α. Οὐσία as Beings
From the basic directions of meaning of the term οὐσία, we initially choose that which intends beings themselves. In this use, the expression appears. Οὐσίαι is said of various “beings” since they have various being-characters. Beings themselves are always primarily discovered prior to being. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 7, Chapter 2: δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν,24 “the being of beings shows itself openly in σώματα.” If we translate σῶμα as “body,” we must note that corporeality for the Greeks does not mean materiality or having-the-character-of-stuff. Rather, σῶμα means a characteristic obtrusiveness of a being, of a being that is there, such that later τὸ σὸν σῶμα, “your σῶμα,” is the same as σύ; and later σῶμα means “slave,” “prisoner,” a being that belongs to me, that is at my disposal, what is there for me in this obtrusiveness and self-evidence. This meaning is to be heard also. Such σώματα are, accordingly, not only bodily things but also animals, trees, earth, water, air, τὰ φυσικά, and even the οὐρανός; not only dead things but beings that, initially and for the most part, are there in the everydayness of life.25 Aristotle says of these beings that to him δοκεῖ ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα; directly and initially the οὐσία shows itself therein. Whether there is yet another kind of being that would qualify as οὐσία is an open question.26 Οὐσίαι [...] ὁμολογούμεναι: Each says the same as another, without qualification, namely, that these beings are.27 These beings are addressed in the genuine sense as beings in the self-evidence of natural being-there.
Therefore, for Aristotle and for all research that investigates being, and thereby wants to have a ground to stand on, it is self-evident that it proceeds from the consideration of being (and the being-structure) that is initially there in this manner; that it proceeds from a sense of being that naturalness understands without qualification. Life moves in a natural intelligibility of that which is immediately meant by “being” and “beings” in its speaking. Metaphysics, Book 7, Chapter 3 (end): ὁμολογοῦνται δ᾽ οὐσίαι εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινές,28 “it is agreed that beings in the genuine sense belong to that which is perceived in αἴσθησις.” When Aristotle speaks of the αἰσθητόν, he never means something objective with the character of sense-data which are present through “sensations.” By αἴσθησις, he means the “perceiving” of beings in the natural mode, a perceiving distinguished by the fact that the senses are implicated in it by providing its access. It is the natural mode of seeing and speaking about things such as trees and the moon. There is a prevailing agreement that beings which
24. Met. Ζ 2, 1028 b 8 sq.
25. Met. Ζ 2, 1028 b 9 sqq.
26. Cf. Met. Ζ 2, 1028 b 13 sqq.
27. Met. Η 1, 1042 a 6.
28. Met. Ζ 3, 1029 a 33 sq.