

PHENOMENOLOGY REDIVIVA
On a recent book by Steven Crowell

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Steven Crowell's *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge, 2013) is something of a manifesto: a wake-up call and much-needed therapy for phenomenology in general and for Heidegger studies in particular, especially in North America. His earlier co-edited collection *Transcendental Heidegger* (Stanford, 2007) already laid the groundwork for a revolution in Heidegger research, one that just might save that field from the self-congratulatory irrelevance towards which much of it seems to be stumbling. This latest book continues Crowell's efforts to draw lines between Husserl and Heidegger, those apparent antipodes, as it probes questions bearing on normativity and the like.

In what follows I focus only on certain Heideggerian aspects of the book, and I do so in the form of a propaedeutic to Crowell's original rewriting of phenomenology as it might be (but mostly is not) practiced by Heideggerians. This is a necessary propaedeutic, I argue, because as Crowell now moves into important issues of normativity, responsibility, ethics, and agency, this book *presupposes* crucial elements of his rewriting of phenomenology, elements that many Heideggerians either overlook or deny or in any case have yet to take on board. I will thematize only two of those issues, but the two that constitute ground zero of Crowell's robust reinstatement of phenomenological *method* in Heidegger research: the phenomenological reduction and the transcendental reduction. For now I will continue to use the usual term "reduction," but below—following Heidegger himself, and in order to name his unique formulation of the matter—I will substitute the term "induction" (*Hinführung*, as in the Greek *ἐπαγωγή*) for "reduction" (*Zurückführung*, as in the Greek *ἐπαναγωγή*).

1. *Sunt lacrimae rerum*

Unfortunately a good deal of contemporary Heidegger scholarship seems to have left phenomenology behind as it cuts its way through the dark thickets of his later texts. Or else it reduces that phenomenology to the quaint simplicity of "letting a thing show itself as it is in itself" — something that is impossible for two reasons. First of all, as regards the "in itself" piece: At least since Plotinus and Augustine, the in-itself-ness of an entity has been understood as the thing's noumenal status before an intellectually intuiting νοῦς,¹ something that Kant placed decisively beyond the scope of human cognition. Secondly, *Sein und Zeit* (SZ) demonstrates that within phenomenology the so-called *in-se-ity* or in-itself-ness of a thing is that thing's current *pro-me-ity* within a specific world of interests and concerns. In SZ Heidegger was clear on this:

The *usefulness* of a thing is the ontological-categorial determination of that thing *as it is* "in itself."

In our *concernful use* of a readily available thing we encounter that thing's specific and self-evident "in-itself-ness."²

In other words, in Heidegger's phenomenology the so-called in-itself-ness of a thing is not its οὐσία or substance or "being," its stand-alone, unchanging essential structure but rather its current and very changeable (*jeweilig*) significance to the person or persons experientially engaged with that thing within a specific context of concern and interest. Heidegger investigates entities not in terms of their status as out-

¹ See, for example, Augustine, "*De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus*, No. 46, "De ideis," and Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, 15, 1. Much transformed, this is the case even in Hegel. Cf. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften 1830*, ed. Friedhelm Nicolin and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969), §577 with the citation from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* XII 1072 b 18-30.

² Respectively: "Zuhandenheit ist die ontologisch-kategoriale Bestimmung von Seiendem, wie es 'an sich' ist" (SZ 71.37-38, the entire sentence is italicized in the original). "Das eigentümliche und selbstverständliche 'An-sich' der nächsten 'Dinge' begegnet in dem sie gebrauchenden . . . Besorgen" (SZ 74.29-31). My emphasis in both texts. See also *ibid.*, 75.23-25; 87.19-23; 106.34-36; 118.3-5; etc.

there-now-real (Aristotle's ἐξω ὄν καὶ χωριστόν and ἐξω [τῆς διανοίας]),³ but only in terms of their *Anwesenheit / Bedeutsamkeit*, their current meaningfulness to someone within specific contexts of human purpose, desire, need, and so on. The key for entering all phenomenology, Heidegger's included, is the principle of correlation, and it applies equally to his investigations of propositional knowing-that and practical knowing-how.

That notwithstanding, however, some scholars claim that Heidegger refused the phenomenological reduction and focused not on the correlation between things and the acts and structures that constitute them as meaningful, but rather on the independent "being" of things in what amounts to a quasi-realist ontology. Throughout the history of Western philosophy, being (εἶναι, οὐσία, εἶδος, ἐνέργεια, *esse*, *Sein*, and so on) has always been the proper object of metaphysics. And in fact Heidegger himself confused matters (and misled three generations of scholars) by adopting the shopworn term "*Sein*" to name the proper object of his own *meta*-metaphysical thinking. He admitted his mistake in the early 1950s when Professor Tomio Tezuka of the Imperial University of Tokyo confronted him with "the confusion created by your ambiguous use of the word *Sein*." Heidegger responded, "*Sie haben Recht*"—"You're right"—but then tried, without much success, to justify the use of *Sein* in his own work.

Heidegger: My own thinking has a clear sense of the distinction between *Sein* as the *Sein des Seienden* and *Sein* as *Sein* with regard to its own proper sense, which is openness (the clearing).

Tezuka: Then why didn't you immediately and decisively hand back the word "*Sein*" exclusively to the language of metaphysics? Why didn't you immediately give your own name to what you were seeking as the "meaning of *Sein*" on your path through the essence of time?

Heidegger: How can I give a name to what I'm still searching for? Finding that would depend on assigning to it the word that would name it.

Tezuka: Then we have to endure the confusion that has arisen. (GA 12: 104.16–105.3).

And that unnecessary confusion has thrown off the scholarship for more than eight decades. Fortunately, however, Heidegger relented in his later years:

I no longer like to use the word *Sein*. (GA 15: 20.8–9)

Sein remains only the provisional term. (GA 7: 234.13)

Sein is no longer the proper object of thought (GA 14: 50.2-3)

There is no longer room even for the word *Sein*. (GA 15: 365.17–18)

William J. Richardson noted a half-century ago that the word *Sein* "has almost completely disappeared from [the later Heidegger's] vocabulary. . . . Even in SZ, presumably, Heidegger sensed the inadequacy of the term but could find no other way to designate the process under discussion."⁴

But alas, instead of abandoning that misleading term and (like Heidegger himself) designating his topic as "the appropriated clearing" (*die ereignete Lichtung*, GA 71: 211.9). Heideggerians beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into crypto-metaphysics as they struggle to salvage the word *Sein* / being, either by an idiosyncratic spelling ("beyng" in imitation of Heidegger's *Seyn*) or by writing it under erasure (~~Being~~) or by offering lame distinctions (e.g., being-itself vs. being-*qua*-beingness) that only perpetuate the confusion.

³ Respectively *Metaphysics* XI 8, 1065a 24 and VI 4, 1028a 2. Cf. GA 6, 2: 379.34-380.13.

⁴ William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 4th ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003; 1st ed., 1963), 633.16–17; also 633 note 30.

Retaining the word “being” under very strong erasure might just possibly work, but only if Heideggerians first managed to get clear on two facts: (1) that Heidegger radically reinterpreted the word *Sein* in a phenomenological mode as the *Anwesen* or meaningful presence of a thing; and (2) that the phrase *das Sein selbst*, “being itself,” is not some phenomenon in its own right but only a provisional heuristic term that stands in for the sought-for “X” of Heidegger’s work. The phrase “being itself” means little more than “*das Erfragte*—the thing we’re after,” which turns out to be *Da-sein* as the appropriated clearing that makes possible (“gives”) all forms of the meaningful presence of this or that.

Welt “gibt” Sein; das Dasein ist das je vereinzelt “es”, das gibt; das ermöglicht und ist das “es gibt” (GA 73, 1: 642.28–29).

World is what “gives” being. Ex-sistence is the ever individual “it” that gives, that makes possible and is the “it gives.”

Getting clear on the first fact—*Sein* reinterpreted as *Anwesen*—would require that Heideggerians abandon what Husserl called “philosophical naiveté” and finally embrace the phenomenological reduction. Getting clear on the second fact would entail rewriting reams of Heidegger scholarship.

2. *Instauratio phaenomenologica*

Crowell insists that Heidegger’s philosophy begins with a phenomenological reduction. Over the entrance to Plato’s Academy was allegedly written: “No geometry means no entry.” Crowell suggests in effect that over the entrance to Heidegger’s Academy should be inscribed: “No phenomenological reduction? Don’t even *try* to get in.”⁵ But a significant number of Heideggerians would object that such a reduction may be necessary in *Husserl’s* phenomenology but certainly is not in Heidegger’s, and that for three reasons.

First objection: For Heidegger human ex-sistence (*Da-sein*) is being-in-the-world, living inescapably in this very messy everyday world of people and things. Unlike Husserl, therefore, SZ allegedly repudiates the phenomenological reduction and remains resolutely and directly embedded in that world of the everyday.

Second objection: Allegedly, therefore, there can be no epoché of the natural attitude in Heidegger, no bracketing of the work-a-day worlds of the carpenter, the farmer, the hacker, or, for that matter, the philosopher. On this reading, instead of performing such an epoché SZ ferrets out the implicit ontology that is at work *within* the natural attitude: concern with tools, solicitude for people, the everyday structures of fallenness, care, temporality, and the like.

Third objection: After his *Kehre* or “turn” in the 1930s, Heidegger allegedly left phenomenology behind for what he called *Seinsdenken*, the thinking of being. In fact it was Heidegger himself who gave William J. Richardson the subtitle of his famous book: “*Durch Phänomenologie in das Denken des Seins*” (Heidegger’s emphasis), that is: *through and beyond* phenomenology and into the thinking of being. That phrase would seem to summarize the later Heidegger’s progress as a turn *away from* the correlational phenomenology of SZ and a *turn to* the pre-thematic, unmediated understanding of being as it reveals and conceals itself, indeed as it currently abandons beings in today’s *τέχνη*-besotted world, but some day, after the dark night of *Gestell*, will once again show itself as it really is.

However: wrong on all three counts.

Regarding the first objection (no phenomenological reduction). Crowell cites chapter and verse on how Heidegger insisted on a phenomenological reduction, most pointedly on Thursday, 4 May 1927, in his course *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (GA 24: 29.12-15). Of course Heidegger did not mean a

⁵ For Plato, see Henri-Domenique Saffrey, “Ἀγεωμέτρητος μηδεὶς εἰσὶτω. Une inscription légendaire,” *Revue des Études Grecques*, 81 (1968), 67-87. Regarding Heidegger, perhaps: ἀφαινομενολέγητος μηδεὶς εἰσὶτω.

Husserlian reduction to “the transcendental life of consciousness . . . , in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness.” Rather, for Heidegger the phenomenological reduction means

leading one’s phenomenological gaze back from the apprehension of a thing . . . , back to the understanding of the *Sein* of the thing, that is, taking the thing in terms of the way it is disclosed [*auf die Weise seiner Unverborgenheit*].⁶

We note that the word *Sein* in this passage refers to the mode of *Unverborgenheit*, that is, the meaningful disclosure of something to someone within a phenomenological correlation. Heidegger’s phenomenological revolution rewrites the *Sein* of a thing in such a way that it now means the way that thing is disclosively related to someone (*mich-bezogen*, GA 58: 105.12-13), the way it happens to be meaningful in the present circumstances. In the natural attitude our intentional awareness focuses on *objects*, whether persons or things, and we overlook two things:

- how those objects appear to and are understood by a person;
- the prior constituting (*ausmachen, festmachen*: GA 9: 244.26-28) of the modes of the thing’s appearance and understanding.⁷

By contrast with the naïveté of the natural attitude, in a phenomenological reduction we draw our intentional gaze away from the object qua independently and objectively “there” and even as meaningful (whether it be *vorhanden, zuhanden, or persönlich*), and lead our gaze back (*re-ducere, zurück-führen*) to the way the object is currently disclosed/understood. Once we have done that, we can begin analyzing *how* and *why* the thing is disclosed in the way it is. For example: Why do I currently understand this rock as an ersatz mallet for pounding in tent pegs rather than as a specimen of granite from the Achaean Eon? It may have to do with the specific world of concern (camping vs. academic petrology) in which I now find myself in the woods.

Once Husserl had put “phenomenological eyes in my head,” as he said in 1923 (GA 63: 5.22–23), Heidegger fought against the naïve objectifying realism of the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics he had been steeped in, which held that “the real” is *id quod habet esse* or *id cui existentia non repugnat*, i.e., that which exists independent of any subjective constitution by human beings. In that traditional view the realness of a thing is its *existentia* or *Vorhandensein*, its “mere existence” (1) outside of nothing and (2) out there in the real world. The phenomenological attitude breaks with that naïveté and draws us back reflectively and thematically to where we always already stand without noticing it: within meaning-giving fields of possible intelligibility. There we relate to things not merely as objects positioned spatio-temporally in the universe, independent of us, but rather in terms of their significance, their meaningful presence to us as personally, socially, and bodily *engaged* with them. From the start of his career Heidegger affirmed, “I live in a first-hand world of meaning; everything around me makes sense, always and everywhere” (“*In einer Umwelt lebend, bedeutet es mir überall und immer*: GA 56/57: 73.1–8). Heidegger’s philosophy, like all phenomenology worthy of the name, is *correlation* research. For us “the real” is not simply what’s-out-there-now; it is *the meaningful*—not necessarily the “true,” but always the meaningful. *Huis clos*: there is no *hors-texte*, no exit from meaning. For us who are condemned to λόγος, outside of meaning there is only death.

Regarding the second objection (“no epoché”). This objection notwithstanding, Heidegger in fact *does* carry out an epoché. He puts the brakes on (ἐπέχει) our natural tendency to overlook the constitution of meaning, to look *through* the meaning-giving world we currently inhabit in order to focus directly on meaningful *things* without noticing what constitutes them *as* meaningful. Aron Gurwitsch famously declared that after the phenomenological reduction the only philosophical issues one may properly pursue are the hermeneutical questions of sense, meaning, and signification.⁸ This certainly holds for Heidegger,

⁶ Ibid., 29.15-9: “Für uns bedeutet die phänomenologische Reduktion die Rückführung des phänomenologischen Blickes von der wie immer bestimmten Erfassung des Seienden auf das Verstehen des Seins (Entwerfen auf die Weise seiner Unverborgenheit) dieses Seienden.” Re “understanding” in the translation above, see GA 16: 424.21-2: “Verstehen, d.h. Entwerfen.” See also GA 20: 423.4-5.

⁷ GA 9: 244.26-28.

⁸ *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 7, 4 (1947), 652.8-9.

for whom the so-called “being” of things is now no longer their εἶναι or οὐσία or *esse* or *Sein*, as in the tradition, but their phenomenological παρ-εἶναι, παρ-οὐσία, or *An-wesen*, where the prefixes παρὰ and *An-* point to what the medieval philosophers called the *praesentia intelligibilis* of a thing.⁹ In this regard Heidegger was simply channeling Aristotle, who states in *Metaphysics* II, 1 (and spells out in IX, 10) that a thing’s degree of being (εἶναι) is the same as its degree of knowability (ἀλήθεια).¹⁰ This text in the *Metaphysics* was the source of the scholastic axiom *ens et verum convertuntur*: the realness of a thing is measured by its ability to be intelligibly accessed, an axiom that Heidegger himself accepts.¹¹

This is the fundamental, show-stopping fact that is completely missed by the naïve-realist interpretations of Heidegger that have proliferated lately from the pen of Richard Capobianco.¹² In Heidegger “being” is always written under phenomenological erasure. This means that his provisional topic (as contrasted with his *Grundfrage*) was not *Sein* but *Sinn*, not the independent and unchanging “being” of things but their ever-changing significance in relation to one’s specific interests and concerns. Heidegger repeatedly and unambiguously equated his own understanding of “being” with phenomenological *Sinn*, that is, with the intelligibility and meaningfulness of things.

- Phenomenology is about “the meaningfulness” [*Sinn*] of things.¹³
- Phenomenological ontology is “the explicit inquiry into the meaningfulness [*Sinn*] of things.”¹⁴
- The *Seinsfrage* is “the inquiry into the intelligibility [*Sinn*] of things, i.e., the inquiry into being.”¹⁵

Of course neither Husserl nor Heidegger doubt that things remain “out there,” independent of our minds, after the reduction. Heidegger is emphatic: “Questions like ‘Does the world exist independent of my thinking?’ are meaningless” (GA 58: 105.15-6; cf. GA 26: 194.30-1)—because after the reduction, what we had originally perceived as out-there-in-nature is not lost but instead is now seen within a phenomenological correlation as the *perceived of a perceiving*. (Heidegger in 1927: “The thing [now] belongs to the perceiving as its perceived.”)¹⁶ Yes, after the reduction things are still “out there,” but as such they are not phenomenologically interesting. The subject matter of a phenomenological inquiry is things only in terms of our meaningful engagement with them, and to do phenomenology is to study one’s *relation* to the objects of intentionality. In phenomenology, Heidegger writes, “the philosophizing individual belongs together with the matters being treated” (GA 9: 42.25-27: “zu den Sachen der Philosophie aber der Philosophierende selbst . . . mitgehört”).

Regarding the third objection (“after the turn”). This objection notwithstanding, Heidegger in his later years insisted that his work was phenomenological from beginning to end. In 1962 he said that even his writings about *Ereignis*, obscure as they might seem, were *echt* phenomenology (GA 14: 54.2–3). And in his last published tribute to Edmund Husserl (1969) he said the same about his “history of being”: it, too, is unmitigated phenomenology (GA 14: 147.15–16). And by “phenomenology” he did not mean the feckless

⁹ See Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum.*, liber 1, distinctio 3, quaestio 4, articulum 5, corpus: “Intelligere autem dicit nihil aliud quam simplicem intuitum intellectus in id quod sibi est praesens intelligibile.”

¹⁰ *Metaphysics* II 1, 993b30–31: ὅσθ’ ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.

¹¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I–II, 3, 7 c: “Eadem est dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate,” and *Summa contra gentes*, I, 71, 16: “Unumquodque, quantum habet de esse, tantum habet de cognoscibilitate.” Cf. GA 45: 122.3–5: “Oft steht auch ἀλήθεια einfach anstelle von ὄν. Die Wahrheit und das Seiende in seiner Seiendheit sind dasselbe.”

