The Torso of Humanity: An Interpretation of Being and Time

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Preface

**Being and Time** is a work by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger on the "Question of Being", published in 1927. As the centennial of the book approaches it perhaps ought to be said that as we press further into the 21st century the 'world-views' of intellectuals in the early 20th century like Heidegger's might well be expected to fade in importance in the face of the onslaught of new technologies and 'ways of life' which has characterized this century to date. Yet in many ways Heidegger's first book, though its famous 'difficulty' is not much overstated, is one of the most enduring landmarks of philosophical modernity: a book which for a long time gave 'those with eyes to see and ears to hear' a new way of thinking that ignored neither the human predicament nor the shape of the cosmos.

Furthermore, it almost does not need saying that the book's importance for philosophy in general exceeds the numbers of those who explicitly subscribe to its tenets. I would not personally describe myself as a 'Heideggerian', but I do think getting clear about this book is an important station on the way to understanding where philosophy is today; it is also simply an important work of 20th century intellectualism ('letters', if you will) that has a significant 'documentary' value as such. Time spent with it is not time wasted; reading difficult books is an essential part of a liberal education, and making the case that philosophy in
general is also an essential part of one is unfortunately easier than commonly suspected.

I intend this introduction to **Being and Time** to be an exposition of Heidegger’s 'early' thought under its most serious aspect; although Heidegger is often presented as a sort of crazed seer by the larger philosophical community if appropriate considerations are made he can be seen to be in his way as rigorous and serious a thinker as the most hardened analytic philosopher. In fact, Heidegger's attempt to draw philosophical attention away from the 'subject-object' relation that bewitched historical modern philosophy and to have philosophy attend to the details of our most personal, most intimate relationship to the world has not failed to have an influence on all areas and paradigms of philosophy, even ones where his views are explicitly 'proscribed'.

We ought not to unthinkingly follow any great mind of the past, but 'falling back behind our own object'—being indifferent to the lessons taught by some intellectual we feel we can ridicule on the cheap, to the point that our 'criticisms' actually parrot their ideas—is hardly the best practice. Furthermore, those who only wish to negate Heidegger's pronouncements are still conducted by reading the book into an understanding of many German (and French) intellectuals they cannot quite as easily dismiss; this was a book in dialogue with the most significant intellectual currents of its times and an ahistoricism approaching near-totality is a distressing mark of our current intellectual life, an affliction which
grappling with Being and Time will go some distance towards remedying.

The wide scope of Heidegger’s inquiry into the different regions of human existence and their importance for understanding the “Question of Being” suggests the attention lavished on the book by subsequent European philosophers and their admirers throughout the world is no accident; it is regarded by 'all the world' as the most important book of 20th century philosophy, and those in Anglophone philosophy who would put Philosophical Investigations in first place could stand to see it as a work Wittgenstein was reacting against (perhaps even somewhat sympathetically) in his later work. Yet it is true its profundity comes at a cost; Heidegger’s work is widely viewed as painfully obscure, perhaps fatally so, and a cursory reading of any of his pages will give you an idea why.

Unfortunately, the books in English that have aimed to remedy this failing have themselves failed, in my opinion, to set the record straight regarding Heidegger’s intentions in pursuing “fundamental ontology”; it is far too easy to simply ring mystical changes on Heidegger's idiosyncratic terminology without grasping the philosophical theory expressed by it. This book aims to be an accessible but serious 'general introduction' to Being and Time as a whole; the intended reader is a 'novice', for everyone newly confronted with Heidegger lacks much of the background necessary to 'put together' a full conception of what he is saying (but that means you are in good
company if you wonder for no particularly definite reason whether there is indeed more to the story than previously thought).

In a way, reading one of the extant English-language books on *Being and Time* is a little like being taken to see someone's high-end stereo system; novel translations of Heidegger's major terms are introduced, particularly exciting features of the entire architectonic are dwelt upon at (too much) length, and the result is “as much confusion as clarity” (Goethe). So I have contributed another effort to the genre intended to lack some of these defects; a long habituation on my part to thinking about Heidegger in terms of expository goals may indeed put a fresher approach within reach, and I expect an 'even-handed' approach to the book's appeal both to those oriented to 'Continental' philosophy and also to 'analytic' readers (a schism in approach one found already in Kant, with his distinction between the "school" and "cosmic" conceptions of philosophy) will also make this volume useful.

I think *The Torso of Humanity* is distinguished by its attention to the goal of treating Heidegger’s entire text with the seriousness it deserves. Many 'guides' to *Being and Time* essentially leave out Division II, the “Time” part of the book; others would go so far as to attempt to comprehend the entire treatise as planned, filling in gaps out of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and the early lecture courses. Perhaps unimaginatively, my book has thirteen chapters (one for each chapter of Divisions I and II and the book’s Introduction); in them I will not go
beyond what Heidegger actually committed to print before his famous *Kehre*, “turning”, made his earlier views questionable even to himself. In each chapter I will attempt an exposition of the corresponding chapter of *Being and Time* that the reader understands both what I take the book to be about and what it has historically been taken to be about.

The *Being and Time* we have is a ‘torso’ of a work and ought to be taken seriously as such; there is two-sixths of the manuscript as planned in the book we hold in our hands, but what is printed has certainly proved more than challenging enough for generations of philosophy students throughout the world. Many people have speculated that material in the 1927 lecture-course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and Heidegger's numerous courses on the 'great philosophers' Kant, Aristotle, Descartes and Parmenides mentioned in his prospectus for *Being and Time* allow us a view of the uncompleted whole. In later years Heidegger made clear it was no mistake that Division III of Part I and Part II were never published, and those who wish to grasp a larger work 'in its entirety' are perhaps champing at a non-existent bit; when later writings only recently available to the reading public—particularly the often-cryptic *Contributions to Philosophy*, composed ten years after *Being and Time* but published in Heidegger's centenary year 1989—explicitly deal with "Dasein" and other critical elements of *Being and Time*'s conceptual framework I do not think that they should not be ignored, but the focus will be very
pointedly and intentionally on the text of *Being and Time* itself.

Heidegger himself contributed valuable criticism of his 1920s philosophy in his later works and so I will occasionally advert to some of these later remarks; yet I believe that there is quite enough in the published text to keep a student of philosophy busy, even one with the 'philosophical maturity' the book demands. So this is not an 'omnibus' introduction to Heidegger, not even to his earlier writings; it is an attempt to take one particular book as it is. Although I have been influenced in various ways by several American scholars of Heidegger (I was first introduced to the reading of Heidegger by John Haugeland, whose 'fidelity' to a Heideggerian vision was exemplary; Hubert Dreyfus was encouraging about a previous project, and although my own account of "originary temporality" is different than his I think William Blattner's *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism* is a model monograph about Heidegger) external advisements will be kept to a minimum. My primary task is expository and if the *interpretation* of a Heidegger 'expert' helps make the point I will talk about it; otherwise I will refer to the idea, stated in an 'inversion' of a philosophical cliche, that if you cannot see *trees* you cannot see a *forest*.

What are the 'prerequisites' for this book? It is intended as a 'stand-alone' guide to *Being and Time* for people with a prior exposure to philosophy broad enough to include some knowledge of the major modern philosophers discussed by Heidegger (Descartes, Kant) and deep
enough to comprehend his relationship to Husserl and other 'mentors' he critically diverged from; all in all I expect it is a large enough audience, and my book will have achieved its purpose if the reader comes away feeling as though they have a solider grasp of this difficult tome. In particular, I aim to make those frustrated by an attempt to comprehend Heidegger 'outside the academic fold' less dissatisfied with their purchase of the standard English translation; although a genuinely challenging intellectual work always inspires vertigo in those thinking through it, I assure you it is very dubiously beneficial to have 'analytic' philosophers close at hand in working through Heidegger's pages, as their usual aim is precisely to prevent that sort of vertigo.

As someone who has been reading Being and Time on and off for twenty years I also assure the reader that 'insight' into one of the most complex and variously interpreted philosophical texts of all times will not come 'at a stroke' and that Heidegger himself—who spent a great deal of time in his later years giving lectures to 'non-philosophers'—would hardly think that one must have the grand dream of being a great philosopher to 'give it a go' and acquire competence in an important book. The book did not really come into focus until I read it carefully in German, and a further level of understanding arose with writing this text; the dream of a sudden and total epiphany regarding a topic or figure in philosophy is something like an 'occupational disease', and so I can only counsel people first trying to understand Heidegger or 'trying anew' to
take what I have to say for whatever value it has and patiently try to make their own sense of the book.

I myself toyed with the idea of new translations to make my own intentions in interpreting Heidegger clear, but spending more time with Heidegger's German made this seem more like the task of a lifetime than a year (if I may be specific, the result of trying one's own hand at translating a passage of this book is astounding; the complex imbrication of Heidegger's German prose resists the necessary simplifications of English translation even at a sentence-by-sentence level). Yet using existing translations requires creating a unity out of a dozen-odd renderings of Heidegger's terms, often chosen with a particular interpretation in mind; we all have our cherished 'insights' into things, but when they do not intuitively convey meaning to others we must cherish them privately.

Macquarrie and Robinson's decision in their quite adequate translation of *Being and Time* (long widely available in the English-speaking world) to include large swaths of Heidegger's original German in footnotes is a gesture in this direction of this difficulty; that writing team obviously already faced down many of the problems involved in 'Englishing' Heidegger even today and also—in spite of the natural desire abroad to detract from their primacy—succeeded to a large extent. Quotes will be from their edition. Beyond that I will generally tend to stick with short explications of Heidegger's German—a gift and encumbrance everyone who wants to get clear about
Heidegger must take more or less 'neat'—in my discussions of key terms and interpolate those terms into quoted translations. (It is sometimes said that Hegel taught philosophy to speak German, and a reader who wishes to comprehend Heidegger's terminology would do well to understand its contours in terms of its resonances with 'colloquial' German.)

One thing my book has in common with existing 'analytic' books on Heidegger is a de-emphasis of Heidegger's Nazi adventurism so soon after the book's publication, an issue which has come to dominate the discussion of Heidegger in the 'Anglosphere' following the recent publication of the wartime Black Notebooks. Let us say I hold no brief for the extreme right and its 'persistence of vision' down into our time; furthermore, it is clear that Being and Time is already a book with many socio-political overtones, many of them not salutary to the left. However, I encourage the contemporary 'polemical' reader to try to historicize Heidegger carefully. For example, Heidegger's discussion in Chapter 4 of das Man, the impersonal 'they' or 'one' that governs the everyday doings of the human being, had contemporary resonances with H.L. Mencken's excoriation of mediocrity in American society (which is not usually viewed as particularly banal or evil).

Furthermore, in a way previous English-language interpreters have failed to do justice to it might easily be said that Being and Time was fundamentally a work of the 'Roaring 20s', not a signpost to the fascist destruction to come. Claiming as Theodor Adorno did that Heidegger's
philosophy was “fascist in its innermost cells” is of no help when many of the viewpoints in Being and Time could just as well have been “Democratic Vistas” as ‘conservative-revolutionary' ones; and unfortunately I must demur in general from the supposition of Gilbert Ryle (one of the earliest Anglophone readers of Heidegger) that a “bad man” obviously “must be a bad philosopher”. Richard Rorty, admittedly not always the most astute observer when it came to the political ramifications of philosophy, was still right to hold that Heidegger’s philosophy has much to teach the ‘social democrat’ or leftist; as for example it fundamentally informed the work of Heidegger’s student Herbert Marcuse, not anyone’s idea of a brownshirt.

Furthermore, a sound rule of interpretive charity is that if someone thinks it—and one often meets people who are a good deal "Heideggerian" in contemporary society, and is tempted to place them ‘between good and evil’ like the English-language title of Rudiger Safranski's biography of Heidegger—it is a thought to think, worth pondering on that account even if its political valences are not all propitious. In an era of what has been called 'tone-policing' we are all too quick to cut off the 'unenlightened', unfortunately even or especially when their views more nearly approach enlightenment than we wish they did. It has never been possible for even the most ardent devotees to view Heidegger as a saint, and connoisseurs of his work do not usually approach saintliness either; however, the brute fact of his extensive influence naturally suggests to anyone perceptive something was 'going on' in his work.
A systematic theory of political unfreedom has been in the works for almost two centuries now, and one is indeed going to find its major achievements elsewhere than in Heidegger; however, it is at least true that not everything is 'political' in the same way, and the test of reading a reactionary author like Carlyle is one Karl Marx often set himself. Is there something to object to in Being and Time on the grounds of 'political correctness'? Heidegger would not be a major figure and the 'progressive social critic' considering him would be no critic at all if there were not 'hay to be made'. However, philosophy is indeed an inclusive endeavor and we are under no compulsion to repeat mistakes we identify in the past.

Those who have a wise suspicion that all is not well in the pages of Heidegger's book ought not to discard that suspicion, but to 'hold it in suspense' as they learn the concepts that might sensibly be objected to. At the end of the book, once we have completed the hard labor of getting Heidegger's early thoughts right, I have appended a postscript discussing Heidegger's later thought, its relation to Nazism, and the concept of "Continental philosophy" generally in its political aspect; the postscript will focus on Introduction to Metaphysics, Contributions to Philosophy, and What Is Called Thinking? as exemplary of the way in which the thought of Heidegger's later philosophy was formed and deformed by Heidegger's unthinking embrace of the monstrous Nazi movement and the disaster it spelled for Europe.
However, after much thinking I cannot say that this is more than an afterthought compared to the great seriousness and scope of Heidegger’s initial ascent; and, although my sympathy for those trying to work out strategies against fascistic tendencies in our society approaches totality, perhaps in working through the problems of our own time we should try to be 'philosophically correct' as well as politically correct. There is a famous Roman saying from Terence that often gets unthinkingly thrown around, "Nothing human is alien to me"; it is secretly often read in an exclusionary 'categorical' sense, but it can also more sensibly be taken in an optative one—knowledge of books like Being and Time is yours, if you want it.
Introductions I and II

Introduction I: Sein and Dasein

The lengthy two-part Introduction to Being and Time is, like the “Preface” to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, almost a work in itself. The Introduction lays crucially important foundations for the twelve chapters to follow and any student of the book must read it with some care, and perhaps even return to it after studying the body of the book as Jean Hyppolite suggested for Hegel's Preface. However, it is worth remembering that it is a prospectus for the entire work Heidegger planned, not just the ‘torso’ we have today; Hegel’s “Preface” was also an intended foreword to the never-completed “System of Science” the Phenomenology was supposed to be the introductory part of. The forty-page introduction to Being and Time comes in two parts, “The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being” and “The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. Method and Design of Our Investigation”.

The division between the two halves of the Introduction is not pointless; they deal with slightly different aspects of the book differently, but the importance of either ought not to be underplayed. Furthermore, it very definitely ought to be noted that the total contribution made by the
Introduction to understanding the book as a whole is immense; not every 'watchword' of the text as a whole makes its first appearance there, but when you are 'stumped' by Heidegger (or my exposition of him) it is the place you should turn for guidance.

Although Heidegger’s book is famous for being difficult to 'scan', perhaps no portion of the book is as difficult as the first four pages. The epigraph features a carefully selected quote from Plato's *Sophist* (not a famous one) and a carefully worked translation of it by Heidegger. “Selective” translation of classic philosophical texts from Greek and Latin is a recurring theme of *Being and Time*; it is slightly overshadowed in our English translation, but rest assured it is no accident that Heidegger chose to translate the way he did. This is followed by an announcement that Heidegger wishes to “raise anew the question of the meaning of being (die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein erneut zu stellen)”. The question of this ‘question’ could fill an entire career in academic philosophy and has, and even merely trying to figure out 'what is said' by Heidegger in making this demand proves difficult, but the relative beginner must take it on some degree of faith that something has been said by this they will gradually work their way into.

The topic of 'being' as it is treated in philosophy, a topic which may seem comically broad to neophytes, has historically been known by the name metaphysics and is again today; Heidegger's "fundamental ontology" both is and is not metaphysics, and offers grist for the
contemporary mill by virtue of that alone. I am no expert in contemporary metaphysics, but I am willing to quite confidently assert that devotees of 'paradoxes of constitution' or 'grounding' will not find reading Being and Time worthless effort if they bring an unjaundiced eye to it; it might even be said that "fundamental ontology" places important and intelligible constraints on the kinds of 'general metaphysics' that can be done.

The first three pages of 'Introduction I' continue to elaborate on this plan of action, giving us a programmatic explanation of Heidegger's task as he understands it: the "Question of Being" (Seinsfrage) which had fallen into neglect by the 20th century had to be asked again and asked in a radical spirit: handed-down pieces of the philosophical tradition made it look trivial or irrelevant, but Heidegger wants us very much not to think that increasing modernity had rendered this and other 'philosophical problems' irrelevant. He rehearses three common objections to the plan of his book: “Being is the most universal concept” (i.e., one that falls out from properly conducted scientific research), “Being is indefinable” (we ‘know it when we see it’) and “Being is self-evident” (the affordances of our conscious experience give us enough to go on).

Often enough in modern German philosophy a catchphrase or description 'stands in' for the ideas of another thinker, but it is not evident to me that the three objections correspond to three distinct contemporaries of Heidegger: whatever their historical provenance they are lively
enough principles, such that considering Heidegger's rejoinders is well worth the time. Heidegger's objection to the first pre-emptive statement is that "the 'universality' of 'Being' is not that of a class or genus", not simply a 'highest common factor' predicated of all that is. Since Aristotle some people have said that the unity of the category of being is a "unity of analogy", that there is no all-encompassing generic quality named by being. (This is a rejection of 'atomism' in the widest sense: if we take Heidegger's critique seriously we cannot attempt the common philosophical strategy of finding 'building blocks' of reality, collating them together, and calling being that which exists in this 'conceptual scheme'.)

His objection to the second pre-emption is that "'Being' cannot indeed be conceived as an entity"; these two rejoinders anticipate the famous statement "The being of beings is not that of Being" (known as the "ontological difference"). This point is an extremely subtle one, and much in Being and Time turns on it. A first approximation of the meaning of the "ontological difference" is that Being is not something we will find canonically represented in a being; there is no 'universal being', be it the human mind or the mind of God, which faithfully represents reality as it is and can serve as an 'Archimedean point' for explaining the rest of reality. A second, perhaps deeper consequence is that this rejection implies that we inquirers really do not know what being is based on our understanding of individual beings, however 'sophisticated' it might be; what some call 'reification' or 'hypostatization' is expressed by Heidegger with his distinction between the
'ontic' and the 'ontological', neither of which fully explains the other.

The objection to the third pre-emptive statement, “Being is self-evident”, is stated in full as “The very fact that we already live in an understanding of being and that the meaning of being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again.”

According to Heidegger we cannot not already know what being is in some sense, yet almost every aspect of it is elusive; self-evidence is therefore a non-starter. These are hard-hitting critiques of currents in philosophy which were not only characteristic of the philosophy of Heidegger's time but much of our own; they ought to pique the interest of a modern philosopher of any affiliation.

However, what has Heidegger told us about his own 'theory' in these cryptic first four pages? One central tenet of Heidegger's philosophical practice that gets expressed is that the history of philosophy 'hiddenly determines' the way we think about issues today in a way which makes philosophical progress difficult but is not for that reason 'worthless': what Heidegger says the Greeks “wrested with the utmost intellectual effort from the phenomena”, along with Kant’s dark insights about his “covert judgments of the common reason”, will be continual touchstones as we follow Heidegger's arguments. (His own ideas about a “destructive” history of philosophy, supposed to comprise

1 BT, p.23
the never-published Part II, will be addressed in the section on Introduction II.)

Another is that, whether we go in for ‘metaphysics’ of one particular shape or not—and it is true this is pointedly not Heidegger’s word in Being and Time for what he is doing—being cannot be irrelevant to philosophy as a whole; we may not know how to ‘catch it in our hands’, but an understanding of it is surely something we are questing for in philosophical research. Conveniently enough Heidegger asserts human inquirers always already operate with a sort of Seinsverständnis or “understanding of being”, however ill-examined; but in what exactly does this lie, and how can we get a better grasp of it?

Heidegger makes his answer to that question clear. The Question of Being is a question, and that means it involves something which is ‘asked about’ (sein Gefragtes), something which is ‘interrogated’ (ein Befragtes), and something which is ‘asked after’, which is the goal of the questioning (das Erfragte). For the Question of Being what is ‘asked about’ is Being, and that which is ‘interrogated’ is the world of existents. However, there is one type of being that has a priority over other types of being, one which is utterly crucial to even posing the question correctly. This being is Dasein, the ‘protagonist’ of Being and Time; Heidegger's new word for certain aspects of the human experience is enmeshed with nearly every aspect of the book's argument, and so I will take extensive care here and elsewhere dealing with it as it is defined in the book.
In the case of *Dasein* as with many of Heidegger's other specialized terms, the reader must do a great deal of probing the text as a whole to acquire anything like comprehension of the particular concept; I hope to make this task easier with short explications of the "German" connotations of Heidegger's words, but the effort must lie primarily with you. The word *Dasein* is almost always left untranslated in English-language discussions of Heidegger, and I will follow the convention in this book (perhaps one might translate it as “human being” without an article if passionate Heidegger acolytes were nowhere to be found; Heidegger himself later suggested it was inherently untranslatable). In a way Heidegger makes it abundantly clear what he means by Dasein and why it is of the utmost importance for understanding the problem of “fundamental ontology”, and in another way the term has remained perhaps understandably highly refractory to exegesis.

As is discussed in Division I *Dasein* is an ‘ordinary’ term of philosophical German, which refers to the ‘that-it-is’ of an entity rather than its ‘what-it-is’ (*Was-sein*); however, people without a background in German literature may not know that it is a fairly ‘ordinary’ term of modern German *tout court* in a manner that Heidegger is surely playing off. (We surely ought not to view *Being and Time* in the sense Habermas once lampooned, as having 'washed up on a California beach': yet German culture is not all rigid yet permissive cultural fixities, either, and we need not assume the "context of utterance" was so very different from our own times.) *Dasein*—it is a term with
neutral gender, *das Dasein*, which Heidegger makes some weather of elsewhere; unlike the central figure in the theories of the subject of many of his contemporaries, Heidegger's 'normative' human could be either a man or a woman—is a word for 'existence', in the sense that we speak of an 'unsatisfying existence' or a 'happy existence'.

There has been a great deal of controversy about how to apply analytic philosophy's 'mass noun/count noun' distinction to *Dasein*; John Haugeland claimed it was absolutely a mass noun like 'water' with only 'cases' or 'instantiations', which ultimately made it something like an 'ethos' in the 'standard' sense we use that loan-word from Greek in today, but in German Heidegger does sometimes use the definite article in connection with *Dasein* and in Introduction I Heidegger makes it rather clear he has a 'target concept' in mind that Dasein is to explain: “As ways in which man behaves (*Verhaltungen des Menschen*), sciences have the manner of Being which this entity—man himself (*Mensch*)—possesses. This entity we denote by the term 'Dasein'."²

It might be noted that *Mensch* (which I have interpolated into the printed translation for purposes of clarification) is a particular German word English speakers may not quite 'know as such', a term for human beings which has in modern times not distinguished between males and females and roughly marks out humans in terms of their 'elevated' faculties (there are a wide range of words in

² BT, p. 32
German to describe people operating in other 'modes'). In Heidegger's time there had been quite a vogue for *Menschheit* or 'humanity' but Nietzsche had still quite recently posed the question of the possibility of a type of human life that could be described as the Übermensch (a decade after the publication of *Being and Time* Heidegger would make his own nuanced interpretation of the "overman" available in a series of lecture-courses on Nietzsche). This is no mere detail; all of this is 'context' for what it is about our lives Heidegger wants to 'mark out' with *Dasein*; as with history we do not study philosophy 'under conditions of our own choosing, but ones transmitted from the past', and what Heidegger's contemporaries broadly speaking were thinking about could not be irrelevant to what he is intending here.

*Dasein* is not an ideal of a perfectly self-aware, rational intellect but the human being considered in terms of their existence (*Existenz*); it is not the cultural ideals and religious dogmas that would define the core of our being 'under ideal conditions', but we ourselves as we actually do live life (and 'of course' we live that life 'alone' as individuals, not merely as members of an always somewhat fanciful collectivity). This is an interesting enough topic in itself, as it has filled countless pages over many centuries, but in Introduction I Heidegger says *Dasein* has an “ontic priority”, an “ontological priority”, and an “ontic-ontological priority” for the Question of Being as well. Firstly, as indicated by the way it is introduced in the text *Dasein* is simply *the being that questions*, so no question is getting around it; it is
ontologically relevant because it is “ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it”. Dasein simply cannot be ‘quits with the issue’ of taking an interest in itself; the question of what it itself is can never stop being relevant. Finally, Dasein possesses “equiprimordially” (gleichursprünglich) an interest in the things of the world; a famous and still provocative passage of Aristotle’s De Anima, “Man’s soul is in a certain way entities”, is here quoted to give the reader some idea of Heidegger’s thinking about Dasein’s relationship to the 'external world' (a topic famously and thoroughly taken up in Chapter 6 of Division I).

If the you continue on with me in reading Being and Time, you will never be far from the book's ‘hero’ Dasein; the portions of the book which were completed are Division I, “Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein”, and Division II, “Dasein and Temporality”, and so the human dimension of reality thoroughly permeates everything we will be considering. If Being and Time is 'objectively' known for something in the history of modern philosophy it is for putting the issue of humanity at the center of philosophy, turning our attention to 'man' as a concrete entity as the center of our understanding of the world. On the other hand, Heidegger’s philosophical analysis of Dasein as a picture of the human soul (he discreetly makes reference to die Seele, “The ‘soul’ which makes up the being of man”, in Introduction I) is absolutely famous yet neither part of the book’s title mentions it at all.
We might do well to heed that in considering the 'existentialist' elements usually played up in examining the book, far from irrelevant but far from the book's only point; furthermore, I will say that Hegel's *Geist* ('spirit' or 'intellect') and Wittgenstein's *Lebensformen* both also seem to me to be totally inadequate models for understanding what Heidegger is aiming at with his analytic of Dasein. We all are deeply concerned with what it is to live a 'good life', both in terms of what is ethically acceptable and what will give our time on earth a 'distinctive' character, and during the modern era reflection on what it is to be human in general has come to seem far more like the answer to these questions than previously; but was there something more Heidegger was questing for? With this thought in mind, I will turn to Introduction II.

**Introduction II: Temporality and Phenomenology**

As I mentioned in my own Preface over the near century *Being and Time* has been read there has been a great deal of attention to the analysis of “Being” in terms of Dasein and relatively little to the topic of “Time” given equal weight in the title. We do not have Division III of the book, “On Time and Being”: Heidegger published a short lecture-course under that title in 1962 but that was just as much to say that Division III was uncompletable as to 'fill in the gaps'. However, we do have Division II as printed and the
remarks on temporality in Introduction II to give us some sense of the project as a whole; what is available to us is a striking and novel, if apparently somewhat incoherent, theory of a form of time different from our ordinary conception of it.

‘Time’ as we ordinarily conceptualize it is a topic that has received a great deal of attention from philosophers in the 20th and 21st centuries, including by philosophers closely linked to Heidegger (Heidegger himself edited Husserl’s Lectures on Internal Time-Consciousness, published in 1929). Heidegger’s concept of “temporality”, however, is intended to confound these multitudes. The task of explaining the importance of temporality for Heidegger’s philosophy will be handled in depth in my chapters on Division II, but it is important to note that very provocative statements about temporality can be found here at the beginning of the book. As a section in Division II makes clear, the sort of grasp of time one gets from looking at a watch will absolutely not shed much light on the topic he wants to address, and yet time and “temporality” are very definitely topics he does not want to leave behind.

We might very well think that Heidegger had a 'subjectivist' or 'relativist' understanding of the nature of time in mind, but I will attempt to justify later in this book a conception of the role of temporality in Daseinsanalytik that is quite other than that. At the beginning of Introduction II Heidegger gives us some hints as to what that might be: famously, he points out that
Dasein is "ontically" the closest thing to us, it is us ourselves, and yet it is "ontologically" the furthest thing from our common understanding. The sense that we do not know our own selves is a characteristically 'modern' thought that Heidegger drives in two directions. Sections of Being and Time that have been widely noted over the years make of this and other concepts built upon it a sort of 'critical theory', a cultural critique of our massified lives in industrial society.

This is obviously an incredibly exciting topic for people setting out to interpret the world we live in and many versions of it can be found in 20th century intellectualism, yet Heidegger's own account does not stop there but reincorporates that criticism into a philosophical story about 'reality in general'. As the reader will see in my chapters on Division II Heidegger's concern with "authentic" and "inauthentic" understandings of reality and our circumstances is not an irrelevant excrescence but I also must stress the 'philosophical' seriousness of the theory that runs in parallel with it as well. Throughout his career Heidegger was prone to such statements (and actions in keeping with them—for example, he wore traditional German suits when his colleagues were impeccably tailored) but I want the reader to understand the goals of “fundamental ontology” have more to do with ‘first philosophy’ than ‘ideology criticism’ even if the element of the latter in the book is not accidental.

