have not defined the mode of being of life or that I have shored it up with some underpinnings only as an afterthought - after I have given lecture courses for years now about the mode of being of life- is, as far as I'm concerned, as false as could be. And when he then says, "The experiencing of resistance - that is, the discovery, in striving, of what resists us- is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of the world" (SZ, 210 [italicized in the original]) and: "The 'against' and the 'counter to' in their ontological possibility are supported by disclosed being-in-the-world" (ibid.), then I must strongly object to these propositions- as what I said earlier has shown.

But it is entirely a misunderstanding when Heidegger speaks of a "summation" of the experiences of resistance which produce the being-real of one and only one world. I teach precisely that against the one vital drive-center [Triebund Lebenszentrum] resistance produces the unity of a real sphere- before all individual realities insofar as they are indebted to such being-functions and qualities of sensation in a secondary way. What is given prior to the "discovery in striving" of external resistances is the subjective multiplicity of space as spatiality and, besides, as temporality- but in no way a "world," let alone one world. "Worldhood" as a phenomenon (not as an "idea") is, I am sorry to say, entirely unknown to me. The "referential totality of significance" (SZ, 210) seems to me a very vague and ill-defined concept. There simply is no proof (cf. the following) that the drive-impulse is a "modification" of a non-cognitional mode of comportment which Heidegger calls "care," and that resistance presupposes being as something we arc concerned for (or the being of our fellow-man as someone for whom we have solicitude). Heidegger goes on to say that resistance is only one character of reality along with others. But if we properly distinguish the problem of the "in-itself" of the so-called "independence" or transcendence or existential relativity and so forth, and if we properly distinguish being-real as a mode of being vs. that which is real, then we see that this character is the only constitutive one for being-real. And it is equally not the case that "resistance presupposes necessarily a world which has already been disclosed" (SZ, 211). If "world" in this sentence means being which is independent of living subjectivity and all that this subjectivity holds "to exist" by virtue of this world- not just the forms of activity which well up from the life-center and, secondarily, the forms of intuition and consciousness of spatiality and temporality- then it is rather the case [264] that world is disclosed only in -resistance and in the rhythmical change of a subsequent cancellation of resistance (via suspension of the drive-center's drive-impulses which yield being-real).8 But at the same time only through ever newly initiated acts of re-flection - man's "being thrown back" upon himself9- is there formed what Heidegger calls "Dasein." The suffering of resistance is simultaneously the basis of the subsequent perceptive and pictorial clarification of what we suffer and of the self we become and, secondarily, of the self-


138/SCHELER


Max Scheler (GA 16) Reality and Resistance: On Being and Time, Section 43 - Heidegger the Man and the Thinker