Wikipedia, papers on this website.
Space and time do originate in the event, although no longer as if in some focus centering them in advance of experience and for its sake.
What if Dasein were a woman?
Heidegger’s critique should in fact lead Marxists to see the crucial role of the domination of nature in Marx’s theory.
This new relation found in quantum mechanics, the retrocausality, seems counterintuitive but can be interpreted and supported by Heidegger’s philosophy.
Such is the force of the “inner truth and greatness of this movement,” Trumpism, MAGA.
Heidegger’s releasement is a form of non-representational, non-willing, self-aware meditative thinking, that is neither active nor passive, but involves a kind of open calmness and expectation
Dasein has to be understood as that which is already from the outset accessible, without which nothing belonging to it can be exhibited, brought to language and thus to explicit attention.
How and why is Heidegger led to this idea that every consciousness is self-consciousness?
Heidegger does not embrace bio-posthumanism but insists on the "metaphysical" importance of a distinction between world and ring.
If anarchy is uncovered as something deeper than the distinction between theory and practice, to what extent does it make sense still to speak of the priority of one over the other?
The logic of evental propriety and alienation forms the pre-personal ground of Dasein’s intrinsically problematic authentic selfhood.
[I]t can be surmised that it is Beck who—for better or worse—publicly established the thesis to the effect that Being and Time is the “accomplished synthesis of Dilthey and Husserl”.
| Text | Page |
|---|---|
| Being and Time | 67 |
| Discourse On Thinking "Memorial Address" | 43 |
| Bremen Lectures "The Thing" | 6 |
| Heraclitus | 9 |
| Early Greek Thinking "The Anaximander Fragment" | 13 |
| Pathmarks "Letter on 'Humanism'" | 239 |
| Basic Writings "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" | 431 |
| On Time and Being "My Way to Phenomenology" | 74 |
| Heidegger the Man and the Thinker "'Only a God Can Save Us': The Spiegel Interview" | 56 |
| The Principle of Reason | 112 |
* excluding pages in previous years' top ten.
Keynotes by Robert Bernasconi and Francisco Gonzalez
What is human? The question, to go back to Heidegger, as Anders reminds us, is a “what”-question opposed for Heidegger to the that-question and, indeed, to the who-question.
| Text | Page |
|---|---|
| Sein und Zeit (Niemeyer 1927) | 12 |
| Wegmarken (GA 9) Brief über den »Humanismus« (1946) | 313 |
| Vorträge und Aufsätze (GA 7) Das Ding (1950) | 174 |
| Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge (GA 79) Das Ding (1949) | 23 |
| Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65) (1936-1938) | 34 |
| Besinnung (GA 66) (1938-1939) | 139 |
| Einführung in die Metaphysik (GA 40) SS 1935 | 208 |
| Unterwegs zur Sprache (GA 12) Die Sprache (1950) | 10 |
| Grundfragen der Philosophie (GA 45) WS 1937-38 | 169 |
| Leitgedanken zur Entstehung der Metaphysik (GA 76) Einige Leitgedanken über das Entstehen und Vergehen der Metaphysik | 5 |
* excluding pages in previous years' top ten.
[I]s the right headspace—a genuine openness to the ontological—is this a region of experience anyone can enter or only some?
Marx is concerned to identify a non-metaphysical ethos that allows for the virtues of justice, compassion, and neighborly love (including friendship, fraternity, and solidarity) as a corrective to indifference, and do so with reference to awareness of a common human mortality.
Edited and translated by Giovanni Jan Giubilato and Ian Alexander Moore
The “difference” is not about keeping the truth of being away from metaphysical truth; rather, metaphysical truth must be thought anew from the truth of being.
'sense' does not apply to entities or even being; it is rather what the understanding projects the entities or being upon, such that their intelligibility is sustained.
While Heidegger emphasizes the openness and mystery of being, Whitehead foregrounds the presence of ideals and values that beckon humanity and shape the cosmos.
[I]f we think through and past his occasional protestations about these terms, we realize that his later thinking of Being did indeed proceed through what he had identified early on as “intuition and feeling.”
[T]he logic of validity fails to show what the essence of truth is and why being, in relation to truth, must be maintained as that which is merely present.