Now, as for beginning with the interpretation of time and temporality Heidegger makes two crucial statements at
the start of Introduction II: “We shall point to temporality as the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call ‘Dasein’” ³ and “Time must be brought to light—and genuinely conceived—as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it.”⁴ These are hugely audacious statements the published Division II only begins to justify, but they are in the book all the same and must serve as a Leitmotive for interpreting the book as a whole. Being and Time is about being and time; furthermore, my account of Heidegger’s "temporal Interpretation" goes so far as to say the analytic of Dasein only makes proper sense after Division I has been considered in the light of Division II.

Introduction II introduces two other topics, which are not as critical to the overall project as completed but which ought to be considered carefully for understanding the discussions to come. The second part of Being and Time was to contain what Heidegger calls a “Destruction” of philosophical history, critical remarks on Descartes, Kant and Aristotle illustrating the theoretical terms of Part I—in this it would rather precisely parallel Theories of Surplus-Value, the “fourth volume of Capital” edited and published by Karl Kautsky long after Marx’s death, when Heidegger was a young man. Heidegger spends several pages explaining what his critical history of philosophy would look like, always using the word “Destruction” to explain its intent (it might be mentioned Jacques Derrida, a

³ BT, p. 38
⁴ BT, p. 39
very great admirer of Heidegger, sometimes claimed his “deconstruction” was a varying of Heidegger’s "Destruktion). Now, the difficulties 20th and 21st century philosophers have had with Descartes and his ego cogito are well-known, though the “historically effective” role of Being and Time in setting the terms of the debate may be less securely grasped; Heidegger's role in advancing the 'modern' critique of Descartes is also widely appreciated. Consequently, I will speak more fully here about Heidegger's Kant and Heidegger’s Aristotle.

In the period where the 'final touches' were being put on Being and Time Heidegger delivered a lecture-course on “Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason”, and in 1929 he published Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics; although only Ernst Cassirer was tempted to call Heidegger a "Neo-Kantian", and this ironically, they are useful works to read for setting Heidegger's own thoughts within the philosophical tradition. In Being and Time Heidegger himself makes broad, somewhat unconvincing claims that Kant’s work as a whole properly understood is consonant with his own thought, but it is absolutely worth noticing that in Introduction II he identifies one particular section of the first Critique, the “Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding”, as particularly crucial to his own project.5

5 The “Schematism” is a short section of Kant's "Transcendental Analytic" where Kant introduces “monograms” for the “categories” of thought he has elaborated, features of cognition
Parsing the role of Aristotle—once such a dominant thinker in philosophy as to simply have been called “The Philosopher” by Thomas Aquinas—in Heidegger’s early thinking is even more difficult. Heidegger’s grasp of the Greek language was importantly solid, though his etymologies for Greek words like *aletheia* are somewhat fanciful; more than almost any other major 20th century philosopher (the other major contender was his student and admirer Hans-Georg Gadamer) Heidegger spent a great deal of time throughout his career trying to ‘make ancient thinking new’ for the philosophical public. In the Introduction Heidegger justifies his own famous tendency to neologism by calling on the reader to compare Plato and Aristotle with a page of Thucydides to see “the altogether unprecedented character of those formulations which were imposed on the Greeks by their philosophers”.

This was presumably a reference-point for Heidegger’s own often-ridiculed attempts to bring a spirit of ‘neologism’ to bear on philosophical problems. Although the analytic philosophers who lambaste Heidegger as a point of honor may find it ironic, he himself gives pride of that ‘incarnate’ the intellectual categories; e.g., “The schema of substance is permanence of the real in time, that is, the representation of the real as a substrate of empirical determination of time in general, and so as abiding while all else changes” (CPR A143/B183). Thinking about the role Kant’s conception of time, “The form of inner thought”, plays in Heidegger’s theory will be critical in my discussion of Division II.

6 BT, p. 63
place to Aristotle for inventing ‘analysis’ to replace Plato’s dialectic; furthermore, Aristotle’s analysis of time in his Physics is an exemplary text for Heidegger in Being and Time, containing views which Heidegger wants to almost diametrically oppose himself to and yet still leave in place to a great extent. (Learning how such a thing can be done is critical for understanding the book's direction as a whole; one is not quite witnessing a Hegelian 'dialectic' at work in Heidegger, and this is not by accident, but if one does not learn how to harmonize seemingly incompatible claims one will make no progress reading him.)

The final portion of Introduction II is devoted to a lengthy discussion of the term “phenomenology” and how Heidegger wants to use it. Heidegger’s mentor Edmund Husserl—later his enemy, after the disaster of the Nazi regime had thrust them apart and caused Husserl to be banned, with Heidegger's complicity, from the Freiburg campus he had previously graced with his legend—had begun the phenomenological movement in 1900 with his Logical Investigations; it was indeed a movement, with many famous philosophers rivaling Heidegger for ‘star power’ calling themselves phenomenologists. (Being and Time was originally published as an issue of the Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research edited by Husserl). The phenomenological movement may be 'passe' but, as with the complicated issue of the relationship between Marx and Hegel, there is no avoiding the question of what Heidegger borrowed from Husserl and other phenomenologists and what is his own 'unique' contribution.
In the wider philosophical world phenomenology is usually understood as a philosophical tendency crucially fixated on 'lived experience' and how the ego 'constructs' its world, but this is not how Heidegger wants us to understand the term; he goes back to the Greek words *phenomena* and *logos* to define phenomenology as the philosophical effort “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way it shows itself from itself”. The phrasing is tortuous from the perspective of a reader of English, but an unobvious help from German is provided by Husserl's slogan "*zur Sache selbst*" frequently referenced by Heidegger in this book. This is usually translated as "to the things themselves", but that makes it sound as though Husserl was talking about the Kantian *Ding an sich* in a way the rest of Husserl's philosophy puts the lie to. The real meaning of *die Sache* in this case is "the matter", as in "the heart of the matter".

Consequently, the understanding of phenomenology shared by Heidegger and Husserl is that it addresses philosophical issues *as they arise* in the context of our lives, and brings us to a conception of them *in terms we can understand*. The sense in which they differ is indirectly conveyed by Heidegger's Greek etymology for 'phenomenology'. This etymology provided seems extremely forced on a first reading, but something of the point of it can be understood when one realizes later in the book that the stock concept of there being a

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7 BT, p. 58
'phenomenology' of... will not do for Heidegger's purposes; Heidegger does not do without attention to 'lived experience', in fact his analyses of experience are famous, but if that was only what phenomenology was it would not do what he needs it to do.

He connects the Greek *phainomenon* to its Indo-European root *phuo*, 'shining', and *logos* to the Greek *apophansis* ('veridical discourse'; elsewhere he connects *logos* to the Greek *legein*, "gathering", to show it is not a 'null point' of a rational calculus but intermeshed with 'takings-for-true' that are actually accomplished). Heidegger's larger point with the etymologies is that an uncomplicated view of the 'subjectivity of the subject' as the center of all thought is neither necessary nor even possible in philosophy, but that the general program of phenomenological research can still be pursued even given this caveat; his own 'modifications' of the phenomenological concepts will allow the mind's contents to be understood more correctly, not as mere 'qualia' a 'zombie' human could well not have but as an index of the dynamic tension the human being lives in with reality (one which is inescapable).

In a way that is important to grasp the three sub-sections of Introduction II on the definition of “phenomenology” operate within a compass larger than Heidegger's entire *oeuvre*; we see him talking about philosophy in its broadest aspect here as a task set us by reality, one which even the hundred-plus volumes of his collected works only begin to 'scratch the surface' of. A theoretical choice which Heidegger opts for, one which is (as is usual for him)
infuriatingly broad and unequivocal at the same time, is to say philosophy understood as phenomenological is nothing other than ontology, the ‘study of being’, of which the “fundamental ontology” of Dasein is the chiefest part. In a way, this statement ‘discloses a world’. Hardly anybody, in 1927 or at any other time, would have thought to say that phenomenology and ontology or 'metaphysics' were the same thing and they have had their reasons for that. However, if you can countenance the thought for a moment you can begin with a book that, more than anything, teaches you how to 'do philosophy'; Being and Time is almost never thought to contain 'the last word' on topics, but in a signal of its importance as a landmark of thought many thoughts flow from reading it.
Division I: The Human Achievement
Chapter 1: “Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein”

Let us (since Life can little more supply Than just to look about us and to die) Expatriate free o'er all this scene of Man; A mighty maze! but not without a plan;

Alexander Pope, "An Essay on Man"

Beginnings are difficult, and with Being and Time it is no different. The first chapter of Division I is one of the shorter chapters in the book and contains no 'axioms' to be systematically developed throughout; it primarily serves the task of further explicating Dasein, that entity which asks the "Question of Being" and which I have called the 'hero' or protagonist of the book. It is hard to understate the difficulty of this task; as with other 'master-concepts' like Hegel's Geist Dasein is the cornerstone of every argument in the book and thusly in a way almost inscrutable itself, as 'point' is not analyzable in geometry. The philosophically sophisticated may want to note my suggestion earlier that Dasein and Hegel's Geist have almost nothing to do with each other; the reader will see enough of the former, and a few suggestions about the
latter, in my exposition in this book such that they can judge the hypothesis at book's end.

For the 'uninitiated', a word of explanation: almost all philosophy aims to provide an account of some aspect of human thought which is 'revisionary', saying how there is something we in our ordinary lives think we understand but do not. I will encourage the reader at first to imagine "Dasein" as what Hitchcock called a "MacGuffin"; whatever it ultimately amounts to be, Heidegger intends you to grasp it is very important and that his account of it is wonderful and pathbreaking. Though it is well worth considering to what extent it 'maps onto' traditional philosophical concepts, Heidegger's Dasein was not quite anything anyone had ever talked about prior to Being and Time.

Furthermore, although there had been other German philosophers interested in an 'anti-reductionist' picture of human beings in the decades prior to the book's publication, what he was attempting to say was something that was by definition not what they had said. It is an index of how striking Heidegger's account genuinely was that today those of us far from traditional German intellectual culture spend a relatively enormous amount of time talking about him compared to someone like Max Scheler, a similar 'swashbuckler' of German intellectual life at the time. Whatever it 'is', Dasein simply matters; the message of my book is that this indicates Heidegger is striking some genuine sparks on the flint of human existence with his account of it, which flashes of insight even those
constitutionally allergic to ‘German pomposity’ ought to take seriously.

In this chapter Heidegger also further demarcates his researches from then-contemporary intellectual fashions; people who are surprised to notice Heidegger inveigh at length against considering his work 'anthropology' should remember that the works of Malinowski were newly minted in 1927, and many intellectual currents we now think of as wholly separate were far from obviously so at the time; it is also worth noting that the German tradition of 'philosophical anthropology' inaugurated by Kant was far from extinct at the time. At the end of the chapter Heidegger also discusses a “natural conception of the world”, that is to say, of the 'really real' world as we experience it and live in it rather than hypothesize about it or 'stipulate' it to be. Although we get very little of Heidegger's full theory in this chapter, the remarks he does make are worth studying carefully for they will be utilized in crucial ways later on.

A general grievance expressed in the analytic of Dasein with philosophy is this: a great deal of philosophy since Descartes has focused on the 'subject', that construal of the human mind which makes it rationally authoritative about drawing correct inferences from evidence about the world combined with a priori truths. As Heidegger has already indicated, Dasein both is and is not this 'subject'; it is a construal of certain aspects of subjectivity which does not leave the living, feeling, practically engaged side of the human being off to the side. Many other 20th century
philosophers critiqued the subject afterwards, but none of them were not in some level of dialogue with Heidegger's theory and Heidegger was not simply a generic 'anti-Cartesian'; it will take several thousand words for me to 'contextually define' what I think Dasein is in the context of Heidegger's theory, and this because there is far more than a cheap critique of 'self-evidence' or 'sense-data' at work in what he is saying.

Heidegger emphasizes two features of Dasein in Chapter 1, one which I mentioned in my initial discussion in the chapter on the Introductions and one which has caused a great deal of exegetical uncertainty among Heideggerians. The first is the sense in which the ordinary use of the term Dasein in philosophical German has it correspond to the Latin existentia ('that-it-is'), in contrast to Was-sein ('what-it-is') and essentia. In discussing this break with philosophical ‘tradition’ Heidegger makes an argument that would prove to be fateful for much of the 20th century philosophy that followed it: he connects the ‘received’ understanding of existentia with a conception he will analyze extensively in Chapter 3 of Division I, Vorhandenheit or ‘presence-at-hand’. Roughly speaking, presence-at-hand is the ordinary conception we have of what philosophers sometimes call ‘middle-sized dry goods’ as objects outside us with a durable character not totally subject to our whims, nor liable to pop in and out of existence in keeping with the vicissitudes of our neurology.
In *Being and Time* Heidegger will have none of what Derrida later called the “metaphysics of presence”, the frequently repeated attempt to solve philosophical problems by grounding them in some variety of foundational reality ascertainable by some sort of scientific means, particularly when considering human being: in a famous phrase echoed by Sartre, he says here “The essence (*Wesen*) of Dasein lies in its existence (*Existenz*).” In other words, there is not a ‘human nature’ floating over and above what we end up concretely being in our ‘works and days’; there is no ‘definitory formula’ (a translation sometimes used for the Greek *logos*) in terms of physics, neurology, or what-have-you that spells out what it is to be human in the fashion that we expect a ‘bicycle’ to have two wheels and get us places without a motor.

Heidegger calls the core structural features of Dasein which resist such characterization but are critically important to thought and life “existentialia” (*Existenzialien*); they are distinguished from the “categorial” structure belonging to other entities, as in the "table of categories" established by Kant to explain the metaphysical behavior of objects. In a way *Being and Time* could be considered nothing other than an inventory of these existentialia, but examining exactly how they are intrinsically interconnected will reveal Heidegger's overall strategy. (The strongest resonances of Heidegger's existentialia are with the movement called 'social

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8 BT, p. 67
phenomenology' involving thinkers such as Alfred Schütz; social phenomenology's accounts of the 'social construction of reality' laid deep tracks outside of philosophy proper.)

The second feature of Dasein Heidegger emphasizes in Chapter 1 is quite complicated and turns on the peculiarities of a German particle, je. “Because Dasein has in each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit], one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am’, ‘You are’. Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine [je meines].”9 Whatever Dasein is, it is “in each case mine”; the analytically minded may sense the similarity of 'je' to a quantifier in logic, and it is in truth not far removed at all from the universal quantifier as it is ordinarily used.

If further linguistic ‘color’ has to be added, it has something of the sense of the English ‘ever’ as a prefixed adjective (“Ever yours” implies that in each case I am yours, for example, though there may be less uniformity to this than the dedicatee would like). This is one of many cases in Heidegger where a peculiarity of German causes great cognitive dissonance for English-speaking students of philosophy; it is surely worth considering how "the silver rib of a foreign word" (Adorno) can constructively structure our thinking on a topic but the reader is completely forgiven a 'depression or bewilderment' in

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9 BT, p. 68
initially trying to 'map' this idea on to the concepts they think in in English.

The characteristic of *Jemeinigkeit*, which means that Dasein is *je meines* ("always of my own" would be a more literal translation, as 'meines' is the genitive form of the possessive) is a critical term for the ‘existential’ or ‘critical-theoretical’ strand in *Being and Time*; as a short promissory note for several long discussions it has occasioned many interpretative difficulties. Much later in Division II (and in his lecture course from this time, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*) Heidegger describes Dasein as something that gets “individualized”, in German *vereinzelt*.

Thusly I would describe “In each case mineness” as a *standing capacity* to be thrust back on our own self-awareness and existential goals, although as Heidegger points out here in the average or “inauthentic” mode that necessarily characterizes most of our lives we do not accomplish this with any determination. Heidegger’s extremely complicated distinction between “authenticity” (*Eigentlichkeit*) and “inauthenticity” (*Uneigentlichkeit*) is introduced here but only explained in full in the early chapters of Division II; it is one of a few 'red threads' running through *Being and Time* that the student who wishes to make the book 'their own' must consider carefully.
One of the points Heidegger makes repeatedly in the book is that Dasein is usually not itself, lacks a genuine overview of why it really thinks what it thinks or does what it does and simply acts in a 'rote' fashion determined by received understandings. “But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic—that is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity—when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment.”

The second section of Chapter I is entitled “How the Analytic of Dasein is to be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology”. Heidegger’s statements here are of great importance for another strand in his thought, the sense in which he anticipated ‘contrarian’ cognitive science hostile to 'cognitivism': Hubert Dreyfus’ celebrated interpretation of Being and Time focused on these elements and proved quite influential among the philosophers of mind of his generation, even those who would explicitly disclaim a

10 ibid.
'Heideggerian' inspiration. There is one great foe mentioned here—the Descartes whose ‘dualism’ most philosophy students have rehearsed arguments against—but there were also a few German contemporaries of Heidegger that he wished to read ‘against the grain’ as both compromised by ‘Cartesianism’ and pointing beyond it.

Husserl, who would go on to write a book in the 1930s called **Cartesian Meditations** extolling a modern adaptation of Descartes' ideas, is actually both censured and praised here for saying “But an act is never also an object; for it is essential to the Being of acts that they are experienced only in their performance and never in reflection” (quote from **Ideas Pertaining to a Phenomenological Philosophy** book I, pg. 74.) Heidegger implies this is a criticism of Cartesian cogitationes which is both trenchant and incomplete; complaints about ‘reification’ of the human mind ought to be well-taken, but Heidegger’s gambit is that thinking of any kind of distinct ‘mind’ per se as the locus of human ‘subjectivity’ already gives away the game. If we are to understand our grasp of reality, in other words, we must be ‘right where it occurs’ in our everyday life and not experimenting with concepts of a ‘future psychology’.

Heidegger’s older contemporary Max Scheler and the august Wilhelm Dilthey (whose views on the philosophy of history are discussed in Division II, Chapter 5) are also mentioned as philosophers whose attempts at a 'holistic'
philosophical anthropology are notable but incomplete. In a move which is characteristic of his discussions of modern philosophy, Heidegger provides a twofold genealogy of the anti-reductionist but incomplete theories of his era which points back to the Greeks and Christian theology as well. Aristotle famously defined the human being as a “zoon logon echon”, and although Heidegger is unwilling to give up the ‘substantive’ truth of Aristotle’s characterization he finds the commonplace interpretation of the Greek phrase in the tradition deriving from Roman antiquity as ‘rational animal’ completely unacceptable. (Heidegger’s own gloss of the Greek *logos* in terms of the German *Rede* will be discussed later.)

Furthermore, the sometime seminarian Heidegger insists on pointing out the traditional Christian definition of ‘man’ as “fashioned in God’s image” (he quotes the book of Genesis in Greek, Calvin in Latin, and Jacob Zwingli in Middle High German). This trope not only justifies an interpretation of mankind as ‘endowed with reason’ but also as essentially *transcendent*; Heidegger’s full explication of human transcendence in terms of “ek-stasis” is critical to his development of the idea of originary temporality in Division II.

I have already mentioned that anthropology was the discipline *du jour* at the time Heidegger was writing *Being and Time*, such that even though Heidegger’s statements have much of traditional “philosophical anthropology”
about them he thought to mention that the dating habits of Trobriand islanders were not especially important to examining their veracity. In the third section Heidegger is quick to mention that he does not view ethnological research into ‘primitive Dasein’ as useless, but that “*Everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness*, but is rather a mode of Dasein’s being, even when that Dasein is active in a highly developed and differentiated culture—and precisely then”.

(If the "decolonizing" reader's teeth are immediately set on edge by this, it is hardly implausible intellectual history that the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, which found a deep conceptual richness in 'primitive' cultures, was precisely defined against views such as this; it is *absolutely certain* intellectual history that reactions in turn to Lévi-Strauss later in the 20th century by people like Bourdieu and Clifford Geertz were deeply indebted to some of Heidegger's analyses.)

The chapter ends with a highly suggestive proposal that philosophy has failed to work out a “natural conception of the world”, and the section ought to be read as something like a demand for a ‘realist phenomenology’; a sphere of ‘phenomena’ and ‘experiences’ which we have views and feelings about undoubtedly does exist, but for beings capable of a ‘transcendental reduction’ we tend to take those phenomena *all too seriously* for traditional Husserlian methods of 'bracketing' to be truly seaworthy. Working out how Heidegger balances the pull of realism

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11 BT, p. 76
and ‘idealism’—the need to oscillate between a lively understanding of what we will come to know as "facticity", and the critically important fact that "Being" is really only in our understanding of beings—is one of the major tasks of reading Being and Time (I will note preemptively that it is one which the reader need not assume can be completed, as in a pinch it can always be assumed that even the most 'profound' philosopher has missed something in their analysis).
Chapter 2: “Being-in-the-World in General as the Basic State of Dasein”

My Latin Quarter hat. God, we must simply dress the character. I want puce gloves. You were a student, weren’t you? Of what in the other devil’s name? Paysayenn. P.C.N., you know; *physiques, chimiques et naturelles*. Eating your groatsworth of *mou et civet*, fleshpots of Egypt, followed by belching cabmen.

James Joyce, *Ulysses*

Chapter 2 is another shorter chapter of Division I. It lays out the general plan of the rest of the division, but is closely twinned with Chapter 5 (“Being-In as Such”): together they give us Heidegger’s approach to the problem of *intentionality*, one of the major topics in philosophy of mind to this day. Although the word ‘intentionality’ was invented by Scholastic philosophers in the Middle Ages, they used it to describe the purposiveness of acts; Kant himself uses it in this sense in the *Critique of Judgment*. It was in his 1874 book *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* that Franz Brentano (an Austrian philosopher who could be called the ‘grandfather of phenomenology’) introduced the modern sense of the term. It might be noted that reading Brentano was one of the young Heidegger’s formative philosophical experiences.
In this modern sense it describes not our 'intending' to do something but the ‘aboutness’ of mental states. My thoughts about the chair in the corner, for example, 'intend' it in the way an arrow ‘intends’ its target (the original meaning of *intentum*); the chair is their 'content' or meaning, what they represent. To Brentano, this “intentional inexistence” was the definition of a mental phenomenon. Although the relationship of his mature philosophy with Brentano's is usually left at the level of historical commonplaces like the one above, it is indeed true that one might say Edmund Husserl was fascinated by Brentanian intentionality: compelled, governed by the drive to make intentionality the central concept of philosophy.

If Husserl's phenomenology is an 'idealism' it is through being motivated by the urge to make all of reality pass through 'the mind's eye', and if this is an error it is surely one all youthful philosophers repeat in their attempt to truly explain what they deeply sense. 'Intentionality' is not one of Heidegger's terms, but this is not to say that we do not find important meditations on the nature of intentionality in *Being and Time* under other headings. I would argue that Heidegger's concept of “Being-in” (*In-sein*) sketches precisely his alternative account of intentionality and the role it plays in human mindedness; readers who wish to apply Heidegger to problems arising in contemporary 'philosophy of mind' should take note of a possible homology here, not merely adapt Heidegger's remarks piecemeal.
Chapter 2 here begins the discussion of *In-sein* with an etymology of the German word ‘*in*’ (any doubters of Heidegger’s grasp of his own language ought to keep in mind that it is importantly true German phrases can have a ‘pragmatic’ significance other than their ‘homophonic’ cognate expressions in English; one would not really want to be told that an observation was *so akkurat*, for example). *In* is lexically or ‘standardsly’ understood as we understand it in English, as expressing a spatial or ‘metaphorically’ spatial relationship: Heidegger’s examples are “the water is ‘in’ the glass, or the garment is ‘in’ the cupboard”.\(^\text{12}\) Gilbert Ryle’s famous critique of the "*ghost in the Machine*" seizes on exactly this 'spatial' understanding of the mind to undermine the idea that in talking about the mind we are really discussing any kind of entity at all; the behaviorists in general pointed out that there was no physical ‘location’ that could be established for psychophysical interaction, that the untenability of Descartes' famous suggestion that location was the pineal gland 'begged the question' against the concept of a 'soul'.

A quick point ought to be made to 'prime the pump' for considering the notion that there is more to the meaning of ‘*in*’ in German than is immediately evident. English-language interpreters of Brentano sometimes make the mistake of thinking “intentional inexistence” means that the ‘intentional object’ need not be actually in existence: the ‘celestial city’ which we are sometimes to dream about, for example, may not be real even though we can

\(^\text{12}\) BT, p. 79
think about it. This is an error; Inexistenz for Brentano means that the thing we are perceiving or reasoning about is ‘indwelling’ in our thoughts, raising that problem of how an object could be ‘out there’ in the world and yet ‘in here’ in our mind which has set many traditional philosophers of mind their tasks. Heidegger’s definition of Being-in touches on these themes, presumably not by accident.

He quotes the authoritative Grimm lexicon of German to the effect that the ‘spatial’ in derives from a ‘habitational’ innan, ‘to reside’, ‘to dwell’; in “Being-in” we are “Being alongside” the world, “absorbed” in it in a sense which will be made precise in Division I’s Chapter 3. This is the beginning of a Herculean labor made to quit spatial metaphor and understand the human mind in other terms. According to Heidegger there is not the world ‘out there’ and us ‘in here’, as most epistemology and philosophy of perception deriving from Descartes would have it. Rather, as Dasein—as Heidegger makes explicit at many points the word literally means “there-being”—we are, all of a piece, “Being-in-the-World”; there is no sense in which our existence as minds can be separated from the world we dwell in. (If we go this far with Heidegger, we will see that an 'interminable oscillation' between subject and object can be avoided by looking right at "the matters themselves", the problems our concrete life actually sets us about what we do and do not understand; not necessarily a simple task, but perhaps simpler than an impossible one.)
Furthermore, Heidegger here took the then-novel step of clarifying that intentionality as Being-in need not exhaust what we might call ‘armchair perception’; he notes “the phenomenon of being in has for the most part been represented exclusively by a single exemplar—knowing the world”¹³ and much of the rest of the book will be devoted to disputing the usefulness of this preoccupation. Concerns of this nature have been raised frequently in recent decades, and correct intellectual history cannot leave Heidegger’s example out of this story, but his particular version is not just generic anti-Cartesianism. According to Heidegger, in a strand of his theory in Being and Time which is richly articulated but often ignored, mindedness not only observes select external facts but ‘comes to grips’ with our practical projects and affective relationships encapsulated in the terms Heidegger introduces here, “concern” (Besorgen) and “care” (Sorge). In an obvious and historically signal way Heidegger’s theory of intentionality as “Being-in” is anti-intellectualist, making the case that so much of our human being, even its purest thinking, is more a matter of ‘heart’ than ‘head’.

In the second section of Chapter 2 Heidegger makes this explicit in a discussion of knowledge as “A Founded Mode in which Being-in is Exemplified”. This section is both important and obscure; in a way it tells you exactly what Being and Time is not, namely an ‘epistemology’. To begin, it is important to note that ‘foundedness’ is a term

¹³ BT, p. 86
from Husserl’s **Logical Investigations** which is not widely utilized today but which has fairly precise parallels to the concept of supervenience in analytic philosophy: a ‘founded’ entity is rather precisely ‘dependent upon’ or derived from a structurally more basic feature of the world, without which it cannot be at all what it is itself. For comparison, something is 'supervenient' on a base phenomenon if there can be no change in the supervenient phenomenon without a corresponding change in the base phenomenon (the standard case is that mental phenomena 'supervene' on biological ones).

Considering that a great many modern philosophers have tried to make knowledge the *ultima ratio*, even calling into question the reality of the external world and everything in it as not up to knowledge’s ‘level’, it was a brave and bold step by Heidegger to insist the ‘epistemological enterprise’ ought to be recognized as an *ancillary* one in philosophy and to search for a deeper level of understanding in the human mind. The attempt to break out of the ‘subject-object dichotomy’ is perhaps the central oscillation of nearly all modern philosophy, and Heidegger’s standard-setting attempt to evade the issue hinges on rooting ‘declarative knowledge’ in more practically or *personally* fundamental ways of being *en rapport* with the world.

Heidegger was no ‘physicalist’ of the sort that wants to discuss intracranial matters in lieu of ghosts in the machine, so we must recognize this ‘foundedness’ as containing no 'reductionism' but as a dismissal of what the
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called the “scholastic fallacy”. The important idea both the philosopher and the sociologist were aiming at was that we come to understand observation, the Greek *theoria*, plays a subsidiary role in our ‘transactions’ with the world, and that the leisure (*skhole*) possessed by intellectuals is not an infallible model of a superior understanding; what we are 'about' at any point is fundamentally more important than theses we would posit about a 'matter at hand', and it is a telling error of modern philosophy that so much of it before 'pragmatism' discounts this so totally. Heidegger’s theory of mind as worked out more fully in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 of Division I importantly situates the mind in the practical business of living, primarily amidst what he calls "concernful circumspection".

Although Chapter 3’s famous analysis of “readiness-to-hand” (*Zuhandenheit*) and “presence-at-hand” (*Vorhandenheit*) makes use of this 'cameo' of an epistemology, we must wait until the less-carefully-examined Chapter 5 to fully see what Heidegger intends by “Being-in”; furthermore, the aims, goals, and methods of *Being and Time* we have already discussed mean that unlike with many modern “anti-Cartesian” philosophies of mind that attempt to ‘square the circle’ of understanding human mindedness by appealing to a set of scientific facts elsewhere we ‘unproblematically’ accept for other reasons here we have to take Heidegger’s views on the matter as something more like an “ethnomethodology” in sociology, a way of describing the operations of the mind that is intended to be ‘primitively compelling’, comprehensible in
terms of our own 'inner patterns' of interpreting ourselves. (It could well be argued that *Being and Time* is something like a 'sociology of knowledge' far more interested in cognition as it 'manifested' itself in the society of Heidegger's time than universal rules for reasoning; I will touch on this in a few remarks in my chapter on Division I's Chapter 4.)
Chapter 3: “The Worldhood of the World”

Had we but world enough and time/this coyness, lady, were no crime.

