[S]ense/meaning are the subject matter—the Befragtes—of all Heidegger’s work.
[T]he specifically initiatory dimension of the foreignness of the foreign language moves us from the pole of interlingual translation to the pole of innerlingual translation, “translating” us, so to speak, into the very movement of translation as this is realized in the root unfolding of language.
[O]ne of Heidegger's most important insights is the recognition that the world opens up only in and through the bounded singularity of place.
If the possibility of dwelling as “becoming-at-home” depends on the possibility of a “homecoming” and on the appropriation of the origin from the end, this means that dwelling signifies the hermeneutic capacity to re-interpret the home.
[D]eath is nothing to be actualized, not even in the imagination, because it is, precisely, and gives, precisely, nothing.
What is so fascinating about the Black Notebooks is that, in so many ways, they beg not to be read. They seem written so as to be written off.
[T]he ground itself withdraws into concealment and so can never be secured beyond the temporal revelation of its withdrawal. In fact, the revealing of this withdrawal into concealment is precisely the truth of beyng itself.
Contra received logic, Heidegger proposes the radical poverty of reflective thinking: thought, in all its modesty.
When Dasein speaks in fallen everydayness, it seeks to show itself as having already known everything in advance
Translation and Commentary by Adam Bobeck
Heidegger treats the poetry as reporting the Befindlichkeit of stone.
That Aristotle’s understanding of the good is ontological is thus not the result of his disregarding ‘values’, but simply of his radical attempt to understand the good for each thing primarily on the basis of the way each thing can be said to be.
New book online
Heidegger did send us a “message;” namely, to ponder philosophical questions. Just like he said of Aristotle, all of the questions are still “open”.
[A] mythical world of meaningful life is a mode of dwelling immune to critique by a standard of scientific objectivity.
Derrida is then right to emphasize a radical alterity of every Dasein, not just in the sense of being as other but in the more ontic sense of other beings who are nevertheless constitutive of Dasein’s ownmost Seinkönnen.
For both, Anaximander articulates the justice of order according to the interplay of things and the apeiron, where apeiron is conceived as both the limitless and the ordering principle (or arche) of the interplay.
LLMs, like Heidegger's concept of "Das Man" or the "they," which are reliant on verbal relational links, are categorically inauthentic.
The reconstruction of the preparatory question (SZ I.1-2) and its reversal (SZ I.3) reveals that Heidegger’s later criticism of the (preparatory) transcendental question in fact relies on the success of the question. Transcendental terms become translated into the terms of Ereignis and its “reciprocity” (Gegenschwung).
Some expressions ‘cut closer to the metaphysical joints’ than others. Among the expressions that cut closest are what I called ‘semantically primitive quantifier expressions’ that correspond to (possible) senses of ‘being’ that in turn correspond to Heidegger’s fundamental modes of being.
[W]hen he interprets other thinkers, he adopts a terminology that is foreign to his ordinary way of writing. ... When translated, these interpretations should read differently than when Heidegger builds his own terminology in order to express his own philosophical positions.
Those seeking to use Heidegger to illustrate the limitations of AI should recognize that both divisions of Being and Time are crucial to their argument.
Foreword and Afterword
In approaching SZ it is important to get off on the right foot, and that entails understanding the presuppositions underlying his work.
[W]hat divides textualists from purposivists may be more in the nature of a Holmesian can't-help, a difference in ‘the world as I found it,' thematic commitment, Grundbefinden.
Even if he accepts presence as our destined and inescapable meaning of being, presence is enabled by a mysterious—let us say—“event” that lets things come to the fore while it itself keeps quiet.
This deficiency in logic leads Heidegger to the idea that the true logic is ontological and what is usually known as logic is nothing but a contingent expression of it.
[I]f there is any truth to the priority Heidegger gives to possibility, then it should also be expressible outside that philosophy, in another context
Thinking should take place in a state of waiting in order to receive what is essential, which does not come about on the basis of the human will. For this purpose, it is necessary for thought to derive from the event itself – Vom Ereignis – as a response to the call of being.
Language disposes as Ereignis in conversation. While man’s being is grounded in language, grounding occurs only in conversation.
Behind Levinas’s idea of religious exigency of “excendence” lies Heidegger’s notion of the spiritual quality of ontological transcendence
But Heidegger also seems to betray unmistakable vestiges of modern transcendentalism as well, especially when one considers the characteristic turn of modern transcendentalism from experience to the conditions of the possibility of experience.
Translated by Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner
[B]y exposing and asking out beyond the conditions of European humanism [...], Heidegger entered a trans-humanist or post-humanist realm of thought in which an essential part of philosophical reflection on the human being has moved ever since.
τέχνη, here conceived as a secondary form of knowledge whose scope is limited to nonhuman ways of being, becomes the dominant model for conceiving human Being and human knowing.
The inceptive appropriating event clears an openness, with which Heidegger rethinks the “there” of being-there, the open site (or time-space) for the truth of beyng.
The unspoken is not simply what is not vocalized ..., but it is rather what is unremittingly withheld as the unsaid, the mystery of all mysteries of the thoughtful saying ..., the concealment that persists as concealed in the disclosure of the concealment disclosed in the concealment of disclosure ....
[P]henomenology for the young Heidegger was never a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness, but always, however obliquely presented throughout the 1920s, a way of participating in the creative unfolding of the site of Being’s happening.
The inceptive event is a grounding of a question (Who are we? What does being mean?), a grounding of a problem, a grounding of a displacement.
[German Idealism] does not come to a “question of being.” ... In the thinking of Heidegger the “finitude” of the human being is what “comes to view.”
Nothing other than itself, and itself an abyss; in Heidegger's alternative usage, Nichtigkeit.
Beliefs and assertions uncover entities, that is, only because human beings disclose worlds.
Preservation in the sense of the disclosure of truth becomes questionable in the age of modern technology because enframing has greatly diminished our capacity for understanding ourselves as historical beings formed by institutions we sustain and transform through our practices.
Heidegger assumes that the modern mode of being is structured by computability (Berechenbarkeit), which means a universal quantification of things into energy to create more energy.
In the order of the evolution of the human species, as well as in the development of a child, bodily effort and resistance come before a full-fledged world, in which we pursue ways of existing by adopting possibilities in a cultural and historical context.
[T]he first beginning of philosophy originates as the inceptual event through which an incalculable movement of history is brought forward in the direction of its own Origin, which, being paradoxically futural, is thus capable of being enacted as the other beginning.
Truth as ἀλήθεια would make possible truth as correctness by setting forth a look, a presenting foreground, to which apprehension could correspond and so be correct.
Heidegger’s language carves a furrow within the German language that, paradoxically, the foreign reader may feel while the native speaker does not
The meaning of human being’s existence has to be found in this space, in the relational openness where it finds itself.
Worlding is thus characterized by an experience that can be defined as the opposite of alienation: the experience enters into a mode of heightened authenticity, in which I grasp myself all the more as I am more strongly integrated into the context of meaning in which something shows itself as something.
As we become habituated in a particular way of making sense of entities, we shelter, preserve, and maintain the “openness” within which entities can manifest themselves.
[B]ecause living opens one up to death, every thinker who loves life, as I think Ortega y Gasset and Unamuno, among others, did, has to accept the imperative of death as something that belongs to living itself.
The essence of the human is to be thought of as a guarding and the human as a “guardian.” The guarded here is “the event,” and through the guarding of it, the human belongs to it.
On the final pages of Scheler’s critical notes to Being and Time, he makes the following observation: “What would the human being mean if he had only to care for himself and the world - and not also for its ground? He would be a footnote to being.”
For Paul and Heidegger the law and metaphysics ‘been on the job too long,’ with consequent lethal curse.
Being reveals and conceals not in but as history.
The essence of the human being is “needed” for the event (Ereignis) of such emergence into unconcealment, into presencing (Anwesen). Being-in-itself, the presencing of beings-in-themselves, is thus dependent on the human essence.
[The other beginning] views being as an ongoing, dynamic event of meaning-constitution that constantly situates and (re)contextualizes meaningful presence—as Ereignis, the temporal and spatial event or “taking place” of meaningfulness in and through the reciprocal correlation between the givenness of meaning and human receptivity to meaning.
