Theodore Kisiel
The first volume of Being and Time was drafted in the course of 1926 under publish-or-perish conditions and appeared in print in April 1927 under the title "Being and Time, First Half," both as a separate edition and together with only one other lengthy article (Oskar Becker's "Mathematische Existenz") in Husserl's Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. The decision to divide his opus magnum into two volumes was made in the first days of January 1927, as Heidegger relates it in retrospect, during a visit to Karl Jaspers in Heidelberg, "on the day that the news of Rilke's death reached us" (GA49 40). The purpose of the visit was to discuss the page proofs of Sein und Zeit (= SZ) that Heidegger had been forwarding to Jaspers. During the course of this visit, it became clear to Heidegger that his elaboration up to that point of the pivotal third division of Being and Time, entitled "Time and Being," would have been incomprehensible to keen minds like Jaspers and Rilke. The published portion thus contains only the first two divisions of the systematic Part One of Being and Time. "Moreover, external circumstances (the excessive length of the Jahrbuch volume) fortunately prevented the publication of this division [I.3]" (GA66 413/M 366). Its first elaboration "was 'destroyed,' but a new start was made, on a more historical path, in the lecture course of Summer Semester 1927" (GA66 413f/M 366f). Combined historical-systematic attempts seeking a lucid elaboration of various aspects of this crucial third division continued into 1930. Heidegger's still unpublished file of notes entitled "Supplements to Being and Time"1 contains the draft of a preface to the third edition of the book, handwritten in the middle of 1930, which announces a completely new reworking of the published First Half of Being and Time and a second half that would embody only the third division of Part One, sufficiently surcharged historically. But in 1931, the third edition of "Being and Time, First Half" appeared unchanged. The book project entitled Being and Time had now finally come to a dead end (Holzweg), although Heidegger communicated his decision to abandon this path through Being and Time in personal letters to only a few confidants. For example, on September 18, 1932, he writes to Elisabeth Blochmann: "People think that I am writing SZ II, and are even talking about it. That's OK with me. SZ I was once a path that led me somewhere, but this path is now no longer trodden and has become overgrown. That is why I can no longer write SZ II. I am not writing any book."2 Even earlier, on November 14, 1931, Heidegger writes to Rudolf Bultmann about new directions in his work now being carried out behind "the mask of someone who 'is writing his second volume.'"3
We begin with an attempt to reconstruct Heidegger's various efforts toward drafting the third division immediately after the completion of the "First Half" of Being and Time, starting with the "unintelligible" version which was therefore "destroyed" (vernichtet).
Textual references. In the earliest editions of Being and Time (until the seventh edition) one finds a footnote to § 68d on "The Temporality of Discourse" (SZ 349) that provides an insight into the thematic structure of the very first draft of the third division–that is, the "systematic" draft that was said to be completely incomprehensible to intellects like Rilke and Jaspers. The footnote reads, "Cf. Division Three, Chapter II of this treatise" and it is attached to the following hermeneutically charged sentence: "It is only out of the temporality of discourse, i.e., of Dasein as such, that the 'emergence' of 'meaning' can be clarified and the possibility of any concept formation be made ontologically intelligible" (SZ 349). This section also refers to problems that in part are already indicated in § 69 as substantive themes to be treated in Division 3, such as the development of the problem of the connection in principle between being and truth on the basis of the problematic of temporality. But in § 68d the elaboration of this basic problem of phenomenology now becomes the presupposition for "the analytic of the temporal constitution of discourse and the explication of the temporal characteristics of language-structures" (SZ 349). Central to an ontological explication of discourse is the widely dispersed grammar of the verb "to be" in the classification of the variations of its conjugation. For discourse does not primarily temporalize itself in one particular ecstasis. The verb is grounded in the whole of the ecstatic unity of temporality. Furthermore, the three tenses are mingled with "the other temporal phenomena of language–'aspects' ['Aktionsarten'] and 'temporal stages' ['Zeitstufen']." In particular, contemporary linguistics, which is obliged to carry out its analyses with the help of the common concept of time, cannot even pose the "problem of [the] existential-temporal structure" of aspects (SZ 349).
Verbal action is grammatically divided into three basic types: 1) momentaneous, instantaneous, iterative; 2) continuous, ongoing, lasting, imperfect; 3) perfect, complete, perfecting. This grammatical division of verbal action ("aspects") will find an experiential variant in the phenomenological division of three types of boredom in WS 1929-30, which are based accordingly on a wavering fleeting time, a limited constant time, and the time of Dasein as a whole, which is spell-bound by a horizon. For horizonal time as Temporality is an ontological, transcendental, or a priori perfect "which characterizes the kind of being belonging to Dasein itself" (SZ 85). "Each ecstasis as such has a horizon that is determined by it and that first of all completes that ecstasis' own structure." The open horizon where each ecstasis ends is a perfective sign of the finitude of temporality, for "this end is nothing but the beginning and starting point for the possibility of all projecting." The enabling of the transcendental perfect has the character of a prior letting-be (Seinlassen) (SZ 85), where the perfective suffix is both active and passive, in the ambiguity of the middle voice: it means both already-having-let-be-in-each-case and letting-be. Thus we have a series of perfective existentials in Being and Time: thrownness, disposedness, disclosedness, fallenness, resoluteness, etc. The perfect expresses an action that has somehow become definitive and that is always still in the further process of becoming. The perfect is used only when the effect of earlier activity is still at work. Heidegger comments, for example, that in perception, understood in terms of intentionality, what is central is neither perceiving nor the perceived; instead, perceivedness is the enabling center of the intentionality of perception, the sense of its intentional direction, which is neither subjective nor objective and which, as what makes perception possible, can ultimately be understood only on the basis of the essence of time.
Archival reference. Included with Heidegger's manuscript of the lecture course of WS 1925-26 in the Heidegger Archives in Marbach, there is a file of some 200 pages wrapped in a sheet marked "I.3." A selection of 30 pages from this text has been published, but these include none of the many pages–and an entire file–that are marked with the number "69." The entire folder is a collection of notes that refer to the themes, and even to particular chapters, of the unpublished Division 3, probably written in the course of 1926. A summary of the classification of the notes suggests a division into about six chapters of Division 3. Chapter 1 would have probably borne a title such as "Phenomenology and the Positive Sciences" and would have treated the method of ontological (as opposed to ontical) thematization. "Temporality (Zeitlichkeit) and Worldliness" is the explicit title of Chapter 4, which would have taken its themes primarily from § 69c of Being and Time, which bears the title, "The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World." One also finds remarks, expressions, and turns of phrase throughout this text that do not appear in Heidegger's known lectures and publications: for example, the division of awaiting into "expectative–presentative–perfective"; "moments of existence" such as "the formally futural" and "the formally perfect"; the claim that "time is a self-projection upon itself (its horizonal [self-projection], its ecstatic [self-projection])." A thorough study of the entire file can deepen our knowledge of the direction and goals of the missing Division 3, and enrich the attempt to reconstruct it.