Andrew Marvell, “To His Coy Mistress”

Chapter 3 of Division I is the portion of Being and Time that has occasioned the most commentary in English-speaking philosophy; in a spirit akin to that of the American pragmatists (it is perhaps worth mentioning that Dewey’s Experience and Nature had been published in 1925, and pragmatist ideas were being spread at that time in Germany by F.C.S. Schiller) Heidegger puts doing rather than ‘observing’ at the heart of our interactions with “world”, die Welt. In a section in the chapter which is sometimes overlooked he makes fully explicit his difficulties with Descartes’ distinction between res extensa and res cogitans, and then goes on to a discussion of “existential spatiality”.

Unfortunately I cannot fully join in the enthusiasm for the chapter; it must be indicated as somewhat ‘overrated’, even if only due to the functional neglect of other parts of the book. In an instructive case of the ‘hermeneutic circle’, we will only know what Chapter 3 says when we realize it is a limited part of a larger whole; those looking for established 'connections' between Heidegger's ideas and
those of more recent philosophers will find the sources of them here, but every generation ought to attempt to find something new in a topic and the paint has dried on the role of ‘action in perception’ to the point it is a topic for scientific psychologists. If we return to the core of Heidegger’s analysis in the chapter, an examination of the concept of ‘world’, it will strengthen our hand for moving on to the rest of the book.

‘World’ as something distinct from the planet on which we find ourselves is a distinctive usage of German philosophy since at least Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation. Generally speaking, the German Welt is not quite ‘objective reality’ and not quite our ideas of it; in this accounting of ‘the passing show’ it is somewhat more incisive than the conception of other national philosophical traditions. At the beginning of Chapter 3 Heidegger gives four senses in which die Welt can be taken. Firstly, it can be the ‘totality of things’, all the sundry objects we encounter and us among them; secondly, as the ‘worldly’ nature of those things discoverable by science; thirdly, a sense in which it is considered “not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within the-world, but rather as that ‘wherein’ (worin) a factual Dasein can be said to live”\(^{14}\); a fourth sense of “worldhood in general” is specified, but Heidegger indicates he will here use it in the third sense.

\(^{14}\) BT, p. 93
In modern philosophy worldwide this ‘world’ is sometimes taken to be a nearly *spurious* thing; Hume, for example, suggested interesting things happen to it when one presses on one’s eyeball and bifurcates one’s field of vision. In that sense which was being clarified by European biologists like Jakob von Uexkull around the time of *Being and Time*, the idea of an animal’s environment (*Umwelt*) is far closer to Heidegger’s pragmatist definition of world than the views of British empiricism on the topic and Heidegger will frequently speak of ‘environmentality’ as roughly fungible with worldhood; sections 15 through 18 of Chapter 3, which are the most-examined portions of *Being and Time*, clarify the sense in which Dasein’s ‘world’ is constituted by its interactions with its environment. It is absolutely critical to understand that this ‘worldhood’, as opposed to the mere contents of reality enumerated according to some going scheme, is a concept Heidegger will not leave behind and insists human thinkers cannot leave behind in general.\(^{15}\)

**World and Action**

Section 15 begins with these words: “The Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited phenomenologically if we take as our clue our

\(^{15}\) As with the rest of this book in discussing worldhood I will aim for rough orthodoxy in interpretation rather than being ‘suggestive’; Heidegger's ideas are complex enough, yet perhaps they possess a rough coherence my own speculations would obscure.
everyday Being-in-the-world, which we also call our ‘dealings’ (Umgang) in the world and which entities within-the-world.”

Macquarrie and Robinson offer a brief explanation of the word Umgang in a footnote but omit an interesting overtone: colloquial or ‘everyday’ speech is called in German Umgangssprache, and in this section Heidegger provides a literal Umgangssprache to describe ‘concernful’ dealings with the world. In a nod to the already-extant pragmatism Heidegger begins with a discussion of the Greek term pragmata; pragmata are objects considered not under the aspect of their static physical properties but their ‘use-value’, if you will, how they are handled in action. Heidegger translates this by using the German term das Zeug, which the translators render as “equipment”.

John Haugeland’s proposed translation of Zeug as “gear” is well-taken in one respect, that Heidegger mentions “Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment”. In practical activity there is always an assemblage of equipment, an “equipmental totality”, defined by how it is used “in-order-to” (um-zu) do something. This in turn contains “an assignment or reference (Verweisung) to something”. (Readers of analytic philosophy should note that Verweisung is in no way connected to Fregean ‘reference’, Bedeutung.) When we put together an equipmental totality according to an ‘in-order-to’, we

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16 BT, p. 95
17 BT, p. 97
18 ibid.
discover in its individual constituents their “readiness-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit). If any concept of Heidegger's was ever widely taken up by others and taken up well, this was it; even the first-time reader is struck by how little similar material they have ever found in philosophy books, and what is similar is largely indebted to Heidegger.

If one had to think up a slogan for the concept of the "ready-to-hand", it would reflect that practical activity is always bound up with what Heidegger calls "significance": doing something means something, and thusly a 'disenchantment of the world' that deprives our picture of human reality of that element may make a hash of how we actually conduct our affairs. In "concernful circumspection" we are almost-unconsciously bonded to a practical process, yet meaning emerges from the equipmental totality and the way we use it that is critical for our awareness of the world in general.

“Readiness-to-hand” is a phrase that encapsulates an entire critique of the ‘spectator’ theory of perception and cognition, as in Heidegger's famous remarks on hammering. “In dealings such as this where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the ‘in-order-to’ which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly it is encountered as that which it
is—as equipment”.¹⁹ A tool like a hammer must necessarily be far less interesting as a physical object with thus-and-such a shape, weight, and so on than as a part of our 'workflow' in the practical business of hammering.

This total process Heidegger calls ‘circumspection’ (Umsicht; the Latinate English is importantly a literal translation, as both words mean "around-sight"). Two more important concepts are invoked in Section 15: “Towards-which” (Wozu) and “Presence-at-hand” (Vorhandenheit). Although each individual element of circumspective behavior has an “in-order-to”, they all come together in a ‘Towards-which” which reflects the 'ordinary' understanding of “practical reason”. Although Heidegger was of course aware of Aristotle's reflections on practical reason in his Ethics my inclination is to resist much of an assimilation of Heidegger's typology of action to Aristotle's; the extent to which a concept like phronesis is part of the 'common currency' of philosophy is not beside the point, but Heidegger's goals in writing Being and Time were expressly theoretical and not 'practical'.

A note to the reader: Hubert Dreyfus connected Heidegger's account of circumspective activity to Merleau-Ponty's theory of the 'body-subject' in his Being-in-the-World and a paper in a Festschrift for John Searle; in a sense the connection is 'beyond obvious' (Merleau-Ponty, like Sartre, was part of a generation of French intellectuals for whom Heidegger's writing was the 'hot new thing') but

¹⁹ BT, p. 98
in another way Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* and *Being and Time* must be taken to have completely different subject-matters, to 'disclose different worlds' as it were. Heidegger was 'anti-intellectualist' but his subjects were *intellectual*, pertaining to great themes in the life of the mind; Merleau-Ponty was by comparison a radical psychologist out to give the reader the 'real thing' as regards the function of the human body in its environment. The difference between the approaches is practically slight, but it makes all the difference; intellectual hygiene requires not reading Heidegger into Merleau-Ponty, or vice versa. In a similar fashion, Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* 'ostensibly' treats of the same topics as *Being and Time* but authorial intention and the action of world-history make it fundamentally unclear to what extent the authors agreed with each other.

Although Heidegger argued in a way which was historically novel and deeply influential thereafter that circumspective practical behavior is our *primary* way of relating to the world, we are sometimes—in a sense which will be clarified in Section 16—deprived of our circumspective ‘bearings’ and simply see an object or piece of equipment as it is 'itself' or present-at-hand (though Heidegger is quick to qualify and perhaps confuse the issue by saying that we already access the ‘in-itself’ through readiness-to-hand). The understanding the 'ordinary' philosophical consciousness thinks we have of 'objective' fact is a *derivative* one; in an important sense we cannot put the 'scene of our labors' back together from
random elements of an objective world-order. However, objectivity is not a 'superstition' but a fact of human existence; that we can sometimes simply just see things as inert objects is a reality of our 'inner life'.

Later in Division II Heidegger will develop an explanation of scientific research in terms of the distinction between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand; the parallels of his 'existential conception of science' to 'modern' philosophy of science suggest that this account of 'mind in action', or rather inaction, is far from outmoded and ought to be considered with seriousness. If we must care for objectivity, a story which is less fanciful than its being a 'view from nowhere' can be compatible with it. In Chapter 3's Section 16 three types of infelicity in concernful circumspection are identified: “conspicuousness” (Auffälligkeit), “obtrusiveness” (Aufdringlichkeit) and “obstinacy” (Aufsässigkeit); the 'neologicist' character of these terms is sometimes stressed, that they are not 'ordinary' terms of German, but the reader should understand the language generally permits the speaker to 'epitomize' something with a slightly unwieldy compound noun (this is a common enough practice in other words).

Something that becomes un-ready-to-hand (a damaged piece of equipment, e.g.) is conspicuous in its inert presence-to-hand; it is an 'I-know-not-what' that must be put back into repair to regain intelligibility. When an equipmental totality lacks something, the remaining ready-to-hand parts become obtrusive; the the failure of
the ‘business’ we had hoped to attend to weighs upon us in them. A piece of equipment that actively thwarts our “in-order-to” is obstinate; we must ‘change plans’ in order to account for it. In conspicuous, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy the world is disclosed (erschliesst); they are not simply 'failures of practice' but ones that first reveal an 'objective world' with no particular aim or goal.

“Disclosure” is one of Heidegger’s most important concepts, yet he does little but introduce it here; we will encounter a fuller account in Chapter 6 of Division I, but the reader may be forgiven for feeling that they lack a complete grasp of its mysteries at any point. The section concludes with Heidegger’s full explication of Being and Time's conception of “world”: “But if the world can, in a way, be lit up, it must assuredly be disclosed. And it has already been disclosed beforehand whenever what is ready-to-hand within-the-world is accessible for circumspective concern. The world is therefore something ‘wherein’ Dasein as an entity already was, and if in any manner it explicitly comes away from anything it can never do more than come back to the world”.  

I must ask the reader to mark these words well, since the close coupling of Dasein to world is one of the distinctive elements of Heidegger's critique of 'subjectivism'. Heidegger then announces the task of the next section, “Reference and Signs”: to get a clearer grasp of the “referential totality” that constitutes our essential grasp of

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20 BT, pp. 106-7
worldhood. The two words of that section's title, "reference" and "signs", figure in a huge number of philosophical texts from the last hundred years: yet at the same time we ought not to draw the conclusion that Heidegger's views can be interpreted as 'influenced by', 'inspiring' or 'like unto' those of a more familiar philosopher.

Although Heidegger, early and late, was obviously obsessed with language and the possibilities of language (especially Greek and German) for expressing philosophical truth, he is known to almost nobody as an important philosopher of language. This is really no oversight or confusion, as the often-skipped Section 17, "Reference and Signs", makes clear: Heidegger's obvious inattention to the conceptual details that drove philosophers like Frege and linguists like Saussure is an 'index' of his choice to rather stalk the 'big game' of being and a fuller ontology. The sense in which Heidegger was aware of this will be made clear to readers of his 1935 lecture-course Introduction to Metaphysics; Heidegger's discussion of the basic concepts of linguistics proper there is patently desultory, and so we must perhaps cast the failings of Heidegger's account as a matter of 'won't' rather than 'can't'. It should be noted, and rarely is, that Heidegger's word translated as “reference”, Verweisung, is not Fregean “reference”, Bedeutung, which is the building-block of ‘formal semantics’; however, Heidegger's "reference" has something to do with Husserl's concept of “indication”, introduced in the first of Husserl's Logical Investigations.
Heidegger takes Husserlian “indication”—the paradigmatic example might be a ‘knot in a rope’ as a reminder of something; Heidegger thinks of the then-new turn signal on an automobile—as characteristic of signs (*Zeichen*), which are “equipment” in the sense already established by Heidegger. Heidegger argues that the meaningfulness of ‘conventional signs’ like the turn signal is dependent upon the general structure of the “in-order-to”. In distinction to the ‘Fregean’ approach to the problem (which focuses on what Husserl called the "expression" in distinction to indication) these signs are kept apart from the general structure of relations (*Beziehungen*); “Every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference. Every ‘indication’ is a reference, but not every referring is an indicating.”21

The final heading of the first part of Chapter 3,

21 This lack of structure is as much to ‘give up the game’ of a substantive semantics (a Heideggerian semantics could hardly be “compositional”, e.g.) without thereby giving up a defensible 'schematic' understanding of how language must work; partisans of a 'linguistic turn' could well begin a critique of Heidegger with this neglect of semantic structure, but it is not *ipso facto* a failing of his approach to other topics. I would argue we must simply view Heidegger as deaf to the problems of linguistics.
“Involvement and Significance; the Worldhood of the World”, is extremely dense and difficult but important in several ways for understanding later chapters of Being and Time; several important concepts are introduced for the first time. Heidegger presents the ‘highest common factor’ of signification and concernful circumspection as “involvement” of entities in circumspection, and determines the primary “in-order-to” of a task to be the “for-the-sake-of-which” (Worumwillen); this last concept has shades of the concept of telos that governs practical activity in Aristotle’s writings. In a passage which is deeply significant for the later development of temporality in Division II as the "meaning of care" Heidegger says “That wherein (Worin) Dasein understands itself is that for which (Woraufhin) it has let entities be encountered beforehand”.22

An act of “understanding” (Verstehen, which is as we will see a word with many nuances in the German philosophy of Heidegger’s time) brings all these threads together; in this, the “world” is revealed to be crucially rooted in the possibilities of understanding native to Dasein, not a foreign entity looming over it. We are what we do; what we can understand is what we do.

22 BT, p. 119
Descartes’ Gaffe

The heading of Chapter 3 which is ‘historical’ deals with material from Descartes’ *Principles of Philosophy* in a critical spirit. Though Heidegger is usually warmly congratulated as a foe of ‘Cartesianism’, this section of *Being and Time* typically receives little or no attention (the matter is perhaps complicated by the quotations from Descartes being given in Latin by Macquarrie and Robinson, as they are in the original German text; translations are provided in their end-matter). Descartes’ philosophy also receives a great deal of attention in Heidegger’s contemporaneous lecture-course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, a work which is of no small interest to the student of *Being and Time*, but as opposed to that text the focus here is very narrow. In this section of Chapter 3 a particular definition of physical substance in terms of “extension” is deemed wholly inadequate for philosophical purposes, and consequences are drawn therefrom which are more than a little obscure to the unaided eye. In interpreting Heidegger’s remarks on Descartes we must neither discard them and downplay them, nor overemphasize their importance; the light they shine on the text as a whole is what ought to be grasped. Every student of philosophy has been made to look at the *Meditations*, and eventually we read them carefully: Descartes’ never-
questioned status as the ‘first modern philosopher’ is perhaps less interesting to us than it ought to be, but we at least do take his arguments about the mind and the existence of God seriously.

**Principles of Philosophy**, Descartes' much longer ‘omnibus’ philosophical work which revisits material from the *Meditations* and *Discourse on Method* as well as containing much material about then-modern physics, has no widely available translation (the excerpts from it in the Cambridge collected works are comparatively very brief). The intellectual-historical point might be made that we lack knowledge even of what we *would* think about the *Principles* since nobody other than scholars reads it. Heidegger has found a 'dormant' text by a great philosopher, as he often does in the exegetical portions of *Being and Time*, seizes on a definition there of “corporeal substance” as constituted by “extension in length, breadth, and thickness” and the contention that our grasp of this is due to the “resistance” physical objects offer us. What can be made of this?

The contemporary reader may wish to see Heidegger as opting for a more complicated rival theory of the physical as something like our 'quantum world' (as Gadamer once pointed out, he was not at all unaware of the major developments in physics during his era). That is not the point, however: the issue here is Heidegger’s deeper one with what is called in our contemporary philosophical jargon ‘mereology’ and its inadequacy for the kinds of problems he is setting himself. More of contemporary
philosophy deals with problems of mereology than the unfamiliarity of the term suggests; furthermore, more of Heidegger's critique in *Being and Time* is directed at mereological impulses at work in his time than is generally realized. (We have a case where there is a word for the thing, only those that know the word do not know the thing and those that know the thing do not know the word.)

The famous American philosopher David Lewis, who helped put mereology on the analytic agenda, once proposed a principle called “Humean supervenience”—that all truths are dependent on “local matters of fact”: roughly speaking, the idea that great things must be built up out of smaller things for them to make sense at all. Many philosophers have spent decades trying to clarify the sense in which this could be true; Heidegger wants to point up the sense in which it is *irrelevant*. ‘Physicalists’ take physical reality, defined in a way which is usually far more complicated than Descartes’ cartoon sketch but fundamentally of a piece with it, as completely definitive of *what it is to be*: numbers, football teams, and political movements had better find the molecules of which they are composed, if you will.

Heidegger heads the *Leitmotiv* of physicalism off at the pass by arguing that this conception is dependent on an equivocation about the concept of substance. Descartes and most early modern philosophers viewed physical reality as a secondary or ‘inferior’ form of reality compared to God, the *ens perfectissimum*, and Heidegger
wants to say that reasoning of the sort Descartes is doing about physical entities is wrongheaded for this reason; if, lacking a definitive word about the nature of the divine being, we do not properly speaking know what a “substance” is being sure that physical objects are exemplary substances is probably not correct.

Furthermore, it is not at all the problem Heidegger has set himself. If “World” is what we are questing after, an exhaustive listing of entities “within-the-world” and their structure—a ‘completed mereology’—is only one conceivable option for defining its character, and given the way Heidegger has developed the themes of world and worldhood in Chapter 3 hardly the most promising one. In fact, we can argue that Heidegger is genuinely continuing the work of Husserl by pointing out that *die Welt is sui generis*, a layer or dimension of being that is completely untranscendable by Dasein because it is 'wherein' Dasein dwells; our concernful circumspection in interacting with the world is not something that Dasein can ‘quit’ through ascetic renunciation, and it is also something that permanently resists a physicalist reduction. The section on Descartes closes with a promissory note pertaining to the never-completed Division 3, wherein a semi-historical exploration of these themes in the fragments from Parmenides on was to have occurred.

Space and Existence

The final sections of Chapter 3 have to do with ‘existential spatiality’, the sense in which Dasein’s ‘worldedness’ forms and is formed by its experience of space. The topics
handled here have little to do with the general thrust of the book, but it is a good example of a traditional phenomenological analysis of the usual type and has occasioned some serious research in psychology and ‘cognitive science’. (He has an important precursor in Kant’s “What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” a short later essay which begins with the practical business of orienting ourselves in space.) In another anti-mereological argument, Heidegger argues the space which we experience is not at all a portion of vacuum of a certain size ‘filled with junk’, but something within which Zeug becomes relevant: salient, accessible and subject to an ordering which is not strictly a ‘geometrical’ one.

Heidegger’s watchwords for existential spatiality are “de-severance” (Entfernung) and “directionality” (Ausrichtung). Entfernung is not quite as strange a word in German as Macquarrie and Robinson’s neologism makes it look, nor is its verbal form entfernen; something which is entfernt is usually just reckoned simply distant from us. Heidegger is making a play on words involving the word’s containing the privative prefix ent- (equivalent to the English de- in most cases). Things which are entfernt are not just simply distant, they are de-severed: their distance is “active and transitive”, an affair of Dasein wherein distance paradoxically involves nearness (Näherung). Similarly, 'directionality' is not simply a matter of buying a good-quality compass but recognizing how we put together a ‘cognitive map’ of the environment that crucially involves our projects of circumspective concern.
These two features constitute space as a "region", *Gegend* (perhaps idiomatically rendered by the English expression “these parts”).

“*Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space.* Space is rather ‘in’ the world so far as space has been disclosed by that Being-in-the-world which is constitutive for Dasein. Space is not to be found in the subject, nor does the subject observe the world ‘as if’ that world were in a space; but the ‘subject’ (Dasein), if well-understood ontologically, is spatial. And because Dasein is spatial in the way we have described, space shows itself as an *a priori.*”

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23 BT, p. 146
Chapter 4: “Being-in-the-World as Being-with and Being-one’s-self. The ‘They’”

There was nothing of the giant in the aspect of the man who was beginning to awaken on the sleeping-porch of a Dutch Colonial house in that residential district of Zenith known as Floral Heights.

His name was George F. Babbitt. He was forty-six years old now, in April 1920, and he made nothing in particular, neither butter nor shoes nor poetry, but he was nimble in the calling of selling houses for more than people could afford to pay.

Sinclair Lewis, Babbitt

Who Are You (The Self and Others)

Division I’s Chapter 4 is another shorter chapter but one which had a deep resonance in the ‘culture criticism’ of the 20th century; in it Heidegger deploys his already-developed theoretical tools to analyze a problem that had been brought to the fore in recent decades by Freud and others, that of ‘personality’. The modern philosophical tradition held as a consequence of its epistemology that personality was a sort of ‘shadow’ cast by the rational mind, one which could be more or less arbitrarily altered by an effort of will. In writings beginning with The Interpretation of Dreams in 1900 Freud had already subjected this ‘commonplace’ to a searching critique,
arguing that subpersonal forces based in deep biological imperatives fundamentally determined the nature of our personality (and that psychic pathologies arising from them could only be mended by a careful and nonjudgmental ‘analysis’ of those forces’ expression in a patient’s discourse).  

Heidegger was no Freudian; remarks on psychoanalysis are almost nowhere to be found in his writings, early and late. (Later, 'existential psychoanalysis' in the hands of Sartre and Binswanger would be proposed as an alternative to a hardening Freudian orthodoxy.) Still, in this chapter he is a ‘fellow-traveler’ with Freud in arguing that the 'sentiments' we hold as individuals are far from inferences from ‘declarative knowledge’ securely possessed by a res cogitans. Heidegger’s analysis of “the ‘Who’” (das Wer; it is equally neologistic in German to add the definite article) that we think we are shows it to be fundamentally impersonal, an “inauthentic” taking-over of attitudes from an overarching but superficial collective rationality. This “Who” turns out to be “proximally and for the most part” (zunächst und zumeist, a phrase that appears often in the rest of the book) the “They” (das Man).

24 Although the scientific veracity of Freud’s statements was never not in dispute, and the promise of Freudian psychotherapeutics often thought to be yet more questionable—Karl Kraus famously said "Psychoanalysis is the disease for which it purports to be the cure" in Freud's own time and place—Freud, like Heidegger, set countless 20th century intellectuals their essential tasks.
The chapter begins by posing the problem of the self in terms of the characteristic of Dasein noted earlier, *Jemeinigkeit*. It never is the case that Dasein is ‘not a self’; as Heidegger says, “The question of the ‘who’ answers itself in terms of the ‘I’ itself, the ‘subject’, the ‘Self’”. Yet work that had already been done by his older German contemporaries and Heidegger’s own critique of the conception of the ego in terms of “presence-at-hand” militate for an astonishing and suggestive conclusion: the self is for the most part *not itself*, not a fully realized and securely grasped personality. Lack of self-awareness is, furthermore, not its diametric opposite: “In that case, the ‘not-I’ is by no means tantamount to an entity which essentially lacks ‘I-hood’ [‘Ichheit’], but is rather a definite kind of Being which the ‘I’ itself possesses, such as having lost itself [Selbstverlorenheit]”.

The Russian futurist novelist Zamaytin published his *We* in the 1920s, the title undoubtedly a reference to a statement of Mikhail Bakunin’s: "I do not want to be me, I want to be We". Truly spoken this is often what actually obtains, we are often not at all 'rugged individualists' even in our most idiosyncratic moments. In this chapter Heidegger comes very close to the pessimistic critiques of personality as it manifests in 'late capitalism' later elaborated by his student Marcuse and others in the Frankfurt School, and even those who despise him for

25 BT, p. 150
26 BT, p. 152
'falling' for the mountebank Hitler would do well to think carefully about what is said here and how it relates to their own 'critical theory' of society. The question is further complicated by another theme which had begun to be sounded in the philosophy of Heidegger's time, *intersubjectivity*.

A few years prior to the publication of *Being and Time* the German-Jewish philosopher Martin Buber had a widespread success with his *I and Thou*, in which he argued that the self was created by dialogue with an Other far more than was commonly realized. (Heidegger could not have failed to have been aware of Buber's writing.) Heidegger's own account of the importance of “Others” is presented in Chapter 4 against the account of concernful circumspection developed in Chapter 3: as anyone is aware, the practical business of everyday life integrally involves others; when we are at work or ‘among friends’ we are far from an isolated ego furiously attempting to break out of its hermetic self-sufficiency but “always already” there with entities which “are neither present-to-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are like the very Dasein which frees them, in that *they are there too, and there with it*.27 Husserl’s own later solution in the *Cartesian Meditations* to the ‘problem of other minds’ in terms of “intermonadological intersubjectivity” is patently lacking by comparison.

27 BT, p. 154
Many of Heidegger’s most important terms deal with the affective dimensions of Dasein, of which the most general case is “care” (Sorge, the topic of Chapter 6). In Chapter 4 he discusses “solicitude” (Fürsorge, which is alternatively translated as “welfare”, a sense in which it had traditionally been used in German government); the extent to which “co-Daseins” come to matter to us in the center of our existence. Heidegger’s analysis of solicitude is no bravura performance but has an interesting resonance with a concept of popular Christian theology. In discussing how Dasein can “leap in” (Einspringen) to help another, Heidegger is tacitly invoking the Christian ‘practice’ known in English as “standing in the gap”.

However, for reasons that will become richly apparent when we study Division II this is no unequivocal endorsement of “pastoral” care. Heidegger here suggests a superior form of solicitude would be to “leap ahead” of the Other “in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time”.  

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28 BT, p. 159
You Can’t Be “The One” (“The They”)  

Making Dasein and its co-Daseins ‘all of a piece’ in the “with-world” of concernful circumspection is a philosophically brilliant stroke, but the fact that we then understand ourselves and each other as we would “proximally and for the most part” is a further complication. Heidegger says the “Who” that evolves out of this condition (the basic and fundamental one, of which an “authentic” understanding is actually derivative) is an inauthentic self, “the ‘They’” (das Man), which hiddenly dominates our understanding of everything. “In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the ‘they’ is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find shocking what they find shocking”.  

Das Man is "everyone and nobody", the person "we" all disclaim being and yet end up falling into the patterns of ceaselessly. It is the false yet omnipotent force of what we 'should' do according to common canons of behavior we do not even have the time or wherewithal to examine. (The author of the wry countercultural observation "I’m

29 p. 164
an individualist, just like everyone else" almost certainly owned a copy of this book.)

A remark, one I think fairly important, on interpreting this phrase: translations alternative to Macquarrie and Robinson’s choice have been proposed, but almost nobody has hit on the appropriateness of a ‘lexically literal’ translation of das Man as “the ‘one’” (Herman Philipse does mention this as a possible translation in his Heidegger's Philosophy of Being, but he also uses several others). Man in German is not a 'cognate' of our English man, but has exactly the function of “one” in sentences like “One says...” or “One ought to do...” and, like “one”, it is rather obviously not completely 'us' as individuals; no human being is a Man, though its perhaps-spurious normativity touches us all in the form of 'maxims' and gentle reminders from the more sophisticated. Furthermore, at the end of the chapter Heidegger makes an incredibly surprising claim: “Authentic Being-one’s-self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they’—of the ‘they’ as an essential existentiale”.

Unpacking how this paradoxical commitment could be intellectually tenable will be a central issue in considering Division II. Rebelling against 'conformity' is a perennial

30 BT, p. 168
temptation for intellectually sensitive youth and despairing adults, but there is also an unavoidable wisdom to 'going with the flow'; Heidegger's account of authenticity and inauthenticity is much more even-handed with respect to the matter than most people realize. Still, it is crucially important to recognize this is a genuine point of commonality between the Heidegger who would go on to be a relatively content citizen of the Nazi Third Reich and the Frankfurt School members who fled Germany.

