over is necessarily synthetic—but not every synthetic act of speech is necessarily one that covers-over. It can also uncover. But not every uncovering is synthetic, only the uncovering in statements:
ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἕν ὄντων. (De anima III, 6, 430a27–28)
Nonetheless, where covering-over as well as uncovering is possible, there is already some kind of synthesis of the things intended, of what is represented in representations, as if they were one.
Accordingly, synthesis is the foundation of falsehood and truth. That is, here we have the kind of truth in place of which there could also be falsehood. In other words, here we have the truth of statements. Now:
ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν φάναι πάντα. (De anima III, 6, 430b3)
But all of these can also be called a “taking-apart.”
That is: every σύνθεσις [act of synthesizing] is likewise a διαίρεσις [act of separating], and vice versa. All synthesizing is separating, and all separating is synthesizing. Therefore, in the crucial passage where his theme is λόγoς as statement, Aristotle can summarize the determinations given up to this point [137]:
περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσίν ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. (De interpretatione, chap. 1, 16a12)
In the sphere of synthesizing and separating, covering-over and uncovering are [always] found together.10
* * *
Clearly, with putting-together and taking-apart we have found something that constitutes (or at least co-constitutes) the basic structure of λόγoς as statement. But how are we now to understand this putting-together and taking-apart (σύνθεσις-διαίρεσις), and how might we apply it to the entire phenomenon of a statement? It is certainly not hard to find examples. Take the statement, “This chalkboard is black.” Here we have an uncovering statement and a synthetic statement. Therefore, according to our explanation, we can say the statement is true—i.e., it contains within itself the very thing, now uncovered, that it intends. It shows the thing about which it makes a judgment just as that thing is in itself.
10. [Here the lecture of Friday, 4 December 1925 draws to a close, to be followed by Heidegger’s nineteenth lecture on Monday, 7 December.]