Propaedeutic. "That the intentionality of 'consciousness' is grounded in the ecstatical unity of Dasein, and how this is the case, will be shown in the following division" (SZ 363, note). The markers that project the contents of the third division that would have concluded the systematic Part One of Being and Time are clustered around the pivotal §69. § 69 refers not only to the "idea of phenomenology, as distinguished from the preliminary conception of it which we indicated by way of introduction [§7]," but also to the corresponding "existential conception of science" and its understanding "of the ontological genesis of the theoretical attitude." "Yet a fully adequate existential interpretation of science cannot be carried out until the meaning of being and the 'connection' ['Zusammenhang;] between being and truth have been clarified in terms of the temporality of existence" (SZ 357). And this clarification is the "central problematic" (SZ 357) of Division 3. As a preparation for these tasks of the following division, § 69c (SZ 364ff.) develops "the temporal problem of the transcendence of the world," that is, the problem of how the world temporalizes itself as the toward-which of the temporal ecstases into a horizonal unity in accordance with the "horizonal schemata"–the respective "whithers" of the ecstases. The temporal transcendence of the world is thereby founded ecstatically-horizonally. The ecstatical unity of temporality is also designated at the start of §69 as the cleared clearing of Dasein, which grounds the disclosedness of the there (cf. SZ 350f.). The clarification of the connection between being and truth thus begins with Dasein, whose fundamental characteristic is the understanding of being. In turn, the understanding of being is made possible by disclosedness, that is, disposed understanding–dynamically understood as thrown projecting (cf. §44c, SZ 230). The thrown projection that is Dasein in its ek-sistence is ultimately–and so finitely–grounded in ecstatical temporality, in the cleared clearing of the there. In this way time is used as the "preliminary name" for truth, which is now understood as disclosedness, clearing, and unconcealment. "Being [projected as time–T.K.] and truth 'are' equiprimordially" (SZ 230).
SS 1927. Heidegger's older students like Karl Löwith knew in advance that the lecture course of SS 1927 was to be a "new elaboration of Division 3 of Part One of Being and Time" (GA24 1/BP 1) by way of a more historical path. But because of the long historical detour that it takes through the "destruction" of four traditional theses about being in order to come to four basic problems of phenomenological ontology, the course covers only a part of the path projected in § 69 toward establishing the correlation of being and truth in terms of temporality, before it had to be broken off for lack of time.
The "first and last and basic problem" of a phenomenological science of being is: "How is the understanding of being at all possible?" (GA24 19/BP 15). More explicitly, "Whence–that is, from which antecedently given horizon–do we understand the like of being?" (GA24 21/BP 16). The already developed analytic of Dasein gives a first answer: "Time is the horizon from which something like being becomes understandable at all. We interpret being by way of time (tempus). The interpretation is a Temporal [temporale] one. The fundamental subject of research in ontology [...] is Temporality [Temporalität]" (GA24 22/BP 17). Ontology is not only a critical and transcendental science (cf. GA24 23/BP 17), but also a Temporal one (cf. GA24 324/BP 228), which is hence quite different from all other, so-called positive sciences. But it is like the positive sciences in one way. A positive science must objectify the entities that lie before it upon the latent horizon of their particular being, upon the whither of the "projection of the ontological constitution of a region of beings" (GA24 457/BP 321). Similarly, ontology must objectify being itself "upon the horizon of its understandability" (GA24 459/BP 322)–that is, upon Temporality. Ontology becomes a Temporal science "because Temporal projection makes possible an objectification [Vergegenständlichung] of being and assures conceptualizability, and thereby constitutes ontology in general as a science" (GA24 459f/BP 323). "It is in the objectification of being as such that the ground act constituting ontology as a science is performed" (GA24 398/BP 281). This basic act has "the function of explicitly projecting what is antecedently given upon that toward which it has already been projected [and unveiled] in pre-scientific experience or [pre-conceptual] understanding" (GA24 399/BP 282). The explicit objectification "thematizes" (GA24 398/BP 281), and "thematization objectifies" (SZ 363). This explicit articulation of the basic concepts of a science, or explicit interpretation of its guiding understanding of being, determines the distinctive conceptual structure of the science, the possibility of truth that pertains to it, and its manner of communicating its true propositions (SZ 362f.). The true propositions of scientific ontology are a priori, transcendental, and Temporal (GA24 460f/BP 323f). The phenomenological language of being as such is the language of Temporality, which is properly "the transcendental horizon for the question of being" (GA24 461/BP 324). With this, the announced goal of Division 3, "the explication of time" as just such an interrogative horizon, has been reached (SZ 39). Thus, Temporality is the transcendental horizon of the understanding of being especially in its more question-worthy moments in the radical questioning "of" being.
Temporality (Temporalität) is the temporality (Zeitlichkeit) already laid out in the existential analytic of Da-sein but now thematized in its function as condition of possibility of the pre-ontological and ontological understanding of being, and thus of ontology as such (GA24 324/BP 228, 388/274). In this function, Temporality is "the most originative temporalizing of temporality as such" (GA24 429/BP 302). As the most original temporality, it is the most radical–the temporality that is fundamentally factical down to its abyssal ground, that is, the "propriating event" (Er-eignis), if we may here use the later Heidegger"s favorite word for be-ing. But in 1927 Heidegger hesitates to plunge into the concealed depths of temporality, "above all with regard to its Temporality," and to enter "the problem of the finitude of time" (GA24 437/BP 307f.).
One reason for this hesitation lies in the incompleteness of the analyses of Temporality as a whole as "temporality with regard to the unity of the horizonal schemata belonging to it" (GA24 436/BP 307). The horizon of ecstatic temporality is understood more precisely as the horizonal schema of the corresponding ecstasis. For every ecstasis, as a removal-unto, also has in it an anticipation of the formal structure of the "whither" of the remotion, which is never an indefinite removal into nothingness. This anticipated whither of the ecstasis is the horizonal schema that belongs to it (GA24 428f/BP 302). In Being and Time (SZ 365), the horizonal schemata are expressed prepositionally, that is, in a meaning-like way, following the model of meaning as the pre-structured toward-which (SZ 151): the for-the-sake-of (the ecstasis of the future as coming-towards), the from-which of thrownness or the to-which of abandonment (past as having-been, Gewesenheit), the in-order-to (present). But in SS 1927, Heidegger proposes to designate the horizonal schemata with the Latin expressions for the "tenses" (Tempora) of time. "Here, in the dimension of the interpretation of being via time, we are purposely making use of Latinate expressions for all the determinations of time, in order to keep them distinct in the terminology itself from the time-determinations in the previously described sense" (GA24 433/BP 305). Praesens is used instead of "present" (Gegenwart), where praesens now means the horizonal schema of the present. More precisely, praesens (instead of the in-order-to) is supposed explicitly to "constitute the condition of possibility of understanding handiness as such" (GA24 434/BP 305).
