additions, the tradition of which they were the inheritors. Nor were they devoted to renewing the ancient republican orders so admired by many of their contemporaries. They were directed, rather, to founding, in the words of Machiavelli, "new modes and orders." And though they certainly were convinced that the liberation of mankind from all previously dominant spiritual and political tyranny would provide ordinary men with unprecedented peace, security, and prosperity, their ultimate motive in undertaking these efforts seems to have been enunciated most clearly by Spinoza in his Theologico-Political Treatise. On the very title page of this work, Spinoza declares that its arguments, one and all, are dedicated to demonstrating "not only that the freedom of philosophizing can be granted in keeping with piety and the peace of the republic; but that [such freedom] cannot be removed unless along with that very piety and the peace of the republic." No one, I trust, is convinced that the piety and peace to which Spinoza here refers are the piety praised and the peace promised in the teachings of the Christian religion.—Steven Berg, Bellarmine University.

CAPOBIANCO, Richard. Engaging Heidegger. New Studies in Phenomenology and Hermeneutics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010. xvi + 182pp. Cloth, $55.00—Most philosophers would have heard by now that Heidegger's work was devoted to the question of being, so they might be surprised to learn that there are scholars of Heidegger who regard that as a spurious question, some even insisting that this had never been his topic. Others have argued that while Heidegger started out to examine the question of being, he changed course in the 1930's and turned his attention to something else: the Ereignis (a term extremely hard to translate). These revisionary readings are outlined and documented in the first two chapters of the present book, and submitted to a critique. The first chapter draws heavily on the last work that Heidegger completed in his lifetime, Four Seminars, dating from 1966 to 1973, where he seems to establish clearly that his thought had always been motivated by the question of the meaning of being. Capobianco does acknowledge, however, difficulties of thought and phrasing that often affected the expression "the being of beings," that could account for some of the unorthodox readings. The second chapter confronts those who have championed the Ereignis as the new theme of the middle and late Heidegger, displacing being. Capobianco assembles a great deal of evidence, from the 1930's, 40's and 50's, to show that this is only a new name for the same matter of thought. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence here to undercut the hypothesis that Heidegger undertook a deep-seated new departure in philosophy when he introduced this term.
But Chapters 3 and 4 head in a new direction, in that they do point to changes in Heidegger's thinking between the period of *Being and Time* and the later period. Chapter 3 deals with home and homelessness; while *Being and Time* and works of that period foster a grim existentialism, with homelessness our basic condition, in the later work Heidegger comes to a re-appraisal of home as fit for our belonging. The contrast is enshrined in two different readings of Sophocles's *Antigone* ode: in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935), the heroic human being is driven out of all settled belonging, while in the treatment of the same ode in 1942, in a commentary on Hölderlin's hymn *Der Ister,* "the hearth is no longer the site of inauthentic Dasein: now it is the site of being-at-home in a primordial and authentic way." Chapter 4 constitutes a parallel, for it shows a development in Heidegger's thought, from the early period in which Augst appears as the basic attunement of Dasein, to the later period, in which Augst is replaced by astonishment (translating *das Erstaunen* and the Greek *thaumazein*) and awe (die *Scheu*), both of them qualified by "a deep and abiding joy." The reader may wonder, however, whether the unitary reading proposed in the first two chapters has now become somewhat compromised in Chapters 3 and 4. Is there not after all more homelessness and Augst in the later Heidegger than Capobianco allows?

Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the Heideggerian metaphor *die Lichtung* (lighting or clearing): first, with its place in *Being and Time*, and then with its role as a bridge to the "light-metaphysics" of the Platonic tradition. These are absorbing and highly original studies in which we do not find either a unitary Heidegger or a discontinuous one, but instead a challenge to Heidegger himself and to his English translators. At the core of the discussion is the question whether this term is a modification of the German word *das Licht* (light, that is, *lux*, illumination) or whether it is connected to *leicht* (what is not thick and heavy, that is, "light" in quite another sense). Capobianco leaves no doubt that, in *Being and Time*, the word means primarily "lighting," that is, *lux* or *lumen*. But several very late works of Heidegger—especially from the 1960's—are vociferous in denying any such derivation; instead it means a clearing, as in the forest, a spatial metaphor signifying an opening surrounded by a thicket. Why is the late Heidegger so insistent on the second meaning? It is perhaps the flight from Plato?

Chapters 7 and 8 are enlightening guides to Heidegger's significance for architecture and psychoanalysis.

This book as a whole presents a well-argued, independent view that will interest and challenge specialists, with a wide selection of the secondary literature. It is lucidly written, with very well-chosen quotations from Heidegger, and will serve as an excellent introductory guide for students.—Graeme Nicholson, *University of Toronto.*