Heidegger’s way of raising the questions is especially provocative; even at his most parochial and perverse, his texts challenge defenders of reason to reason more clearly and carefully, with greater attention to reason’s limits.
The systematic character of Heidegger's thinking lies not only in its retention of irreducible negativity but also in its structure as a progression of forms in which this negativity takes shape in the guise of untruth.
Heidegger’s “Legacy” manuscript and the Brauch material in particular – for all their interpretive challenges – give us something of a final articulation of the relation between Dasein and being.
Special dossier on Shawn Loht’s Phenomenology of Film: A Heideggerian Account of the Film Experience (2017) organised by Robert Sinnerbrink.
The task of the“other beginning” is, in fact, a philopatry to the first site of the first beginning through the vestige and remnant left by the description of Beyng.
With contributions from: Scott Campbell, Babette Babich, Erik Kuravsky, Teelin Lucero, Christopher D. Merwin, Ian Alexander Moore, Richard Polt, William McNeill, Andrew J. Mitchell, Tobias Keiling, Theodore George, Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei, Rebecca A. Longtin, John Lysaker, Pol Vandevelde, Lucas Buchanan Carroll, and Jeffrey Patrick Colgan.
[T]he madman comes to teach those in the marketplace, as Nietzsche points out in The Gay Science, that they have done this to themselves. For Heidegger: “They no longer seek because they no longer think.”
Edited by Stuart Elden. Translated by Kenneth Mills.
Nihilism as the empire of the mastery of the will to will—already Nietzsche saw that: the will “would rather will the nothing than not will”—, and as the epoch of technology (itself understood as “metaphysics in completion”), perhaps forms the core of Marxism, its driving truth.
Dasein's fundamental authentic project is to make sense of its very sense-making.
[A]ll philosophical concepts are formal indications, “formal” in gathering the focal meaning of lived experiences, and “indications” in pointing to engaged circumstances and practices that cannot be fully captured in, or exhausted by, formal concepts.
BBC radio 3 show
The postmodern is not a moment beyond the modern. Instead, what is represented by the postmodern is the unmasterable, disappointed condition of the Enlightenment ideal of modernity "after Auschwitz."
Language is not a being at all, but, like Being itself, it is what gives us access to all beings in the first place.
If Heidegger's characterization of philosophical concepts as formal indications possesses a significant similarity to the nature of artistic composition, it has even closer ties to what he understands as the theological formation and development of Christian belief.
Being is always disclosed to such falling – hence the ontological being is always concerned with falling and always falling itself. Tota vita—tentatio; all life is falling.
| Text | Page |
|---|---|
| Bremen Lectures "The Thing" | 5 |
| Heraclitus | 110 |
| Being and Truth | 35 |
| The Beginning of Western Philosophy | 70 |
| Early Greek Thinking "Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16)" | 102 |
| Being and Time | 22 |
| Pathmarks "What is Metaphysics?" | 120 |
| The Question Concerning Technology | 19 |
| The Principle of Reason | 113 |
| Discourse On Thinking "Memorial Address" | 56 |
| Heraclitus Seminars | 6 |
There are 11 pages because the bottom two tied for 10th place.
* excluding pages in previous years' top ten.
[Heidegger] laments that what is lacking today is “phenomenological discipline” (which is something else than the discipline of phenomenology), one that is not biased by one or the other philosophical position and lets itself be determined by the claim of the Sache, the matter of thinking.
Beginning means both the one beginning, that is the most originary inceptive occurrence of being in its truth, and the beginning again in a more futural sense, but of a “future,” a coming to be that is already there, but not yet in being.
| Text | Page |
|---|---|
| Wegmarken (GA 9) Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers »Psychologie der Weltanschauungen« (1919/21) | 1 |
| Logik: Die frage nach der Wahrheit (GA 21) WS 1925-26 | 170 |
| Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (GA 13) Der Feldweg (1949) | 90 |
| Zur Sache des Denkens (GA 14) Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens (1964) | 81 |
| Vorträge und Aufsätze (GA 7) Bauen Wohnen Denken (1951) | 156 |
| Holzwege (GA 5) Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (1935/36) | 21 |
| Sein und Zeit (Niemeyer) | 250 |
| Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65) (1936-1938) | 408 |
| Frühe Schriften (GA 1) Nachwort des Herausgebers | 437 |
| Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (GA 4) Vorwort zur Lesung von Hölderlins Gedichten | 195 |
* excluding pages in previous years' top ten.
