[173] Let us formulate our question once again. How does art relate to truth? Where does art stand in the relationship? Art is μίμησις. Its relation to truth must be ascertainable in terms of the essence of μίμησις. What is μίμησις? Socrates says to Glaucon (at 595 c): μίμησιν ὅλως ἔχοις ἄν μοι εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν; οὐδὲ γάρ τοι αὐτὸς πάνυ τι συννοῶ τί βούλεται εἶναι. "Imitation, viewed as a whole: can you tell me at all what that is? For I myself as well am totally unable to discern what it may be."
Thus the two of them begin their conversation, ἐπισκοποῦντες, "keeping firmly in view the matter itself named in the word." This they do ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου, "in the manner to which they are accustomed to proceeding, being in pursuit of the matter," since that is what the Greek word "method" means. That customary way of proceeding is the kind of inquiry Plato practiced concerning beings as such. He expressed himself about it continually in his dialogues. Method, the manner of inquiry, was never for him a fixed technique; rather, it developed in cadence with the advance toward Being. If therefore at our present position method is formulated in an essential statement, such a designation by Platonic thought concerning the Ideas corresponds to that stage of the Platonic philosophy which is reached when Plato composes the dialogue on the state. But that stage is by no means the ultimate one. In the context of our present inquiry this account of method is of special significance.
Socrates (i.e., Plato) says in that regard (at 596 a): εΐδος γάρ πού τι