It is quite often the case that an intellectually well-turned critique of society is in some sense inescapable, capable of being held by those most responsible for the problem diagnosed and also those who find the problem the least 'problematic'. Furthermore I have said in my Preface that the immediate context of Being and Time, the German 1920s, is very rarely adverted to in discussions of such aspects of the book; my discussions of various chapters begin with quotations selected from non-German material contemporaneous with Heidegger's book, such as the quotation at the beginning of this chapter from the once-famous satire of the small American city "Zenith" and its conformist residents, Sinclair Lewis' Babbitt. More than any famous figure from German literature Babbitt is das
Man, and the pre-set trajectory he follows in Zenith is in large part still our own today.31

31 I am in general resisting the temptation in this book to ‘editorialize’ about far-fetched interpretations of Heidegger’s work, thoughts I would find personally agreeable but which would be hard to justify by citing ‘chapter and verse’, but in preparing to write this book a surprising ‘revaluation’ of Heidegger’s views on intersubjectivity came to me and I will relate it. Being and Time is a book on the “Question of Being”; it is also called by Heidegger’s student Gadamer a “hermeneutic phenomenology”—the kind of statement that sets the philosophy enthusiast to a satisfying nodding of the head as a protective measure against anything going on within it, as I well know. Gadamer’s explication of this designation for Heidegger’s work in Truth and Method hinges on his own enthusiasm for the problem of language, but as I have earlier argued Heidegger had no special truck with “linguistic philosophy”. I will tentatively say that I think the sense in which Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is a “hermeneutic phenomenology” is that it is essentially an intersubjective phenomenology; what lies underneath much of Being and Time’s conceptual armature is a brilliant if perhaps ultimately Quixotic attempt to consider ‘what we talk about when we talk about Being’ as deeply revelatory of the human mind in concert, more revelatory than a jim-dandy inventory of ‘private episodes’ using ‘scientifically precise’ language. In a way Being and Time could perhaps be viewed as an essay in understanding the “elemental force of the words” Heidegger is invoking as they
were used around him, not an attempt to imperiously impose his own personal conception of how they ‘ought’ to be used.
Chapter 5: “Being-in as Such”

It seemed to me that I had first of all really made quite a mistake in being at all born, seeing that I was wifeless and only half awake, cursed with pimples, correctly dressed, cleanshaven about the nombril, and much to my astonishment much impressed by having once noticed (as an infantile phenomenon) George Washington almost incompletely surrounded by well-drawn icecakes beheld being too strong, in brief: an American, is you understand that I mean what I say I believe my most intimate friends would never have gathered.

e.e. cummings, is 5

In Chapter 2 we saw a provisional delineation of a concept Heidegger called “Being-in” (*In-sein*), and I initially suggested it was his “replacement concept” for *intentionality*, a term used by Brentano and Husserl and which was very widely discussed in *analytic* philosophy of mind in the closing decades of the 20th century. Intentionality is usually defined as the ‘aboutness’ of a mental state or linguistic utterance, its intrinsic ability to represent a “state of affairs”: the problem of figuring out how to ‘naturalize’ intentionality—fit it into the “scientific image of man”—is something analytic figures like Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor and John McDowell have sought for an answer to.
Those unfamiliar with analytic philosophy may not realize the extent to which for a time intentionality was its "Dasein", the problem everyone wanted to solve after figuring out what it was; the ability of ‘Continental’ figures like Heidegger to contribute anything to the sharply turned analytic discussion is often contested. In Chapter 5—where Heidegger offers his fully-worked-out account of Being-in—we have an excellent proving ground for determining what one philosophical camp has to say to the other: surely not nothing, and perhaps in this instance 'more than ever' in that recent developments have made a new 'hybrid' paradigm more possible and desirable than before.

Heidegger begins the chapter with two somewhat cryptic statements. In a version of his usual complaint that modern philosophy has attempted to read the character of Dasein off entities that are “present-at-hand”, he says something very striking: “But in this case, what else is presented with this phenomenon than the commercium which is present-at-had between a subject present at hand and an Object present at hand? Such an interpretation would come closer to the phenomenal content if we were to say that Dasein is the Being of this ‘between’.”32

32 BT, p. 170; another variation Heidegger presents elsewhere is saying that Dasein is the “sum” in cogito, ergo sum.
The other arcanum takes its cue from the literal meaning of “Dasein”, formed from Sein and da, “there”: as in the title of Jerzy Kozinski’s novel Da-sein literally means “being there”, and the importance of this linguistic 'happenstance' is a topic which Heidegger is absolutely loquacious on in this chapter and in parts of his later ‘unpublished’ work Contributions to Philosophy (in this and many other cases Heidegger employs the device of hyphenation to make the constituent elements of a word salient and analyzes the words 'bit by bit’). In this introductory section he says “If it lacks its ‘there’, it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness”.33

There is a great deal of material in Chapter 5, and it would be unfair to simply ‘dictate’ the meaning of Heidegger's other terms based on a perhaps-perverse construal of these two statements; yet what is presented surely oscillates in a space defined by them, between them. I think the most general statement that can be made, one which will not steer the reader astray, is that these principles and the obscure notion of the “clearing” (Lichtung) indicate that Dasein is not a 'methodologically solipsistic' subject with the mere ‘potentiality’ of grasping intentional contents about the world but something like a space defined by the human’s effective grasping of intentional contents.

33 BT, p. 171
In other words, it is essentially an arena where ‘news of the world’ fundamentally belongs rather than anything that could be temptingly viewed as relaxing in a vat away from reality. This suggests a somewhat ‘anti-intellectualist’ view of intentionality is what is on offer in Heidegger’s “Being-in”, and I perhaps more than others do think so; I will argue for the view that there it is highly significant there is not a primacy of representation in Heidegger’s theory of mind in this chapter and Chapter 6 on “care”, not because 'declarative knowledge' is spurious but because our 'cognitive understanding' of a topic is essentially affectively laden and 'value-dependent'. We do not escape us, our feelings and goals, in coming to know something.

In the first half of Chapter 5, “The Existential Constitution of the ‘There’”, Heidegger introduces two very important concepts, which will acquire even more importance in his presentation of “originary temporality” in Division II: “state-of-mind” (Befindlichkeit) and “understanding” (Verstehen). Befindlichkeit is a Heidegger neologism that proves refractory to translation, and many complaints have been raised about Macquarrie and Robinson rendering it as “state-of-mind”: if I had to try my own hand at Englishing it, I would select “awareness” (the quite common German expression Wie befinden Sie sich? strictly asks after your ‘self-awareness’, instructing you to report your mood as though you were reading a thermometer). State-of-mind, understanding, and “discourse” (Rede) are presented as “equiprimordial” elements of Being-in, all of which are essential to its
existence and none of which can be privileged over the others.

This characteristically Heideggerian 'definition in parts' poses the interpreter no lack of difficulties; when all three elements are equally important and none eliminable the usual slide to locating a theoretical 'cornerstone' is blocked, such that we must uncomfortably reckon with the ambiguous whole behind the equally weighted elements.

The section on *Befindlichkeit* begins with this statement: “What we indicate ontologically by the term ‘state-of-mind’ is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned.” In other words, if state-of-mind is an essential part of our awareness of the world it is an essentially affective one as well; Heidegger is selecting our moods, our feelings as something which tell us something very important about Being in general. How can this be? “Dasein always has some mood”\(^{34}\), and the way in which reality becomes emotionally relevant to us is important to what our relationship to it can be.

Not necessarily a *good* mood, mind you, and not one we rationally select for by psychological (or pharmacological) conditioning; moods are an example of what is called in German philosophy *facticity* (*Faktizität*), a “thus-it-is” we

\(^{34}\) BT, p. 173
simply do not get to choose for or against. The word used in *Being and Time* for this is “thrownness” (*Geworfenheit*). The life situations we find ourselves in, and how we feel about them, are very much *not of our choosing*; essentially so, according to Heidegger, as we are always *thrown into* our condition.

“Factically, Dasein (*Dass ein Dasein faktisch...*) can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods; in certain possible ways of existing, this may signify a priority of volition and cognition. Only we must not be misled by this into denying that ontologically mood is a primordial kind of being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself *prior* to all cognition and volition, and *beyond* their range of disclosure. And furthermore, when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods. Ontologically, we thus obtain as the first essential characteristic of states-of-mind that *they disclose Dasein in its thrownness, and—proximally and for the most part—in the manner of an invasive turning-away*.\(^{35}\)

The ‘exception that proves the rule’ is the emotion of *fear*. Fear is on some accounts not only an unpleasant emotion but a useless one, one which should be shunned in all cases by avoiding “detrimental” situations or Stoically resolving simply not to be afraid of them. Something many interpreters have failed to do justice to is the reality that Heidegger *does not* believe that ‘unfortunate’ aspects of

\(^{35}\) **BT**, p. 175
Dasein’s existence (such as those that are 'inauthentic') can be done away with; this is the truth of his frequent assurances that he is not using a pejorative term for something in a ‘disparaging’ way, for it has to be that the thing in question has a bad aspect we’re not getting away from.\footnote{In Chapter 6 a ‘modification’ of fear, \textit{Angst}, will play a critical role in the argument; if we thought we could do away with fear we would not take \textit{Angst} seriously enough and would therefore completely fail to grasp an ontologically important aspect of human existence.}

\textit{Verstehen} or “understanding” is absolutely not a ‘Heideggerianism’ but a term which was heavily used in German philosophy in the half-century prior to \textbf{Being and Time}: in the philosophy of history and the social sciences the particular virtues of \textit{Verstehen} versus \textit{Erklärung} (“explanation” in the sense of a rigorously scientific explanation) were debated, and the fans of ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ put a specially high value on “understanding”: even Max Weber managed to subtitle his \textbf{Economy and Society} as a work in “\textit{verstehende Soziologie}”. Like \textit{Welt}, \textit{Verstehen} is a distinctive contribution by German philosophical culture to the world intellectual discussion; the extent to which this concept of ‘true understanding’ both draws us and defeats us is a genuine spur to greater theoretical knowledge.

Heidegger’s understanding of understanding is a highly unorthodox one, however: interpreting Section 31 of
Chapter 5, “Being-there as Understanding”, is one of the most challenging tasks in reading Being and Time. The reader must be forewarned it is eminently possible not all such tasks can be completed; part of the difficulties in interpreting a philosophical text honestly arise from realizing the theory articulated in literal words on a page may not be a perfect 'entelechy', but essentially incoherent on some level (without therefore being irrelevant). Heidegger says: “In the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called ‘understanding’. In the understanding of the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, the significance which is grounded therein, is disclosed along with it. The disclosedness of understanding, as the disclosedness of the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ and of significance equiprimordially, pertains to the entirety of Being-in-the-world”.

This might be glossed as follows: when we ordinarily think we ‘have an understanding of something’, we think of its consisting in our understanding how a part of the world ‘works’, but Heidegger wants to emphasize the sense in which ‘my understanding of — is...’ is related to personal projects, what we aim to accomplish. This is said in a different way by Heidegger pointing out the similarity between Verstehen and vorstehen, being ‘equal to’ a task; to "understand how to read" is to be able to do it, but the 'cash-value' of even a personally idiosyncratic and intellectually refined understanding of something can only

37 BT, p. 182
be what it in the end lets us do relative to what we want to achieve. This pre-theoretical intuition is captured by the realization that in ‘understanding’ something in the Heideggerian sense we are engaging in what he calls ‘projection’ (*Entwurf*; the footnote on p. 185 from Macquarrie and Robinson describing the valences of this term is unusually useful).

We are not only coping with an ‘external reality’ in engaging in *Verstehen*, we are *bringing ourselves into being*—largely ‘as we are’, it might be added—by considering the 'projection possibilities' in which a piece of the world is enmeshed with our story. It is a curiously satisfying twist on the ‘traditional’ story about intentionality (perhaps one worthy of William James, who welded a substantial knowledge about biological mindedness to a searching examination of 'phenomenological' subjectivity in action; already with James there was no very great distinction between understanding and 'what we were about' in acting) to say that our ‘sketching our own character’ plays a tremendous role in what we can cognize about the world; as we will see Heidegger is no fan of an ‘unbearable lightness’ to the conception of reality, but his thoroughgoing pragmatism about ‘content’ indicates that genuine truths will be understood ‘in the last instance’ by humans, humanly. As Heidegger's sometime lover Hannah Arendt's book had it later it is a *vita activa*.
When state-of-mind (which deals with ‘facticity’) and understanding (which reveals the essentially ‘agentive’ character of our commerce with the world) are taken together, a characterization of Dasein becomes possible: “Dasein is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself—thrown possibility through and through”. Heidegger’s suggestive but sketchy remarks about understanding in the rest of Section 31 are well worth pondering ‘without prejudice’, as they are quite difficult but offer much food for thought.

He connects understanding’s 'living within possibilities’ to Kant’s search for the “conditions of possibility” for a knowledge of Nature, and raises the question of the distinction between an authentic understanding and an inauthentic one (which will be taken up in much greater detail in Division II). However, I have a word of caution for the reader: "understanding" (which John Locke memorably went on about for hundreds of pages) is what Heidegger calls a tantum singulare, an "Om" that could easily encompass all of our knowledge about anything in a slightly obscure way, such that it is important that we mind it as a constituent of the entire theory of Being and Time and not a mere 'fulcrum' for comprehending the entire world as in empiricism.

The final term discussed in “The Existential Constitution of the ‘There’” is Rede, “discourse”. Rede is a very difficult word for English speakers without it actually strictly

38 BT, p. 183
being a non-English word; a famous work of Middle English literature is **Richard the Redeless** (a ‘king without counsel’), although it is a term that has completely fallen out of use in Modern English. However, Heidegger is really perfectly clear that there is a word in a **non-Germanic** language that he wishes *Rede* to offer a truly full account of, and that is the Greek *logos*. *Logos* is a word important both in ancient philosophy and the Christian tradition: we traditionally know it either as *ratio*, an all-worthy principle, or “the Word”, an inspired revelation. Heidegger wants *Rede* to be neither, and it is surely not too much to think that he means to cast doubt on the traditional valuations of *logos*.³⁹

German philosophy since the “return to Kant” in the late 19th century had become quite addicted to ‘validity’ or what we might today call ‘normativity’: and an idea from the neo-Kantians that the judgment is the “locus of truth” has had a great resonance in ideas circulating recently. Heidegger was foursquare against it. In two sections, “Understanding and Interpretation” and “Assertion as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation”, he lays out a

³⁹ John Haugeland’s elaborate gloss of *Rede* as 'telling' is fundamentally unsound since he wants to make heavy weather of the sense in English in which something is 'telling', say about the nature of your 'hand' in cards. Heidegger's later philosophy makes something of a concept of "jointure" borrowed from the fugue in music which captures something of what Haugeland wants to say, but I have no enthusiasm for a conception of Heidegger's *Rede* here which delinks it from *Gespräch*. 
complicated and quite obscure alternative theory for how we manage to communicate useful truths by uttering statements. The theory of concernful circumspection in Chapter 3, with its concomitant 'network of significance', provides the basis for challenging 'logocentrism' about meaning.

For Heidegger meaning starts right with our affective, practical involvement in the world and 'enunciation' of statements must take its cues from this rather than the other way around. A remark to mark well on this topic has to do with how understanding interacts with meaning (Sinn); “Meaning is the ‘upon-which’ of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a foresight, and a fore-conception”.40 The idea of the ‘upon-which’ (Woraufhin) introduced in passing here will be very important in considering temporality as the ‘sense of being’ in Division II.

The final section of “A” addresses the relationship of Heidegger's theory of ‘significance’ to language properly considered. The programmatic statement is “The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk”41, but it is hard to say what this means. I think one thing it might mean is that Heidegger would have had very little time for ‘structuralist’ concern with the ‘languages’ or ‘codes’ at work in some element of human life that

40 BT, p. 193
41 BT, p. 203
dominated European intellectual life in the post-World War II era; if the difference between lipstick shades is not especially ‘telling’ for what we actually care about in life, if they would all suit one particularly relevant woman just as well, they may not in truth really be awaiting an analysis of their larger significance for our society.

Another thing he is quick to do is to put a positive valuation on the traditional German value of taciturnity; someone who ‘keeps silent’ (schweigen, which is actually quite an active verb) can say more than the most loquacious man in the room. Finally, Heidegger does ‘give away the game’ that Rede is in fact an ‘improvement’ on a logos thought in terms of assertions and a Dasein that is constituted by it an improvement on the zoon logon echon instantly classed as a 'rational animal'.

The part of Chapter 5 labeled "B", “The Everyday Being of the ‘There’, and the Falling of Dasein”, takes the positive theories of “The Existential Constitution of the There” and sets them to a ‘critical’ task: analyzing three phenomena where discourse, understanding, and state-of-mind fail to provide us with a perspicuous view of the world: “Idle Talk” (Gerede), “Curiosity” (Neugier), and “Ambiguity” (Zweideutigkeit). Notes similar to the critique of the “They” in Chapter 4 are sounded; again, it is important to note that Heidegger does not view such things as eradicable but when he indicates he is not using “disparaging” significations it does not indicate a positive view of the matter in question either.
**Gerade** is the ordinary German word for “gossip”, and “idle talk” occurs when the average understanding of *das Man* overrides adequate attentiveness to the “matter at hand”: it becomes far more important whether Mr. X has in fact said such-and-such than whether it is in fact true. *Neugier*, "curiosity", is a thoughtless ‘modernism’ about whether 'the grass is greener on the other side', a willingness to abandon fixities without bringing a necessary 'wonder' (Heidegger explicitly mentions the Greek *thaumazein* as what is lacking in “curiosity”) along with you.

“Ambiguous” speech says everything by saying nothing; it could be one thing and it could be the other, which means what is said is effectively nothing at all.

Although in general I think it is often possible to read *Being and Time* too ‘existentially’ Heidegger is not articulating a simple philosophical psychology of ‘intentional content’ here; these three phenomena are examples of “falling” (*Verfallen*), a term obviously taken over from the Christian theological tradition to describe the sense in which we are 'lost' in the bustle of everyday life. Heidegger says of "falling": “This term does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside the ‘world’ of its concern. This ‘absorption in ...’ [*Aufgehen bei...*] has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the ‘they’”. 42

42 BT, p. 220
Understanding the phenomena associated with “falling” and their more authentic counterparts will be a major task of Division II; of course one of our most vital and deeply felt concerns in philosophical thinking is how to 'stay true' to reality and ourselves when confronted with a conception of things which is in truth 'fool's gold'. However, it ought to be said that Heidegger was a devotee neither of 'mereology' nor *soteriology*, so that if there is a sense in which *Being and Time* is a ‘guide to the blessed life’ it is a *life without salvation*. 
Chapter 6: “Care as the Being of Dasein”

"Gee, that is tough," said Clyde, troubled, and yet fairly sympathetic after a time. "You wouldn't have run away with him unless you cared for him though—would you?" (He was thinking of himself and Hortense Briggs.) "I'm sorry for you, Ess. Sure, I am, but it won't do you any good to cry about it now, will it? There's lots of other fellows in the world beside him. You'll come out of it all right.

Theodore Dreiser, *An American Tragedy*

The British analytic philosopher J.L. Austin famously said it was a general rule of intellectual discourse that “There’s the bit where you say it, and the bit where you take it back”. At the beginning of my discussion of Chapter 6 of Division I Austin's advice will be employed; a somewhat radical suggestion I made about Chapters 2 and 5 will be modified, although at the same time somewhat extended. There I suggested that Heidegger’s concept of “Being-in” ought to be viewed as a ‘replacement’ concept for intentionality: in other words, “Being-in” says what Heidegger thinks intentionality would *really* be, contains a deep critique of the concept as it was used by Husserl (and by extension those later philosophers who have modeled their conception of intentionality on Husserl's).

However, in Chapter 6, “Care as the Being of Dasein”, the question of what intentionality would be in the context of
“Care” (an even broader characteristic element of Dasein’s constitution) implicitly arises. My critical emendation and extension of my earlier conjecture is this: Heidegger in fact had a ‘two-ply’ theory of ‘intentionality’ in **Being and Time**, one part of which is the "Being-in" Chapter 5 and another part of which is dealt with as “Care” in Chapter 6. The governing idea for this might well have been taken from Husserl, who in his **Ideas** made a distinction within his theory of intentionality between the **noesis**—the subjectively available experience or content of thinking—and the **noema**, the “intentional object” thinking makes cognitively available.

Under this interpretation, Being-in is as a Husserlian would say the subjectively accessible ‘meaning’ of our intentional directedness to the world, what we think ‘in our minds’, but Care is intentionality considered as our interfacing with its objective reality, the coin in which our awareness of the world is repaid in ‘objectivity’. This is not a standard interpretation but far from an arbitrary diktat; I think my own theory of the last two chapters of Division I will pay off in considering the intricacies of temporality in Division II. At any rate, the importance of Sorge or Care in Heidegger’s ‘architectonic’ is often unexplored and we would do well to heed it as one of his major 'words'. In chapter 3 we met “concern” (*Besorge*) and “solicitude” (*Fürsorge*): “Care” (*Sorge*) is far from adventitiously linked to them linguistically.
“Pre-ontologically”—a concept which comes into play later in Chapter 6—*Sorge* is linked to the ‘cares of the world’ and generally has a far from ‘positive’ signification in German: however, later in *Being and Time* Heidegger makes it clear that when he says “Care is the Being of Dasein” he is absolutely serious and this is not a metaphor.

At the first he offers no pithy summary of what he thinks ‘falls under the heading’, but in the first half of Chapter 6 he makes it perfectly clear that Care is what binds the ‘equiprimordial’ aspects of Being-in-the-World together: it is under the aspect of Care that the ‘totality of the structural whole’ of Dasein can be synoptically grasped, which will be extremely important in the development of temporality in Division II. The second half of Chapter 6 contains two famous analyses of the “problem of Reality” and truth; those who have been waiting for Heidegger to tackle 'traditional' philosophical problems will find his remarks are highly thought-provoking, and we will examine them closely with an eye towards joining the disparate elements of Division I together cohesively.

Chapter 6 begins with a discussion of the concept of anxiety (*Angst*). The 19th-century existentialist theologian Soren Kierkegaard famously wrote a monograph called *The Concept of Anxiety*, and we might well think that—as with certain discreet nods made to famous 'watchwords' from Nietzsche throughout *Being and Time*—there is much to be made of this from the
standpoint of continuity in 'existentialism'. I am not of this opinion; though like most of his contemporaries Heidegger was well aware of Kierkegaard’s name, he disclaimed much of a direct influence and beyond their quite similar efforts to “think the Europe of their time” (it is entirely possible to underplay the extent to which Kierkegaard’s ‘missives’ and Heidegger's shorter writings were a sort of 'philosophical journalism' of the sort also practiced by Georg Simmel) I do not think there is a substantial direct influence to find.

All the same, it is surely worth ‘marking’ anxiety as a ‘theological’ concept which would completely resist an interpretation in terms of biological psychology: measurements of galvanic skin reactions are quite definitely not what is intended here, and attention to the general direction of Heidegger’s analysis is important for the book as a whole (the concept will importantly reappear in Division II).

On the surface, anxiety is like a form of fear: when we are anxious we are ‘not feeling well’, apprehensive, afraid bad things are going to happen and the like. However, Heidegger’s distinction between anxiety and fear begins with the observation that if anxiety were a form of fear it would be distinguished by the curious fact we do not really know what we are anxious about: “That in the face of
which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world”.\textsuperscript{43} If there is anything we are anxious about, it is everything: “The obstinacy of the ‘nothing and nowhere within-the-world’ means as a phenomenon that the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety”.\textsuperscript{44} In the chapter on the Introduction I mentioned that whatever Dasein was intended to represent ‘individualization’ was something Heidegger indicated happened to it, and here Heidegger explains: “Anxiety individualizes (\textit{vereinzelt}) Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands projects itself essentially upon possibilities”.\textsuperscript{45}

The sense in which anxiety is a key to grasping Heidegger’s idea of “authenticity” is merely implicit here, but when we turn to Division II themes circling around the connection between the two will become signally important. For now I will simply encourage the reader to register this is another case in \textbf{Being and Time} where a ‘negative’ existentiell phenomenon plays a positive philosophical role. Here it is critically important for Heidegger’s developing an argument about the nature of Care, because anxiety generates no ‘cognitive yield’: it is ‘no-one and nothing’ we are anxious about, and yet our affective involvement in the world we inhabit most certainly does not leave us in this instance.

\textsuperscript{43} BT, p. 231
\textsuperscript{44} ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} ibid.
If Care is to be part of a story about intentionality, the story must be a special one in that Dasein’s grasp of the world in terms of Care is not necessarily paid in the coin of *verba*; the relevant questions are quite other than those of John Dewey’s “warranted assertibility”, resting much rather with the concrete and often never fully explicated 'passions' we have for the people and things we live amidst. Heidegger’s development of the concept of Care is defined against the background of the preliminary observations on anxiety, and revives elements of Chapter 5 which will go on to play very critical roles in the theory of “temporal ecstases” in Division II.

“Understanding” indicates a way in which Dasein ‘comes to itself’ in the form of its goals and plans being an issue for that self: "Dasein is always ‘beyond itself’ ['über sich hinaus'], not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is *not*, but as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself. This structure of Being, which belongs to the essential ‘is an issue’, we shall denote as Dasein’s ‘Being-ahead-of-itself’". 46 State-of-mind indicates as sense in which Dasein is ‘thrust into’ the situations it experiences: “To Being-in-the-world, however, belongs the fact that it has been delivered over to itself—that it has in each case already been thrown into a world”.

46 BT, p. 236
47 ibid.
Finally, in falling Dasein is “absorbed in the world of its concern”; taken together these mean “The formally existential totality of Dasein’s ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)”.

This is Care as a whole: our total ‘investment’ in the world. It is not an irrelevancy that Heidegger defines Dasein’s being as Care; the ability to be affectively moved is a specially and genuinely human achievement, and much of what we are ostensibly thinking in an 'intellectual' way actually does not leave its confines.

Section 42, where Heidegger examines an ancient Roman fable about cura or “care”, may seem anomalous in this tightly-argued chapter. It is important to understand that Heidegger is not quite claiming the Roman fabulist (or the Stoic Seneca, who was very interested in a philosophical treatment of the 'cares of the world') as an ‘intellectual precursor’: he is laying out evidence that his notion of “Care” has an important resonance with this earlier usage. Generally speaking I think it is not sufficiently appreciated that Heidegger’s keywords are not Wittgensteinian “beetle-boxes” which were intended to mean ‘whatever he meant by them’, but to be eventually intelligible as contributions to discussing the ‘matter at hand’, die Sache selbst, as it was ordinarily understood. In section 42 Heidegger also gives us a bit of the philosophy of

\[\text{BT, p. 237}\]
historicity which will be developed in Chapter 5 of Division II: “We must also note that Dasein’s being is characterized by historicity, though this must first be demonstrated ontologically. If Dasein is ‘historical’ in the very depths of its Being, then a deposition [Aussage] which comes from its history and goes back to it, and which, moreover, is prior to any scientific knowledge, will have especial weight, even though its importance is never purely ontological”.49

The Scandal of Reality

Heidegger’s analysis of the “problem of Reality” (das Realitätsproblem) in Section 43, “Dasein, Worldhood, and Reality” is one of the great favorites in the Heideggerian canon for theoretical philosophers in general. Many people who have no relish in general for his writings have applauded the ‘anti-skeptical’ tendency of the arguments; it should be said, however, that a great deal of the woolier theoretical thrust of Being and Time these ‘realists’ deprecate can be developed out of the material presented here. The “problem of Reality” was not new to philosophy from Heidegger’s hand: it was a piece of the legacy of Kant that German philosophers had enthusiastically seized upon, dividing themselves into ‘realists’ who could find no difficulty with the metaphysical status of any piece of

49 BT, pp. 241-2
purported knowledge about ‘how the world is’ and ‘phenomenalists’ who expected a genuine physical object to almost but not quite materialize out of ‘sense-data’.

In the first subsection of 43, he examines Kant’s famous “Refutation of Idealism” (the argument that a lack of persistent objects ‘outside me’ would make internal self-consciousness impossible) and compares it to his own theory: unlike the traditional “Dasein” of existent objects, of which the question ‘With what right?’ could easily be asked of our assertions that they exist, Heideggerian Dasein would simply make no sense without an existent world to interact with: there would be no Being-in-the-world to do without a world, rather obviously.

Heidegger’s second set of targets in Section 43 is comprised of his ‘direct precursors’ Max Scheler and Dilthey, both of whom attempted a more ‘holistic’ philosophical psychology which would solve these problems using a fuller account of the subjects’ humanity. Heidegger unfavorably contrasts their theories with his own; according to him no theory of ‘emergence’ of human mindedness at some point from the biological world, nor a dynamic theory of the knower’s feedback cycle involving ‘resistance’ from the world, nor a vague concern with ‘life’ in terms of vitalism can account for the fundamental fact of disclosedness, that we are given to know something by the world: “But the fact that this totality has been discovered is grounded in the disclosedness of the referential totality of significance. The experiencing of resistance—that is, the discovery of what is resistant to
one’s endeavours—is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of the world”.\(^{50}\)

This statement importantly differentiates Heidegger from many of his contemporaries and successors; a desire to base our theory of reality in an improved 'theory of the organism' motivated many in the 20th century, but Heidegger intends the concept of disclosedness to block this theoretical development. Whether we are made of 'stern stuff' or not, what is obscurely represented in that German expression often discussed by Heidegger "es gibt" ("there is...", literally "it gives") is that we are not everything. Finally, Heidegger connects the problem of reality and Care.

The discussions of the question of ‘mind-independence’ in Being and Time may be intellectually unsatisfying to veterans of the ‘realism/anti-realism’ debates in analytic philosophy, but understanding them is important for grasping the book’s thrust as a whole. In the subsection “Reality and Care” Heidegger says “As we have noted, Being (not entities) is dependent upon the understanding of Being; that is to say, Reality (not the Real) is dependent upon care”.\(^{51}\) This assertion, which will be echoed in a different key in section 44, is important to grasping the character of Heidegger’s “ontological difference” generally. The statement “the being of Being is not that of Beings”

\(^{50}\) BT, p. 253

\(^{51}\) BT, p. 255
ought to be taken in a sense which is ‘anti-realist’ and ‘realist’ all at once.