Owning our emotions is thus not a matter of choosing them but of choosing to let them be what they are, as genuinely disclosive.
In Heidegger's work the Master Signifier of human uniqueness is Ereignis.
Translated by Haralambos Ventis, introduction by Andrew Louth
Heidegger's analysis, although it applies to the western tradition of what Heidegger calls "onto theology", it does not take account of the Orthodox tradition of apophatic theology, of which Dionysius the Areopagite is a pre-eminent example.
[I]t is difficult, at first blush, to understand how, of all people, Trakl—the drug-addled, Austrian expressionist in love with decay and obsessed with his sister—could become for Heidegger the next “poet of the Germans” and take on the role of savior of the German people and indeed of the entire Occident.
Temporally, the notion of the last god is an instantiation of Heidegger’s open circle, the return to the beginning that never was, the genuine iteration of the again that is altogether otherwise.
As event, the Ereignis does not offer itself in any positive manner, but precisely as its own ex- or dispropriation. It events by dis- or deventuating: Ereignis gives only as Enteignis; or there is Ereignis only as Enteignis.
Aletheia meant responsivity between the seer and the seen, a relation of mutual interpenetration: the knowing subject changes its forms of understanding as the known object is resignified.
[C]an this temporal field of a GA perhaps also be understood in the equiprimordial register of truth as unconcealment, such that the “institutional errancy” of family, publishers, editors and translators that in fact has manifested itself in the erratic path of the GA can itself be justified in Heideggerian terms, as what Heidegger himself in fact anticipated?
Heidegger considers not just the human but primordial being (or beyng) itself to be finite. Indeed, according to Fink, this is what distinguishes Heidegger’s philosophy from that of all of his predecessors.
I think for Heidegger and the question of technology, it's not so much that technology is either a good or a bad thing, it's just the way that metaphysics has distorted the essence of technology or occluded it, so that we don't quite get to its essence.
Nothing stands in the way of the final possibility that for Dasein the only issue left becomes ordering for the sake of order itself.
Face-to-face with its own being, Dasein’s uncanny feeling is not just a sense of being “not-at-home,” it is also a sense of this strangeness being itself at the heart of one’s own existence.
Of the two versions of the ontological difference, metaphysical and phenomenological, only the latter allows for an adequate understanding of the referential character of symbols (in symbols a first, apparent meaning refers to a second, hidden meaning which is explored through practice).
Heidegger's insight disclosed to him that the Dasein in human being is nothing human.
Philosophy is the getting-going of the going out, over, and beyond the whole of beings that lies at the basis of Dasein.
Heidegger’s metaphysical grounding of logic supports Langer’ contention that art is not opaque and ineffable simply because it cannot be projected into propositional form.
The clearing is an opening lighting center beyond beings that encircles all that is akin to the barely known nothing.
Grasping the truth of the situation, I see how what I am doing here and now is what is to be done as an action worth doing for itself, and that insight is constitutive of its product, πρᾶξις.
Are we, today, in touch with time as history? Are we capable of asking who we are, not just what we are? Are we open to the arrival of what is our own? Or do we continue to be absorbed in representing, producing, and reproducing what is present?
The significance Heidegger finds in his words, and Emerson and Thoreau find in theirs, is remarkable enough; but that in the face of this significance, to discover that their thoughts are intimately, endlessly related, has become for me unforgettably interesting.
Authenticity would thus be tied, not to adherence to some determinate inner 'truth', but rather to an openness to what Heidegger calls the 'event' of appropriation – an openness to the happening of place.
As Plotinus, Heidegger, and Lacan have said, you have to give what you don’t have. If you give what you have, you’re not giving.
Heidegger's Christian heritage includes the theme of the Fortunate Fall—”Yet all our honey in that poyson grewe”—and he uses its analog the Fortunate Breakdown to think in accordance with philosophy's inveterate norm of imparting good news, or inventing it.