But Heidegger treats only the ecstasis of the present in regard to praesens, and says nothing at all about the other ecstases in regard to their presumably Latinized tenses and schemata, the futurum and praeteritum. Yet praesens in particular is not independent; it stands in an inner Temporal connection with the other Temporal schemata. "In each instance the inner Temporal interconnections of the horizonal schemata of time vary also according to the mode of temporalizing of temporality, which always temporalizes itself in the unity of its ecstases in such a way that the precedence of one ecstasis always modifies the others along with it" (GA24 436/BP 307). In a summary of the prepositional nexus already laid out in Being and Time, Heidegger had already emphasized that the relations of the in-order-to can be understood only "if the Dasein understands something of the nature of the for-the-sake-of-itself" (GA24 418/BP 295). An in-order-to (present) can be revealed only insofar as the for-the-sake-of (future) that belongs to a can-be is understood.
But the futurum, as the condition of possibility of understanding the self of Dasein, does not come under consideration at all, not even in its inner connection to praesens. With his exclusive treatment of praesens, Heidegger appears to yield to the domination of the traditional metaphysics of constant presence, which understands the being of beings only "in the horizon of productive-intuitive comportment" (GA24 165/BP 117) and would soon find its epochal denouement in the contemporary age of technology. In this way the most brilliant insights of the analytic of Dasein, for example, insights into the existential priority of the future and into the historicity of Dasein, are not pursued any further and silhouetted upon the fundamental horizon of the most radical temporality. Heidegger's break with Plato's anamnesis-thesis had already been projected in his transformation of Pindar's saying, "become what you [always already] are," into "become what you are to be"; in Being and Time the directive is "be what you will be" (cf. SZ 145), "become what you yourself are not yet at all" (cf. SZ 243), or "become what you can be" (cf. the statements on "resoluteness," SZ 305f.). But this transformation is not taken further, into the uttermost Temporal horizon and into its abyssal implications. The levels of Dasein's historicity–for example, how, in the resolute "repetition" of a communal destiny in the "natural" course of a change of generations, the past perfect of precedented Dasein assumes the form of the future perfect of a community–remain uninvestigated in the Temporality of their modes of being. For example, the practical historical science of Christian theology, which takes as its object the historically transmitted and repeated happening of revelation for the community of faith, is corrected only in a formally indicative way by philosophical concepts and not comprehended in a philosophically scientific way, that is, Temporally ("Phenomenology and Theology" [1927-28], GA9 45-77/BP 39-61). With the renunciation of the language game of Temporality, the dream of philosophy as a Temporal science–that is, the objectification of being itself upon the horizon of time–comes to an end. The thought that philosophy cannot be a science at all then becomes the central theme of Introduction to Philosophy, the lecture course of WS 1928-29.
Nevertheless, the conceptual pair "transcendence – horizon" persists in the next lecture courses, although Temporalität virtually disappears from Heidegger's vocabulary and henceforth appears only "in brackets." The course of SS 1928, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, renews the elaboration of ecstatic-horizonal temporality without any reference to Temporality. In contrast to the previous year's emphasis on the horizon of praesens, originary temporality is now focused on the ecstatic being-toward-itself in the mode of the for-the-sake-of-itself (GA26 276/MFL 213). "This approaching oneself in advance, from one's own possibility, is the primary ecstatic concept of the future" (GA26 266/MFL 206). The for-the-sake-of is the distinctive mark of the Dasein that is in each instance mine (yours, ours), "that it is concerned with this being, in its being, in a particular way. Dasein exists for the sake of Dasein's being and its can-be. [...] It belongs to Dasein's essence to be concerned in its being about its very being" (GA26 239/MFL 186, my emphasis). The for-the-sake-of-itself thus formally determines an ontological circuit from being to being that transcends beings–the "circle" (GA26 278/MFL 215) of self-understanding, of freedom, of selfhood and its binding obligations in being. "Freedom gives itself to understand, freedom is the primal understanding, i.e., the primal projection of that which freedom itself makes possible" (GA26 247/MFL 192). But what does freedom make possible? The meaningful context of the world, "the wholeness of beings in the totality of their possibilities" (GA26 231/MFL 180), which gets its specifically transcendental form of organization from the particular for-the-sake-of in each instantiation (cf. GA26 238/MFL 185). The world temporalizes itself primarily from the for-the-sake-of, from the ecstasis of the future, and is grounded in the ecstatic unity and wholeness of the temporalized horizon (GA26 275 & 273/MFL 211f.). Heidegger now speaks of an "ecstematic" unity of the horizon, that is, a systematic unity that is temporalized by the unity of the ecstases (GA26 269/MFL 208). This horizonal unity directed toward the future is the "temporal condition for the possibility of world" (GA26 269/MFL 208). Because this horizon is not an entity, it can nowhere be localized. It shows itself only in and with the ecstases as their organized ecstema. Its horizon is "not at all primarily related to looking and intuiting, but by itself means simply that which delimits, encloses, the enclosure. [...] It 'is' not as such, rather it temporalizes itself" (269/208). Or better: It's worlding! (Es weltet)–to use an expression that Heidegger now revives (GA26 219-221/MFL 170-173), after having coined it in 1919. With this formulation, Heidegger seeks to indicate that the world is not an entity, but rather a temporal how of be-ing. The world, the unity of the temporal horizon, is "nothing that is and yet 'it gives'. The 'it' that gives this non-entity is itself not entitative, but rather is the temporality that temporalizes itself. And what the latter, as ecstatic unity, temporalizes is the unity of its horizon, the world [...] that which simply arises in and with temporalization. We therefore call it the nihil originarium" (GA26 272/MFL 210).