[I]t strikes me as performative contradiction to assert the fact of impossibles and also to seek a ground of the impossible, to adduce conditions for the possibility of impossibility.
In Heidegger’s interpretation, the Platonism Nietzsche attacks is simply the historical process of decline or of moving away from Plato’s genuine thought.
Humanistic understandings of the human being never so much as raise the question of Being, and so fail to locate the human being in relation to it. In this sense, they are one and all ‘metaphysical’.
When we say being emotionally situated in the world, we are saying that we are in the world as bodies, bodily being-in-the world. Heidegger's Dasein is not at all disembodied.
The concern for the question of Being, ... is the search for the enabling power that makes possible, and so is responsible for, “the correlation between an entity’s givenness and the dative of that givenness.”
[T]here is at least one important sense in which Heidegger does remain an heir to transcendental idealism until the end: Ereignis remains a name for the correlation between being and thinking.
Since the clearing is characterized by or originates in Ereignis, another new name for Being and Time might be “presence and appropriation”.
Particular actions may come to an end, but the need for action as such will not.
The task that is left to all of us is to rediscover these cosmotechnics in order to reframe modern technologies, namely, by reframing the enframing (Gestell).
What is important for Heidegger is that the self-concealment of the clearing, its nothingness, can never be “sublimated” (aufgehoben) or negated.
Approximately, the ontopathology of everyday life is to Heidegger what the psychopathology of the same is to Freud: the phenomena of a primordial disclosive process: UnbewussteSeyn.
the entire worldliness, including the verdicts of heaven and the underworld, as well as nirvana, preserved in the storytelling of our ancestors, cycles once again as thinghood intersects with Dasein and enters the Open through the latter’s decision to make art
Philosophy alleviates nothing, eases nothing; it does not point beyond, to a value or standard beyond the people from whom it emerges. Instead it burdens.
Existence so understood as expressly, as specifically delimited existence, under one form or set of limits or borders or bounds as opposed to another, is the existence that is always, as Heidegger reminds us, in each case mine, whether taken up as a project or not.
Heidegger investigates the source of the understanding of being as presencing, the donation of presencing as the sense of beingness. This source can be called Seyn or Ereignis, and he clearly distinguishes it from presencing.
Muslims as Sufis can release themselves “into the nothing” by entering the clearing that is Sufism as mysticism—the ground of the mystical in Islam.
[T]he entire worldliness, including the verdicts of heaven and the underworld, as well as nirvana, preserved in the storytelling of our ancestors, cycles once again as thinghood intersects with Dasein and enters the Open through the latter’s decision to make art.
Dasein is the movedness of time
As a philosophical project, topology arises out of the simple recognition of the way all thinking begins with place, with our own being-placed, and with the questionability that belongs to them.
[W]hereas Heidegger’s Gestell defines the ubiquitous modern mode of disclosure through which natural resources and human capacities appear, Foucault lays out a multiplicity of dis-positifs, each creating distinct visibilities.
[W]hat Murdoch came to see in Heidegger was a continuous attempt to offer a more-or-less-systematic and all-encompassing picture of what she calls ‘the unconditioned’ and its essential relation to human being. That is the central task of what she calls ‘metaphysics’.
Being within the without is understood as a learning not of another way to be and to think, but rather of an unlearning. We could recall here a verse by the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa, who speaks about the need to aprender a desaprender, “to learn to unlearn.”
Dasein is not a self-sufficient substance but open to the world. I can exist only as long as I am open to the world.
[T]he being-uncovering of a belief is bound up with its being true as opposed to false, since we can regard beliefs as true only because we can have them.
[S]ense/meaning are the subject matter—the Befragtes—of all Heidegger’s work.
[T]he specifically initiatory dimension of the foreignness of the foreign language moves us from the pole of interlingual translation to the pole of innerlingual translation, “translating” us, so to speak, into the very movement of translation as this is realized in the root unfolding of language.
[O]ne of Heidegger's most important insights is the recognition that the world opens up only in and through the bounded singularity of place.
If the possibility of dwelling as “becoming-at-home” depends on the possibility of a “homecoming” and on the appropriation of the origin from the end, this means that dwelling signifies the hermeneutic capacity to re-interpret the home.
[D]eath is nothing to be actualized, not even in the imagination, because it is, precisely, and gives, precisely, nothing.