[L]ooking at Heidegger in light of an anti-sceptical reading of Wittgenstein and looking at Wittgenstein in light of Heidegger’s problematic of authenticity
No one ‘lives in the moment’ according to Heidegger’s reckoning. Intelligent beings stretch out in time, caught between birth and death: we live between.
[I]n Adorno’s view, Heidegger is more concerned with primordial possibility than with the real possibility of emancipation, which is suppressed by existing conditions.
Heideggerian authenticity and mindfulness would involve a rehabilitation of the Stoic idea of oikeiōsis, as is revealed for example by the homology between oikeiōsis and Befindlichkeit, where both non-conceptually disclose the organism’s constitution to itself.
[T]his neutrality is never in fact neutral, acting as a disguise that erases sexual difference and femininity in favor of a surreptitious phallogocentrism Derrida finds Heidegger guilty of [...]
Heidegger was highly attentive to his own reputation and was a master at self-representation, yet we should not allow ourselves to be distracted by Heidegger’s own sleight of hand.
We, as sexed bodies, are responsible for the throwness (that forms the past) of Dasein.
Heidegger appropriates Aristotle’s texts on ethics, politics, rhetoric, and psychology for the purposes of his analysis of factical life, so that neither ethics nor politics as such define his interpretive angle, which remains quintessentially ontological.
[O]nce one recognizes the technological understanding of being for what it is—a historical understanding—one gains a free relation to it.
We can also think of the respective determinations of deliverance as two poles of a continuously varying ontological reaction norm (contour of the individual capacity for taking-as, for ex-sistence, eigenen Seinkönnen): one the extreme of safety-seeking (stability, predictability, order, equilibrium, harmony, shelter) and the other of risk-seeking (self-creation, Solon's flowers of folly, Schiller's Spieltrieb, Schürmann's ‘singular,' the later Heidegger's an-archie)
New book
[Heidegger] offers an extraordinary vision of the place of the human being in the cosmos, which calls for the practice of acute and steadfast attentiveness, thus providing a standpoint that transcends traditional political oppositions.
[A]lthough Heidegger identifies an originary ontological indeterminateness and points out that this manifests itself ontically through an immanent process of auto-expression, he insists that ontic analyzes of sexuality must be specific to each concrete Dasein and thought in relation to the open-ended becoming that each Dasein is.
[U]nlike Heidegger — who, as we have seen, places all human movements in the category of the concept of gesture — Flusser reserves this term only for a specific kind of movement.
[I]f the world is intelligible upon the basis of this “public one,” it is correct to say that Dasein is not neutral, but rather marked for gender in a patriarchal order.
Galileo’s most important insight, according to Heidegger, is that he saw that in order to experimentally examine nature, you first need to have a conception of nature that underlies all your experiments.
[T]he treatment succeeds because the truth it seeks is the truth of revelation (ἀλήθεια) which is self-validating to the extent that the e-vidence for evidence is e-vidence. As a liberating from darkness (λήθη), this truth is essentially freedom, and freedom of this kind comes to pass through the functioning of language.
This void must be filled. But for Heidegger, attempting to fill it at all, especially by some human self-assertion is itself an expression of nihilism.
It is not that we don’t recognize differences between human beings, machines, and “lifeless nature” or whatever; rather, it is that we act in such a way that those differences finally do not matter.
Malabou transforms Heidegger’s hierarchical binaries of the history of being and metaphysics, ἀλήθεια and ὀρθότης, concealing and revealing, into a ‘general economy of […] mutability’ that, she believes, governs through and through Heidegger’s thinking and is itself based on an ‘ontological metabolism’ that produces ‘changes, mutations, and transformations’.
Heidegger’s own point was that what is in question – this is for him the «danger» – is nothing other than our increasing inability to raise any question at all, let alone critical questions regarding technology.
Heidegger’s lectures on Schelling coincide with his efforts to think being as the self-concealing yet revealing event between humans and God, in which the contest between a recalcitrant earth and a malleable world is waged.
