Nevertheless, Dasein must also be called 'temporal' in the sense of Being 'in time'. Even without a developed historiology, factical Dasein needs and uses a calendar and a clock. Whatever may happen 'to Dasein', it experiences it as happening 'in time'. In the same way, the processes of [377] Nature, whether living or lifeless, are encountered 'in time'. They are within-time. So while our analysis of how the 'time' of within-time-ness has its source in temporality will be deferred until the next chapter,iii it would be easy to put this before our discussion of the connection between historicality and temporality. The historical is ordinarily characterized with the help of the time of within-time-ness. But if this ordinary characterization is to be stripped of its seeming self-evidence and exclusiveness, historicality must first be 'deduced' purely in terms of Dasein's primordial temporality; this is demanded even by the way these are 'objectively' connected. Since, however, time as within-time-ness also 'stems' from the temporality of Dasein, historicality and within-time-ness turn out to be equiprimordial. Thus, within its limits, the ordinary interpretation of the temporal character of history is justified.
After this first characterization of the course of the ontological exposition of historicality in terms of temporality, do we still need explicit assurance that the following investigation does not rest upon a belief that the problem of history is to be solved by a coup de main? The poverty of the 'categorial' means at our disposal, and the unsureness of the primary ontological horizons, become the more obtrusive, the more the problem of history is traced to its primordial roots. In the following study, we shall content ourselves with indicating the ontological locus of the problem of historicality. The researches of Dilthey were, for their part, pioneering work; but today's generation has not as yet made them its own. In the following analysis the issue is solely one of furthering their adoption.
Our exposition of the existential problem of historicality—an exposition which is necessarily limited, moreover, in that its goal is one of fundamental ontology—is divided up as follows: the ordinary understanding of history, and Dasein's historizing (Section 73); the basic constitution of historicality (Section 74); Dasein's historicality, and world-history (Section 75); the existential source of historiology in Dasein's historicality (Section 76); the connection of the foregoing exposition of the problem of historicality with the researches of Dilthey and the ideas of Count Yorck (Section 77).
¶ 73. The Ordinary Understanding of History, and Dasein's Historizing
[378] Our next aim is to find the right position for attacking the primordial question of the essence of history—that is to say, for construing historicality