In light of the foregoing considerations, this distinction has been shown to boil down to the distinction between

• the complication of the presence disclosed in ecstatic timeliness, i.e., the references, inherent in meaningful presence, to a background context of nonpresence, and
• the foreground of presence, which becomes accessible by virtue of this complication and is, in each instance, focalized on a meaningful being.

When the ontological difference is understood in this way, we discover that it is brought up already in the Introduction to Being and Time, where Heidegger declares being, which lies “beyond” every being in its determinateness, to be the “transcendens pure and simple”—i.e., the context that, when approached via beings, “transcends” or extends “beyond” every determinate being, every focal point of presence.

The ambiguities inherent in Heidegger’s articulation of the ontological difference signal a fundamental ambiguity in his use of the word “being” (Sein). This ambiguity is not the result of mere terminological carelessness. It rather betrays the “transitional” character of Heidegger’s discourse, the unresolved tension between the metaphysical and postmetaphysical approaches to being that he constantly grapples with. In order to understand the ontological difference, we must leap ahead of things and distinguish three distinct aspects in Heidegger’s discourse on “being.” It should again be noted that they are distinct only as aspects of one fundamentally unified constitution. Heidegger does not speak of “being” in many simply equivocal and detached senses any more than Aristotle does; nevertheless, his use of this word and its cognates have different emphases in different contexts. In order to highlight this aspectuality without overlooking its basic unity, it may be helpful to distinguish these main aspects by using a subscript numeral: being₁, being₂, and being₃.⁶¹ In so doing, however, we must be aware of the shortcomings inherent in this practice and of the risk of superficial formalism, pointed out by George Kovacs,⁶² that such typographical strategies entail. We will also see (in Chapter 6) that late in his career, Heidegger himself chose to renounce the use of any cognates of “being” for his “own topic,” Ereignis, which further complicates matters. In any case, this threefold distinction does not pretend to be a clear-cut or exhaustive one: all three levels can be shown to encompass a variety of nuances in themselves, and in late texts such as the Identity and Difference lectures Heidegger has a tendency to use

Jussi Backman - Complicated Presence: Heidegger and the Postmetaphysical Unity of Being