It is a kind of overlapping between Marx's late texts and those of Heidegger's with regard to their respective assessments of the modern epoch: the epoch of the bourgeois-capitalist form of society on the one hand, and the technical age on the other
Proudhon, Bakunin, Saurin—they are all pseudo-anarchists or anarchists only in name. For, according to Schürmann, they fail to exit the metaphysical field
Marcuse diverges from Heidegger in arguing that the congruence of science, technology and society is ultimately rooted in the social requirements of capitalism and the world it projects.
The Net of Indra is not embedded in pre-existent, absolute space; rather, spatial relation is an effect within the Net of Indra.
No common trait or strategy leads from the rule of subsumption to the freedom of the event. This is why, to understand being as Ereignis, a leap is required.
[T]here are good reasons for drawing a strong connection between Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια and Heidegger’s later guiding-word for being, namely, Ereignis.
[T]o write it down in the service of a systematized or scripted curriculum, with the requisite set “lesson-plans,” already betrays Heidegger’s point about one of the things that makes Socrates the purest thinker of the West, namely, “he wrote nothing,” and if he would have attempted to do so, he would have turned away from authentic thought.
What if sexual difference were already marked in the opening up of the question of the sense of Being and of the ontological difference?
Geschlecht III is, then, arguably Derrida’s most frontal and incisive Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger, a German word often translated as “encounter,” but that Derrida hears in the more polemical sense of confrontation
In Broken Hegemonies, [Schürmann] goes further, arguing that anarchy, another name for finitude, has a double principle, natality and mortality, which leaves us in a double bind insofar as natality and mortality are always undoing each other: mortality is the undertow that undoes every new beginning.
Perhaps the best way of describing angst, which captures what Heidegger needs from it methodologically, is as an ‘epiphany’ (in the Christian sense) or ‘apocalypse’ (in the Greek sense).
What unfolds as Ereignis is presence itself, i.e. our standing in, and simultaneously reflecting on, the open.
Heidegger says that Angst ‘does not know' what it's anxious about.
[M]usic will belong to thought precisely in such a way as to preclude its becoming an object of that thought.
The problem as [Heidegger] sees it is not that we have a decent philosophy of language but have missed something else.
Does not the heideggerian analysis amount to saying that the fall into everydayness is useful, pragmatically necessary, but "immoral"?
Being is something that happens to us rather than something we do, even autonomically. This, along with the dynamic connotation, is why he comes to use the term Ereignis: being manifesting itself is an event in which we are caught up rather than an act we perform.
[T]he appropriation of historical Being in the Ereignis does not denote the forceful, willful taking possession of Being, in the sense of usurping something. Rather, in the Ereignis, it is Being that takes possession of us.
Technological language is thus the language of inauthenticity. It is the modern technological Gerede. Cyber-talk is idle talk.
[L]anguage adjusts to the needs of our experience of what is.
[T]here can be no doubt whatsoever that Heidegger held these notebooks to be intellectually significant—something which, considering their thoroughgoing banality, is for me not merely surprising but actually horrifying.
Once he saw that Husserl’s breakthrough regarding the categorial intuition had already been anticipated by Aristotle in Metaphysics IX, 10, Heidegger had a new insight, one that launched him on his lifelong pursuit of “the thing itself.” He saw that movement determines meaning.
With a response from Richard Polt.
[A]s opposed to an event in the history of Western metaphysics (onto-theology) linked to Plato’s philosophy, for Detienne, it is actually the poet Simonides of Ceos (c. 556–468 BC) who is among those chiefly responsible for the devaluation of alētheia.
Derrida thinks of Heidegger's notion of appropriation—Ereignis but also authenticity, Eigentlichkeit—a virtuous pretense residually connected to the Judeo-Christian, or Abrahamic, faith.
As it is a letting of beings appear in their being, so the granting of the openness of beings in and through language is a letting of beings into their 'own', into what is proper to them, but as such it is also into a letting of beings into their proper 'relation' with one another – both as together and apart.
Anders’ questioning project of the meaning of having with respect to both Being and the body is not only phenomenologico-ontological but aesthetico-epistemological: concerned with appearance, quite specifically with feigning of fictions, illusion.
[I]t is not that Theaetetus’ answer should be assimilated to empiricism and rejected on such grounds, but rather that this answer assimilates unhiddenness to presence (what-is-present, phantasia) to the point where the two terms become identical.