¹² See his *Engaging Heidegger* (2010) and *Heidegger’s Way of Being* (2014).

¹³ SZ 35.25: “Sinn und Grund,” i.e., meaningfulness *as* the ground of things in phenomenology.

¹⁴ SZ 12:14-15: “das explizite Fragen nach dem Sinn des Seienden.”


¹⁵ GA 19: 205.13-4: “Das ist die eine Richtung, in der die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seienden, nach dem Sein, gestellt wird.”

¹⁶ Heidegger in Edmund Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology, and the Confrontation with Heidegger* (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 113.14f; in the German original, *Husserliana* IX, ed. Walter Biemel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968), 261.8-9.

gesture of “letting things show themselves as they are in themselves.” He meant the phenomenological reduction and all that it entails.

3. *In-ductio phaenomenologica*

At this point we have to clarify and define what a “phenomenological reduction” means in Heidegger, and here we return to what I mentioned at the beginning of this text. The directional adverb *zurück* in the term *Zurückführung*—where *zurück* corresponds to the “re-” in “phenomenological *re*duction”—can be quite misleading. Heidegger and Husserl hold very different views of both (1) the phenomenological correlation and (2) that-back-to-which one leads the phenomenological gaze. We may illustrate that difference by the following diagram.



All phenomenology, including Heidegger’s, is correlation-research, and as such it is about meaning, and specifically about the meaningful presence of what one encounters (GA 64: 23-25). But that which *constitutes* the meaning turns out to be radically different in Husserl and Heidegger. For Husserl the correlation is between the meaning-constituting *sub-ject* (both psychological and ultimately transcendental) and the meaningfully constituted object. Hence, Husserl’s phenomenological *re*-duction shifts the gaze “in reverse,” in the direction of the constituting sub-ject. In Greek that shift would be called an ἐπα-αγωγή, a leading *backwards*.

For Heidegger, on the other hand, the existential essence of human being is not sub-jectivity but e-jectivity, projected-ahead-ness. Ex-sistence is structurally a *geworfener Entwurf*, thrown *forward* as possibility into specific possibilities; and thus the phenomenological correlation lies between whatever we encounter and the meaningful possibilities we are living into (GA 14: 131.16-17). Heidegger radically recasts the *re*-duction as an in-duction—*Hinführung*—in Greek an ἐπ-αγωγή (GA 62: 131-32, 191-92; GA 22: 250.29; GA 9: 244.12-35). For Heidegger, getting to the existential correlation is a matter of shifting our phenomenological gaze *forward* (ἐπί) towards the possibilities that we are living *into*, which give meaning to what encounter.

We could call Heidegger's refocusing of the gaze a phenomenological *re*-duction, as he himself did (GA 24: 29.15) but only if we remember that leading the gaze "back" means leading it *back to where we already are* without always noticing it: a priori ahead as possibility among possibilities. To bring out that point, in what follows I will use the term Heidegger finally favored: in-duction rather than re-duction.

4. *Sub-ductio phaenomenologica*

Once Heidegger had laid that foundation—phenomenological in-duction as the entrée to all his work—his thinking could go in one of two directions, either (1) to the *subsequent* question of how one's experience of meaningfulness can turn out to be true or false; or (2) to the *prior* question of how things become meaningful in the first place. He chose the latter path.

Granted that discursive meaningfulness rather than intellectual intuition is the only form of meaningfulness we have, Heidegger was less interested in

- what we may call ἀλήθεια-3: the true-or-false dimension of meaningfulness: ἀλήθεια as the correspondence (*adaequatio*) of intellect and thing;
- what we may call ἀλήθεια-2: the pre-predicative meaningfulness of any specific thing.

Instead, he was more focused on:

- ἀλήθεια-1: that which makes discursive meaningfulness possible and necessary in the first place. This issue rode under the rubric of *die Lichtung* or *das Offene*, the clearing or the "open."

Intimately bound up with this "open" is the question of the a priori *opening* of the open—*das Lichten der Lichtung* (GA 49: 41.25-28; GA 4: 56.27; GA 66: 84.33-34)—or better, the a priori *opened*-ness of the clearing, a state of affairs that Heidegger referred to in terms of *Er-eignis*, "ap-propri-ation." *Ereignis* is not an "event" in any normal sense of that term: something that has not yet happened at t^1 but then takes place at t^2 . *Ereignis* is not an event at all, not even "the event of appropriation" (GA 11: 45.19–20; GA 14: 25.33ff.; GA 70: 17.19).

Rather, it is the ever-operative *factum*, the fundamental existential fact that ex-sistence, by its very nature, has always already been brought-*ad-proprium*, ap-propri-ated to its proper state as the open clearing that makes discursive meaningfulness possible and necessary. Insofar as this already-opened-ness of the clearing is a priori, it is not effected by anyone's personal-existential will-act. Rather, it is existential: it comes with the territory of being *Da-sein*, having ex-sistence as one's structure.

The focal topic of Heidegger's work—what the heuristic term "being itself" provisionally stands in for—is *Da-sein* as appropriated to sustaining the clearing: *die ereignete Lichtung*. Two questions arise at this point:

1. How does the appropriation of ex-sistence make discursive meaningfulness possible and necessary?
2. What kind of "reduction" would be the proper procedure for discovering the appropriation of ex-sistence?

First: How does the appropriation of ex-sistence make discursive meaningfulness possible and necessary?

In the *philosophia perennis*, being (εἶναι, *esse*) shows up for us not intuitively but only in a synthesis. Analogously in Heidegger's phenomenology we experience the meaningfulness of something only in discursive acts of λέγειν, taking-something-as, whether propositionally or practically. That is what Aristotle

meant by *τι κατὰ τινὸς λέγειν/σημαίνειν*.¹⁷ All sense-making is discursive, where *dis-currere* means “to run back and forth,” in this case between things and their possible meanings. For example, “I take Socrates *as* a Theban” (which is incorrect but still meaningful) or “I take this rock *as for* hammering in tent pegs” (whether the rock works successfully to that end or not). Such synthetic activities are properly classified as “intentional,” and to be able to perform them, I must “reach across the gap” between a thing and either its possible meanings or its possible uses. As Heidegger puts it, in all discursive activity I must “traverse an open space.”¹⁸

In establishing what makes these takings-as possible and necessary, Heidegger follows the medieval axiom *operari sequitur esse*: a thing’s activities follow from its nature; or in reverse: natures determine operations.¹⁹ As Heidegger puts it: “Each thing only performs and carries out what it is.”²⁰ He applies that axiom to his existential analysis of human being. By way of a phenomenological description of various operations—for example, hammering nails (SZ) or uttering declarative sentences (GA 21: 135-162)—Heidegger uncovers patterns that recur in those activities, and he resolves those recurrent patterns into the essential structures they share in common. Those, formally speaking, are (1) structures in the absence of which the operations in question cease to be those very operations; and (2) structures the denial of which instantiates the very structures that are denied (*retorsio argumenti*).²¹

Whether in practical activities or declarative sentences, Heidegger discovers the recurrent, essential pattern to be that of aheadness-and-return, *Sich-vorweg-sein als Zurückkommen* (GA 21: 147.23–26). In practical activities (whether ποιήσις or πράξις) we first “look ahead” and envision the desired outcome (the εἶδος προαιρετόν) and then “return” from there to utilize some means to achieve that end. In making a declarative statement (an ἀπόφανσις), we first have a pre-understanding of the possible predicate and then “return” to the subject matter to synthesis it with that predicate.

Heidegger derives this pattern of aheadness-and-return from Aristotle’s notion of κίνησις, in which the *actuality* of a moving thing is its being-possible-for/unto. For Aristotle the being of a moving thing is its prolepsis of its goal, its being-onto-its-completion (ἐν-έργεια as ἐν ἔργῳ εἶναι, and ἐν-τελ-έχεια as ἐν τέλει εἶναι: GA 6, 2: 368.33ff.). By looking ahead to what the thing is moving *towards*—whether by nature (acorn to oak tree) or by choice (this wood, cut and assembled for constructing a bookcase)—I discover what an acorn *is* or what a pile of wood in the carpenter shop *is for*. In these cases the “future” determines the “present,” a rule that Heidegger took over in his interpretation of human temporality (SZ 327.20-328.25).

Heidegger gathers these issues into his key term *Da-sein*, which should never, ever, be translated as being-here or being-there or being t/here. I choose to translate it as “ex-sistence” (hyphenated and misspelled to bring out its etymology). First: “-sistence.” In Latin *sistere* is a causative verb, just as ἵστημι is in Greek. It does not mean “I stand” (by my own power, as it were) but “I am *made* to stand”—or with Heidegger, I am “*thrown* into standing.” Secondly: the prefix “ex.” I am thrown (1) “ahead” of myself and (2) “out beyond” the persons and things I encounter. Into what? In the first case, into myself *as* possibility; and in the second case, into the open field of possible meanings that those persons and things can have. “Ex-sistence” says two things about my structure: *Geworfenheit* and *Entwurf*, thrownness and openness, or taken together: thrown-open-ness. Structurally—i.e., in my ineluctable way-of-being as ex-sistence—I am a priori the gap, the space, the clearing that makes discursive-synthetic meaning both possible and necessary.