What is so fascinating about the Black Notebooks is that, in so many ways, they beg not to be read. They seem written so as to be written off.
[T]he ground itself withdraws into concealment and so can never be secured beyond the temporal revelation of its withdrawal. In fact, the revealing of this withdrawal into concealment is precisely the truth of beyng itself.
Contra received logic, Heidegger proposes the radical poverty of reflective thinking: thought, in all its modesty.
When Dasein speaks in fallen everydayness, it seeks to show itself as having already known everything in advance
Translation and Commentary by Adam Bobeck
Heidegger treats the poetry as reporting the Befindlichkeit of stone.
That Aristotle’s understanding of the good is ontological is thus not the result of his disregarding ‘values’, but simply of his radical attempt to understand the good for each thing primarily on the basis of the way each thing can be said to be.
New book online
Heidegger did send us a “message;” namely, to ponder philosophical questions. Just like he said of Aristotle, all of the questions are still “open”.
[A] mythical world of meaningful life is a mode of dwelling immune to critique by a standard of scientific objectivity.
Derrida is then right to emphasize a radical alterity of every Dasein, not just in the sense of being as other but in the more ontic sense of other beings who are nevertheless constitutive of Dasein’s ownmost Seinkönnen.
For both, Anaximander articulates the justice of order according to the interplay of things and the apeiron, where apeiron is conceived as both the limitless and the ordering principle (or arche) of the interplay.
LLMs, like Heidegger's concept of "Das Man" or the "they," which are reliant on verbal relational links, are categorically inauthentic.
The reconstruction of the preparatory question (SZ I.1-2) and its reversal (SZ I.3) reveals that Heidegger’s later criticism of the (preparatory) transcendental question in fact relies on the success of the question. Transcendental terms become translated into the terms of Ereignis and its “reciprocity” (Gegenschwung).
Some expressions ‘cut closer to the metaphysical joints’ than others. Among the expressions that cut closest are what I called ‘semantically primitive quantifier expressions’ that correspond to (possible) senses of ‘being’ that in turn correspond to Heidegger’s fundamental modes of being.
[W]hen he interprets other thinkers, he adopts a terminology that is foreign to his ordinary way of writing. ... When translated, these interpretations should read differently than when Heidegger builds his own terminology in order to express his own philosophical positions.
Those seeking to use Heidegger to illustrate the limitations of AI should recognize that both divisions of Being and Time are crucial to their argument.
Foreword and Afterword
In approaching SZ it is important to get off on the right foot, and that entails understanding the presuppositions underlying his work.
[W]hat divides textualists from purposivists may be more in the nature of a Holmesian can't-help, a difference in ‘the world as I found it,' thematic commitment, Grundbefinden.
Even if he accepts presence as our destined and inescapable meaning of being, presence is enabled by a mysterious—let us say—“event” that lets things come to the fore while it itself keeps quiet.
This deficiency in logic leads Heidegger to the idea that the true logic is ontological and what is usually known as logic is nothing but a contingent expression of it.
[I]f there is any truth to the priority Heidegger gives to possibility, then it should also be expressible outside that philosophy, in another context
Thinking should take place in a state of waiting in order to receive what is essential, which does not come about on the basis of the human will. For this purpose, it is necessary for thought to derive from the event itself – Vom Ereignis – as a response to the call of being.
Language disposes as Ereignis in conversation. While man’s being is grounded in language, grounding occurs only in conversation.
Behind Levinas’s idea of religious exigency of “excendence” lies Heidegger’s notion of the spiritual quality of ontological transcendence
But Heidegger also seems to betray unmistakable vestiges of modern transcendentalism as well, especially when one considers the characteristic turn of modern transcendentalism from experience to the conditions of the possibility of experience.
Translated by Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner
[B]y exposing and asking out beyond the conditions of European humanism [...], Heidegger entered a trans-humanist or post-humanist realm of thought in which an essential part of philosophical reflection on the human being has moved ever since.
τέχνη, here conceived as a secondary form of knowledge whose scope is limited to nonhuman ways of being, becomes the dominant model for conceiving human Being and human knowing.
The inceptive appropriating event clears an openness, with which Heidegger rethinks the “there” of being-there, the open site (or time-space) for the truth of beyng.
The unspoken is not simply what is not vocalized ..., but it is rather what is unremittingly withheld as the unsaid, the mystery of all mysteries of the thoughtful saying ..., the concealment that persists as concealed in the disclosure of the concealment disclosed in the concealment of disclosure ....
[P]henomenology for the young Heidegger was never a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness, but always, however obliquely presented throughout the 1920s, a way of participating in the creative unfolding of the site of Being’s happening.
The inceptive event is a grounding of a question (Who are we? What does being mean?), a grounding of a problem, a grounding of a displacement.
[German Idealism] does not come to a “question of being.” ... In the thinking of Heidegger the “finitude” of the human being is what “comes to view.”
Nothing other than itself, and itself an abyss; in Heidegger's alternative usage, Nichtigkeit.
Beliefs and assertions uncover entities, that is, only because human beings disclose worlds.
Preservation in the sense of the disclosure of truth becomes questionable in the age of modern technology because enframing has greatly diminished our capacity for understanding ourselves as historical beings formed by institutions we sustain and transform through our practices.
Heidegger assumes that the modern mode of being is structured by computability (Berechenbarkeit), which means a universal quantification of things into energy to create more energy.
In the order of the evolution of the human species, as well as in the development of a child, bodily effort and resistance come before a full-fledged world, in which we pursue ways of existing by adopting possibilities in a cultural and historical context.
[T]he first beginning of philosophy originates as the inceptual event through which an incalculable movement of history is brought forward in the direction of its own Origin, which, being paradoxically futural, is thus capable of being enacted as the other beginning.
Truth as ἀλήθεια would make possible truth as correctness by setting forth a look, a presenting foreground, to which apprehension could correspond and so be correct.
Heidegger’s language carves a furrow within the German language that, paradoxically, the foreign reader may feel while the native speaker does not
The meaning of human being’s existence has to be found in this space, in the relational openness where it finds itself.
Worlding is thus characterized by an experience that can be defined as the opposite of alienation: the experience enters into a mode of heightened authenticity, in which I grasp myself all the more as I am more strongly integrated into the context of meaning in which something shows itself as something.
As we become habituated in a particular way of making sense of entities, we shelter, preserve, and maintain the “openness” within which entities can manifest themselves.
[B]ecause living opens one up to death, every thinker who loves life, as I think Ortega y Gasset and Unamuno, among others, did, has to accept the imperative of death as something that belongs to living itself.
The essence of the human is to be thought of as a guarding and the human as a “guardian.” The guarded here is “the event,” and through the guarding of it, the human belongs to it.
On the final pages of Scheler’s critical notes to Being and Time, he makes the following observation: “What would the human being mean if he had only to care for himself and the world - and not also for its ground? He would be a footnote to being.”
For Paul and Heidegger the law and metaphysics ‘been on the job too long,’ with consequent lethal curse.
Being reveals and conceals not in but as history.
The essence of the human being is “needed” for the event (Ereignis) of such emergence into unconcealment, into presencing (Anwesen). Being-in-itself, the presencing of beings-in-themselves, is thus dependent on the human essence.
[The other beginning] views being as an ongoing, dynamic event of meaning-constitution that constantly situates and (re)contextualizes meaningful presence—as Ereignis, the temporal and spatial event or “taking place” of meaningfulness in and through the reciprocal correlation between the givenness of meaning and human receptivity to meaning.
Heidegger’s way of raising the questions is especially provocative; even at his most parochial and perverse, his texts challenge defenders of reason to reason more clearly and carefully, with greater attention to reason’s limits.
The systematic character of Heidegger's thinking lies not only in its retention of irreducible negativity but also in its structure as a progression of forms in which this negativity takes shape in the guise of untruth.
Heidegger’s “Legacy” manuscript and the Brauch material in particular – for all their interpretive challenges – give us something of a final articulation of the relation between Dasein and being.
Special dossier on Shawn Loht’s Phenomenology of Film: A Heideggerian Account of the Film Experience (2017) organised by Robert Sinnerbrink.
The task of the“other beginning” is, in fact, a philopatry to the first site of the first beginning through the vestige and remnant left by the description of Beyng.
