consciousness which, as a Dasein-structure that is present as completed, is Heidegger's point of departure. The being of the world and the being of the self are strictly equiprimordial, and both of them as modes of being arise out of resistance, the cancellation of resistance, and the subsequent view of what has come about.

Now how does Heidegger himself proceed in order to grasp the peculiar quality of being-real? To being with, he restricts this "title" to "innerworldly entities." That which has existence in Heidegger's sense, i.e., the vital subjecthood of the solus ipse, has no reality. "There is" being-real only in a possible relation to the being of Dasein. Even the world- or better, the worldhood of the world - has no reality. In Heidegger, being real presupposes the disclosure of the world. Within innerworldly entities the nature which surrounds us sets itself off as a whole; in nature we run across two modes of being-real: readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand. The reality of things (this is the word in its "traditional meaning") is only a modification of presence-at-hand and comprises neither nature as a sphere itself nor all the things present-at-hand in nature. Thence comes the insight: Neither does reality have a priority, nor can this kind of being adequately characterize in an ontological way something like world and Dasein (SZ, 211).

These propositions contain true and false in a curious mixture. It is annoying that the being of the givenness of reality and the being of being-real itself are not distinguished. In Heidegger that in no way leads to the idealism of consciousness. That is the superiority of his doctrine. Consciousness is not introduced as a kind of being. It also seems to me to be the sense of Heidegger's excellent insight that the pre-given world and what is immanent in it are given to us primarily as "ready-to-hand," as "implements," and that this givenness is a pre-conscious and also pre-objective one.¹⁰ But all the more in Heidegger does nature, as well as the being-real factor in nature, become existentially relative, in my sense, to Dasein - that is, not to consciousness, knowledge, cognition, and the like, but rather to man as a mode of being, indeed to the solus ipse-to Heidegger. Let us recall that neither in Heidegger nor in Nicolai Hartmann is there any "existence in general" which would go beyond the specific and particular instances of "existence," and certainly no intellectus "infinitus," no "consciousness in general." Almost with contempt all such things are dismissed [265] as fancy names for the "they" into whom and into whose "idle chatter" man's selfhood is first of all "fallen." Nonetheless, it holds for Heidegger: "When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in-itself.' In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood ... In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they arc not. But now, as long as there is an understanding of being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that in this case entities will still continue to be" (SZ, 212). But here are we not very

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