For a while the early Heidegger called this existential thrown-open-ness “transcendence,” understood as the aheadness (as beyond things and into their possible meanings) that makes possible all intentional acts of

¹⁷ *De interpretatione* 5, 17a21 and 10, 19b5; *Metaphysics* VIII 3, 1043b30-31.

¹⁸ GA 15: 380.6: “eine offene Weite zu durchgehen.” Cf. GA 14: 81.35 and 84.3-4; GA 7: 19.12; etc.

¹⁹ For example, Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, 75, 3, corpus, ad finem: “similiter unumquodque habet esse et operationem.” Or to reverse the direction, “qualis modus essendi talis modus operandi”: a thing’s way of *being* determines its way of *acting*.

²⁰ GA 4: 65.26–28: “Jegliches . . . je nur das leistet, was es ist.” I translate “leisten” with a hendiadys.

²¹ Argument by retorsion, i.e., περιτροπή τοῦ λόγου, “turning the argument [of the opponent against him]”: Sextus Empiricus, Πυρρωνείων ὑποτυπώσεων/*Outlines of the Pyrrhonians*, II, 128 ad fin.

taking-as. As he put it in 1927, transcendence is the *ratio essendi* of intentionality, and intentionality is the *ratio cognoscendi* of transcendence.²² Transcendence has the ontological structure of aheadness-and-return, and that is what allows me to make sense of something by “reaching ahead” to a possible meaning and “returning” to synthesize that meaning (correctly or incorrectly) with the person or the thing I’m encountering. Such is Heidegger’s early notion of transcendence, which, as we shall now see, he fills out in his later writings.

Second: What kind of “reduction” would be the proper procedure for discovering the appropriation of ex-sistence?

For a moment let us allow Heidegger the words “transcendence” and “transcendental” even though he eventually went beyond the two terms by filling out their structure and meaning to include appropriation. In a personal communication made to Professor Max Müller after World War II, Heidegger distinguished two meanings of “transcendental,” namely:

1. *das Transzendente*, the transcendental
2. *das Transzendenzhafte*, the transcendence-related.²³

The former refers to what we have already discussed: ex-sistence’s “passing beyond” things to their possible meanings. The latter refers to the fact that ex-sistence has always already—structurally and a priori—“passed beyond” both things *and* their possible meanings. *Transzendenzhaft* names ex-sistence’s *relatedness to the clearing itself* insofar as that relatedness makes possible the other—the *transzendental*—passing-beyond. In other words, *transzendenzhaft* refers to the always-already operative appropriation of ex-sistence to its existential condition of being-the-clearing (*Lichtung-sein*: GA 15: 380.11f.).

As we said, Heidegger’s phenomenological in-duction leads our intentional focus *away* from the objects of intentionality and *forward* to the correlation between those objects and the possibilities that we are living into, possibilities that let those objects show up as having this or that meaning. And when fully unfolded, this in-duction also thematizes the particular meaning-giving context (the “world of meaning” organized around our aheadness in purposes, desires, etc.) wherein and whereby these specific things get their current significance. — But the further question is: What holds open (*offenhalt*) or sustains (*aussteht*) this meaning-giving context?

We have already seen the answer: the fact that ex-sistence’s way-of-being (its “essence”) consists in its having been a priori stretched-ahead (*erstreckt*) or drawn out (*angezogen, ausgezogen*) as possibility into possibilities. To thematically articulate that fact requires the phenomenologist to burrow *beneath* the horizontal-transcendental to what makes it possible. In Greek such a leading of one’s gaze “under” or “beneath” (κατά) one’s transcendental aheadness in order to discover appropriation as what makes possible such transcendental aheadness would be called a καταγωγή—in a rather lame and literal translation, a phenomenological *sub*-duction as the complement of a phenomenological *in*-duction.

The phenomenological sub-duction is a *further* re-directing of one’s philosophical gaze, but this time not away from things and onto their possible meanings but rather away from the whole panoply of discursive meaningfulness (including whatever worlds constitute such meaningfulness) and onto ex-sistence’s a priori appropriation as *das Lichten der Lichtung*, as holding open the clearing and thus making possible any and all such meaning-giving worlds.

²² GA 24: 91.20-22. On ratio cognoscendi, cf. Thomas Aquinas, “Commentum in tertium sententiarum [‘De incarnatione Verbi’] Magistri Petri Lombardi,” distinctio 14 (“Si anima Christi habuerit sapientiam parem cum Deo, et si omnia scit quae Deus”), quaestio 1, articulus 1 (“Utrum in Christo sit aliqua scientia creata”), quaestiuncula 5, solutio 4: “Ratio autem cognoscendi est forma rei in quantum est cognita, quia per eam fit cognitio in actu; unde sicut ex materia et forma est unum esse; ita *ratio cognoscendi* et res cognita sunt unum cognitum: et propter hoc utriusque, in quantum huiusmodi, est una cognitio secundum habitum et secundum actum,” in Thomas Aquinas, *Opera omnia*, ed. Stanilaus Fretté and Paul Maré (Paris: Louis Vivès, 1873), IX, 215, column a, ad fin.

²³ Max Müller, *Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart*. Heidelberg: Kerle 1949, 73f.

1. Ex-sistence is “thrown . . . , that is to say, appropriated” (*geworfener . . . das heißt ereignet*”: GA 65: 239.5).
2. “Ex-sistence is thrown, appropriated” (“*Das Dasein ist geworfen, ereignet*”: GA 65: 304.8).
3. *Dasein*’s taking over its thrownness (“*die Übernahme der Geworfenheit*” at SZ 325.37) is equated with *Dasein*’s taking over its being appropriated (“*die Übernahme der Ereignung*” at GA 65: 322.7–8).²⁵
4. Existence’s readiness for ap-propri-ation is equated with resolutely assuming and becoming the thrownness it already is (“*die . . . Bereitschaft des Daseins für die Er-ernung, das Geworfenwerden,*” GA 65: 34.8-9).
5. The projectedness of ex-sistence as “thrown” is equated with the same projectedness as “belonging to ap-propri-ation” (“*als geworfen . . . zugehörig der Er-ernung,*” GA 65: 252.23-25).
6. Or in a simple hendiadys that expresses one and the same phenomenon: “*Geworfenheit und Ereignis*” (GA 9: 377, note d).

(I think Heidegger scholarship would do well to drop the term *Ereignis* entirely and always use *Geworfenheit* instead, thereby underscoring that *Faktizität* is the archi-existential that unifies the early and the later Heidegger.)

In the second place, and in contrast to the widespread but erroneous understanding of the term, the *Kehre* in its *proper* sense is the oscillating sameness (*Gegenschwung*) of *Da-sein* and *Da-sein* (cf. GA 65: 29.15 et passim; GA 70: 126.18; GA 75: 59.15; etc; cf. GA 26: 270.4-5).

Therefore, the *Kehre* in its proper sense is:

1. not a move that Heidegger carried out in the 1930s, beginning with GA 65, *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (cf. GA 13: 149.29-30);
2. not the change in how he thought through his fundamental question, beginning in the 1930s; that was what he called not the *Kehre* but the *Wendung* or *Wandel im Denken* (GA 13: 149.21-22);
3. not a change in the standpoint of SZ (GA 13: 149.23)
4. not a change in his fundamental question: “What accounts for the fact that there is significance at all?” (cf. GA 9: 201.30-32);
5. not a change in his *answer* to that fundamental question: ex-sistence as appropriated to being the Open (cf. GA 9: 202.5-9); and therefore it is not
6. not a matter of “demoting” ex-sistence in relation to the Open (aka “Being Itself”).

* * *

A final thought that follows from the above but would require much more space to spell out: All of the middle and later Heidegger can be folded back onto the early work up through December 1930, when he discovered the *intrinsic hiddenness* of the clearing, what is usually and wrongly called “the self-concealing of being.” Yes, there were plenty of new *formulations* after 1930—“ap-propri-ation” is one of them; the confused term “*Seinsgeschichte*” and the so-called “givings of being” are others—as well as some new topics (the nature of art, the analyses of poetry, and so on). But as I have argued elsewhere, these new formulations and topics can be more clearly and convincingly explained in terms of the early work and its less obscure lexicon.²⁶

Let me end by saying two things—first, that Steve Crowell’s rich and clearly argued book not only lays out programmatically the possibility of a renewed dialogue between Husserl and Heidegger but goes further and *enacts* that dialogue. And secondly: If read closely and with an eye to its presuppositions about method, it could liberate Heidegger scholarship from its obfuscating tropes, its fuzzy “methodology,” and

²⁵ Cf. GA 94: 337.7–8: resolve as “ein Zurückwachsen in das Tragende der Geworfenheit.”

²⁶ *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift*, London and New York: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2015.

its slavish parroting of an exhausted Sein-ology. It could free up Heidegger scholarship for re-appropriating crucial but neglected elements of its phenomenological heritage and open the way to what Plato called τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτό, that elusive “thing itself” that Heidegger spent a lifetime pursuing.²⁷

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²⁷ Plato, “Seventh Letter” (ἐπιστολή Ζ), 341c7; *Protagoras*, 330d15.