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§ 14. Relationship of force and conversance

idea of the whole interrelation between δύναμις μετὰ λόγου and ἐπιστήμη ποιητική. Aristotle has this interrelation in mind as he further develops the δύναμις problem.


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The inner relation of δύναμις and λόγος drew our attention to δύναμις μετὰ λόγου. What is characteristic of this is that it is directed at contraries. What does this mean, and to what extent does it characterize δύναμις μετὰ λόγου, that is, ἐπιστήμη ποιητική? Ἐπιστήμη ποιητική is a being familiar with the producing of something, with something in its producibility, or even better in its being produced, as ἔργον. Εἶδος, τέλος, and πέρας are determinative for this work relation- the forming of a model as a forging into bounds. We find here a preliminary designation ὕλη. Ὕλη itself is established as what is cut out for, what is in fact not yet, what is still distant, ἄπειρον. There occurs a continual excluding, letting go and avoiding, and that means a relation to contraries. But all of this seems to go on without λόγος. Yet Aristotle says it should be the other way around. If so, then this concerns the relation between εἶδος and λόγος. The "representing" [Vor-stellen] of the εἶδος is a selecting and thus a giving notice (λόγος). The τέλος is selected out. Addressed in this way, it claims the leadership in producing; it regulates, and it does this by excluding. But is not the entire interrelation in Aristotle more simply seen inasmuch as judgment-both positive and negative judgment-pertains to ἐπιστήμη, knowledge?

But why is there this contrariness of positive and negative in λόγος? Because the essence of λόγος is notification. and because this giving notice to something is necessarily a giving of something as something. But why necessarily? Because all giving is a response to a receptive not having. This receptive taking as not having is only partially a laking into possession of something because that which is to be possessed always remains other. Partially means always in this or that respect. always as this or that. With this "as" it is always a this or that Which is decided upon and separated out. But why then does the as belong to λόγος? Because notification pertains to conversance, and


Martin Heidegger (GA 33) Aristotle's Metaphysics θ 1-3