With contributions from: Scott Campbell, Babette Babich, Erik Kuravsky, Teelin Lucero, Christopher D. Merwin, Ian Alexander Moore, Richard Polt, William McNeill, Andrew J. Mitchell, Tobias Keiling, Theodore George, Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei, Rebecca A. Longtin, John Lysaker, Pol Vandevelde, Lucas Buchanan Carroll, and Jeffrey Patrick Colgan.
[T]he madman comes to teach those in the marketplace, as Nietzsche points out in The Gay Science, that they have done this to themselves. For Heidegger: “They no longer seek because they no longer think.”
Edited by Stuart Elden. Translated by Kenneth Mills.
Nihilism as the empire of the mastery of the will to will—already Nietzsche saw that: the will “would rather will the nothing than not will”—, and as the epoch of technology (itself understood as “metaphysics in completion”), perhaps forms the core of Marxism, its driving truth.
Dasein's fundamental authentic project is to make sense of its very sense-making.
[A]ll philosophical concepts are formal indications, “formal” in gathering the focal meaning of lived experiences, and “indications” in pointing to engaged circumstances and practices that cannot be fully captured in, or exhausted by, formal concepts.
BBC radio 3 show
The postmodern is not a moment beyond the modern. Instead, what is represented by the postmodern is the unmasterable, disappointed condition of the Enlightenment ideal of modernity "after Auschwitz."
Language is not a being at all, but, like Being itself, it is what gives us access to all beings in the first place.
If Heidegger's characterization of philosophical concepts as formal indications possesses a significant similarity to the nature of artistic composition, it has even closer ties to what he understands as the theological formation and development of Christian belief.
Being is always disclosed to such falling – hence the ontological being is always concerned with falling and always falling itself. Tota vita—tentatio; all life is falling.
| Text | Page |
|---|---|
| Bremen Lectures "The Thing" | 5 |
| Heraclitus | 110 |
| Being and Truth | 35 |
| The Beginning of Western Philosophy | 70 |
| Early Greek Thinking "Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16)" | 102 |
| Being and Time | 22 |
| Pathmarks "What is Metaphysics?" | 120 |
| The Question Concerning Technology | 19 |
| The Principle of Reason | 113 |
| Discourse On Thinking "Memorial Address" | 56 |
| Heraclitus Seminars | 6 |
There are 11 pages because the bottom two tied for 10th place.
* excluding pages in previous years' top ten.
[Heidegger] laments that what is lacking today is “phenomenological discipline” (which is something else than the discipline of phenomenology), one that is not biased by one or the other philosophical position and lets itself be determined by the claim of the Sache, the matter of thinking.
Beginning means both the one beginning, that is the most originary inceptive occurrence of being in its truth, and the beginning again in a more futural sense, but of a “future,” a coming to be that is already there, but not yet in being.
| Text | Page |
|---|---|
| Wegmarken (GA 9) Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers »Psychologie der Weltanschauungen« (1919/21) | 1 |
| Logik: Die frage nach der Wahrheit (GA 21) WS 1925-26 | 170 |
| Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (GA 13) Der Feldweg (1949) | 90 |
| Zur Sache des Denkens (GA 14) Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens (1964) | 81 |
| Vorträge und Aufsätze (GA 7) Bauen Wohnen Denken (1951) | 156 |
| Holzwege (GA 5) Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (1935/36) | 21 |
| Sein und Zeit (Niemeyer) | 250 |
| Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65) (1936-1938) | 408 |
| Frühe Schriften (GA 1) Nachwort des Herausgebers | 437 |
| Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (GA 4) Vorwort zur Lesung von Hölderlins Gedichten | 195 |
* excluding pages in previous years' top ten.
Owning our emotions is thus not a matter of choosing them but of choosing to let them be what they are, as genuinely disclosive.
In Heidegger's work the Master Signifier of human uniqueness is Ereignis.
Translated by Haralambos Ventis, introduction by Andrew Louth
Heidegger's analysis, although it applies to the western tradition of what Heidegger calls "onto theology", it does not take account of the Orthodox tradition of apophatic theology, of which Dionysius the Areopagite is a pre-eminent example.
[I]t is difficult, at first blush, to understand how, of all people, Trakl—the drug-addled, Austrian expressionist in love with decay and obsessed with his sister—could become for Heidegger the next “poet of the Germans” and take on the role of savior of the German people and indeed of the entire Occident.