It's worlding, it's giving, it's temporalizing: these are the impersonals of the sheer dynamism of facticity. "The primal fact, in the metaphysical sense, is that there is anything like temporality at all" (GA26 270/MFL 209). Sheer facticity is the nihil originarium, and the product of the "peculiar productivity intrinsic to temporality" is "precisely a peculiar nothing, the world" (GA26 272/MFL 210), the historical world. Thus the primal fact of temporality is no factum brutum, but rather "primal history pure and simple" (GA26 270/MFL 209), "the primal event of propriation [Urereignis]" (GA26 274/MFL 212). The impersonal sentence "it's propriating itself [es er-eignet sich]" already makes an appearance in 1919 as the principium individuationis, that is, the principle of facticity as such (GA26 270/MFL 209; cf. GA56/57 75/TDP 63f.). But in this course, Heidegger emphasizes the ontic upshot of the "historical happening of transcendence," in which "beings are already discovered as well" (GA26 281/MFL 217). The metaphysical primal history of Dasein as temporality also documents the completely "enigmatic" tendency to understand beings as intratemporal, extratemporal, and supratemporal (GA26 274/MFL 212). Of course, "the event of the world-entry of beings" happens only as long as historical Dasein exists, which as being-in-the-world gives beings the opportunity to enter the world. "And only when [being-in-the-world] is existent, have extant things too already entered world, i.e. become intraworldly" (GA26 251/MFL 194). "There is time, in the common sense, only with the temporalization of temporality, with the happening of world-entry. And there are also intratemporal beings that transpire 'in time' only insofar as world-entry happens and intraworldly beings become manifest for Dasein" (GA26 272/MFL 210). The thorough elaboration of world-entry here is in part Heidegger's answer to the basic metaphysical problem of the ontological relation between realism and idealism (SZ §§ 43, 44c) in his confrontation with Max Scheler (GA26 164-9/MFL 131-4) which he inserts into this lecture course on the occasion of Scheler's death. Intraworldliness and intratemporality do not belong to the essence of the extant in itself, which remains the same entity that it is and as which it is "even if it does not become intraworldly, even if world-entry does not happen to it" (GA26 251/MFL 194). The happening of the world-entry of beings is only the transcendental condition of possibility for the fact that extant entities reveal themselves in their in-itself, and thus "for [extant] things announcing themselves in their not requiring world-entry regarding their own being" (GA26 251/MFL 195; cf. 194f./153). The fact that we are called to let beings be what and how they are is another sign of the facticity and thrownness of temporal Dasein, whose powerlessness in the face of beings is disclosed in transcendence and in world-entry (cf. GA26 279/MFL 215). The freedom of transcendence is at the same time the binding character of the ground. To sum up what has been said in sheer temporal terms: "The ecstematic in its expansive sweep temporalizes itself as a worlding. World entry happens only insofar as something like ecstatic sweep [Schwingung] temporalizes itself as a particular temporality. [...] The entrance into the world by beings is primal history pure and simple" (GA26 270/MFL 209).
The next lecture courses, delivered upon Heidegger's return to Freiburg as Husserl's successor, document the first signs of the gradual and often halting and even silent abandonment of the conceptual constellation "transcendence–horizon–Temporality," which had formed the original core of the projected third division. In "On the Essence of Ground" (his article for the Husserl Festschrift composed in October 1928 and published in 1929) Heidegger speaks, without explicitly mentioning Division 3, of Being and Time's "sole guiding intention [...] the entire thrust, and the goal of the development of the problem": "what has been published so far of the investigations on 'Being and Time' has no other task than that of [...] attaining the 'transcendental horizon of the question of being'" (GA9 162n./PM 371n.66). But he also notes that "in the present investigation, the Temporal interpretation of transcendence is intentionally set aside throughout" (GA9 166n./PM 371n.67). Yet Heidegger's personal copy of the 1929 edition contains two handwritten marginalia that still recognize Temporality as the condition of possibility of temporality: "the essence of the 'happening'–temporalizing of Temporality as a first name for the truth of be-ing [Seyn]." (GA9 159/PM 123, note a; GA9 171/PM 132, note a). In the Contributions to Philosophy (1936-38), Temporality or "the originary unity of the self-clearing and self-concealing transporting [that] provides the immediate ground for the grounding of Da-sein" (GA65 234/CP 184) is understood as the first beginning's transition to the grounding of the temporal playing field (Zeit-Spiel-Raum) of the site of the moment (cf. GA65 18/CP 16, 29/CP 25, 294-5/CP 232). In order to complete this passage of transition, it was necessary "above all to avoid any objectification of be-ing, both by withholding the 'Temporal' interpretation of be-ing and by attempting to make the truth of be-ing 'visible' independently of this interpretation (freedom toward ground in 'On the Essence of Ground'; especially the first part of that treatise still adheres strictly to the ontic-ontological schema)" (GA65 451/CP 355). Thus, in the course of SS 1930, freedom and not the unitary horizon of Temporality is designated as "the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings, of the understanding of being" (GA31 303/EF 205). Nevertheless, one could always still "identify" freedom and temporality by way of mediating concepts like "possibility." The displacement of Temporality by freedom is in fact already in full swing in SS 1928, where freedom is already related to the "play" and "leeway" (Spielraum) offered by the particular possibilities of the historical world into which we happen to find ourselves thrown. Freedom is thus actualized by transcendence to the world disclosed as the "temporal playing field" (Zeit-Spiel-Raum) of historically transmitted possibilities. World becomes the historical playing field where we play out our most fundamental freedom of transcendence. "'World' is the name of the game that transcendence plays" (GA27 312; cf. 300, 306ff.). Freedom here is not a property possessed by humans but is rather the happening that possesses or "properizes" the unique human being into ex-sisting its historically particular being-in-the-world. It is this freedom that serves to re-place horizon-schematizing Temporality with "time-play-space," or "time-space" (Zeit-Raum: from 1934) for short, of the later works (GA66 424/M 375).
The very idea of a "horizon of time" comes under intense critical scrutiny in a litany of questions (GA29/30 219f/FCM 145f) in WS 1929-30, in the context of a phenomenological interpretation of the essence of radical or "deep" boredom. It has long become a commonplace, Heidegger notes, to invoke a single yet threefold horizon of time when we wish to gather all beings together simultaneously in all three perspectives of time–with respect to the present, in retrospect of the past, and in prospect of the future, "the perspectives of all action and inaction of Dasein" (GA29/30 219/FCM 145). But the complete indifference induced by total boredom–"being bored with it all"–empties this temporal horizon of beings as a whole in all respects and turns this horizon into an empty expanse "not at all actually articulated and delimited according to the past and future" (GA29/30 222/FCM 148). The lengthening of the while of Dasein that characterizes boredom (= Langeweile = "long while") only accentuates this hollowed expansion into the full expanse of the temporality of Dasein (GA29/30 229/FCM 153). In such total boredom, Dasein as a whole, left empty and oppressed by the indeterminacy of the long while of total boredom, with a sense of being everywhere and yet nowhere, in fact becomes captivated, spellbound, entranced by its temporal horizon.
This spell of time is broken by the moment of holistic insight into the unique situation of action of being-here, Da-sein, which is in each instantiation mine (yours, ours). Since this proper possibility is intimated in the entrancement in the temporal horizon, the two apparently juxtaposed aspects of temporality belong together in a "single unitary phenomenon, in which ... the Dasein in us swings [schwingt] out into the expanse of the temporal horizon of its temporality and only in this way is able to swing into the moment of essential action" (GA29/30 227/FCM 151). The inactivity induced by profound boredom is thus dispelled. The mood of radical boredom is precisely this swinging between the empty expanse of the temporal horizon and the peak experience of the moment of insight (Augenblick). The moment is the keen vision of Dasein's resolute openness toward being-here, which in each instance, as existing, is in the comprehensively grasped situation of action, as this particular, singular, and unique being-here (GA29/30 251/FCM 169, 224/149). "The moment of holistic insight breaches the binding spell of time, and is able to breach it insofar as it is itself a specific possibility of time. It is not some now-point [...] but is the look of Dasein in the three perspectival directions" (GA29/30 227/FCM 151). The entrancement of time is broken, and can be broken only by time itself, by the "breakthrough"–often characterized as a sudden insight–of transcendence into the peak experience of the holistic moment. Thereby time itself has now become still more enigmatic for us, "when we think of the horizon of time, its expanse, its horizonal function–among other things as spellbinding–and finally when we think of the way in which this horizon is connected to what we call the moment of holistic insight" (GA29/30 228/FCM 152).
