of its previous homelessness into the ground of its essence, in order for man to become the founder and the preserver of the truth of Being
182d) The question of the essentialization of truth as the question of the essentialization of Being
184III. Recollection of the first shining forth of the essence of truth as ἀλήθεια (unconcealedness)
1848. Recollection of the first knowledge of truth at the beginning of Western philosophy as an indication of the proper question of the more original essence of truth as openness
1859. Articulation of the historical recollection in Jive steps of reflection
187Supplement to §40
188Supplement to §41
EDITOR'S AFTERWORD