Heidegger’s Being is a ‘watchword’ for all our important and truthful knowledges, theoretical and practical; but, if you will, their rootedness in the world can never be explained by a ‘fable’ beginning with quarks or basal ganglia and building from there (the ‘mereological’ approach). All the same, it is a deep and important thought-experiment to ponder the notion that Heidegger’s “Care” as a basis for intentionality is important because it strips the thought of ‘reference-failure’ for a theory of some of its power; the idea of another person's theoretical term 'failing to refer' has gotten many a philosopher of science through a difficult night, but when we are thinking about a person’s fundamental relationship to the world that undergirds theoretical knowledge the temptation to say 'that's just nonsense' ought to be somewhat less. In a sense Being-in-the-world can fundamentally never fail to think its world in an essentially veridical way; our involvement in the world always in a way 'refers', in that whatever is going on the world simply matters to us in the terms we do think it in, and this is not cognitively empty. (Echoes of Davidson’s “Principle of Charity” may be found here.)

Standing in the Truth

The final section of Chapter 6, “Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth”, is more infamous than famous. Considering it carefully is important from detaching from the
'legendary' Heidegger, who is still supposed by many to have had precisely "Nothing" to say (Carnap famously mocked Heidegger's cryptic assertion in "What is Metaphysics?" that Das Nichts nichtet). In it Heidegger is supposed to have provided an etymology for the Greek word for “truth”, aletheia, which a Greek would 'laugh out of court': he also develops a theory of truth as “unconcealment” which is far from giving Tarski a run for his money. There is more going on in Section 44 than these 'learned observations' would suggest, and Heidegger again echoes his statements in a previous section in another key.

This is one of the 'exploratory' sections of Being and Time, and Heidegger would return to the problem in "On the Essence of Truth" and other later writings. Again, the section is divided into three subsections. In the first, “The Traditional Conception of Truth, and its Ontological Foundations", Heidegger takes aim at the “correspondence” theory of truth widely believed to be descended from Aristotle and ‘pre-theoretically’ taken for granted. Heidegger quotes Aristotle often in this chapter, and the first quote is from On Interpretation: “the soul’s ‘Experiences’, its noemata ('representations'), are likenings of Things”.52

This would later be ‘hardened’ into the Latin definition of truth as adequatio intellectus et rei, “the agreement of

52 BT, p. 257
intellect and object”. Heidegger’s criticisms of the *adequatio* theory are sharp and based in his earlier critique of the Cartesian relationship between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*: “With regard to what do *intellectus* and *res* agree? In their kind of Being and their essential content do they give us anything at all with regard to which they can agree? If it is impossible for *intellectus* and *res* to be equal because they are not of the same species, are they then perhaps similar? But knowledge is still supposed to ‘give’ the thing *just as it is*.⁵³ Heidegger is not without company with his doubts here: what we think we can put together out of the 'correspondence' of the thought in 'our mind's eye' and a reality that we think it 'mirrors' in some deep but problematic sense is shown to easily outstrip the simple platitudes at work in Tarski's theory of truth, for example.

As we have seen, Heidegger is ‘realist’ enough to not doubt the existence of truth: later in this chapter he will go on to say ‘Kuhnian’ things about science, but it is importantly true some kind of sympathy for the ‘intuition’ that drives the correspondence theory can be assumed on his part. Still he would not not have time for the usual talk of ‘confirmatory evidence’, for conceiving of scientific rationality as a systematic bias towards ‘more sophisticated’ forms of pronouncing ‘on what there is’: if the Truth is the Truth, it is the Truth *cru et vert*. Heidegger’s radical unstitching of the correspondence theory, which he will build on in the following subsection,

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⁵³ BT, pp 258-9
is “To say an assertion ‘is true’ signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, ‘lets’ the entity ‘be seen’ (apophansis) in its uncoveredness. The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering”.54 The next subsection begins thusly: “‘Being-true’ (‘truth’) means Being-uncovering. But is not this a highly arbitrary way to define ‘truth’? By such drastic ways of defining this concept we may succeed in eliminating the idea of agreement from the conception of truth”.55

This subsection (b), “The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth and the Derivative Character of the Traditional Conception of Truth”, is notorious for a play on words which Heidegger makes and ‘announces’ as a definition of truth: Truth, aletheia, is ‘unhiddenness’, a-letheia. In Greek the prefix “a” typically means “un”, and Heidegger connects the word to ‘hiddenness’, lantheai. Though I am far from a scholar of antiquity, given that this ‘definition’ is quite widely viewed as risible (that it is ‘wrong’ is one of the few things a large number of people have heard about Heidegger, for instance) a few words need to be said about why Heidegger might have said this and what it ought to be taken for.

54 BT, p. 261
55 BT, p. 262
It is true enough this is not standardly how Greeks—who are perhaps in a richer and more direct line with ancient Greek culture than fetishists for ‘Western European’ classical studies of an earlier era are prone to think—understand the meaning of the word: to them it is simply ‘truth’, much as we English-speakers very rarely are thinking of ‘troth’ or anything like that. That being said, nobody that knows any Greek has failed to hear of “Lethe”, the river of forgetfulness, and so it would be wise to figure that ‘common knowledge’ into an interpretation of what Heidegger is saying here: a-letheia is the truth in its resplendence, free from its 'lapsing into obscurity'. (A direct reference to Lethe appears in supplementary material to the Gesamtausgabe edition of *Was heisst Denken*?)

Only not only, because as Heidegger says Dasein is equiprimordially in the truth and untruth\(^{56}\): falling means that we are not in a direct and unmediated connection to Reality, but fundamentally thinking ‘the events of the day’ in terms of frameworks and heuristics we have ‘taken over’ without really having much reason to believe in them at all. In such a condition humaine we are not going to be in Unmediated Contact with True Reality under normal circumstances. Heidegger uses the value of truth and the counter-value of falling to critically judge the understanding of truth as “correct assertion” (one which the extant Greek tradition does provide some

\(^{56}\) BT, p. 265
corroborating evidence for); aletheic truthfulness underpins correct assertion, and falling means that ‘saving the rhetorical appearances’, a superficial logicality, is unlikely to reinforce truthfulness.

To conclude my remarks on Division I, subsection (c) of “Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth” (“The Kind of Being which Truth Possesses, and the Presupposition of Truth”) is a place in Being and Time where Heidegger says things that should be of great and direct interest to analytic philosophers and gets ‘blown off’ even by his devotees; the bold and unprecedented statement “Before Newton’s laws were discovered, they were not ‘true’; it does not follow that they were false, or even that they would become false if ontically no discoveredness were any longer possible”\(^{57}\) is The Structure of Scientific Revolutions ‘in a nutshell’ and can also actually provide a sort of skeleton-key to understanding Being and Time as a whole. Heidegger’s own ‘Protagorean’ credo which can be understood in terms of the observation about Newtonian mechanics is “Because the kind of being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein’s being”\(^{58}\).

His ability to bring plausibility to remarks like this, which are so urgently desired by the philosophical direction of modernity and yet seem so utterly impossible given

\(^{57}\) BT, p. 269
\(^{58}\) BT, p. 270
certain 'commonplaces', is one of Heidegger's genuine excellences as a philosopher. What the quoted statement means (and it is of much consequence for considering the Division II which is soon to be our focus) is that according to Heidegger 'objective reality' is a concept that only makes sense in terms of the travails of Dasein, not a 'God's-eye' view that the destruction of the human race would hardly trouble the surface of.

A truth which we do not know has not yet 'come to be' in terms of the enlightenment and direction it will offer, and thinking systematically about the mind makes it clear that we cannot by definition have any conception of its 'prehistory'. In a remark in this subsection which is rarely quoted but which I think is highly suggestive, he says “Both the contention that there are ‘eternal truths’ and the jumbling together of Dasein’s phenomenally grounded ‘ideality’ with an idealized absolute subject, belong to those residues of Christian theology within philosophical problematics which have not as yet been radically extruded”\(^59\); Again, Heideggerian truth is 'neither mereological nor soteriological', impossible to piece together out of the present-at-hand 'natural world' but also a truth without salvation. The importance of sounding these tones will become apparent shortly.

\(^{59}\) BT, p. 272
Division II: The Temporal Interpretation
Chapter 1: “Dasein’s Possibility of Being-a-Whole, and Being-towards-Death”

Stop and consider! life is but a day;
A fragile dewdrop on its perilous way
From a tree's summit; a poor Indian's sleep
While his boat hastens to the monstrous steep
Of Montmorenci.
Keats, "Sleep and Poetry"

There is an anecdote often told about the publication of Being and Time; it is said Heidegger attempted to submit Division I alone for publication but was told the manuscript was ‘too short’, whereupon he hastily wrote Division II. In the English-speaking world, the accolades have almost only been for material in Division I: to our usual eyes what we can make out of Division II is a dark vision of ‘freely-chosen death’ with little redeeming philosophical value.

As I have said earlier in the book, it is my contention that if we are to care about Being and Time today it must be

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60 by, inter alia, Haugeland 2012.
recognized that as published it does not end with Division I but also does not run on to an easily-imagined Division III and Part II. My presentation of Division II will be as an *explication* of Division I: many seemingly ‘quirky’ themes and theoretical constructions in Division I are found to ‘pay their way’ in Division II’s accounts of authenticity and originary temporality. The story of Division I, Dasein as the 'achievement' of humanity, is in Division II systematically "Interpreted" in terms of the new concept of *temporality*. Like Division I, Division II has six chapters; I will devote one chapter to interpreting each.

I think it is worth acknowledging that the first four chapters of Division II form a concrete whole, traveling from Heidegger’s account of mortality in Chapter 1 to the account of temporality in “everydayness” in chapter 4; chapters 5 and 6 are heterogeneous treatments of historicity and the “ordinary conception of time”, and I will suggest though Heidegger says much of interest there we would do well not to search too closely for a deep ‘order’ in them other than a ‘consilience’ with the general contours of the book’s ontology. As I indicated in the preface, I think the picture of temporality that emerges from Division II is as its being ‘the form of facticity’, a new coinage which may be illustrated in a preliminary way by what Heidegger says of Kant’s theory in
Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: “Time is that which constitutes ontological knowledge as intuition (Anschauung).”\textsuperscript{61}

To begin with the text of Division II, it perhaps could be said that Chapter 1 is either the least challenging or the most challenging chapter in \textbf{Being and Time}. Montaigne’s essay famously had it that “To philosophize is to learn how to die”, and the concretion of Heidegger’s “existential conception of death” is unusual for the book; there is a great deal more ‘cross-checking’ of what Heidegger says about death which can be done fairly easily than is usually possible for his more imperious constructions. At the same time, this chapter is no ‘throwaway’ and the end of the chapter contains an important gambit in Heidegger’s development of the concept of “authenticity” (\textit{Eigentlichkeit}); getting it right is critically important and by no means easy.

If one is to begin thinking about how Division II ‘fleshes out’ the “preparatory analytic of Dasein” in Division I, beginning at the beginning with Heidegger’s existential account of death is important: more than is realized, the concepts in the chapters of Division II ‘run together’ and one must carefully study each chapter in light of the others. At the end of Division I Heidegger rhetorically asks of what he has written to that point: “Has our

\textsuperscript{61} PIK, p. 58
investigation up to this point ever brought Dasein into view as a whole?”.62 “Dasein’s Possibility of Being-a-Whole, and Being-towards-Death” obviously aims to rectify this lack. However, a problem is set by the ancient Epicurean argument: we ought not to fear death, for as long as we are alive we do not experience it and when we die we are no more and do not experience it. Heidegger provisionally raises the claim that the end of life represents Dasein’s ‘wholeness’ but points out that it is obviously the dissolution of ‘life as we know it’: “As long as Dasein is as an entity, it has never reached its ‘wholeness’. But if it gains such ‘wholeness’, this gain becomes the utter loss of Being-in-the-world”.63 This paradox drives the analysis of death in Chapter 1. What is the “existential” conception of death where it plays both a limiting and enabling role in our ability to think the world?

To understand the meaning of “Care” as the being of Dasein we would have to get Dasein as a whole ‘in our grasp’, but at no point do we ordinarily see it ‘as it is’, we never have an ‘Archimedean point’ from which to transcendentally pry apart its secrets: “The reason for the impossibility of experiencing Dasein ontically as a whole which is [als seiendes Ganzes], and therefore of

62 BT, p. 273
63 BT, p. 280
determining its character ontologically in its Being-a-whole, does not lie in any imperfection of our cognitive powers. The hindrance lies rather in the Being of this entity.”\textsuperscript{64} It is important for the reader to mark this as the beginning of an atheological story in the book about the importance of death to understanding Dasein.

Heidegger was once widely trumpeted as having discovered ‘human finitude’, and the point of this perspective is that whatever Dasein is and thinks it is a thing which ends and does not ‘come back’ in a readily identifiable manner, which in the traditional “ontotheological” understanding of the spirit is a complicated thing for a rational being to be. (Even though many of us are sure today that we are 'nothing but matter' seriously grasping what that would be without interpolating in traditional Christian ideas is far more difficult than commonly realized.)

Not that the dead are forgotten; in Christian societies and other ones, there are usually ‘cults of the dead’ involving funeral rites and remembrances, ‘sacred’ practices in which the living are taken to be in special communion with the memory of those who have passed. Heidegger does not think such ‘commonplaces’ are nothing: “In such Being-with the dead [\textit{dem Toten}], the deceased himself is no longer factically ‘there’. However, when we speak of

\textsuperscript{64} ibid.
'Being-with', we always have in view Being with one another in the same world. The deceased has abandoned our ‘world’ and left it behind. But in terms of that world [Aus ihr her] those who remain can still be with him”. Dasein may be finite, but unlike inanimate objects, plants and animals it is not strictly “present-at-hand” even when it has “perished” and left a corpse; human being is finite yet special in this respect.

Most societies also have a ‘cult of heroism’, where those who have ‘laid down their lives’ for the greater good are celebrated as exemplary. Heidegger has a particularly pointed observation about such ‘heroism’, which is that it in no way solves the ‘problem of mortality’: “No one can take the Other’s dying away from him. Of course someone can ‘go to his death for another’. But that always means to sacrifice oneself for the Other ‘in some definite affair’. Such ‘dying for’ can never signify that the Other has thus had his death taken away in even the slightest degree. Dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time”. Death is “not to be outstripped” (unüberholbare); we may evade it, but ultimately cannot cheat it.

A difficult thought in Heidegger’s argument is that ‘death’ is not something that happens to us, which we can take a

65 BT, p. 282
66 BT, p. 284
complacent or frantic attitude towards; it is non-relational (unbezügliche), there in the structure of our lives as lived from the beginning. “On the contrary, just as Dasein is already its ‘not-yet’, and is its ‘not-yet’ constantly as long as it is, it is already its end too. The ‘ending’ which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s Being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein], but a Being-towards-the-end [Sein zum ende] of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is”. 67

Furthermore, Heidegger’s death is ‘atheistical’ in that there is no way to ‘outlive’ it through the deliverances of a divine being or in ‘the hearts of one’s countrymen’. “As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein cannot outstrip the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is nonrelational, and which is not to be outstripped [unüberholbare]. As such, death is something distinctively impending. Its existential possibility is based on the fact that Dasein is essentially disclosed to itself, and disclosed, indeed, as ahead-of-itself”. 68

Even though death is one of the gravest features of human life, and a matter of deep personal concern to every living human being, the spurious normativity Heidegger

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67 BT, p. 289
68 BT, p. 294
identified as “the ‘They’” (das Man) is deeply involved in how we ‘ordinarily’ understand it. “In the publicness with which we are with one another in our everyday life, death is ‘known’ as a mishap which is constantly occurring—as a ‘case of death’. Someone or other ‘dies’, be he neighbour or stranger [Nächste oder Fernerstehende]. People who are no acquaintances of ours are ‘dying’ daily and hourly. ‘Death’ is encountered as a well-known event occurring within-the-world. As such it remains in the inconspicuousness characteristic of what is encountered in an everyday fashion”.69

In other words, the death we ordinarily “expect” ourselves to experience in the future is fundamentally someone else’s, ‘set to the tune’ of old saws and ‘tranquillizing’ commonplaces, fundamentally not of a piece with what will actually happen to us and in a way already is. “The ‘they’ does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death”.70 At the end of Heidegger’s “existential” analysis of Death, he reveals the element of Dasein’s constitution that it incarnates and makes thinkable: “Defining the existential structure of Being-towards-the-end helps us to work out a kind of Being of Dasein in which Dasein, as Dasein, can be a whole”.71

69 BT, p. 297
70 BT, p. 298
71 BT, p. 303
When we fully grasp our own mortality, ‘total’ and unavoidable, we develop that “courage for anxiety” Heidegger said the they-self would not permit: ”But Being towards this possibility, as Being-towards-death, is so to comport ourselves towards death that in this being, and for it, death reveals itself as a possibility. Our terminology for such Being towards this possibility is ‘anticipation’ of this possibility’.72 Anticipation is an existential courage: from the greatest to the least, the most ‘morally good’ to the most morally reprehensible, our non-repeatable life and what we do with it is our own choice: although we rarely understand it in “average everydayness”, we already have the courage of our deepest commitments (to be further examined in Chapter 2 of Division II). Human life ‘stares into an abyss’, but Dasein inherently has the ability to ‘take life seriously’, to grasp its finitude for what it is by grasping its mortality.

Anticipation is also not merely an existentiell matter: it underwrites our ability to ‘look forward’ to anything, to have a futural relationship to reality as in our “projection” using Verstehen. In chapters 2 and 3 we will see how Heidegger has here begun what I will call the temporal interpretation of Dasein, where the ‘anthropological’ chapters of Division I are ‘homologated’ with a deeper underlying structure in the form of temporality. Heidegger was not only an acute observer of humanity, he

72 BT, p. 306
aimed to be in some sense a scientific one, and the philosophical achievement of *Being and Time* is properly measured by seeing how well this ‘alignment’ between Care and temporality is achieved.

“We may now summarize our characterization of authentic Being-towards-death as we have projected it existentially: *anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and bring it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death—a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the ‘they’, and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious.*”73

73 BT, p. 311
Chapter 2: “Dasein’s Attestation of an Authentic Potentiality-for-Being, and Resoluteness”

Era un’ultima sigaretta molto importante. Ricordo tutte le speranze che l’accompagnarono. M’ero arrabbiato col diritto canonico che mi pareva tanto lontano dalla vita e correvo alla scienza ch’è mi pareva tanto lontano dalla vita e correvo alla scienz ch’è la vita stessa benche ridotta in un matraccio. Quell’ultima sigaretta significava proprio il desiderio di attivita (anche manuale) e di sereno pensiero sobrio e sodo.

Italo Svevo, *La coscienza di Zeno*

Chapter 1 of Division II explored the links between “projection” and *anticipation*: the completion of our life in death is our uttermost possibility, the one that bounds all other sorts of “understanding”. Chapter 2 is devoted to the topic of the conscience; a hallowed topic in philosophical literature, and one which Heidegger has a surprisingly plausible and ‘realistic’ theory of. Heidegger begins the chapter by discussing his theory of *das Man* or “the ‘they’”, and the possibility of fleeing ‘tranquillization’ to an “authentic” mode of being. Heidegger makes the claim that conscience is an “attestation” of this possibility: “In the following Interpretation we shall claim that this potentiality is attested by that which, in Dasein’s everyday
interpretation of itself, is familiar to us as the ‘voice of conscience’ [Stimme des Gewissens]”.74 Conscience and authenticity are closely linked; getting clear about what either is will be the subject-matter of the chapter.

Heidegger argues that the conscience is not a ‘pure formality’, but genuinely revelatory of Dasein’s position in reality: “Conscience gives us ‘something’ to understand; it discloses. By characterizing this phenomenon formally in this way, we find ourselves enjoined to take it back into the disclosedness of Dasein”.75 However, the 'appeal' of the conscience is not all sweetness and light: “The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty”.76 The conscience is for Heidegger a negative thing, but probing its role in Dasein’s relationship to the world will expand our conception of Being-in-the-World, and Dasein’s ability to choose its course: “But in this phenomenon lies that existential choosing which we seek—the choosing to choose a kind of Being-one’s-Self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call ‘resoluteness’”.77

74 BT, p. 313
75 BT, p.314
76 ibid.
77 ibid.
In section 55, “The Existential-ontological Foundations of Conscience”, Heidegger explores the connection between the conscience and disclosedness. (The pronation Heidegger employs to get his point across in this section is of great significance for understanding the relationship between authenticity and “everydayness” in general). Our ‘projection-possibilities’ are part of disclosedness: we understand the world in understanding ourselves and what we want to ‘get up to’. However, this occurs for the most part in the mode of “average everydayness” and “the ‘they’” levelling Dasein’s possibilities: “Losing itself in the publicness and the idle talk of the ‘they’, it fails to hear [überhört] its own Self in listening to the they-self”.78

The conscience, whatever it exactly may be, represents an irruptive capability for Dasein to know itself: “This listening-away must get broken off; in other words, the possibility of another kind of hearing which will interrupt it, must be given by Dasein itself”.79 The programmatic features of Heidegger’s account of the conscience are easy enough to understand, but the details of the “call of conscience” are highly counter-intuitive and merit serious attention. The call of conscience is not that of a ‘higher authority’, but an obscure feature of Dasein’s own existence that calls to it and draws Dasein away from the ‘obvious’ and ‘evident’ features of its life: “And to what is

78 BT, p. 315
79 BT, p. 316
one called when one is thus appealed to? To one’s own Self. Not to what Dasein counts for, can do, or concerns itself with in being with one another publicly, nor to what it has taken hold of, set about, or let itself be carried along with”.

It is a form of Heidegger’s Rede or “discourse”, but what does the “call of conscience” say to Dasein? Actually, nothing specific at all. “But how are we to determine what is said in the talk that belongs to this kind of discourse? What does the conscience call to him to whom it appeals. Taken strictly, nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it try to set going a ‘soliloquy’ in the Self to which it has appealed”. The “anticipation” based on Dasein’s Being-towards-death was related to the futurality of existence, Dasein’s ability to project itself beyond its current circumstances. In contrast, conscience reflects thrownness, facticity, and “state-of-mind”; in the call of conscience we are aware, although ‘through a glass darkly’, of how the past has determined our present conditions and what we irreducibly are within them.

“Existent Dasein does not encounter itself as something present-at-hand within-the-world. But neither does thrownness adhere to Dasein as an inaccessible

80 BT, p. 317
81 BT, p. 318
characteristic which is of no importance for its existence. As something thrown, Dasein has been thrown into existence. It exists as an entity which has to be as it is and as it can be... That it is factically, may be obscure and hidden as regards the ‘why’ of it; but the ‘that-it-is has itself been disclosed to Dasein. The thrownness of this entity belongs to the disclosedness of the ‘there’ and reveals itself constantly in its current state-of-mind.”

The concept of anxiety introduced in Division I is an entree to the broader concept of conscience here. In anxiety, somehow almost about nothing at all, is elucidated the structure of the larger phenomenon of conscience in that we now can understand how anxiety is “disclosive”: there is a certain groundlessness to ‘caring’ about anything revealed in a condition of anxiety, and what is revealed in anxiety carries over to our ability to genuinely connect with an issue and make it our own under 'normal' circumstances. “The proposition that Dasein is at the same time both the caller and the one to whom the appeal is made, has now lost its empty formal character and its obviousness. Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Beingalready-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being.”

82 BT, p. 321
83 BT, p. 322
The call of conscience is “uncanny” (*unheimlich*); it is not comfortable cultural tropes per se that call out to us, but the vertiginous reality of having to make fundamental choices without ‘foundations’ per se. It is also *we ourselves* that summon us to conscience, not a ‘spookily supernatural’ force (which could, under 'normal' theological understandings, just as easily be a diabolic tempter leading us astray).

An important feature of Heidegger’s account of conscience, one which is almost ‘cynically’ realistic and upsetting but revelatory of his general theoretical thrust, is that the conscience is basically a *guilty* one: a ‘good conscience’ is essentially a *contradictio in adjecto*, and what we are 'processing' in the call of conscience can be nothing but always somewhat oppressive feelings of responsibility (oppressive in the case of 'good' conduct as well).

The German word *schuldig* is a bit more complex than the English “guilty” in its relationship to the common German noun *Schuld*, one whose valences are far from limited to ‘determining guilt’. In one sense *Schuld* means “debt”, as in one you literally repay to a lender: “Everyday common sense first takes ‘Being-guilty’ in the sense of ‘owing’, of ‘having something due on account’. One is to give back to
the Other something to which the latter has a claim”.\textsuperscript{84} In another, more complex sense *schuldig* can be taken not simply to mean ‘culpable’ but responsible, even in a positive way. “‘Being-guilty’ also has the signification of ‘being responsible for’ [*schuld sein an*], that is, being the cause or author of something, or even ‘being the occasion’ for something. In this sense of ‘having responsibility’ for something, one can ‘be guilty’ of something without ‘owing’ anything to someone else or coming to ‘owe’ him.”\textsuperscript{85}

According to Heidegger, Dasein as “care” must constructively take up the uncanny voice of the conscience and ‘become what it is’: as an expression of *Befindlichkeit* we cannot find sufficient whys and wherefores behind it, and yet to simply register unease is not yet to have grasped the interrelatedness between “state-of-mind” and projective understanding. When we have ‘made a virtue of necessity’—a phenomenon the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, a passionate but very critical admirer of Heidegger, studied extensively in the social sphere—and worked up our more or less ‘accidental’ qualities into existentially ‘owned’ projects, the conscience has done what it can for “care”. “And how is Dasein this thrown basis? Only in that it projects itself upon possibilities into

\textsuperscript{84} BT, p. 327
\textsuperscript{85} ibid.
which it has been thrown. The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-abasis. To be its own thrown basis is that potentiality-for-Being which is the issue for care.”

In an almost Wittgensteinian sense, the Being-guilty of the conscience does not rest on anything; anyone who is genuinely in touch with theirs essentially must say at some point “This is just what I do” in the sense of the famous Philosophical Investigations quote. Heidegger’s point is that our responsibility for our actions is, in a turn of phrase which is awkward 'on our lips' but metaphorically correct, abyssal: total, for there can be no ground outside Dasein which offers exculpations for its 'bad behavior' or the consequences of passionate partisanship of an issue or cause. We are ‘in others’ debt’ or ‘responsible’ for something because it is a choice we have fundamentally made, not one which forced upon us by a sufficiently beatific vision of a better world or ‘bare facts' about external reality.

“In the structure of thrownness, as in that of projection, there lies essentially a nullity. This nullity is the basis for the possibility of inauthentic Dasein in its falling; and as falling, every inauthentic Dasein factically is. Care itself, in its very essence, is permeated with nullity through and

86 BT, p. 330
through. Thus ‘care’—Dasein’s Being—means, as thrown projection, Being-the-basis of a nullity (and this Being-the-basis is itself null). This means that Dasein as such is guilty, if our formally existential definition of ‘guilt’ as ‘Being-the-basis of a nullity’ is indeed correct.”

In section 59, “The Existential Interpretation of the Conscience, and the Way Conscience is Ordinarily Interpreted”, Heidegger briefly touches upon Kant’s conception of the moral conscience (the possible importance of Kant’s moral philosophy for Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik is also mentioned in the contemporaneous Basic Problems of Phenomenology). “When Kant represented the conscience as a ‘court of justice’ and made this the basic guiding idea in his Interpretation of it, he did not do so by accident; this was suggested by the idea of moral law—although his conception of morality was far removed from utilitarianism and eudaemonism. Even the theory of value, whether it is regarded formally or materially, has as its unexpressed ontological presupposition a ‘metaphysic of morals’—that is, an ontology of Dasein and existence. (Dasein is regarded as an entity with which one might concern oneself, whether this ‘concern’ has the sense of ‘actualizing values’ or of satisfying a norm.)”

87 BT, p. 331
88 BT, p. 339
accusing Kant of a form of utilitarianism, where the irreducible particularity of the individual conscience ought to be sacrificed to the ‘greater good’ of a rich and ramified moral calculus.)

Finally, in Section 60, “The Existential Structure of the Authentic Potentiality-for-Being which is Attested in the Conscience”, Heidegger makes clear what the upshot of his discussion of the conscience is, the Existenzial that reflects a genuinely mature and self-aware sense of conscience: “resoluteness”, Entschlossenheit. “The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience, is thus constituted by anxiety as state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence. This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety—we call ‘resoluteness’.”89 Resolute Dasein has fully come to grips with the abyssal character of conscience, and sees what is revealed within it: a human potentiality to have fully genuine goals, one which can in no case be taken away by ‘moral luck’.