Whence the necessity of this relation between 'expanse' and 'peak'–horizon and holistic moment of insight–world and individuation, and why does it arise? What kind of 'and' is it that links these terms? Why must that expanse of the spellbinding horizon ultimately be breached by the moment of insight? And why can it be broken only by this moment of insight, so that Da-sein attains its existence proper precisely in this breach? Is the essence of the unity and structural linking of both terms ultimately a breach? What is the meaning of this brokenness of Da-sein in itself? We call this the finitude of Da-sein and ask: What does finitude mean? (GA29/30 252/FCM 170)
The finitude of the world, the finitude of the moment of individuation, the finitude of Dasein in the insecurity of its basic questioning: these intercalated questions of world, individuation, and finitude reach in their origin back to the question of the essence of time (GA29/30 252/FCM 171, 256/173), and the groundlessness and fundamental concealment of its finitude (GA29/30 306/FCM 209). Is the horizon of time a confining enclosure or a de-fining limit that is at once an opening of finite possibilities?
In the Contributions of Philosophy (1936-38), Horizont becomes a recessive term (GA65 200f/CP 157f), being replaced on the one hand by the more incipiently "being-historical" term, time-(play)-space, and on the other hand by its metaphysical German synonym, Gesichtskreis, literally "circle of vision," which thus irredeemably ties it to two millennia of the Occidental metaphysics of sight and light (GA65 250/CP 197, 270/CP 213, 376/297, 444/350, 450/355, 502/395; GA66 300-3/M 268-270). A note from the same time period (probably later), written by Heidegger in the copy of Being and Time that he kept in his mountain cabin, in the section on the "Outline of the Treatise" (SZ 39), provides the third division on "Time and Being" with a new direction. This note lists three tasks that must be carried out in "the transcendenal difference": "The overcoming of the horizon as such. The turn-around into the source. Meaningful presence out of this source" (GA2 53 note). The note charts a course that will lead to the very last draft of "Time and Being," so definitive that it found its way into print.
Since 1919, when Heidegger first characterized philosophy as the pre-theoretical primal science of original life, he repeatedly vacillated on the question of whether phenomenological philosophy is a primal science, or even a science at all. For philosophy as primal science is unlike any other science, since it aims to be a supra-theoretical or pre-theoretical–thus a non-theoretical–science, which appears to be a contradiction in terms, like a "square circle." Already in WS 1919-20 Heidegger remarks that philosophy, as "originary science," is not a science at all "in the true and proper sense" (GA58 230/BP (1919-20) 174), since every philosophy presumes to do more than mere science. And in the next semester he traces this "more" back to the original motive of philosophizing, i.e., to the radically disquieting character of life itself.
This pre-theoretical "more" is thematized again in WS 1928-29, at the end of the phenomenological decade of Heidegger's development (1919-1929). As Husserl's successor, Heidegger returns again to the theme of the scientificity of philosophy in this first of the later Freiburg lecture courses, which bears the title Introduction to Philosophy. Philosophy is not a science among others, but is more originary than any science. "Philosophy is indeed the origin of science, but for this very reason it is not science–not even a primal science" (GA27 18). Because it gives science its possibility, philosophy is something more, something else, something higher and more originary. This "something else" is philosophy's power of transcendence, of which science as such is incapable. In exercising this transcending power, this "freedom toward ground," philosophizing is "an existing out of the essential ground of Dasein, becoming essential in transcendence" (GA27 218; GA26 285/MFL 221). It is not a science at all, not out of lack but out of excess, because through its overt dwelling in the understanding-of-being (Seinsverständnis) it is always in a bond of intimate friendship (philia; GA27 22) with the evidential "things themselves," thus truer to the matters at stake and thereby "more scientific than any science can ever be" (GA27 219). Therefore the expression "scientific philosophy" is not only superfluous, like the term "round circle," but also a misleading misunderstanding (GA27 16, 219, 221).
Philosophizing as explicit transcending, as explicitly letting transcendence happen, is grounded in the "primal fact" (GA27 223, 205) of the understanding-of-being, the thrown projection of being. Transcending is, first, the surpassing of beings, which happens in science on the basis of the prior, nonobjective, background projection of the ontological constitution of beings. On this basis, beings in themselves come to appear and can be articulated as openly lying before us (positum). "Against the background of the being that is projected in the projection, the entity that is thus defined first comes into relief" (GA27 196). But in this projection of the fundamental positive concepts of the sciences, being itself remains unconceived and, at first, even inconceivable. Nevertheless, the understanding-of-being is "nothing other than the possibility of carrying out the distinction between beings and being–in short, the possibility of the ontological difference" (GA27 223). There remains the radical possibility of developing the understanding-of-being into a conceiving of being, i.e., into a question about what being itself is, and how such matters as the understanding-of-being and transcendence become possible. This self-articulating transition from the pre-conceptual understanding-of-being to the interrogative will to conceive being is philosophy as explicit transcending.
Philosophy is now sharply delimited from science, which is the cognition of beings as positum in a demarcated domain. "Neither being as such nor beings as a whole and as such, nor the inner connection between being and beings is ever accessible [...] to a science" (GA27 224). "Transcendence is nothing that could lie before us like an object of science" (GA27 395). Being itself is no positum, but is like a nothing, and is close to the nonentities of world and freedom. What, then, is the language of being, onto-logos (GA27 200f.), if it is not scientific language? For the propositional truth of science is founded "on something more originary that does not have the character of an assertion" (GA27 68). Philosophy as onto-logy, "the thematic grasping and conceiving of being itself" (GA27 200), in essence becomes a problem that can be solved only when we "unveil the full, inner direction of the essence of philosophizing" (GA27 217).
Significant in the edition of this 1928-29 lecture course is a single paragraph on time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being, that is, on the schematic-phenomenological construction of the concept of being by way of time at the heart of Division 3. This paragraph, as the editors inform us, was not read aloud in the lecture course (GA27 218n).4 Even the discussion of the "Konstruktion of the problem of being" or the "Konstruktion of transcendence" (cf. GA27 394, 396, 400), which occasionally surfaces in Heidegger's lecture-manuscript, is not to be found in the more extensive student transcripts of the course. Instead, philosophizing as questing and questioning of the comprehensive concept of being becomes an everlasting inexhaustible deconstructive task–a task that "leads us again and again into situations from which there seems to be no exit" (GA27 216). And the question of being, which "leads us anew into abysses" (GA27 205), is only one path to philosophy, the path via science. In order to make the full concept of philosophy intelligible, this path must be supplemented by two further paths: via worldview and via history.