Withy's intervention keeps Tomlinson's book off phenomenology's Index of Wrong-headed Research so that we may avail ourselves of whatever light his effort sheds on die Sache selbst. For the goal of Tomlinson's work is the same as that of Heidegger's, die Herkunft von Anwesen.
[Heidegger] claims that there is a call of the conscience from a place of uncanniness; a place that is alien to us in our everyday mode of being immersed in the they-self.
Heidegger’s phenomenology is, in no small part, in the business of identifying phenomena that conceal themselves and revealing the fact of that self-concealing.
[T]he priority of beings over beyng, which was already on the way to logical self-assertion in the thinking of the thinkers of the first inception, unleashes the metaphysical destiny of the West and its concurring planetary devastation in the wake of Machenschaft.
[updated]
Ereignis is a German word that has no direct English translation. It is often translated as "event" or "appropriation," but these translations do not capture the full meaning of the term. Ereignis is a central concept in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and it refers to the event of being.
For Heidegger, being is not a thing or a substance. It is not something that can be known or understood through reason. Being is the ground of all things, and it is that which makes things possible. Ereignis is the event in which being comes into presence. It is the moment when something is revealed as what it is.
Ereignis is not something that happens to us. It is something that we participate in. When we encounter something, we are participating in Ereignis. We are allowing being to come into presence through us. Ereignis is the event of truth. It is the moment when we see things as they really are.
Ereignis is a difficult concept to understand, but it is central to Heidegger's philosophy. It is the event that makes all things possible, and it is the event that allows us to see the truth.
Here are some additional thoughts on Ereignis:
Ereignis is a dynamic event, not a static state. It is always happening, and it is always changing.
Ereignis is not something that we can control. It is something that we can only participate in.
Ereignis is a gift. It is something that is given to us, not something that we earn.
Ereignis is a mystery. We cannot fully understand it, but we can experience it.
Ereignis is a complex and profound concept. It is a concept that has the potential to transform our understanding of the world.
Needs citations.
Translated by
Kaiser-Wihlem Institute. Bibliotheca Hertziana, Rome, April 8, 1936.
What is asked about is that from which beings arise, and that to which they return - the ground and abyss of Beyng.
The ontological determination of Dasein—that is, of the being that we ourselves in each case are—is primarily possibility.
Carlo Michelstaedter from Gorizia, an Italophone Austro-Hungarian citizen of Jewish origins, finished writing his tesi di laurea on October 16th 1910, put a gun to his head the next day, and took his own life.
A side-effect of this longstanding, broad reception is that the field of Heidegger studies is so differentiated, dispersed, and fragmented that it becomes impossible to adjudicate conflicting claims on a purely conceptual level.
Consistent with the methodological recommendations of phenomenology, Pessoa describes the ontic relationality of Dasein in its non-thematizable everydayness.
Heidegger marks this sort of translation with a shift in emphasis. Rather than übersetzen, he writes übersetzen, stressing the first syllable and hence the “over” into which we are to be “placed.”
The insight into the burden of being may also help us see the limitations of the Enlightenment without leaping to the conclusion that it must be completely rejected.
From Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations.
Thus Heidegger’s characterization of intentionality avoids both the overly conceptual Searlean reading—in which acting intentionally must involve an explicit awareness of the goal or the satisfaction conditions that it establishes—and Dreyfus’s overly self- less understanding of intentionality, which lacks any sense of agency’s mineness.
If, having somehow finessed the measurement problem, we could model a large random sample of ontological insights by a suitable function, the bulk of the distribution would be – so goes the conjecture – populated by noticings, teen angst, ‘existential angst,’ and midlife crises, whereas breakdowns would be found only in the long tail of rarity.
Heidegger failed to develop this insight and realize that this distress caused by the lack of holy names must take root in the body before it can move towards its fulfilment. The event whereby this distress takes roots in the body is like that of Ereignis, whereby Being enters history.
Heidegger's polysemic reading of the principle of reason solves the problem of contra-diction by saying all three levels of being at once, expressing their Sameness the Same way.
A genuine history of thought, then (or a “history of Being”) would neither celebrate the progress of enlightenment nor bemoan the growing darkness, but would trace the interplay of the clear and the obscure.