The ‘world’ of resolute Dasein is the absolute antithesis of the ‘they-world’ of average everydayness: it is life as it actually is, a state of cognition’s full awareness of its abilities and their dynamic interplay with ‘unreliable’

89 BT, p. 343
realities. Heidegger calls this the “Situation” (interestingly ‘alphabetically’ the same word, Situation, in his German text; perhaps he is drawing on a use of the concept in academic sociology that persisted through Erving Goffman and down to our time). “Resolution does not withdraw itself from ‘actuality’, but discovers first what is factically possible; and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being in the ‘they’. The existential attributes of any possible resolute Dasein include the items constitutive for an existential phenomenon which we call a ‘Situation’ and which we have hitherto passed over.”

With “the Situation” and Dasein’s being equal to it in a mode of “anticipatory resoluteness”, a richly detailed description of the 'sense of the game' we mature human beings all wish to have and its deeper meaning for our lives, we come to the end of the properly “existential” portion of Being and Time; for ‘lost souls’ searching for a way through life this is simply the best he had to offer (as the back cover of old copies of the Harper and Row edition used to relate, the American pragmatist Sidney Hook thought this a prime market for Heidegger's book). The book does not end there, though; in looking at the remaining four chapters we will be examining how Heidegger's theory of Dasein’s ‘perfection’ locks into a

90 BT, p. 346

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more complex and philosophically profound story about *time*, what it is in terms of Dasein and how it has been misunderstood by the philosophical tradition.\(^91\)

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\(^91\) The material contained in John Haugeland's *Dasein Disclosed*, published after his death, is fully as provocative and irritating as the man himself; Haugeland was questing for a yet larger philosophical panorama than the published *Being and Time* contained, and had spent the better part of a distinguished career carefully articulating a hybrid between Heidegger and some of the more 'sophisticated' analytic philosophers of his generation. Haugeland's own translations of Heidegger's terms are pithy and pointed, yet I must play the part of the "conformist" in saying I think his suggestion of an alternative translation for the *Eigentlichkeit* normally rendered "authenticity", "ownedness", is too 'partial' to a particular understanding of Heidegger and Heidegger's German.

Heidegger himself was not above playing on the "ownness" present in the German *eigen*; the term from his 'later' philosophy *Ereignis* is sometimes rendered as 'event of appropriation' or 'en-owning' because its relation to the idea of 'making something yours' in the more ordinary German verbal form *ereignen* is no 'dead' metaphor. Heidegger was however also not above using the yet more common German word for "authentic" or "genuine", *echt*, in a philosophical sense: in *Contributions to Philosophy* he explains *wahr* in terms of *echt* and vice versa. This tone should be heard as 'sounded' in *Eigentlichkeit* as "authenticity". It is a *conceptual* similarity, not a 'lexical' one, but it is there all the same.
In other words, the greatest secrets of Heidegger’s work are yet to come.
Chapter 3: “Dasein’s Authentic Potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, and Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care”

In futurity
I prophetic see
That the earth from sleep
(Grave the sentence deep)

Shall arise and seek
For her maker meek;
And the desart wild
Become a garden mild.

Blake, "The Little Girl Lost"

In my opinion Division II’s Chapter 3 is perhaps the most important in the book; although its ‘ways’ are far from obvious, its account of temporality is the linchpin of the book and has been very poorly served by previous expositions. I therefore will ask the reader, whose patience has doubtlessly been tried both by Heidegger’s prose and my own, to take special care in studying it; its structure is not obvious by far, but the deeper structure of
Dasein revealed by the "temporal Interpretation" will be closed off to them if they do not. Chapter 3 is not the whole story about “originary temporality”: many details will be filled in in Chapter 4, “Temporality and Everydayness”, and the final two chapters relate temporality to established theories of history and 'ordinary time'.

Again, this is no simple or clear text; but the reader has fundamentally failed to understand Heidegger’s work if they have not ‘put in the hard yards’ with it, as the explanation of time as the “horizon” of the understanding of being stands and falls with its account. The chapter has five sections, each of which is an important step on the road to explaining what the “meaning” or Sinn of care could be and what conception of time and temporality could justify its role as that meaning; I will address them in order.

Heidegger begins the chapter by connecting the topics of the two previous chapters and putting the final touches on his ‘critical theory’ of authenticity and inauthenticity. “Anticipation” and “resoluteness” have both been painted in glowing colors in the 'existential' picture of Dasein, but it still could be there is no fundamental connection between the two and the way for Dasein to distance itself from the ‘they-self’ would still be unclear. Heidegger immediately grasps the horns of the dilemma: “There still remains one way out, and this is the only possible method: namely, to take as our point of departure the phenomenon of resoluteness, as attested in its existentiell possibility,
and to ask: “Does resoluteness, in its ownmost existentiell tendency of Being, point forward to anticipatory resoluteness as its ownmost authentic possibility?”

The reader ought to take this as a rhetorical question; the answer of Chapter 3 is an emphatic 'yes'. It is well-known (and could stand to be more well-known still) that modern philosophy in most of its variants insists that the human being’s ‘self’ is far more important than was previously reckoned; our ability to make and remake ourselves is considered a distinctive human capacity even by thoroughgoing ‘naturalists’, and important cognitive powers are vested within this Protean flexibility. Now, Dasein is je meines, and so the question of the “Self” is never far from it: there has already been a great deal said about how the primacy of Existenz is the foundation of our selves, but in Chapter 3 Heidegger will introduce the larger topic of temporality by implicitly critiquing more ‘idealistic’ discussions of the self, ones which he argues covertly smuggle the vision of being as “present-at-hand” into their theories.

“Ontologically, Dasein is in principle different from everything that is present-at-hand or Real. Its ‘subsistence’ is not based on the substantiality of a substance but on the ‘Self-subsistence’ of the existing Self, whose Being has been conceived as care. The phenomenon of the Self—a phenomenon which is included in care—needs to be defined existentially in a

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92 BT, p. 349
way which is primordial and authentic, in contrast to our preparatory exhibition of the inauthentic they-self. Along with this, we must establish what possible ontological questions are to be directed towards the ‘Self’, if indeed it is neither substance nor subject.”

With this discussion of the self we finally come to the topic of “temporality” (Zeitlichkeit). As is made clear throughout the rest of Division II, temporality is absolutely not to be conceived on the model of the ordinary time we ‘reckon’ with and imagine as installed at the heart of the cosmic order; it is on a human scale, and I would argue that the way in which the ‘subjectivistic’ originary temporality relates to ‘inner-time-ness’ is essential to understanding Heidegger’s conception of Dasein and its understanding of being. In Chapter 3, we will see how this works for the ‘designated’ case of anticipatory resoluteness, where Dasein sees the Situation ‘for what it is’ without the incursions of inauthenticity.

“Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in Dasein’s authentic Being-a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness. If temporality makes itself known primordially in this, then we may suppose that the temporality of anticipatory resoluteness is a distinctive mode of temporality. Temporality has different possibilities and different ways of temporalizing itself.”

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93 BT, p. 351
94 ibid.
For making the connection between anticipatory resoluteness and temporality it is important to understand the properly philosophical role of Heidegger’s ‘conservative’ critical theory of modern life and ‘levelling’, that he is not merely talking *biedermeierische* guff but setting up an important fulcrum for pivoting to understanding Dasein’s relationship to Being as a whole and its ability to cognize it in several modes. When Heidegger says “Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the ‘overcoming’ of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein’s existence and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments”\(^95\) he is not merely applauding those who sit through ‘steel storms’ and other horrific events, he is stipulating that inauthenticity must indeed have some determinate limits.\(^96\)

It is also a further ‘properly philosophical’ indication that ‘naive’ approaches to philosophical topics are unphilosophical, that the nature of the issues under consideration will always have to be approached as though our ‘intuitions’ were indeed the weakest evidence

\(^{95}\) BT, p. 357

\(^{96}\) In Chapter 4 we will see how the theory of temporality he builds on this basis can be reintroduced back into average everydayness and our conception of it.
of how things are: “The way which we have so far pursued in the analytic of Dasein has led us to a concrete demonstration of the thesis which was put forward just casually at the beginning—that the entity which in every case we ourselves are is ontologically that which is farthest.

The reason for this lies in care itself”.97 The individual who wishes to think philosophically about a topic must be ‘of good courage’, for partially satisfying answers are available where they are not initially to be found. Yet the ‘evidence’ we compile takes us little of the way towards those answers, for it is the grasp of ‘obvious’ facts about the world and their ‘obvious’ significance we wish to be loose of.

Heidegger has put the final touches on his story about the relationship between Dasein, care, and the world as it can be seen ‘straight on’ (though again this is very much not how it is ‘most of the time’). Yet that is not where the book ends, and with his “temporal Interpretation” of care he establishes deeper philosophical points about the ‘plausible’ analytic of Dasein he has presented so far in the book. “The most primordial and basic existential truth, for which the problematic of fundamental ontology strives in preparing for the question of Being in general, is the disclosedness of the meaning of the Being of care.”98 In other words, we must find out what the “meaning” (Sinn) of care can be to know what we have discovered about

97 BT, 359
98 BT, p. 364
'the world in general' and how the ‘life history’ of Dasein relates to Being as a whole. This will be the story of Being and Time 'in a nutshell'.

In this section, Heidegger turns to a learned discussion of Kant’s Paralogisms and their ‘critical’ theory of the self and self-consciousness; in a way the discussion is more interesting than he lets on because he is implicitly laying the ground for his own theory of the self and its innate relation to temporality. In that famous chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant radically suggests reason dictates we not think we have direct evidence of our ‘personality’, that our self is only known to us through our perceptions of it and that the core of our thinking is the non-intuitive application of the categories, which Heidegger quotes and glosses as: “The ‘I’ is a bare consciousness, accompanying all concepts. In the ‘I’, ‘nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts’. ‘Consciousness in itself (is) not so much a representation... as it is a form of representation in general. The ‘I think’ is ‘the form of apperception, which clings to every experience and precedes it’”.

99 BT, p. 366
Heidegger was thinking and writing about Kant a great deal in the years around the publication of *Being and Time*, and the conception of the “form of representation in general” that Kant suggested time was is a suggestive one for the topic of this chapter; in the rest of my interpretation of the book I will attempt to show that the mysterious originary temporality is something like a ‘form of facticity’, a matrix within which an ‘actual’ world can ‘make sense’ to a Dasein conceived in ‘anthropologically’ intelligent terms. Heidegger’s own conception of care involves much more 'thick description' than Kant’s theory of the mind; it would not be possible to ‘care’ about a world we did not have a real and active connection to, whereas Kant rather often leaves the reader hanging as to whether there is, for example, an ability for us to see anything as it is ‘in itself’.

However, in its aforementioned role as part of Heidegger’s critical story about intentionality care does not lack Kantian motifs; it is more basic than our ‘personality’, not based in checks drawn on it, and provides the fundamental structure for personality. “Care does not need to be founded in a Self. But existentiality, as constitutive for care, provides the ontological constitution of Dasein’s Self-constancy, to which there belongs, in accordance with the full structural content of care, its Being-fallen factically into non-Self-constancy. When fully conceived, the care-structure includes the phenomenon of Selfhood. This phenomenon is clarified by Interpreting the
meaning of care; and it is as care that Dasein’s totality of Being has been defined.”

Heidegger’s conception of meaning or *Sinn* receives very little attention in most exegeses of *Being and Time*, and yet it is crucial to understanding how Dasein is intermeshed with temporality (again, for the ‘analytic’ reader Heidegger’s *Sinn* has little to do with Fregean *Sinn*, though unlike the differing uses of "reference" in this case a philosophical cross-comparison would be interesting and suggestive; there is little evidence of a direct confrontation by Heidegger with Frege's work but his mentor Husserl was well-acquainted with it). Heidegger’s word for the role meaning plays in our cognitive lives ‘writ large’ is that it is an “upon-which” (*Woraufhin*, which could also be translated as “whereupon”), the “location” of our cognitive transactions with the world. Heidegger’s own explanation is as follows:

“What does ‘meaning’ signify? In our investigation, we have encountered this phenomenon in connection with the analysis of understanding and interpretation. According to that analysis, meaning is that wherein the understandability [*Verstehbarkeit*] of something maintains itself—even that of something which does not come into view explicitly and thematically. ‘Meaning’ signifies the ‘upon-which’ [das *Woraufhin*] of a primary

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100 BT, p. 370
projection in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as that which it is.”

Meaning is in a very important sense the *locus* of our conception of being in general 'twice over'; we do not think things *without* meaning, and what we *do* think must always pass through this nexus. Furthermore, in thinking the "meaning of care" we can also employ what is called the *subjective genitive*; it is not simply that this phenomenon is "invested with value" in some irrelevantly occult way, not that we have some suitably amusing 'idea' associated with care and that is that, but that the meaning of care is meaning *of* care, that it is the intelligibility that properly belongs to the 'concrete' and intrinsically affectively laden phenomenon of care.

In other words, we not only think care through its meaning; we think *meaning* through care. It must be confessed at once that this thought is not unlike Borges' "Aleph"; if it is true it touches anything and everything we ever do think, and so needed conceptual determinacy is not going to be found within it. Still it ought not to be thought that thought ever really gets beyond the confines of a human mind for which 'caring' is absolutely the most important thing; the bleakest thoughts and the purest thoughts do not escape affectivity, and Heidegger did more

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101 BT, p. 371
reasoning through this than most of his contemporaries or successors.

I will gloss the preceding comments as follows: if temporality is the “meaning” of care, that is because it could well be called *the form of facticity*: our enmeshing with the 'dimensions' of temporality is what allows the world to matter to us in a “factual” way, for it to become thinkable as the ‘reality’ it is (and not, say, an ’emanation’ of the subject or the world-spirit). “If we say that entities ‘have meaning’, this signifies that they have become accessible in their Being; and this Being, as projected upon its ‘upon-which’, is what ‘really’ ‘has meaning’ first of all. Entities ‘have’ meaning only because, as Being which has been disclosed beforehand, they become intelligible in the projection of that Being–that is to say, in terms of the ‘upon-which’ of that projection.”

This point, which is generally ignored in the excitement about ‘existential’ themes in *Being and Time*, is one of the most powerful in the Heideggerian oeuvre and in different ways we will be working through it for the rest of the book.

In the rest of Chapter 3, Heidegger begins to offer a detailed picture of originary temporality and its “ecstases”, the three ‘dimensions’ of temporality that are ‘homologous’ to already-identified elements of the care-

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102 BT, pp. 371-2
structure. In a bold move his analysis begins with *futurality*, which he accords a special status to (in contrast to ‘ordinary’ metaphysics which typically has a strongly ‘presentist’ flavor). “This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, come towards itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus letting it come towards itself—in other words, that it exists. This letting-itself-*come-towards*-itself is that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the *future as coming towards.*”103

In “anticipation”, Dasein is futural; the overt ‘behavior’ of Dasein is intermeshed with the fundamental structure of being able to envision a dimension of existence transcending a ‘point in time’. Not only is Dasein ‘oriented to the future’, in thrownness it ‘is’ its past (even if this understanding is not, perhaps cannot, become explicit in a ‘total description’ of past events). Resolution is the ability to repeat (in a definitely Kierkegaardian sense), to ‘trust’ our understanding of ourselves and the world such that we have ‘courage’ for our *ethos*, our character as it manifests itself in practical conduct. “Anticipatory resoluteness understands Dasein in its own essential Being-guilt. This understanding means that in existing one

103 *BT*, p. 372; at the end of this quote Heidegger is making a play on words, explaining the future as *Zu-kunft*. 
takes over Being-guilty; it means being the thrown basis of nullity. But taking over thrownness signifies being Dasein authentically as it already was.”

The past is not a ‘treasure-trove’ of anecdotes about kings and Senators, but the impossible-to-transcend matrix which hiddenly determines Dasein’s Being in a way it can take up authentically or inauthentically but always does so take up. Yet conceiving Dasein as Existenz means Heidegger insists that our ‘orientation’ in the past is just as much or more derived from our orientation to the future, that ‘where we are going’ is of critical importance for where we think we have been: “The character of ‘having been’ arises, in a certain way, from the future”.

As Dasein we are engaged with all three ‘dimensions’ of originary temporality at once; Chapter 4 will show, however, that a particular ‘focus’ on one or another lends a determinate character to certain Existenzialien.

The analysis of ‘presentness’ in Being and Time is signally more complicated than that of futurality or pastness; one could say following the postmodernists that our present is ‘sutured’ by the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity (and the unavoidable nature of the latter). In a “moment of vision” (Augenblick, which perhaps could be viewed as having the Greek theological term kairos as its target) we do see things ‘as

\[\text{\textsuperscript{104}}\text{BT, p. 373}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{105}}\text{ibid.}\]
they are’, but this is almost ‘founded’ in how they seem to be ‘most of the time’: authenticity can never replace inauthenticity, even in an ontological enquiry, such that the ‘present’ cannot really quite be defined in terms of it.

In a way this is Heidegger’s nod to skepticism; we cannot be ‘a priori certain’ that our grasp of ourselves or a situation is genuinely authentic, nor could we ever reform society to eliminate ‘all the bullshit’ and leave only genuine joy (a point to bear in mind for the discussion of Heidegger’s later involvement with Nazism and its interplay with his philosophical “Turning”, which I discuss in this book’s Postscript).

Even more astounding, this indeterminacy between authentic and inauthentic understanding leaves an impress on Heidegger’s theory of time in general; temporality is finite; since we can never ‘square the circle’ of whether we are acting authentically or not there is no way to ‘normatively’ transcend the human condition, and the ‘infinite’ time we think of as scientifically limning the cosmos is bounded by our fundamentally only being able to think it in terms of Existenz.

Finally, Heidegger presents us with temporality as a whole: “Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the Situation by making present. The character of ‘having been’ arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which ‘has been’ (or better, which ‘is in the process of having been’) releases from
itself the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as ‘temporality’. Only in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality, is the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness, as we have described it, made possible for Dasein itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care”. 106

This is the Hauptsatz of the entire book. Care, the fullest picture of intentionality possible, is unthinkable without the temporal dimensions Heidegger has sketched here; what we actually, practically can think is fundamentally enmeshed with the ‘shape of a human life’ sketched in temporality, nothing sub specie aeternitatis. ”The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality.” 107

Furthermore, temporality is responsible for the ‘ecstatic’ dimension of human thinking; with this Heidegger does not mean that Dasein is very, very happy indeed but that it is genuinely ‘directed to a world’, that Dasein is not a ‘null point’ but that its projects are engaged and implicated in a world they would be unthinkable without: here Heidegger sounds notes familiar to those who have studied recent essays towards ‘realism with a human face’ such as Hilary

106 BT, p. 374
107 ibid.
Putnam’s. “The phenomena of the ‘towards...’, the ‘to...’, and the ‘alongside...’, make temporality manifest as the ekstatikon pure and simple. Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself.”

I think that, in a sense contrary to William Blattner's interpretation of Heidegger, that originary temporality is a realism about time; it is not an ‘affair of the subject’ but the context within which and through which genuinely existing persons, places, and things are encountered as Realien, things quite outside our ‘conceptual scheme’. Temporality as the meaning of care enables it as Being-in-the-world, completely and fundamentally; there is not another non-pathological kind of ‘object relation’ to the external world to posit beyond it.

Chapter 3 of Division II (as I said one of the most important in the book) ends with this ‘recap’: “Our analysis of primordial temporality up to this point may be summarized in the following theses. Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and as such it makes possible the Constitution of the structure of care. Temporality is essentially ecstatical. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future. Primordial time is finite”. The remaining three chapters of Being and Time will show how this ‘darkling glimmer’

\[108\] BT, p. 377
\[109\] BT, p. 380
plays out in terms of epistemology, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of time ‘ordinarily conceived’.
Chapter 4: “Temporality and Everydayness”

To pursue truth with such astonishing lack of consideration for other people's feelings, to rend the thin veils of civilization so wantonly, so brutally, was to her so horrible an outrage of human decency that, without replying, dazed and blinded, she bent her head as if to let the pelt of jagged hail, the drench of dirty water, bespatter her unrebuiked. There was nothing to be said.

Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse

Chapter 3 of Division II introduced the fundamental concepts of the temporal “ecstases” and examined them in relation to the “authentic” vision of the world achieved in anticipatory resoluteness; Chapter 4 expands the “temporal Interpretation” to cover everydayness (Alltäglichkeit, though note that “Alltag” is not ‘numerically’ every day of the week) and the entire analytic of Dasein in Division I. However, I must encourage readers who have ‘rushed through’ Chapter 3 to find the more schematic explanations of concepts like understanding and state-of-mind in this chapter to re-read the former; Heidegger’s study of the ‘designated value’ of authenticity is the lever by which a full comprehension of the temporal structure of care can be achieved, not a ‘mystical’ irrelevancy.
That being said, it is also true that numerous readers in the past who have essentially ‘skipped’ Chapter 4 as well in their analyses of Being and Time have ‘shorted’ the philosophical significance of this division as a whole; Heidegger was in earnest about his temporal theory of human comprehension, and here we will see exactly how. This chapter has four main sections, two of which have several long subsections: s. 68, “The Temporality of Disclosedness in General”, and s. 69, “The Temporality of Being-in-the-world and the Problem of the Transcendence of the World”. In them Heidegger is ‘cross-checking’ his temporal theory of care, showing how the various features of cognition described in depth in Division I fit into it.

Section 68 takes the analysis of “Being-in” in Chapter 5 of Division I and—using clues already developed in the text—fits it into the “temporal Interpretation”. In this section Heidegger discusses the temporality of understanding, state-of-mind, falling, and “discourse”; all these cognitively essential elements of Dasein’s constitution are seen to slot somewhat convincingly into the temporal rubric (though with an interesting twist the reader should be prepared for). Heidegger begins by analyzing “understanding” in its temporal aspect.

Chapter 3 of Division II made it clear that anticipation was fundamentally related to care’s ability to ‘be ahead-of-itself’, and here he takes understanding and the “projection” that is characteristic of it as connected to this futural ecstasis. “Projection is basically futural; it does not primarily grasp the projected possibility thematically just
by having it in view, but it throws itself into it as a possibility. In each case Dasein is understandingly in the way that it can be. Resoluteness has turned out to be a kind of existing which is primordial and authentic.”¹¹⁰ However, the reader must always bear in mind that “inauthenticity” will forever be part of the human condition and that Heidegger’s frequent exhortations that he does not mean such terms “disparagingly” are philosophical reminders that the human mind and our life do not ‘fly away’ when we are confronted with the task of turning a doorknob, for example.

Heidegger’s explanation of inauthentic understanding is that it “projects itself upon that which one can concern oneself, or upon what is feasible, urgent, or indispensable in our everyday business. But that which we concern ourselves is as it is for the sake of that potentiality-for-Being which cares”.¹¹¹ According to him this is exemplary of “awaiting” (gewärtigen), which usually takes the form of “expecting” (erwarten), not anticipation. All of these are bedrock elements of Dasein’s constitution, none of them to be done away with. However, the inauthentic expecting does not intermesh with the authentic Augenblick; instead it “makes present” (gegenwärtigen; Gegenwart is the ordinary German word for “present”). In fact, we will see that inauthentic understanding confuses the future and the present: it “projects” out of the levelled potentialities

¹¹⁰ BT, pp. 385-6
¹¹¹ BT, p. 386
visible in the “now”, rather than ‘staying true’ to a vision of what could be.

The second subsection of section 68 deals with the temporality of “state-of-mind” or Befindlichkeit. The ground for this has been laid by the distinction between fear and Angst or “anxiety” made in Chapter 6 of Division I; the inauthentic fear and the authentic Angst both characterize state-of-mind in its relationship to thrownness and “having been”. Heidegger here gives an extensive disquisition on the inauthentic state of fear and the sense in which it is ‘inferior’ to uncanny anxiety. He first addresses the complaint that fear is about “the expectation of some oncoming evil”: Heidegger grants the ‘literal’ truth of the statement, but makes the critique that what we are afraid for is understood poorly out of the inauthentic “present”.

The concept of anxiety forces us to deal with the relationship of state-of-mind to “having been”; we can only be taken to be anxious about what we already are, our nature as “thrown” and as something which we can in a sense “repeat” (wiederholen, another concept with a Kierkegaardian connotation) out of an existential fidelity to ourselves. Heidegger says “The character of having been is constitutive for the state-of-mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face with repeatability is the specific ecstatical mode of this character”.112

112 BT, p. 394
Thirdly, Heidegger looks at the temporality of “falling”. As we know from the end of Division I, Chapter 5 falling is the inauthentic levelling of Being-in which results in phenomena like “idle talk”, curiosity, and ambiguity. The reader may have asked “Could we not do without these things?” In this subsection Heidegger answers no; falling is a ‘normal’ part of Dasein’s constitution, one which we may ‘practically’ wish to avoid but in no wise can eliminate. It is what is characteristic of the ecstasis of the Present in its inauthentic guise; idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity are characteristic of the Dasein that lets itself be captured by the Present, and does not look away in the form of authentic understanding and state-of-mind to the futural and “historical” aspects of existence.

(If I may be permitted to slip into Latinisms for a moment, Heidegger means the reader to grasp this index falsum is a conditio veri; if care cannot be “inauthentic”, it cannot be authentic either.) Fourthly, Heidegger briefly addresses the temporality of discourse; this is however little more than a promissory note for material that was to be in the never-published parts of Being and Time, intimations of which can be seen in the 1927 lecture-course Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

Section 69, “The Temporality of Being-in-the-world and the Problem of the Transcendence of the World”, takes up the ‘problematic’ of Division I’s Chapter 3 in terms of the temporal interpretation of care. Chapter 6 of Division I dealt with some of the most basic ‘epistemological’ problems posed by the philosophy of Heidegger’s time.
from the standpoint of the analytic of Dasein; here Heidegger looks at the temporal character of “concernful circumspection” and how ‘theoretical knowledge’ arises from its modification in terms of the ecstases. The first subsection, “The Temporality of Circumspective Concern”, carefully reiterates the elements of circumspection in temporal terms:

“Letting things be involved makes up the existential structure of concern. But concern, as Being alongside something, belongs to the essential constitution of care; and care, in turn, is grounded in temporality. If all this is so, then the existential condition of the possibility of letting things be involved must be sought in the mode of the temporalizing of temporality.”

The “involvement” (Bewandtnis) in which "significance" arises involves a “towards-which” (Wozu); for something to ‘make a point’ it must have a point, as it were.114 Awaiting the outcome of the practical activity and retaining the ‘implicit knowledge' of the equipment necessary to achieve it temporalize circumspective concern; this can and usually is an almost-unconscious awareness of the ‘shape of the task’: “It has by no means

113 BT, p. 404
114 This point is expanded upon in Chapter 2 of Blattner 1999, where he argues that originary temporality is “teleological” and as primarily futural is closely linked to the “for-the-sake-of-which” of circumspection. I must demur from endorsing his account, as my own rendering of futural "anticipation" leads me to say Heidegger is "voluntarist" at best about personal projects that "gang aft agley".
the character of getting something thematically into one’s grasp”.\(^{115}\) When we *miss* an element of the equipment, it becomes “present-at-hand”; this is by no means a default of the temporal interpretation, though.

“If, when one circumspectively lets something be involved, one were not ‘from the outset’ awaiting the object of one’s concern, and if such awaiting did not temporalize itself in a unity with a making-present, then Dasein could never ‘find’ that something is missing [fehlt].”\(^{116}\)

This is a continuation of the ‘pragmatist’ theme often seen in Chapter 3 of Division I.

Subsection (b), “The Temporal Meaning of the Way in which Circumspective Concern becomes Modified into the Theoretical Discovery of the Present-at-hand Within-the-world”, attempts to develop an “*existential conception of science*”; to those who have cut their teeth on ‘postpositivist’ philosophy of science it should be reiterated that the ideas aired here were futuristically novel in the 1920s, not a ‘child’s game’; furthermore, it is almost certainly correct from the standpoint of intellectual history to figure 'radical' Anglophone philosophers of science like Thomas Kuhn as directly influenced by Heidegger, not simply as having developed similar views independently. In an important way our sophisticated

\(^{115}\) BT, p. 405
\(^{116}\) BT, p. 407
modern conception of science as something you do rather than know began with Heidegger.

Heidegger begins his account of science by making a sweeping statement about the overarching ontological themes in play:

“The existential conception understands science as a way of existence and thus as a mode of Being-in-the-world, which discovers or discloses either entities or Being. Yet a fully adequate existential Interpretation of science cannot be carried out until the meaning of Being and the ‘connection’ between Being and truth have been clarified in terms of the temporality of existence. The following deliberations are preparatory to the understanding of this central problematic, within which, moreover, the idea of phenomenology, as distinguished from the preliminary conception of it which we indicated by way of introduction will be developed for the first time.”

As I mentioned, the material we do have in this portion of the published text is strikingly close to the philosophy of science Thomas Kuhn developed in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (quite possibly not by accident; the young Kuhn was keen to take up ‘unfashionable’

\[117\] BT, p. 408. This is another place in the extant text of Being and Time which ‘points forward’ to the neverpublished Division III, and so we must forgo speculation about its role in the text as published; if the reader is looking for a 'hint' as to how the book might have gone on, though, they will find one here.
philosophical texts for novel purposes, and as a Harvard Fellow would certainly have had access to a German text of the book). Heidegger’s analysis of the “emergence’ of the theoretical attitude” parallels Kuhn’s change-over from “normal science” to “revolutionary science”; furthermore, Heidegger anticipates other elements of modern philosophy of science in insisting that “just as praxis has its own specific sight (‘theory’), theoretical research is not without a praxis of its own. Reading off the measurements which result from an experiment often requires a complicated ‘technical’ set-up for the experimental design.”