A goal common to both paths is important for our purposes. Being and Time had already articulated the transcendence of being-in-the-world and thereby the transcendence of the world (cf. SZ §69c). "If transcending means being-in-the-world, and if this in each instantiation is a way of comporting oneself in the world, a worldview, then explicit transcending–philosophizing–entails an explicit cultivation of a worldview" (GA27 354f.). "Philosophy is not one worldview among others, not one way of comporting among others, but the comportment that comes from the ground of transcendence, the grounding comportment pure and simple" (SM 678; cf. GA27 397). In philosophizing, as explicitly letting Dasein's transcendence happen from its ground, the most originarily possible comportment takes place (GA27 396).
Philosophy as a wake-up call and as the occasion for free decision and interpretation–this is philosophy's exhortative function, which Aristotle already designated as a protreptic. This function of philosophy is connected to two temporally determined and interwoven features of the transcendence of Dasein: its freedom and its historical particularity. Philosophizing–letting transcendence happen from its ground–means precisely the development of that transcendence of Dasein which we call freedom. Likewise, philosophy is the liberation of the historically particular Dasein (GA27 401). Philosophizing, as letting the historically particular leeway of freedom happen for the peak moment of decision and the possibilities that have temporally ripened in that moment, is itself the primal action of letting-be (cf. GA27 205), of Gelassenheit–"an originary action of the freedom of Dasein–indeed, the happening of the space of freedom of Dasein itself" (GA27 214), "a 'deed' of the highest and original kind, which is possible only on the basis of the innermost essence of our existence–freedom" (GA27 103). "Letting transcendence happen as philosophizing involves the originary letting of Dasein, the human's trust in the Da-sein within itself and in its possibilities" (GA27 401). "This entity [called] Da-sein [...] in and through its being, lets such a thing as a 'there' [a historical space of openness and disclosure] first be" (GA27 136).
And this "there" is always temporally particular, in each instantiation mine, yours, ours, and this means in each instance historical. As Dasein never exists in general, so "philosophy does not occur in general, in some undetermined somewhere or indefinite Dasein, or in itself" (SM 682 = GA27 399). "Dasein never exists in general. As concrete, it exists in a particular circumstance and, depending on these circumstances, in each instantiation secures for itself the essential and inessential situations [of action]" (GA27 227; cf. SM 407). The explicit and decisive leap into worldview as a comportment is necessarily the leap into one's own historicity, into concrete historical circumstances, into the specific historicity of one's own questioning from the whole of one's own historical situation (cf. GA27 400). In a radical sense, philosophy leaps into the historicity of its own factic Dasein in order to attain originality and strength and to be what is essential (cf. SM 682f.). The fact that the essential and originary is revealed only in historical concretion is a difficulty that is considered along the third path to the full essence of philosophy, the path through history. This difficulty is nothing other than the problem of the essence of philosophical truth as opposed to scientific truth, and thus the problem of the essence of truth as such. This problem of truth belongs together with the problem of being (in the first path) and the problem of the world (in the second path) within the architectonic of philosophy. More precisely, each of these problems constitutes the whole of philosophy (cf. SM 683).
Excursus on formal indication. The above paragraph highlights a theme that arose in tandem with the thematic of phenomenological philosophy as a primal science and, like the latter theme, is about to come to its climax at the end of Heidegger's phenomenological decade (1919-29), namely, the theme of formal indication. From the start, it is closely tied to the search for a non-metaphysical, pre-theoretical language for philosophy that would precede and underlie the duality of subject and object. Heidegger's quest for a non-objectifying language of being in the framework of a phenomenological logic of philosophical concept formation becomes particularly clear in the dramatic closing hours of the 1919 war emergency semester (GA56/57 107-117/TDP 90-99). Here he tries to free the main methodological concept of phenomenology, the concept of intentionality, in its application to the "original something" (life in and for itself, lived experience), from all traces of a formal logical misinterpretation as a rigid dualism of subject and object. Objectifying life and treating it theoretically serve to strip life of its very vitality (de-vivification), tear it out of its historical context (de-historicizing), un-world (entweltet) and de-signify (entdeutet) it. In its pure phenomenological formality, intentionality is purely and simply a directing-itself-towards. As comportment as such, it is indicated in its pure moment of the formal "towards," which Heidegger considers the heart, the center, the middle, the origin, the concealed source, of life–the intimate happening of its being. The toward-which (das Worauf) of this comportment is initially described as a unitary intentional relation from motivation to tendency and back, in an intentional "circular" motion of "motivated tendency or tending motivation" (GA56/57 117/TDP 99). It then becomes passionate action before it is described more fundamentally as thrown projection in Being and Time. There, "the toward-which [das Woraufhin] of the primary projection" constitutes the meaning of Dasein qua temporality, whose circular motion is re-described as a thrown projecting of a pre-structured context (the world) "according to which something becomes comprehensible as something" (SZ 151, 324). Meaning is thereby constituted by the circular interplay between the toward-which, the telic (purposive) direction of Dasein, and the precedented context of the world in which "things fall into place and make sense" in the present.
Formal indication becomes the "methodological secret weapon" in Heidegger's logic of philosophical concept formation.5 In the published First Half of Being and Time it is mentioned about a half-dozen times without explanation (SZ 53, 114, 116f, 179, 231, 313-315; but also "provisional indication," 14, 16, 41). The undiscussed theme of "formal indication," as hermeneutic phenomenology's guiding "logic of philosophical concept formation," thus would have to become a central topic of discussion in the third division. This is confirmed by a footnote (deleted after the 6th edition of SZ) that dispatches the following themes for discussion in a specific chapter (2) of Division 3: "Only in terms of the temporality of speech–that is, of Da-sein as such–can the 'origin' of 'meaning' be clarified and the possibility of concept formation be made ontologically understandable" (SZ 349).
On the way to Being and Time, Heidegger passes through a whole series of increasingly more profound formal indications. But each should be seen not only as a struggle to bring out different nuances of the motivated tendency of human life but also as a formal deepening of the dynamic prestructuring (Praestruktion) of intentionality, which is first understood as pure directing-itself-towards: as an intentionality with the three dimensions of relational sense, containment sense, and actualization sense (1920-22), supplemented by a unifying temporalization sense and a truthful safekeeping in 1922; as Da-sein (1923), being-in-the-world (1924), to-be (Zu-sein, 1925), ex-sistence (1926), and transcendence (1927-30). Thus the pure formula for the structure of care in Being and Time, "ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the-world) as being-amidst-(entities encountered within-the-world)" (SZ 192), is clearly intentional in the broader pre-theoretical sense. The "new start" of Division 3 "on a more historical path," in SS 1927, thus reaches the following conclusion by way of a series of formal indications: "Intentionality is the ratio cognoscendi of transcendence. Transcendence is the ratio essendi of intentionality in its diverse modes" (GA24 91/BP 65). In Kantian terms, transcendence becomes the "condition of the possibility" of intentionality.
