Translator's Forewardix
§ 1. The first, most literal meaning of the word “logic”
5§ 2. A first indication of the concept of the subject matter of “logic”
10§ 3. A philosophizing logic and traditional scholastic logic
15§4. The possibility and the being of truth in general. Skepticism
20§ 5. Outline of the course. Bibliography
The contemporary situation of philosophical logic.
(Psychologism and the question of truth)
§6. Psychologism: the name and the concept
37§7. Husserl’s critique of psychologism
37a) Some preliminaries of the critique
39b) Demonstration of the fundamental errors
45§ 8. The presuppositions of Husserl’s critique: a specific concept of truth as the guiding idea
52§ 9. The roots of these presuppositions
74§10. Anti-critical questions. The need to take the question of the essence of truth back to Aristotle
74a) Why must the critique of psychologism be a critique of psychology?
82b) What positive contribution does the phenomenological investigation of psychologism make to the question of the concept and interpretation of the phenomenon of truth?
90c) The connection between propositional and intuitional truth. The need to return to Aristotle
The problem of truth in the decisive origins of philosophical logic, and the seedbed of traditional logic (focused on Aristotle)
107§ 11. The place of truth, and λόγος (proposition)
114§ 12. The basic structure of λόγος and the phenomenon of making sense
120a) The as-structure of our primary way of understanding: the hermeneutical “as”
129b) The modification of the as-structure in the act of determining: the apophantic “as”
136§ 13. The conditions of the possibility of λόγος being false. The question of truth
136a) Preparatory interpretation. Metaphysics IV 7 and VI 4, and De interpretatione 1
143b) Truth and being. Interpretation of Metaphysics IX 10
154c) The three conditions for the possibility of a statement being false, taken in their interconnection
161§ 14. The presupposition for Aristotle’s interpretation of truth as the authentic determination of being
The radicalized question: What is truth? (A retrieval of the analysis of falsehood in terms of its ur-temporality)
167§ 15. The idea of a phenomenological chronology
175§ 16. The conditions of the possibility of falsehood within the horizon of the analysis of existence
185§ 17. Care as the being of existence. Concern-for and concern-about, authenticity and inauthenticity
195§ 18. The ur-temporality of care
203§ 19. Preparatory considerations toward attaining an original understanding of time. A return to the history of the philosophical interpretation of the concept of time
208§ 20. Hegel’s interpretation of time in the Encyclopaedia
218§ 21. The influence of Aristotle on Hegel’s and Bergson’s interpretation of time
224§ 22. A preliminary look at the meaning of time in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
226§ 23. The interpretation of time in the Transcendental Analytic
227a) An explanation of the notions “form” and “intuition”
235b) The constitutive moments of ordering
243c) Form of intuition and formal intuition
246d) Space and time as given infinite magnitudes; quantum and quantitas in Kant’s interpretation
252§ 24. The function of time in the Transcendental Logic. A characterization of the problematic
258§ 25. The question of the unity of nature
264§ 26. The original a priori of all combining—the transcendental unity of apperception
275§ 27. Time as the universal a priori form of all appearances
279§ 28. Time as original pure self-affection
284§ 29. The question about the connection between time as original self-affection and the “I think”
286§ 30. Interpretation of the First Analogy of Experience in the light of our interpretation of time
294§ 31. The schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding
297a) Sensibilization of appearances
298b) Sensibilization of empirical sensible concepts
300c) Sensibilization of pure sensible concepts
301d) Image and schema
309e) Sensibilization of the pure concepts of understanding
313§ 32. Number as the schema of quantity
319§ 33. Sensation as the schema of reality
323§ 34. Persistence as the schema of substance
328§ 35. The time-determination of the synthesis speciosa
330§ 36. The now-structure that we have attained: its character of referral and of making present. The phenomenal demonstrability and limits of Kant’s interpretation of time
337§ 37. Time as an existential of human existence—temporality and the structure of care. The statement as a making-present
345Editor's Afterword
347Glossaries
355Abbreviations