That science critically involves ‘manipulation’ (Hantierung) was a bold idea ‘consilient’ with the principles of the emerging quantum mechanics, but one which would have been antithetical to the ‘declarative’ paradigm of the 19th century (which was echoed in the midcentury philosophy of science trafficking in things like "bridge laws"). The scientific ‘modification’ of the circumspect attitude is neither bounded by a type of ‘object’ nor a particular ‘method’; our practical understanding of anything can be made ‘scientific’, and exactitude is ‘categorically’ imposed on a subject-matter rather than ‘read off’ it.

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118 BT, p. 409
In an interesting comment which usually goes unremarked upon, Heidegger says “The context of equipment that is ready-to-hand in an everyday manner, its historical emergence and utilization, and its factical role in Dasein—all these are objects for the science of economics [Wirtschaft]”; in the Geisteswissenschaften or ‘social sciences’ we are very much within the ‘everyday’, attempting to precisify our ‘ethnomethodology’ of it. Furthermore, he is also quite insistent that there is no particular magic to the use of mathematics in natural sciences. “Thus the paradigmatic character of mathematical natural science does not lie in its exactitude or in the fact that the entities which it takes as its theme are discovered in it in the only way in which entities can be discovered–by the prior projection of their state of Being.”

The genuine existential conception of science has two sides. It is epitomized by the ability to ‘free’ entities to be the subjects of genuine theoretical discoveries, an activity Heidegger calls “thematizing” (thematisieren). “The Articulation of the understanding of Being, the delimitation of an area of subject-matter (a delimitation guided by the understanding), and the sketching-out of

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119 BT, p. 413
120 BT, p.414
the way of conceiving which is appropriate to such entities—all these belong to the totality of this projecting; and this totality is what we call ‘thematizing’.”

However, thematizing is (as with knowing generally) derivative from the fundamental reality of disclosedness and the ability to transcend the field of ‘objectivity’ in question (if one thinks it acceptable to have the accumulated but not properly comprehended material of an established 'subject-matter' or Fach ‘calling the shots’ concerning what one says or does not say about Being in general, one can hardly be said to be speaking ‘scientifically’; perhaps this would be ‘junk science’ in a nutshell).

The final subsection of this section is “The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World”. Heidegger begins with a programmatic statement: “We have defined Dasein’s being as ‘care’. The ontological meaning of ‘care’ is temporality. We have shown that temporality constitutes the disclosedness of the ‘there’, and we have shown how it does so. In the disclosedness of the ‘there’ the world is disclosed along with it. The unity of significance—that is, the ontological constitution of the world—must then likewise be grounded in temporality. The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity,

\[\text{ibid.}\]
has something like a horizon”. He then analyzes the elements of 'significance' involved in circumspective concern in terms of the temporal ecstases and the 'vistas' they create for the thinking Dasein. With the “for the sake of which” Dasein “comes towards itself futurally”; with the “in-order-to” the present is revealed; we ‘live’ the past as that “in the face of which” we act.

Heidegger sums these observations up in a statement I think is decisively significant in indicating the importance of his theory of originary temporality for the book as a whole: “The unity of the horizontal schemata of future, Present and having been, is grounded in the ecstical unity of temporality. The horizon of temporality as a whole determines that whereupon [woraufhin] factically existing entities are essentially disclosed”. The sense in which temporality is the “meaning” of care is critically akin to Kant’s famous definition of time as the 'form of inner sense' in general; the structures of temporality are the horizons wherein we encounter Realien, ‘factical entities’, which are ‘understood’ as Being only by Dasein but also as being ‘as real as real can be’.

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122 BT, p. 416
123 BT, p. 416
I think it is not too much to say that if temporality were not fundamental for the concept of Dasein as care, we would have no genuine ‘sense of reality’ (as is often supposed to be the case in idealist or ‘anti-realist’ philosophies, which handle problems of ‘ideology’ masterfully but leave us empty-handed when it comes to explaining the 'objective pull' of factual discourse). With this "temporal Interpretation" of care Heidegger has achieved, if only obscurely, a philosophy which is both existential and ‘realistic’ in a deep and meaningful sense.

The final two sections of Chapter 4 are far shorter; the issues which are touched upon in them are somewhat ‘less significant’, but they show that there is quite a bit of ‘systematic spirit’ at work. In section 70, Heidegger examines the concept of ‘existential spatiality’ introduced in Chapter 3 of Division I in terms of temporality. That space must also be ‘time’ is a challenging thought, one that ‘calls’ us to really think about what Heidegger is saying about temporality (it is also one that Heidegger did not give up, as sections in his 1930s work Contributions to Philosophy discuss a Zeitraum or ‘time-space’). The formal argument would be that Dasein’s ‘spatiality’ is realized as care, and temporality is the ‘meaning’ of care; in “directionality” and “de-severance” Dasein must be occupying a space temporally, ‘living’ a making-present.
“Only on the basis of its ecstatico-horizontal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space.”

At the end of the chapter Heidegger considers “everydayness” as such. “Everydayness manifestly stands for that way of existing in which Dasein maintains itself ‘every day’ ['Alle Tage']. And yet this ‘every day’ does not signify the sum of those ‘days’ which have been allotted to Dasein in its ‘lifetime’. The reader should note that in ordinary German Alltag is a ‘generic’ occasion, one which is not quite every day but can be applied ‘categorically’ to a moment in time and which marks out a set of ‘appropriatenesses’ that are slightly spurious but which we do not discard; we may evade it in authenticity, but never ‘escape’ it. “Everydayness is determinative for Dasein even when it has not chosen the ‘they’ for its ‘hero’.”

The thoughts we must think will “proximally and for the most part” remain everyday ones, no matter how intelligent or good we are or think ourselves to be; Heidegger’s achievement in this chapter is to show how

\[124\] BT, p. 421
\[125\] BT, p. 422
\[126\] ibid.
his theory of temporality gives structure to both the authentic “moment” and the everyday as well.
Chapter 5: “Temporality and Historicality”

Who built the seven gates of Thebes?
The books are filled with names of kings.
Was it the kings who hauled the craggy blocks of stone?
And Babylon, so many times destroyed.
Who built the city up each time? In which of Lima’s houses,
That city glittering with gold, lived those who built it?

Brecht, "A Worker Reads History"

With the end of Chapter 4 the ‘main thrust’ of Being and Time is completed; Heidegger’s story about Dasein as care and its relationship to temporality is fundamentally finished. The remaining two chapters of the book are not inessential, but stand rather as ‘special studies’ that employ the theoretical machinery developed elsewhere in the book to shed light on topics of interest to the German philosophy of Heidegger’s day; studying them can allow the reader to ‘backtrack’ and grasp parts of Heidegger’s main argument more clearly. At that time Germany
thought of itself as second to none in attention to historical study and the philosophy of history; in “Temporality and Historicality” Heidegger analyzes the historiographic theories of Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Dilthey’s friend Count Yorck through his ‘existential’ lens.

(In our day interest in ‘metahistory’ continues, and the ‘historical materialists’ who have been growing in number in recent years ought to mark well Heidegger’s conception of historicality and how it differs from the Marxist tradition.)

Heidegger begins his discussion by supposing ‘for the nonce’ that the problem of death which so animated him in Chapter 1 of Division I is not solely the ‘ultimate’, for as much as Dasein is fated to die there is also the problem of its origin, its birth: “Not only has Being-towards-the-beginning remained unnoticed; but so too, and above all, has the way in which Dasein stretches along between birth and death. The ‘connectedness of life’, in which Dasein somehow maintains itself constantly, is precisely what we have overlooked in our analysis of Being-a-whole”.

I must caution the reader that all of Division II is not to be upended by such comments; Heidegger is proposing ‘the other heading’ to make the novice philosopher of history think, to see how a seemingly

\[127\] BT, p. 425
'contrary' phenomenon can eventually be brought under the rubric of the theory he has already established. (Like many of his lecture-courses, this chapter is an excellent example of Heidegger instructing the reader in how to ‘do philosophy’ rather than merely laying it on them.)

In the later 19th century a new concept was born in German thought which we now know as 'historicism': it is the idea that a great number of our cultural fixities are not commonly understood in their proper historical context, and turn out to be quite ‘other’ when properly examined as such using a wider variety of documents. Heidegger’s gambit in Chapter 5 is to grant the verbal correctness of historicism without giving up his own theory: Dasein is essentially ‘historical’, but Heidegger adds “In analyzing the historicality of Dasein we shall try to show that this entity is not ‘temporal’ because it ‘stands in history’, but that, on the contrary, it exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being”.  

He also adverts to the next and final chapter, in which “within-time-ness” in which historical events are usually measured will be examined: “Since, however, time as within-time-ness also ‘stems’ from the temporality of Dasein, historicality and within-time-ness turn out to be equiprimordial. Thus, within its limits, the ordinary

\[^{128}\text{BT, p. 428}\]
interpretation of the temporal character of history is justified”.

The following five sections explore diverse features of the connection between historicality and temporality. In section 73, “The Ordinary Understanding of History, and Dasein’s Historizing” Heidegger examines fundamental ambiguities in the way the word “history” (Geschichte) is used. History is not merely books ‘scientifically’ treating the chronology of past events (Heidegger uses the Latinate word Historie or “historiology” for this) but the actual Sache selbst and all it touches; in a sense an inanimate arrowhead is every bit or more “historical” than what I will have for dinner tonight, for example. On the other hand, we can be ‘making history’ right now, particular objects like an invention have a historical “derivation” or Herkunft (a word Nietzsche used in his study of the “genealogy of morality”), and in a difficult but irreducible sense Dasein with its culture and intellect is ‘within history’ in a way fellow animals are not.

Heidegger then asks the question: “How does Dasein have history?” Perhaps predictably by this point in the book, he denies that the ‘historical record’ can simply be read off “present-at-hand” objects: “We contend that what is

129 BT, p. 429
primarily historical is Dasein”.¹³⁰ Other entities are “world-historical” in a literal sense by being part of Dasein’s Welt; familiar to it from ‘works and days’, even ones long gone by. The ‘existential’ thesis has been asserted, but Heidegger ends the section by asking to what effect: “This thesis raises the problem: to what extent and on the basis of what ontological conditions, does historicality belong, as an essential constitutive state, to the subjectivity of the historical subject?”¹³¹

Heidegger’s later philosophy would raise the question of historicality in a different way. He would speak of “being-historical thinking”, seynsgeschichtliche Denken; this was no longer an attempt to understand history existentially, but rather to think of metaphysics as an obscure but crucial part of human history, one in which philosophical theses wound around social change (as in his famous essay "The Age of the World-Picture").

The next section, “The Basic Constitution of Historicality”, poses the question of history in terms of Dasein’s authentic grasp of itself; Heidegger identifies two broadly historiographic concepts, “fate” and “destiny”, as specially linked to Dasein’s existential core. Finite and ‘groundless’ anticipation ‘frees’ Dasein to have a unique, unrepeatable

¹³⁰ BT, p. 433
¹³¹ BT, pp. 433-4
end; this is the ‘individual’s’ fate (*Schicksal*), which the attentive reader would know Dasein wants to ‘escape’ *under no conditions*. On this understanding there is no higher calling than to ‘die at the right time’ for personally important reasons, for that is essentially the shape of a human life. Furthermore, “But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as *destiny* [*Geschick*]”[^132]; this is the existential concept of the *nation*, which would soon cause so much trouble on the Continent.

Those who wish to read Heidegger’s Nazi involvement into *Being and Time* will find the most ‘grist for the mill’ in this chapter; it hardly needs arguing to say that Heidegger’s views on history were already ‘conservative-revolutionary’ by this point compared to the theories being advanced contemporaneously by a Benjamin or a Gramsci. In Chapter 2 of Division II Heidegger introduced the concept “repetition”, *Wiederholung*, and here he gives it a ‘historical’ gloss; one who can authentically “repeat” is taking up what Heidegger’s student Gadamer would later identify as “tradition”. Gadamer claimed there is no type of understanding that does not essentially make use of an

[^132]: BT, p. 436
orientation to tradition, and Heidegger’s ‘existential’ observation here tallies with that:

“The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly—that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there.”

This sort of thought is not completely foreign to politically radical thinkers; Marx’s famous observation in the *18th Brumaire* that the French Revolution draped itself in the ‘costumes’ of the Roman Republic (one certainly known to Heidegger) travels a similar path. Still there is indeed a ‘conservative’ overtone in tying an individual's self-realization to taking over a 'faith-of-their-fathers' in some way.

According to Heidegger repetition proves the key to understanding the existential constitution of historicality: “Authentic Being-towards-death—that is to say, the finitude of temporality—is the hidden basis of Dasein’s historicality. Dasein does not first become historical in repetition; but because it is historical as temporal, it can take itself over in its history by repeating”.

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133 BT, p. 437
134 BT, p. 438
‘phenomenological’ view of history as ‘the passing show’, one we need only integrate in a tightly wound theory to be done with.

Without the *pathos* of the ‘one life we live’ within history it would be a meaningless thing, and the thought which properly belongs to the philosophy of history that connects to this is that “history” must be cognitively accessible in some way to exist at all; if we did not grasp the events of the past and in so doing in some sense empathize for the actors, or if there were a more fundamental and completely 'telluric' history unknown to us, the intelligibility of history would be undone. Yet it should be noted the proviso that “inauthenticity” is ineliminable remains in effect here: “If historicality belongs to the Being of Dasein, then even inauthentic existing must be historical” 135.

Section 75 considers “World-history” and what we know as *artifacts*. One of Heidegger's solid points in this chapter is that the artifact is an *ontologically* puzzling thing; it is 'right here' with us in the world of the present, so the way in which it receives its historical ‘charge’ is difficult to explain. If the artifact simply is historical, all history is the history of Dasein: “With the existence of historical

135 BT, p. 439
Being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world”. Yet our ordinary concern for the cultural value of the ‘curio’ offers little guidance on this topic; why one item would be of inestimable historical significance and another 'mute' and irrelevant is an extremely difficult question. We must figure that it has something to do with their significance for the "world" of a past Dasein; in looking at artifacts from the past the prepared mind sees the past as its inhabitants saw it.

The final ‘programmatic’ section of Chapter 5 addresses the problem of history as a science; Macquarrie and Robinson translate Heidegger’s Historie as “historiology” (it is worth mentioning that a habit Heidegger had in his writings of his 'middle period' was to play off ‘scientific’

\[136\] BT, p. 440

\[137\] “World-history” in the broader sense is also the narrative of famous events and personages, one we somehow end up never knowing too well; Heidegger identifies in this the hand of inauthentic everydayness, in which our relationship to a ‘Nelson’ or ‘Socrates’ is fundamentally an escape from who we could be if we "chose our hero” better.
Latinate terms against ‘ordinary’ Germanic terms like *Geschichte*, not usually to the benefit of the latter). Drawing on his discussion of “thematizing” in Chapter 4, Heidegger explores the character of scientific history or historiology; however, as was the case there the *ursprünglich* phenomenon is “world-history” and the life of Dasein—”factuality”, not factuality: “Only because in each case the central theme of historiology is the possibility of existence which has-been-there, and because the latter exists factically in a way which is world-historical, can it demand of itself that it takes its orientation inexorably from the ‘facts’”.138

Heidegger repeats his ‘existential deduction’ for historical truth, that the ‘archives’ derive their usefulness from the fact that human beings live *within* history rather than constituting history ‘from without’. Heidegger specifically invokes Nietzsche’s famous 1873 writing “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” and the distinction Nietzsche made there between “monumental”, “critical”, and “antiquarian” history. Nietzsche’s intention in that “Untimely Meditation” was openly *partisan*; he was *militating* for the existence of a critical history, not singing

138 BT, p. 447
the praises of German historical notables like David Friedrich Strauss.

However, here Heidegger claims genuine history must combine all three aspects; it must be “monumental” in its respect for historical greatness, “antiquarian” in preserving the reality of the past, and “critical” in combating the illusions of the present. In the final section of Chapter 5 he cites at length a correspondence between the famous philosopher of history and the human sciences Wilhelm Dilthey and his friend Count Yorck to ‘light up’ their demand for the ‘whole fact of man’ to be represented in historiology.

The German historian Leopold von Ranke (mentioned by Yorck in the quotations as a “great oculist”) had famously called for historians to represent the past wie es eigentlich gewesen (“how it actually was”); Heidegger’s own concept of Eigentlichkeit does not support this ‘value-free’ vision of historical science, but he must leave the extremely complicated question of Dasein’s being "within history" essentially open.

“How are we to get historicality into our grasp philosophically as distinguished from the ontical and conceive it ‘categorially’, except by bringing both the ‘ontical’ and the ‘Historical’ into a more primordial unity, so that they can be compared and distinguished? But that
is possible only if we attain the following insights: (1) that the question of historicality is an ontological question about the state of Being of historical entities; (2) that the question of the ontical is the ontological question of the state of Being of entities other than Dasein – of what is present-at-hand in the widest sense; (3) that the ontical is only one domain of entities. The idea of Being embraces both the ‘ontical’ and the ‘Historical’. It is this idea which must let itself be ‘generically differentiated’.”

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139 BT, p. 455. In the Postscript I will touch on the completely other role of "being-historical thinking" in Heidegger's later writings.
Chapter 6: “Temporality and Within-time-ness as the Source of the Ordinary Conception of Time”

J’appuyais tendrement mes joues contre les belles joues de l’oreiller qui, pleines et fraîches, sont comme les joues de notre enfance. Je frottais une allumette pour regarder ma montre. Bientôt minuit.

Proust, Du côté de chez Swann

The torso that is the published text of Being and Time concludes with Chapter 6 of Division II, an examination of the “ordinary conception of time” and its relationship to originary temporality. Like Chapter 5, this chapter cannot be claimed as an “integral” part of Heidegger’s theory; it is an exploration of the standard philosophical story about time from the standpoint of the analytic of Dasein, and as such is more ‘open-ended’ than authoritative. The penultimate section of Chapter 6 contains a startlingly perceptive analysis of Hegel, usually viewed as an opponent of Heideggerian themes, and I am quite confident that Heidegger’s remarks here deserve a great deal more attention than they have received—both for shedding light on his own theory and ‘what was living and what was dead’ in the thought of Hegel at that time.
Finally, the book concludes with a promise of the ‘material to come’ that never arrived; I will conclude my story about temporality as the ‘form of facticity’ with a careful examination of these two sections.

In his remarks on ‘time as we ordinarily understand it’ Heidegger repeatedly stresses a ‘practical’ aspect of the ordinary conception of time, that it is something we “reckon” with: “In its factical existence, any particular Dasein either ‘has the time’ or ‘does not have it’. It either ‘takes time’ for something or ‘cannot allow any time for it’. Why does Dasein ‘take time’, and why can it ‘lose’ it? Where does it take time from? How is this time related to Dasein’s temporality?”140 This draws the seemingly ‘abstract’ and ‘objective’ concept of time close to the prior analysis of “concernful circumspection” and the average everydayness usually implicit in it; the difficult thought of this chapter is that ‘world-time’ is inauthentic in the Heideggerian sense, neither the truth of the cosmos nor the mind but nothing we can ‘replace’ or do without either.

Heidegger gives us a quick synopsis of the analytic of Dasein for use in considering ordinary time: “Dasein exists as an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is itself an

140 BT, p. 456
issue. Essentially ahead of itself, it has projected itself upon its potentiality-for-Being before going on to any mere consideration of itself. In its projection it reveals itself as something which has been thrown. It has been thrownly abandoned to the ‘world’, and falls into it concernfully. As care—that is, as existing in the unity of the projection which has been fallingly thrown—this entity has been disclosed as a ‘there’.

Dasein finds time relates to its concern with the world as a “then”, a “beforehand”, and a “now”: ordinary time introduces an element Heidegger calls “datability” [Datierbarkeit]. This ‘topological’ ordering of the world in terms of 'earlier' and 'later' seems completely inescapable and yet somehow metaphysically irrelevant. Consequently many ‘scientific’ minds during the modern era have felt they had license to deny the reality of time (as in “block” theories of the universe, in which people with wristwatches claim that time is an illusion).

Heidegger’s own ‘phenomenological’ approach to time is different; its presence in the “clearing” of Dasein means it is not nothing, it is not something that can be ‘explained away’ but instead a phenomenon which must be approached as part of Dasein’s Existenz. Furthermore, the ‘dimensions’ of ordinary time obviously parallel the

141 BT, p. 458
temporal “ecstases”, such that there is no way they could not be interestingly related to each other. However, Heidegger is from the outset hostile to the element of the ordinary conception of time which considers it as an infinite sequence of “nows” (Jetzte). “When Dasein is ‘living along’ in an everyday concernful manner, it just never understands itself as running along in a Continuously enduring sequence of pure ‘nows’.”  

The “making-present” of ordinary time fails to do justice to the dimensions of temporality articulated earlier in Division II, and obviously is closely related to the ‘busy rush’ of life in “average everydayness”: “In so far, then, as everyday concern understands itself in terms of the ‘world’ of its concern and takes its ‘time’, it does not know this ‘time’ as its own, but concernfully utilizes the time which ‘there is’ [“es gibt”]—the time with which ‘they’ reckon”.

In section 80, Heidegger examines an aspect of ordinary time epitomizing this which he calls its “publicness” [Öffentlichkeit; it might be noted that the German title of Juergen Habermas’ first book Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was Strukturwandel der

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142 BT, p. 462
143 BT, p. 464
Öffentlichkeit; Habermas was, like all intellectual Germans of his era, deeply marked by Heidegger's influence and so this must be taken to be no random parallel. Time is ‘for me and thee’, we all use ‘spans’ of it the same way and in ancient times knew it the same way, from the changes in sunlight registered on a sun-dial. “Concern makes use of the ‘Being-ready-to-hand’ of the sun, which sheds forth light and warmth. The sun dates the time which is interpreted in concern.”

In modern times, a device has been contrived to serve this function in a regular and exact manner: “This implies that along with the temporality of Dasein as thrown, abandoned to the ‘world’, and giving itself time, something like a ‘clock’ has been discovered—that is, something ready-to-hand which in its regular recurrence has become accessible to one’s making present awaitingly”.

However, the imbrication of chronometry with ‘practical’ concerns means that properly understood we do not ‘live for the clock’ but that it is an outcome of our ability to concernfully interact with the world: “Temporality is the reason for the clock”.

Reading a clock or even a sundial makes a “now” present to all and sundry within which we

144 BT, p. 465
145 BT, p. 466
146 ibid.
can attend to our ‘business’ concernfully: “Time which has been interpreted has by its very nature the character of ‘the time for something’ or ‘the wrong time for something’. When concern makes present by awaiting and retaining, time is understood in relation to a ‘for-which’; and this in turn is ultimately tied up with a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of Dasein’s potentiality for being’. Heidegger calls ordinary time ‘world-time’ to mark its fundamental involvement in our circumspective interactions with *die Welt*, its being a ‘matrix’ within which objects can come to matter in our everyday affairs. “World-time is ‘more Objective than any possible Object because, with the disclosedness of the world, it already becomes ‘Objectified’ in an ecstatico-horizonal manner as the condition for the possibility of entities within-the-world”.

World-time is ‘neither subjective nor objective’; “making-present” makes objects accessible at all, and the subject or Self is inconceivable without it. In Section 81, “Within-time-ness and the Genesis of the Ordinary Conception of Time”, Heidegger analyzes famous remarks by Aristotle on time in the spirit of his own treatment. In his *Physics* Aristotle defined time as “that which is counted in the movement within the horizon of the earlier and later”, and

147 BT, p. 467
148 BT, 471
for well-known reasons many Aristotelian topoi have been massively influential in the history of philosophy following him. “Ever since Aristotle all discussions of the concept of time have clung in principle to the Aristotelian definitions; that is, in taking time as their theme, they have taken it as it shows itself in circumspective concern.”

The attempt to “think beyond Aristotle” is equally common, but Heidegger is in Being and Time especially critical of those who think Henri Bergson had ‘transcended’ Aristotelian motifs concerning time.

A quote from Plato’s Timaeus reinforces another element of the ordinary conception of time, that it is “infinite” in its procession of “nows”. Originary temporality has been determined to be finite, and this poses a paradox of how ‘infinite’ time could be based on finite temporality. Heidegger first articulates an ‘existential’ critique of das Man’s understanding of time as ‘limitless’: “The ‘they’ never dies because it cannot die; for death is in each case mine, and only in anticipatory resoluteness does it get authentically understood in an existentiell manner. Nevertheless, the ‘they’, which never dies and which misunderstands Being-towards-the-end, gives a

\[^{149}\] BT, p. 473
characteristic interpretation to fleeing in the face of death. To the very end ‘it always has more time’.

He then offers a positive theory: “The ordinary representation of time has its natural justification. It belongs to Dasein’s average kind of Being, and to that understanding of Being which proximally prevails. Thus proximally and for the most part, even history gets understood publicly as happening within-time”. I take this as evidence for the claim I have often made in this book that “inauthenticity” is ineliminable, for we certainly cannot do without “world-time” and yet its “infinity” is that of the inauthentic “average” conception of the world.

The ‘final movement’ in the chapter’s account of ordinary time has to do with the relationship between ‘time’ and ‘spirit’ (Geist, an extremely polyvalent German word having something to do with ‘matters of the mind’). “Although, proximally and for the most part, the ordinary experience of time is one that knows only ‘world-time, it always gives it a distinctive relationship to ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, even if this is still a far cry from a philosophical inquiry oriented explicitly and primarily towards the ‘subject’.” Heidegger expands on this remark–perhaps

150 BT, p. 477
151 BT, p. 478
152 BT, p. 479
more important for the general shape of Being and Time than it may seem—in the penultimate chapter, “A Comparison of the Existential-ontological Connection of Temporality, Dasein, and World-time, with Hegel’s Way of Taking the Relation Between Time and Spirit”.

Although Hegel and Heidegger are regarded as two of the great German philosophers and exceptionally German philosophers at that, it has never occurred to anyone to call Heidegger “Hegelian”; whatever we eventually find in Heidegger's philosophy, it ‘factically’ turns out not to be in that column. This has perhaps been responsible for a lack of attention to Section 82 of Chapter 6, in which Heidegger says very interesting things about Hegel which link Hegel’s concerns to his own in Being and Time. Another reason the section is neglected is that people ‘turn up their noses’ at the source of the Hegel remarks Heidegger analyzes, the section on Philosophy of Nature in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline.

This is not a deeply admired text today, but I must point out it is deeply characteristic of Heidegger’s exegeses of ‘great’ philosophers to sometimes find their key material in ‘minor’ works by those philosophers. (Selectively reading a writer is indeed a way to read them; if this means you only find what you want in them, perhaps it thereby becomes obvious that it was what you wanted.) If
I must provide an inducement to taking this section seriously, it may perhaps be viewed as the employing of a Verfremdungseffekt for Being and Time, inscribing its major themes in the terms of Hegel’s theory.

The section has two subsections, “Hegel’s Conception of Time” and “Hegel’s Interpretation of the Connection between Time and Spirit”. The first begins with an ‘infinite judgment’ of sorts: according to Hegel, “Space ‘is’ time; that is, time is the ‘truth’ of space. If space is thought dialectically in that which it is, then according to Hegel this Being of space unveils itself as time”.\footnote{BT, p. 481} Hegel calls space “the unmediated indifference of Nature’s Being-outside-of-itself”, which Heidegger glosses as “a way of saying that space is the abstract multiplicity [Vielheit] of the points which are differentiable in it”\footnote{ibid.}; it genuinely is a ‘sequence of points’.

Hegelian ‘negativity’, which takes the form of ‘negation of the negation’, makes this indifferent manifold thinkable: “Only if the negations do not simply remain subsisting in their indifference but get transmuted—that is, only if they themselves get negated—does space get thought and thus
grasped in its Being”.¹⁵⁵ In a ‘difference which defers’, the “pure thinking of punctuality” necessary to think space generates time, which Hegel describes as such: “Time, as the negative unity of Being-outside-of-itself, is likewise something simply abstract, ideal. It is that Being which, in that it is, is not, and which, in that it is not, is: it is intuited becoming”.¹⁵⁶

This is still close to “ordinary time”, but in the second subsection Heidegger begins to develop his own motifs in terms of Hegel’s theory. He seizes on a famous quote from Hegel’s Science of Logic: “The ’I’ is the pure concept itself, which as concept has come into Dasein”.¹⁵⁷ Heidegger explains this thusly: “The concept is accordingly a self-conceiving way in which the Self has been conceived; as thus conceived, the Self is authentically as it can be—that is free”.¹⁵⁸ A further quote from the Phenomenology of Spirit makes Hegel’s own interpretation plain: “Time is the concept itself, which is there [da ist] and which represents itself to the consciousness as an empty intuition; because of this, spirit necessarily appears in

¹⁵⁵ BT, p. 482
¹⁵⁶ ibid.
¹⁵⁷ BT, p. 484
¹⁵⁸ ibid.
time, and it appears in time as long as it does not grasp its pure concept—that is, as long as time is not annulled by it.

Time is the pure Self-external, intuited, not grasped by the Self—the concept which is merely intuited.” (p. 485).

