phenomenon of living, insofar as one is determined in this manner.
Living as being-in-a-world finds itself characterized by ἡδονή insofar as the ἡδύ is there. For animals, encountering the world in the character of the ἡδύ is, for example, encountering a favorable feeding place and not a symphony. It is always something that is in the animal’s surrounding world. This being that is there in the character of mattering-to-animals is indicated, animals give a “sign,” σημεῖον. It indicates beings that are there with the character of the ἡδύ. The indicating gives no report about the being-at-hand of what is pleasing outside in nature, but rather this indicating and crying out is itself an enticing or a warning. The indicating of the being that is there is an enticement, a warning. Enticement and warning have, in themselves, the character of addressing itself to. . . . Enticing means to bring another animal into the same disposition; warning is the repelling from this same disposition. Enticing and warning as repelling and bringing, in themselves, have in their ground being-with-one-another. Enticing and warning already show that animals are with one another. Being-with-one-another becomes manifest precisely in the specific being-character of animals as φωνή. It is neither exhibited nor manifested that something as such is there. Animals do not subsequently come along to ascertain that something is at hand; they only indicate it within the orbit of their animalistic having-todo. Since animals indicate the threatening, or alarming, and so on, they signal, in this indicating of the being-there of the world, their being in the world. The world is indicated as ἡδύ and, at the same time, it is a signaling of being, being-threatened, having-found, and so on.
γ. The Encounter-Characters of the World of Humans Beings: συμφέρον, βλαβερὸν, and ἀγαθόν. Λόγος as Self-Expression with Others about What Is Conducive to the End of Concern
We must pursue, through λόγος, the dual-character that arises from the fact that the indicating of the world as encountered in φωνή is also the signaling of being-in-the-world. We must clarify how speaking, insofar as it is a basic phenomenon of being, is itself derived from the basic mode of being as being-with-one-another. How is being-in the-world through λόγος distinguished from being-in the-world through φωνή?
It will be shown here how φωνή is a fundamental being-determination of animals, like λόγος is for human beings, and that it has a dual function: (1) the indication of something, of the world as ἡδύ and λυπηρόν, (2) which, as signal, constitutes that which is seen as characteristic of the being-with-oneanother of animals. In this being-in-the-world of animals, the peculiar being of animals as such—being-with-one-another—manifests itself. Aristotle supplies the reference to φωνή and ζῷα as θηρία at the outset, in order to give the correct background for the further being-characteristic of human beings in the world, for the λόγος-investigation. We will now investigate how the characteristic being of human beings in their world as being-with-one-another becomes visible in λόγος, how it is precisely in λόγος that κοινωνία is constituted,