b) The saying about being occurs in correspondences: The first sentence thinks being as τὸ χρεών in correspondence with the inception as threefold enjoinment
The first sentence talks about γένεσις and φθορά; usually we translate these words with “coming to be” and “passing away” (going under, for Nietzsche). “Coming to be” and “passing away” are names for the alternating course of all things. We think, however, that “coming to be and passing away” (wherein precisely the “movement” of things stands out) are in themselves intelligible “processes,” for they are the most familiar “occurrences.” Who is not familiar with “coming to be and passing away”? And who does not know that “coming to be and passing away” take place everywhere and at all times? In what way particular things come to be and by what causes they each go under may remain mysterious and in various respects uninvestigated. But the process of coming to be and passing away is itself indeed a matter of fact that we, as they say today, “experience” [erleben], and, to be sure, in the most diverse spheres of the actual.
And yet, what does this mean: “coming to be” and “passing away”? Above all, what do γένεσις and φθορά mean? How are we ever to think in Greek what one immediately calls ‘coming to be and passing away”?
Our translation should point the way. Γένεσις: emergence; φθορά: elusion. The last-mentioned word says more clearly that it is a question of evasion, meaning going away, as distinguished from coming forth. “Away” and “forth” demand a more precise stipulation of ‘whence’ “away” and “whither” “forth” evasion and emergence and what they are. If we think in the Greek way, thus incipiently, we must necessarily think this “whither forth” and “‘whence away” along with emergence and elusion.
Now, the fragment not only speaks indeterminately about γένεσις and φθορά,but both are grasped as something that is peculiar ἐστιν τοῖς οὖσι, to what respectively presences. Τὰ ὄντα, that means not only “things” but each and every being. Yet, we do not translate τοῖς οὖσι with “to beings,” but with “to what respectively presences.” We want to name that through which what we call “beings” distinguish themselves