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did. What does this “announcing” genuinely mean, this σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις? It constitutes the being-with-one-another of this living being. We will, therefore, consider something that is doubled, with respect to φωνή, as well as with respect to λόγος.

1. In φωνή, just as in λόγος, a definiteness of being-in-the-world appears, a definite manner in which the world encounters life. This occurs, first, in the character of ἡδύ and of λυπηρόν, and in the second case in the character of the “beneficial and harmful” (συμφέρον, βλαβερὸν). These are fundamental determinations: the world in natural being-there is not a fact that I take notice of; it is not an actuality or a reality. Rather, the world is there for the most part in the mode of the beneficial and the harmful, of that which uplifts or upsets being-there. And these characters of access are there at once in “announcing” and then in “speaking,” in φωνή and in λόγος. At once we witness how announcing and speaking appropriate the world as encountered in its original and immediate character of being-there; and they communicate with others in such a way that these beings are with one another. The world’s character of being-there is such that the relationality of its there is precisely toward several that are with one another. This world that is initially being there for several that live with one another, we designate as surrounding world, the world in which I am involved initially and for the most part.

2. We are witnessing how these two possibilities in which the world is encountered in its initial being-there are, as such, the modes in which living things are with one another, in which the κοινωνία is constituted. Thus our next task is to clarify that, in fact, what is meant by these determinations of the ἡδύ and the λυπηρόν are aspects of the encounter with the world that address themselves to being-in-the-world, to living, in such a way that what is there in the character of the ἡδύ and λυπηρόν, as such and in their actuality, is not at all explicitly grasped. The world, in the character of the ἡδύ and λυπηρόν, is nonobjective; animals do not have the world there as objects. The world is encountered in the mode of the uplifting and the upsetting; it is encountered in this character by virtue of the fact that living things speak these characters directly into beings that are there.

This context becomes plain, without qualification, when we look at a determination that Aristotle gives in Book 1, Chapter 11 of the Rhetoric—the determination of the ἡδονή, a determinate mode of being-in-the-world, of “one’swell-being.” “It is established for us that something’s well-being is a certain movement of the being of the living in its world, and indeed κατάστασις ἁθρόα, a transposing-of-oneself-all-at-once εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, into the genuinely available possibility of the being-there in question, in such a way that it is thereby perceived.”⁷ This κατάστασις refers to nothing other than well-being:

7. Aristotelis Ars rhetorica. Iterum edidit A. Roemer. Lipsiae in aedibus B.G. Teubneri 1914. Α 11, 1369 b 33 sqq.: ὑποκείσθω δὴ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἁθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν.