not have an indifferent sense of being, as, ultimately, there is no such thing. Οὐσία is the abbreviation for παρουσία, “being-present.” Usually the opposite is ἀπουσία, “absence,” not simply nothing but something there, although there as a lack. Squinting is a matter of seeing in the mode of ἀπουσία. Ἀπουσία is the ontological basis for the basic category of στέρησις. We want to try to bring the aforementioned characters of the there to a basic orientation.
1. Ὑποκείμενον,43 “being-at-hand,” the “at-hand-ness” of something. This being-character is connected with being in the sense of the customary meaning. It means what is there not only as being-there, but it also means what is there in the sense of that upon which the estate rests, for example, land, earth, sky, nature, trees, what is at hand in the sense of the beings with which concrete life scrapes out its existence (Dasein). Οὐσία—thus at-hand-ness, without I myself needing to do anything vis-à-vis the being of these beings that are there.
2. Αἴτιον (τοῦ εἶναι) ἐνυπάρχον,44 for example, ψυχή.45 The “soul” is οὐσία in the sense that it constitutes the being-there of the beings that have the character of living. A living thing has an entirely characteristic being-there: (a) It is there in the sense of the ὑποκείμενον; it is at hand as are stones, tables. (b) But the human being is not there in the path in the way that a stone is; rather, a human being goes for a stroll under the trees. I encounter a human being somewhere, but this, his being-there as occurring, as “world,” is characterized by the fact that his being-there is in the mode of being-in-the-world. It is by having an orientation. The human being is there in such a way that he is in the world, in the sense that he has his world; he has his world insofar as he knows his way around in it. Ψυχή, as a being-character, is distinguished by comprising in itself being as ὑποκείμενον.
3. Μόριον ἐνυπάρχον,46 that which constitutes the possible being of something: for example, the point, the line, the number as genuine being-character since number is limitation. But number, point, etc. are being-characters only inasmuch as it is demonstrable that, for the Greeks, limit and being-limited are genuine being-characters.
4. Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι:47 this combination already points to the fact that here we are dealing with an entire complex of being-determinations, which we will sort out later. Being in the character of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is the genuine topic of that λόγος that we are now discussing as ὁρισμός. This being-character is that of ἕκαστον. Every being that is there in its particularity is determined through the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.
In the summation of being-characters, there is yet a fifth: εἶδος.48 Already,
43. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 13 sq.
44. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 15
45. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 16.
46. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 17.
47. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 21 sq.
48. Met. Δ 8, 1017 b 26..