Finally, the entire series of formal indications will prove to have "the condition of its possibility in temporality and temporality's ecstatic-horizonal character" (GA24 379/BP 268). Intentionality, transcendence, existence: at their root they each formalize their temporal structuration and indicate the temporal telos that together constitute the very sense (Sinn) of existence. What in factic life could be more formal than time? And with regard to its indicative indexical function, what in factic life could be more concrete and immediate and nearer to us than time, my time, your time, our time? Time is at once the ultimate formality and the most intimate and immediate proximity of being, the original thrust of its facticity. In a note that belongs among the new attempts to elaborate Division 3, Heidegger remarks: "Temporality: it is not just a fact, but itself the essence of the fact: facticity. The fact of facticity (here the root of the 'turn-around of ontology'. Can one ask, 'How does time originate?' [...] Only with time is there a possibility of origination. [...] But then, what is the meaning of the impossibility of the problem of the origination of time?"6
There are accordingly two interrelated aspects of time that must be thought together in formal indication, its dynamic prestructuring and its concretion, factic life in the uniqueness of its facticity, "the fact of facticity." Heidegger formally indicates this uniquely singular aspect of Dasein in the following pronominal terms: "The be-ing that concerns this being in its very be-ing is in each instantiation mine [yours, ours]" (SZ 42). In other contexts, the ontological indexicals of the personal pronouns, "I am, you are, we are," are expressed in the more overtly temporal particularities of "my time, your time, our time" to indicate the unique one-time-only lifetime that each of us is allotted as our very own (GA31 129f/EF 89f). Underlying the Je-meinigkeit (in-each-instance-mine-ness) of Dasein is thus the Je-weiligkeit (to each its while) of being. Time has long been regarded as a principle of individuation, but it is important here to identify this as the time proper to each of us in order to distinguish it from the common time that we all share in the public domain. It is therefore time proper that is the principle of individualization. My (your, our) history is also very much a factor in proper time, for we are clearly individualized by the particular historical context into which we find ourselves thrown. Precursors to Dasein in Heidegger's early development include the "historical I" and the "situation I" or, together, the historically situated I. Coming to terms with our proper temporal selves as Da-sein involves the hermeneutic task of explicating our unique selves in our proper historical context. And on the ontological and pre-ontological levels, the hermeneutics of facticity is a formally indicative hermeneutics where, fundamentally, be-ing as time is properly singular, historical, and finite.
WS 1929-30. Philosophy is not a science, but a directive exhortative protreptic. The course of WS 1929-30 emphasizes this point from the unique perspective of Heidegger's very last, and most definitive, treatment of formal indication. Finding ourselves situated in existence, thrown into a historical world that is in fact very much our own, we, each of us, are called upon to overtly own up to this situation as a whole and properly make it our very own. This call (exhortation, solicitation, challenge, demand) elicited by the existential situation into which we find ourselves thrown is the function of the formally indicative concepts of philosophy. "The meaning-content of these concepts does not directly intend or express what they refer to, but only gives an indication, a pointer to the fact that anyone seeking to understand is called upon by this conceptual context to actualize a transformation of themselves into their Dasein" (GA29/30 430/FCM 297). Because such concepts–Heidegger's terse examples are "death, resolute openness, history, existence"–can only convey the call for such a transformation to us without being able to bring about this transformation themselves, they are but indicative concepts. They in each instance point to Dasein itself, which in each instantiation is my (your, our) Da-sein, as the locus and potential agent of this transformation. "Because in this indication they in each instance point to a concretion of the individual Dasein in the human being, yet never bring the content of this concretion with them, such concepts are formally indicative" (GA29/30 429/FCM 296). In contrast to scientific concepts, all philosophical concepts are formally indicative. For when concepts are generic and abstract rather than proper to the concrete occasion in terms of which they are to be interpreted, "the interpretation is deprived of all of its autochthonous power, since whoever seeks to understand would not then be heeding the directive that resides in every philosophical concept" (GA29/30 431/FCM 298). Yet the kind of interpreting that seeks out its very own facticity in each instance is not "some additional, so-called ethical application of what is conceptualized, but [...] a prior opening up of the dimension of what is to be comprehended" (GA29/30 428f./FCM 296). The concepts and questions of philosophizing are in a class of their own, in contrast to science. These conceptual questions serve the task of philosophy: not to describe or explain man and his world, "but to evoke the Dasein in the human being" (GA29/30 258/FCM 174).
These formally indicative, properly philosophical concepts thus only evoke the Dasein in human being, but do not actually bring it about. There is something penultimate about philosophizing. Its questioning brings us to the very brink of the possibility of Dasein, just short of "restoring to Dasein its actuality, that is, its existence" (GA29/30 257/FCM 173). There is a very fine line between philosophizing and actualizing over which the human being cannot merely slip across, but rather must overleap in order to dislodge its Dasein. "Only individual action itself can dislodge us from this brink of possibility into actuality, and this is the moment of holistic insight [into the concrete situation of action, and be-ing]" (GA29/30 257/FCM 173). It is the originary action (Urhandlung) of resolute openness, letting be, or freedom toward ground, in each instantiation concretely reenacted in accord with one's own unique situation and particular while of history which authenticates our existence and properizes our philosophizing. It is in such originary action, repeatedly reenacted from one generation to the next, that ontology finds its ontic founding. Just as Aristotle (and so the metaphysical tradition) founded his prote philosophia in theologia, so Heidegger now founds his fundamental ontology on "something ontic–the Dasein" (GA24 26/BP 19).