Temporally, the notion of the last god is an instantiation of Heidegger’s open circle, the return to the beginning that never was, the genuine iteration of the again that is altogether otherwise.
As event, the Ereignis does not offer itself in any positive manner, but precisely as its own ex- or dispropriation. It events by dis- or deventuating: Ereignis gives only as Enteignis; or there is Ereignis only as Enteignis.
Aletheia meant responsivity between the seer and the seen, a relation of mutual interpenetration: the knowing subject changes its forms of understanding as the known object is resignified.
[C]an this temporal field of a GA perhaps also be understood in the equiprimordial register of truth as unconcealment, such that the “institutional errancy” of family, publishers, editors and translators that in fact has manifested itself in the erratic path of the GA can itself be justified in Heideggerian terms, as what Heidegger himself in fact anticipated?
Heidegger considers not just the human but primordial being (or beyng) itself to be finite. Indeed, according to Fink, this is what distinguishes Heidegger’s philosophy from that of all of his predecessors.
I think for Heidegger and the question of technology, it's not so much that technology is either a good or a bad thing, it's just the way that metaphysics has distorted the essence of technology or occluded it, so that we don't quite get to its essence.
Nothing stands in the way of the final possibility that for Dasein the only issue left becomes ordering for the sake of order itself.
Face-to-face with its own being, Dasein’s uncanny feeling is not just a sense of being “not-at-home,” it is also a sense of this strangeness being itself at the heart of one’s own existence.
Of the two versions of the ontological difference, metaphysical and phenomenological, only the latter allows for an adequate understanding of the referential character of symbols (in symbols a first, apparent meaning refers to a second, hidden meaning which is explored through practice).
Heidegger's insight disclosed to him that the Dasein in human being is nothing human.
Philosophy is the getting-going of the going out, over, and beyond the whole of beings that lies at the basis of Dasein.
Heidegger’s metaphysical grounding of logic supports Langer’ contention that art is not opaque and ineffable simply because it cannot be projected into propositional form.
The clearing is an opening lighting center beyond beings that encircles all that is akin to the barely known nothing.
Grasping the truth of the situation, I see how what I am doing here and now is what is to be done as an action worth doing for itself, and that insight is constitutive of its product, πρᾶξις.
Are we, today, in touch with time as history? Are we capable of asking who we are, not just what we are? Are we open to the arrival of what is our own? Or do we continue to be absorbed in representing, producing, and reproducing what is present?
The significance Heidegger finds in his words, and Emerson and Thoreau find in theirs, is remarkable enough; but that in the face of this significance, to discover that their thoughts are intimately, endlessly related, has become for me unforgettably interesting.
Authenticity would thus be tied, not to adherence to some determinate inner 'truth', but rather to an openness to what Heidegger calls the 'event' of appropriation – an openness to the happening of place.
As Plotinus, Heidegger, and Lacan have said, you have to give what you don’t have. If you give what you have, you’re not giving.
Heidegger's Christian heritage includes the theme of the Fortunate Fall—”Yet all our honey in that poyson grewe”—and he uses its analog the Fortunate Breakdown to think in accordance with philosophy's inveterate norm of imparting good news, or inventing it.
[L]ooking at Heidegger in light of an anti-sceptical reading of Wittgenstein and looking at Wittgenstein in light of Heidegger’s problematic of authenticity
No one ‘lives in the moment’ according to Heidegger’s reckoning. Intelligent beings stretch out in time, caught between birth and death: we live between.
[I]n Adorno’s view, Heidegger is more concerned with primordial possibility than with the real possibility of emancipation, which is suppressed by existing conditions.
Heideggerian authenticity and mindfulness would involve a rehabilitation of the Stoic idea of oikeiōsis, as is revealed for example by the homology between oikeiōsis and Befindlichkeit, where both non-conceptually disclose the organism’s constitution to itself.
[T]his neutrality is never in fact neutral, acting as a disguise that erases sexual difference and femininity in favor of a surreptitious phallogocentrism Derrida finds Heidegger guilty of [...]
Heidegger was highly attentive to his own reputation and was a master at self-representation, yet we should not allow ourselves to be distracted by Heidegger’s own sleight of hand.
We, as sexed bodies, are responsible for the throwness (that forms the past) of Dasein.