In other words, time is the inception of conceptual thinking: it is not possible to grasp anything with generality without placing it in a temporal matrix; Hegel here echoes Kant’s description of time as “the form of inner sense” within which all “intuitions” must appear, without ceding the prerogative to think material presented “intuitively” in terms of a broader reason. Heidegger contrasts Hegel’s theory of time as “the fate and necessity which spirit has when it is not in itself complete” with his own theory: “Our existential analytic of Dasein, on the contrary, starts with the ‘concretion’ of factically thrown existence itself in order to unveil temporality as that which primordially makes such existence possible.

“‘Spirit’ does not first fall into time, but it exists as the primordial temporalizing of temporality. Temporality temporalizes world-time, within the horizon of which ‘history’ can ‘appear’ as historizing within-time. ‘Spirit’ does not fall into time; but factical existence ‘falls’ as falling from primordial, authentic temporality. This ‘falling’ [“Fallen”], however, has itself its existential
possibility in a mode of its temporalizing—a mode which belongs to temporality.”\textsuperscript{159}

There is no ‘mind out of time’; Heidegger’s “temporal Interpretation” fully respects the ‘human achievement’ of Dasein in thinking of, working on, feeling about, and anticipating the world.

Conclusion

The final section of \textbf{Being and Time}, “The Existential-temporal Analytic of Dasein, and the Question of Fundamental Ontology as to the Meaning of Being in General”, understandably raises more questions than it answers on account of the book’s status as unfinished. The final paragraph of the book runs as follows:

Something like ‘Being’ has been disclosed in the understanding-of-being which belongs to existent Dasein as a way in which it understands. Being has been disclosed in a preliminary way, though non-conceptually; and this makes it possible for Dasein as existent Being-in-the-world to comport itself \textit{towards entities}—towards those which it encounters within-the-world as well as towards itself as existent. \textit{How is this disclosive understanding of Being at all possible for Dasein?} Can this question be answered by going back to the \textit{primordial constitution-of-Being} of that

\textsuperscript{159} BT, p. 486
Dasein by which Being is understood? The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein’s totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ecstatical projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporalizes. How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time manifest itself as the horizon of Being?

The book ends with a question, and I suspect the reader who has stuck with me through this work of interpreting Being and Time still has several of their own.

“What does ‘horizon of Being’ mean?” “What have we really learned from the chapters we did see?” “Is there more to the story in Heidegger’s later writings?” I believe myself to have provided a novel explication of the first question in the phrase “form of facticity”: he is saying that Being as an ‘understanding of reality’—reality as we know it, we humans, and not God would see it or as we would idealistically impose it by fiat—does not escape the orbit of the temporal structures of Dasein’s existence as he has described them. The most serious, obstinate, and ambiguous ‘entities’ and facts that enthrall and bedevil us never ‘come to us’ outside the true shape of our ‘life history’, in which inheres a finite and ‘autonomous’ level
of control human beings possess over their mind and body. We will not escape that history through metaphysical researches of any level of rigor or contemporary relevance; we will not also escape the 'ontological need' through utopian visions for society or individuals of any level of theoretical and cultural sophistication.

**Being and Time** as it was completed is one of the central texts of the intellectual 20th century; its ‘age’ is now really quite distant from our momentary concerns, but very little of the intellectual history of the 20th century has *nothing* to do with Heidegger’s example. (For example, those who would turn to Wittgenstein for comfort in the face of ‘Continental insanity’ may not realize that he owned a heavily annotated copy of the book in the period he was composing his ‘later’ works.) The often-derided and also too-often imitated conformist enthusiasm Heidegger had for the Nazis certainly vitiates his ‘moral example’ and by extension the example of his writings.

In the Postscript I will discuss it, and his later works which explicitly “turned” away from the theories of **Being and Time** (and which perhaps ought to be taken as being far more “in line” with the intellectual milieu of fascism). Still, I have to say that those who have read the book as a ‘skeleton key’ to unlocking a universe of fascist horror might do well to consider **Being and Time**’s ‘gift’ to them,
to humanity in general, as being a practical ability to ‘do philosophy’: to think critically, imaginatively, and systematically about the world, the most important issues of their day, and their finite lives. This is an extremely challenging task, but ultimately one of the most rewarding.
Postscript: Excursus on Heidegger's *Kehre* and Fascism

Franz handelt nun völkische Zeitungen. Er hat nichts gegen die Juden, aber er ist für Ordnung. Denn Ordnung muss im Paradiese sein, das sieht ja wohl ein jeder ein. Und der Stahlhelm, die Jungens hat er gesehen, und ihre Führer auch, das ist was. Er steht am Ausgang der Untergrundbahn Potsdamer Platz, in der Friedrichstrasse an der Passage, unter dem Bahnhof Alexanderplatz. Er ist der Meinung mit dem Invaliden aus der Neuen Welt, mit dem einäugigen, dem mit der dicken Madame.

Alfred Döblin, *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (1929)

"Just look at his wonderful hands!"

Heidegger to Jaspers, on Hitler

For many decades Martin Heidegger was a surprisingly popular figure in American academia considering his once rather full-throated support for a German government that killed millions upon millions of Europeans, including six million Jews gassed or shot to death during the later years of World War II; most Americans of an earlier vintage, including the large numbers of people who had family fight in the Allied forces, felt that this had been a rather poor series of decisions on the part of Germany under Hitler and were not particularly eager even to 'learn from their mistakes'. However, a wrinkle was added for
students of philosophy by the postwar popularity of Heidegger in Europe even in countries brutally subjugated by the Nazis and even among individuals whose commitment to European socialism could not be questioned. This created a complicated terrain people who set out to learn something of ‘Continental’ philosophy at one time more or less all got the lay of; the "master from Germany" was simultaneously forbidden and obligatory.

Today we are 'blessed' in the English-speaking world with a myriad of vicious rightist organizations the likes of which might not have been anticipated to persist into the 21st century; additionally, a large number of 'educated' people (even intellectuals) not obviously marked as goons have some degree of 'secret' sympathy for the monstrously illiberal policies of European and Latin American fascism, a sympathy which waves of capitalist profiteering may somehow not overcome. There is, as someone once said, great disorder under the heavens: how much of it can be blamed on any of the vogues for Heidegger is an open question and one which perhaps awaits a very determined 'muckraker'. In this postscript essay I will attempt to answer another related question: the extent to which Heidegger's philosophy following what is called the Kehre or "turning" in the 1930s, perhaps not coincidently occurring under fascist rule, is more or less politically suspect than Being and Time. If The Torso of Humanity has served the purpose of an
advanced and complete introduction to *Being and Time*, the reader and I should be in relatively good shape for considering this difficult question.

Although *Being and Time* was more widely read than other works like "On the Origin of the Work of Art" before World War II and as I have said in the main text it does contain 'conservative-revolutionary' motifs, I think the answer to *my* question is that the philosophy of the *Kehre* (not exactly beloved by open fascists, it might be said) was signally more politically complicit with the reality and legacy of fascism than Heidegger's 'early' work. Thinking intellectually seriously and coherently about the *Kehre* and Nazism is the 'reckoning' Heidegger deserves; a great many admirers of *Being and Time* would be surprised indeed to learn they thereby 'signed off' on the Holocaust, and any of us with a sense of wartime propaganda and the way it integrates into 'everyday life' can only think the pot-shots recently taken at Heidegger over 'patriotic gore' in his *Black Notebooks* are inane if lucrative. However, Heidegger's Faustian bargain with the Nazi authorities and his continued production of 'pathbreaking' intellectual work under the regime cannot simply be 'written off' either. In works like *Introduction to Metaphysics*, *Contributions to Philosophy (On the Event)*, and *What is Called Thinking?*—the three items I have chosen to discuss in this essay, not quite at random—the careful mind can see the 'real presence' of fascism; it would neither be unfair to Heidegger nor to philosophy to consider this matter seriously.
The three books under consideration are considered among the most 'serious' of Heidegger's productions during this period; if we can find a 'systematic antiliberalism' in them it will tell us something about philosophy and something about Heidegger's attitude as well. This is what a serious intellectual approach to the question of fascism and philosophy consists in, not motivated mudslinging and then quickly 'falling back behind one's own object'; the mass of actual fascists were content with tidbits gleaned from Nietzsche but if we must immediately 'rush to the defense' of the thinker with the most "historically effective" influence on fascism and proclaim "No, no, you've got it all wrong" I despair of a serious analysis of Heidegger's complicity on several levels. Yet in a way the popularity of the Kehre work in the postwar era as a sort of 'philosophical libertarianism' bids it on a purely theoretical level; if generations of US college students were doused in Derrida in literature classes, a Derrida who once claimed he was unsure he had said anything Heidegger hadn't said already, the purely intellectual considerations at work militate for a thorough examination.

As I have said we will not trouble ourselves with the Black Notebooks, which contain obvious if vicious patriotic bromides any German would have put into wartime letters if only to placate censors. I am also uninterested in the lecture-courses tied to the period of Heidegger's direct service to Nazism as Freiburg rector; anyone who ever even aspired to being 'good enough for government work' knows the compulsion of craven conformism in even
idyllic versions of such circumstances, and Heidegger's decision to omit them from the Gesamtausgabe cannot really be called an act of dissimulating cowardice; furthermore, it is certainly not the case that the "introduction of Nazism into philosophy" must have taken the catechistical form of racialism Heidegger briefly employed at this time and no other in his career. The three books I have chosen to deal with have a great deal of 'credibility' with certain philosophical demographics and do not fail to make explicit statements either in support of or defense of Nazism: Heidegger's oft-parsed reference to the "inner truth and greatness of the Nazi movement" in Introduction to Metaphysics is not without parallel in Contributions to Philosophy, an envisioned work summing up the Kehre drafted in 1936-38 but only published in 1989 with Heidegger's centenary.

Even What is Called Thinking?—Heidegger's last lecture-course delivered after several years of a teaching ban by the French 'denazification' authorities—manages a certain insolence about the horrific tragedy of European fascism. The words are there in the 'serious' books, and they very well may not be there by accident; let us attempt to understand what the philosophy and the politics have to do with one another. A word before we begin: the minutiae of Heidegger's actual service to the Nazi government has been dealt with extensively in several books, chief among them Hugo Ott's Heidegger: A Political Life, but between Heidegger's service as Freiburg rector in the first years of the regime and his (mandatory) role as an old man in a civil-defense brigade
towards the end of the war a long period elapsed where Heidegger was essentially an 'ordinary German' who had no special leverage over events; in this essay I will make the suggestion that Heidegger's complicity with fascism was more than is realized a *quotidian* one shared with all those German intellectuals who did not go into exile. Perhaps this makes an Adorno or Ernst Bloch look even more heroic by comparison, but there is no getting around the fact that tens of millions of people lived under a fascist *Regierung* with illusions of personal safety and liberty intact; getting at fascism in the historical or present case requires seeing what it is when it is *not* obviously vicious.

One guidepost to the 'softer side' of fascism—one which is almost always overlooked, though the novel has been effusively praised in recent years—is the character Hans Sepp in Robert Musil's *The Man Without Qualities*. Dealing with the period preceding World War I but composed during the *Nazi-Zeit*, Musil's novel obviously in part aimed to answer the question "How did we get here from there?" Hans Sepp is the *Urbild* of the enthusiast for fascism; a confused denizen of industrial modernity, he enthuses about "racial consciousness" as he courts the half-Jewish Gerda. Sepp is obviously Musil's tragicomic caricature of the grandiose, ill-educated nobodies who made Hitlerism possible; as was perhaps too often the
case in European novels of the era, the reader is left to expect he will die on the battlefield. \footnote{It ought to be noted in connection with Musil’s portrayal of Sepp that ‘enlightened’ nostras for the ills caused by modern society were in no way lacking from the fascist movement; they constituted its ‘policy program’ more than racist xenophobia, which did however serve as a \textit{deus ex machina} to explain the failure of fascist initiatives domestically.}

Furthermore, in a way Hans Sepp \textit{was} Heidegger's 'auditor' during the interwar and war period; more than to those like the 'devilish seducer' Ulrich, whose mind and habits were formed in an earlier era, Heidegger had a \textit{responsibility} to students not unlike Hans Sepp to try to explain their world in terms they could publicly enunciate.

This he did; one need only look at the massive volumes collecting Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche, the philosopher who supposedly must provide the 'antifascist' his core discipline, to see Heidegger legitimating the 'era of the world picture' in terms agreeable to Nazi censors (if you wanted to know what 'they' thought in general, perhaps you will find it right there, and you may have trouble finding things you disagree with). Heidegger's own philosophy had undergone some shifts during the period following the publication of \textit{Being and Time}; many see a new direction beginning with "On the Essence of Truth" published in 1930. Yet it hardly beggars belief to see the work of the \textit{Kehre} or "turning" as \textit{in dialogue} with the totalitarian regime Heidegger lived under; more than providing explicit justifications for Hitler we can see this
philosophy as an assurance that "here too the gods are present". (The 'older American' once possessed the nimbleness of ego to reflexively doubt this; furthermore, American intellectuals who would later become famous still made the journey to Germany to receive training in the 1920s and 30s, and surely did not forget the society they saw there. Though this is a different country now and in many ways better, all must understand that a critical element of fighting fascism is not 'falling for' traps where we are to doubt what we actually comfortably and reasonably understand.)

Still, in reading Heidegger's engagement with fascism seriously we must take him seriously and track what is actually said. To begin, **Introduction to Metaphysics** is a lecture-course delivered at Freiburg in 1935 and published in 1953 (occasioning a famous protest by the young Jürgen Habermas in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*); it remains a 'modern classic' of German philosophy widely read in the German *Sprachbund*. Heidegger himself advertised it as a sort of 'sequel' to **Being and Time**, but it is immediately constructive to compare the two works to see what is shared and what is not.

In a phrase **Introduction to Metaphysics**, which openly considers the question "Why are there beings rather than nothing?", could be characterized as "**Being and Time** without Dasein". The problematics of **Being and Time**'s fully ramified theory are developed immanently within the frameworks of philosophy generally—consider the not
especially Heideggerian character of the distinctions used in the book between "being and becoming", "being and seeming", "being and thinking", "being and the ought"—without the "transcendental" element added to Being and Time by the focus on Dasein.\textsuperscript{161} Those looking to engage Heidegger in a confrontation with “mainstream” philosophy are urged to study this book well, but there is surely not no cost to the loss of a certain modernist enthusiasm for life that was in Being and Time (and today one knows well enough to whom such costs should be charged).

It is obvious in the book, too, that Heidegger's enthusiasm for the society of his time was not total; he criticizes a world where it has come to pass that "a boxer counts as the great man of the people"—anyone with minimal historical literacy ought to draw the conclusion he is not referring to Joe Louis—and goes on to cast doubt on its being the case that "the tallies of millions at mass meetings are a triumph".\textsuperscript{162} Hostility to Max Schmeling and Leni Riefenstahl does not count as craven pandering to the tastes of the Nazi era (though the obvious rejoinder that mountain-climbing academic elitists could feel these things beneath them without actually doing anything to

\textsuperscript{161} To be sure Dasein gets discussed in Introduction to Metaphysics, but the shift to the “Da-sein in man” is the end of a 'transcendental deduction' of the human being in its world; Being and Time effectively promised the reader 'subjectivity enough' and Introduction to Metaphysics no longer does this.\textsuperscript{162} IM, p. 42
combat monstrous injustice is more than fair). The charge that Heidegger took no effective action against Hitlerism, even when he had already seen the cells of the destruction it would later wreak in its insane war of conquest, is accurate; the idea that 'we today' can speak with an unimpeachable moral authority about what Heidegger should have done is delusory.

The famous quote about the "inner truth and greatness of this movement" being "the encounter between global technology and modern humanity" is also more equivocal than realized, as it implies the greatness and truth was "inner" and the encounter between modern man and planetary technology was going to happen anyway. Yet the work is far from free from an enthusiasm for the intellectual culture of the fascist era: Heidegger is far more loquacious than usual about the importance of 'violencedoing' in intellectual practice, and given the application of the term Gewalt to legitimate authorities who could not be deemed 'legitimate' in any ordinary way this is not innocent; additionally, Heidegger's hostility to 'values' and 'humanity' mirror talking points of the Nazi regime in this prewar period. **Introduction to Metaphysics**, which has been available in a 'new' English translation for almost two decades now, is a genuinely interesting work for thinking about Heidegger's relationship to 'traditional' philosophy; yet anyone who does not see it as in some important sense fundamentally

\[163\] IM, p. 222
compromised by fascism is not paying attention, and attention can be paid.

For more genuine intellectual enthusiasm for the era (tempered with 'cryptic' critiques) one can look at Contributions to Philosophy (On the Event), a large work sketched out in 1936-8 but on his instructions only published after Heidegger's death in 1989. (There are two English translations, one "experimental" and one tending towards literality.) Heidegger's untranslatable concept Ereignis, which appears in a great deal of his later work, is most fully explained here; literally translated "event" or "happening", it is a center of thinking opposite to the 'subjectivity of the subject'. In my estimation the Beiträge is easily the second most important book Heidegger ever wrote and a great help to interpreting the most important one. Even if (like the contemporaneous Finnegans Wake) it is nearly 'unreadable' it is unfortunate that there has not been very much more attention paid to it from a purely 'philosophical' point of view.

Though it is thoroughly refractory from an exegetical standpoint, I am tempted to render Ereignis in terms of the famous if seemingly trite book title The Magic of What Happens as it is not quite a 'course of events' and not a mere 'worldview' either. In Introduction to Metaphysics and this book Heidegger also moves towards "being-historical thinking", a strange historicism characteristic of the works produced during the rest of his life in which history is both constituted by the metaphysical frameworks we have inherited from the past
and fully constitutive of our thinking. This 'later Heidegger' (though it is perhaps worth noting that Heidegger was all of 47 when he began working on *Contributions*) is one of the strangest signposts to the 20th century, and new readers ought to expect that it 'registers' the palpable madness of its times intellectually.

Heidegger's famous observations on the loss of meaning occasioned by the translation of Greek concepts into the Latin modern philosophy 'learned them from' belong to this period. It was also the period where Latinate terms which previously carried the strong connotation of 'scientificity' in Heidegger's philosophy dropped out, probably not because they would have looked bad in Helvetica; this shift ought to be considered more carefully than it is. However piecemeal this "proto-postmodern" turn was intended to be it is quite a bit more total than that. Though it resists interpretation even more than the *Being and Time* we have painstakingly waded through, Heidegger's later philosophy was deeply important for the intellectual 20th century and we perhaps ought to consider it an instantiation of the 'principle of sufficient reason'; even if we are not quite sure what he was saying, Derrida and Lacan and everybody else surely wanted to hear it and did hear *something*.

I myself have been at points inclined, perhaps a bit too much in a spirit of 'controversialism', to call Heidegger's views in *Contributions to Philosophy* 'metaphysical Keynesianism': perhaps this is not a terrible rendering of the direction in German thought generally during the
1930s, where improved conditions of living and new technologies were to ‘materialistically’ render irrelevant the insane whims and dangerous Verbote of the German and Austrian leaders. Certainly, though, I think it is not unfair to suggest seynsgeschichtliches Denken is something like an inversion of Heidegger's earlier concern with "historicality", which Dasein could live rightly (if groundlessly) and understand correctly in Historie. "Being-historical thinking" is a coupure of the idea of an Archimedean point from which we can judge history; we are all simply in transit to an uncertain future, thinking our journey using concepts from a necessarily "concealed" past. 164

It is also worth mentioning that Chapter V of Contributions to Philosophy, “The Grounding”, offers extremely interesting and suggestive remarks on Heidegger’s own understanding of Dasein. The text was composed about ten years after Being and Time, and what we see is halfway between an exposition and correction of Heidegger’s earlier book. Dasein (now styled “Da-sein”) is hardly the central focus of Contributions to Philosophy, but Heidegger makes clear he did not and does not intend it as the properly understood “subject” but rather the riddle of human existence which one might

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164 In my opinion his often-examined choice at this point to revert to the spelling the idealists like Hegel used, Seyn, simply exceeds the linguistic abilities of an Anglophone commenter.
say is posed in the “middle voice”; Heidegger speaks of both the Da-sein “of” the human being and the Da-sein “in” the human being (definitively establishing that Dasein can never be perfectly “matched” to a conscious self-understanding).\textsuperscript{165}

There are two especially 'politically relevant' remarks in \textit{Contributions to Philosophy}, though attention is rarely drawn to them. In one Heidegger claims that Bolshevism was essentially \textit{not} Russian, but "Christian-Jewish", and asks "What then?"

“To ask the question of who we are is in fact more dangerous here than any other opposition encountered on the same level of certainty about the human being (the final form of Marxism, a form that has essentially nothing to do with Jewishness or even with Russianness; if an undeveloped spiritualism still lies dormant someplace, then that place is the Russian people; Bolshevism is originally Western, a European possibility: the rise of the masses, industry, technology, the dying out of Christianity; insofar, however, as the supremacy of reason, qua equalization of everyone, is merely a consequence of Christianity, which is itself basically of Jewish origin \{d. Nietzsche's idea of the slave revolt in morals\}, Bolshevism is in fact Jewish; but then Christianity is also basically

\textsuperscript{165} CP, p. 269
Bolshevist! Which decisions thereby become necessary?"\(^{166}\)

The full response to the question is intended to be "Indeed", if one can read carefully; though the hostility of the high-ranking Nazis to traditional Christianity did not go unnoticed either within Germany or outside it, four years later the Germans had not yet given up painting crosses on their machines of war. The abyss Heidegger saw “Western civilization” confronting as the energies of “Christendom” went awry was so total that he counseled here (as did Nietzsche in his better moments) there was nothing to lean on, not even antisemitism. In another comment in a section critiquing what we now call “scientism” he heaps abuse upon the concept of "Jewish physics", which would place Leibniz and Newton among the 'Jews' intended to be excised from scientific history by an 'Aryanizing' focus on experiment; let us say this is not meant completely seriously either.

Far from containing ringing endorsements of the Nazis, in fact this book shows Heidegger working through the world society of the era (which was 'massified' all over and free from prejudice nowhere) in terms of its philosophical relevance; Michel Foucault at one point wondered at how young Germans could experience the Hitler regime, which he of course lived under as a schoolboy in Vichy France, as a "utopia"; however, one's era is categorically one's era and its errors typically become evident only in the fullness

\(^{166}\) CP, p. 44
of time and even then only partially. (If it unfortunately needs saying today that the supremacism of the Germans was a defective way to cope with the problems of the era I will say it.) If fascism was a delusion, it was a delusion of millions and *Millionenstädte*; furthermore, it is a sorely neglected lesson of the last century that greater success fighting it is not promised to other nations.

During the actual war, which was conducted by the Germans in a condition of material affluence for most of the conflict, Heidegger remained a professor; at the bitter end he was thrown into civil-defense service, a role he shared with young children. After the war Germany was divided up into four 'zones' corresponding to the four major Allied powers; Freiburg was in the 'French' zone, and following Liberation the new French authorities were not especially inclined to be gracious. As part of 'denazification' Heidegger was banned from giving lectures for several years, though with Hannah Arendt's assistance he had an intellectual success in France with the "Letter on Humanism", a response to Sartre's sensational reworking of his ideas. Finally, in the early 1950s (as he passed seventy) Heidegger was allowed to resume giving lectures; he gave one, *Was heisst Denken?* (*What Is Called Thinking?* is the translation's title, although as the lectures make clear the meaning of heissen is essentially ambiguous between "is called" and "calls for") and retired.
The work has been widely available in English translation for over fifty years; if a ‘neophyte’ had to learn something of Heidegger's later philosophy, it is the place to look.

In an environment where Heidegger could not be taken to enthuse about National Socialism (under Adenauer the issue of Germans’ conduct under the Nazis simply officially ceased to exist) he did make a few politically relevant remarks. At one point the attention of the audience is drawn to an exhibition opening on Kriegsgefangene, a term which is ambiguous between "prisoners of war" and the victims of concentration camps; we are given to understand it is dreadfully, dreadfully sad, though the question of how exactly young men ended up getting killed and imprisoned in this way is not raised.

The philosophical content of What Is Called Thinking? is non-trivial and can be taken to feature a yet further 'reduction' of the paradigm of Being and Time; I called Introduction to Metaphysics "Being and Time without Dasein", but it is hardly unfair to Heidegger's extended meditations in What Is Called Thinking? on the observation (elaborated on without citation by Derrida in Of Grammatology) that "The most thought-provoking thing is that we still do not think", the modern construal of thinking as representation, and on a "paratactic" rendering of saying of Parmenides to call them Heidegger without Heidegger. In a way in this book the legend of the "secret king of philosophy" established early in his career.
is fully elided, and only the problems set him by the history of philosophy remain.

I cannot share Herman Philipse's enthusiasm for discerning the ideas of Pascal at work in all stages of Heidegger's philosophy; the planned postwar seminar on *Pensées* Philipse adverts to in *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being* was indeed most likely a forced exercise in "ecumenicism". On the other hand, if we are to see an early-modern (and Christian) philosopher secretly at work in Heidegger's later philosophy, I think it could very well be said that *Leibniz* is far more important for Heidegger's later works than is generally realized; it is certainly more sensible to suppose our Nazi Heidegger, who wondered about basic French grammar in the "Letter on Humanism", was attuned to the great intellectual figure of German Christianity than the difficult French Jansenist.

A great deal of *Contributions to Philosophy* is devoted to the "other beginning", anticipating a new dawn in human awareness following the destruction of the Christian ideal where a new diffuse religiosity will transform existence; although this is an unusual spiritual-intellectual ideal Heidegger claimed was primarily anticipated by Hölderlin, it was really *not at all* incompatible with the ‘inner talk’ of the more sophisticated sort of fascist trying to work out a non-Marxist way to the overcoming of monotheistic religion. Perhaps it could be said Leibniz, whose texts were repeatedly analyzed in Heidegger's later lecture-courses and essays, had an attitude to Christianity which was not so different from this, though. If I may be
permitted the expression, the Leibnizian God is an integral of physical existence, a meaning to existence distinct from them but ultimately compatible with any perceived evil.

Following him 'theodicy' became a generic term for the 'explaining away' of evil in moral discourses, but one could argue that in Leibniz the existence of evil poses an ontological task for faith; one's 'world' must literally be reconstructed, all one's thoughts organized, to see the hand of a Creator in it. When we are 'wandering on the way' with the later Heidegger, we are performing our own integrations; in a situation where nothing makes sense, thought begins with what it has and proceeds towards what it can reach. Heidegger's message, which was wellheard by the 'postmodernists' often declaimed to have given up on reality, is that this is what intellectual life in 'late capitalism' must amount to.

Given how deeply the later Heidegger's message resonates with a certain kind of “liberated” intellect, it is easy to forget that the concepts were forged under outright fascist rule. This message is by no means as non-conciliatory to fascism as it might seem, either; as I said the actual fascists were well-schooled in Nietzschean 'perspectivism' and the bewilderment of industrial society. One might very well prefer an 'existential' commitment to radicalism on pain of death, or a 'third option' entirely. However, we are not where we are not; the massified consumer culture of the 20th century has receded from us only in details, and 'we Americans' are not necessarily the people to point the finger at those complicit in world-historical evil.
After we have considered these three books, the "considered judgment" of Heidegger on the philosophy and history of the era in question (in which protoenvironmentalist questions about "technology" bulked large) what is left of Heidegger's complicity with fascism? He was an enthusiastic promoter of the regime for the first few years, and a 'loyal subject' thereafter (his own statements, including in the dark and cryptic interview given at the end of his life "Only a God Can Save Us", do not contradict this). As rector he was responsible in part for his mentor and friend Edmund Husserl, whom his family even used to take vacations with, being banned from the University of Freiburg; I suppose we can be grateful to Heidegger for provoking Husserl's interesting response in the last few years of his life to the threat of fascism in texts like The Crisis of European Sciences, but a disturbing lesson of Heidegger's life is how close someone with extensive intellectual and personal connections to Jews could be to fascism.167

Though it is actual historical fact Heidegger was not a 'name' in the public sphere used to justify fascist policies,  

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167 I suppose I might have liked to put something about Hannah Arendt's love affair with Heidegger in the period preceding the composition of Being and Time in the main text of my book, but intellectual seriousness about the fascist threat still bids a separation between the ‘parallel lives’ of Arendt and Heidegger and their intellectual productions.
unlike many European intellectuals even in his 'internal emigration' later in the regime Heidegger did nothing to resist fascism; saying 'no' was simply an option, one some intellectuals chose at the price of their life. It is also far truer than foreign enthusiasts have been tempted to admit that *Being and Time* may in part 'anticipate' the views of fascists about the self, their cries (echoing Nietzsche's observations on the Black Plague) of "Long live death!" and their focus on 'hardness'; and it is indeed true that in general later appeasement does not provide an excuse for theoretically ‘anticipating’ a problem.

Heidegger's later work, the product of an 'ordinary German' who lived through fascism, may in part be a 'resistance' (any society at any time, even one that one identifies with fanatically, must needs provide some occasion for that) but it was no refutation. Heidegger was a genuine philosophical star of the 20th century, one no European of any bona fides could intellectually ignore; he was neither an especially egregious fascist nor a "guide to anti-fascist living", so those looking for practical intellectual answers to problems raised by fascism will indeed have to look elsewhere. I hope they find them.
Books Cited

By Heidegger


By Others


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