The path through Being and Time was finally abandoned by the end of 1930, adjudged to be an overgrown path littered with unsuccessful drafts of “Time and Being” that could no longer be trodden, as Heidegger confides to several of his intimate correspondents. The larger reading public was not informed of the abandonment of this path until the seventh edition of Being and Time published in 1953, which deletes the phrase “First Half” from the title with the following prefatory explanation: “After a quarter century, the second half can no longer be added unless the first half were to be presented in a new way. Yet the path it has taken remains a necessary path even today, if our Dasein is to be aroused and moved by the question of being” (SZ V). The necessity is derived from the Da-sein experience in its radical interrogative power, secure in the revolutionary direction of its questioning and the interrogative domain of being that it projects and into which it finds itself thrown. “SZ (1927) … originated … as an initial path of making the question-of-being evident as fundamentally as possible and at once in an actual performance [of this question] in a gestalt that points beyond all former ways of posing that question” (GA66 413/M 366). Accordingly, “what was unsatisfactory in the division that was withheld was not an insecurity in the direction of questioning and its domain, but only an uncertainty in its proper elaboration” (GA66 414/M 367). Secure in its direction of questioning, but inadequate in its proper elaboration—to the point of being incomprehensible to sharp minds like Rilke and Jaspers: where exactly is the fatal flaw in the third division, which after repeated attempts to elaborate it, was never to appear? The im-proper elaboration would gradually be attributed to the language of metaphysics. Heidegger’s explanation in the “Letter on Humanism” (1947) strikes us as a good summary and final overview of the detailed accounts of these various failures of elaboration. In this context, Heidegger is trying to deflect the misinterpretation of the “projection” of the understanding-of-being as an achievement of subjectivity. It can be thought only as the ecstatic relation to the clearing of being:
The adequate actualization and completion of this other thinking that abandons subjectivity is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of Being and Time the third division of the First Part, “Time and Being,” was withheld (cf. Sein und Zeit, p. 39). Here everything is reversed. The division in question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning [Kehre] and did not succeed by means of the language of metaphysics. The lecture “On the Essence of Truth,” thought out and delivered in 1930 but not published until 1943, provides a measure of insight into the thinking of the turning from “Being and Time” to “Time and Being.” This turning is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the locality of that dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced, that is to say, experienced in the fundamental experience of the oblivion of being. (GA9 327f./PM 249f.)
The key to what follows regards the nature of the new "insight into the thinking of the turning from "Being and Time" to "Time and Being" that is provided by the lecture "On the Essence on Truth." The lecture famously concludes with the distinction between two extremes of truth as concealment, insistence in the everyday concealment of errancy and ex-sistence in the lifetime concealment of mystery, which proves to be insuperably concealed. Terminologically, we shall follow Thomas Sheehan, who has situated the very last draft of "Time and Being" at the very heart of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. Beginning with the tacit field of meaning exposed by way of the hermeneutic-phenomenological reduction, he asks about the meaning-giving source that enables that field of meaning. Whence sense? What makes meaning at all possible? What lets meaningfulness come about at all? In his briefest account, Sheehan provides a two-concept answer to this question, one from the very core of Being and Time and the other from the core of the later Heidegger. What makes meaning possible at all? The answer: die Lichtung, the lighted clearing that opens a realm of intelligibility for the human being and demarcates its essentially hermeneutic situation. But what then makes the clearing possible? The answer: das Ereignis, the properizing event of appropriation that throws us into the unique clearing of intelligibility into which we happen to find ourselves thrown.
A longer and more detailed account7 follows the development of Heidegger's thought from his repeated failure to complete the published fragment of Being and Time, which prompts a radical change in direction of his thought that is gradually made known through his talks, lecture courses, and writings from the thirties on, most of which were not published until well after the war. Our story begins with the repeated attempts to draft the third division of the First Part of Being and Time, entitled "Time and Being," without success. The fulcrum of the story is a reconstituted version of "Time and Being" that Heidegger jotted down in his "cabin copy" of Sein und Zeit no earlier than the late thirties, in my estimation, that sketches out the stages of the reversal into the new direction that the later Heidegger was pursuing (GA2 53 note):
[1]. The transcendental difference.
[2]. Overcoming the horizon as such.
[3]. The turn around into the source [Herkunft].
[4]. Meaningful presence out of this source.
[1]. This title recalls the overall title of Part One of Being and Time, which was to conclude with the never-published Third Division entitled "Time and Being": "The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being."
[2]. As we have seen above, the lecture courses of 1927-30 seek to further elaborate the ecstatical-horizonal unity of temporality, which was begun in § 69c of Being and Time in a section entitled "The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World." Toward the end of this period, the single yet threefold horizon of time is subjected to increasing critique in view of its blatant objectifying tendencies, in particular, the objectification of being itself! As it was hinted above, horizonal temporality will eventually be displaced and re-placed by grounding Dasein in the temporal playing field (Zeit-Spiel-Raum), usually simply time-space (Zeit-Raum) (GA65 18/CP16, GA65 234f./CP184-186), which is located in the integral moment (Augenblick) of holistic insight and decision.
[3-4]. The talk that Heidegger first delivered in 1962 entitled "Time and Being" most clearly makes the turn into the source and derives meaning and meaningful presence (Anwesen) from out of this meaning-giving source. The source, at first identified neutrally as an It, is initially said to let or allow meaningful presence, Anwesenlassen. The letting is more originally understood as a giving, such that It gives being, It gives time. The giving is then specified further as It sends being, It extends time, or more precisely, time-space. And the It itself? The It that gives is das Ereignis, which "appropriates being and time into their own out of their relationship" (GA14 24/TB 19). Moreover, in giving, "the sending source keeps itself back and, thus, withdraws from unconcealment" (GA14 27/TB 22). The meaning-giving source itself is self-concealing and remains insuperably concealed, the ultimate facticity beyond which we can go no further.
1. This file is to be found in a larger folder at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach entitled “Sein und Zeit” Vorarbeiten und Nachträge under Zugangsnummer 75.7315 in Gattung/Gruppe B 36.
2. Martin Heidegger and Elisabeth Blochmann, Briefwechsel 1918–1969, edited by Joachim W. Storck (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsches Literaturarchiv, 1989), p. 54.
3. Rudolf Bultmann and Martin Heidegger, Briefwechsel 1925–1975, edited by Andreas Grossmann and Christof Landmesser (Frankfurt/Tübingen: Klostermann/Mohr Siebeck, 2009), p. 172.
4. The two sentences on a “ transcendental horizon ” before the paragraph in question were likewise not read aloud. I have compared the edition of GA27 with a much more comprehensive transcript of the course by Simon Moser and have supplemented and improved my citations from the edited version with clarifying turns-of-phrase drawn from the Moser transcript (hereafter referred to as SM). A copy of this Moser transcript is to be found in the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center at the Duquesne University Library.
5. Theodore Kisiel, “Die formale Anzeige: Die methodische Geheimwaffe des frühen Heidegger,” in Heidegger—neu gelesen , ed. Markus Happel (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1997), pp. 22–40.
6. Martin Heidegger, “Unbenutzte Vorarbeiten zur Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1929/30: ‘Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt — Endlichkeit — Einsamkeit.’” Heidegger Studies 7 (1991), pp. 5–12, at p. 9.
7. Cf. Thomas Sheehan, “The Turn,” in Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts (Durham, NC: Acumen, 2010), ed. Brett W. Davis, pp. 82–101. The “briefest account” above is distilled from one of his unpublished papers.
Theodore Kisiel - The Drafts of ‘Time and Being’: Division Three of Part One of Being and Time and Beyond
Original document.