not-being-able-to-discover this knownness, one extrapolates a phenomenological deception and construction!
Thus, when a series of living contexts of experience relating to the immanent meaning of the experienced world-reality are explored phenomenologically and then it is said: "But I still do not regard as meaningful anything and everything that I experience; I have no explicit consciousness of meaningfulness:" so is that: 1) no objection against the stated thesis, since something like that simply could not be said, insofar as the wholly unreflected character of what is experienced in the factical pull of life should be seized; 2) only an indication that the phenomenon, meaningfulness itself, is not originally seen, particularly not in its untouched [unangetasteten) life, that is, in its life-context.4 This belongs to factical life in itself or plainly is it. The continually open horizons of expectation, even if not currently known—i.e. the remarkably prefiguring motivating tendencies from out of the somehow prefigured future-allow factical life in each case to become engrossed in what it experiences, which, as such, has the sense of meaningfulness. The co-incidental [Zu-fällige] in life, the surprising, the new are characterized as phenomenal in various ways, falling out of or occurring out of and in the temporally particular context of expectation, which for its part is carried by factical life.
 It is thus not the case that the factical experiencing of the world, with respect to the sense of reality in which it lives, may be phenomenally characterized as a judgment about the value or the particular meaning of what is directly experienced. Aside from the fact that from out of this, what is to be clarified [das zu Klärende] would be taken simply as an explanatory [erklärende] presupposition of itself, and aside from the fact that something like that cannot be exhibited phenomenally-hence nothing was mentioned in our thesis, as clarified above —, meaningfulness is erroneously construed as the constitutive correlate of a taking of value or a valuing or even as an explicit judgment of value.5
Certainly, the taking of value plays a dominant role in factical experiencing, yet once again as improminent, and it governs both the forms of construction and the worlds of experience, and it has precisely through its factical improminence an intimate connotation with the basic sense of the factical reality of experience. The sense of "meaningfulness" in which the factical consciousness of experience lives is thus also not the correlate of a particular kind of taking of value. Then what should be taken value of? The real. But its sense, how it gives itself in the factical context of meaning, we simply want to see for ourselves, not what is experienced with the in such a sense, i.e. what is experienced as real, what is otherwise experientially undertaken, so to speak. Delimitation
86 BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY