that the ἀγαθόν has primarily the character of an end only because it can be a for-the-sake-of-which, a for-the-sake-of-another.
3. Further, the ἀγαθόν is determined as οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα,29 “that toward which everything maintains itself, that toward which it is under way”; specifically,
4. οὗ παρόντος, and this “insofar as it is present,” εὖ διάκειται.30 If the ἀγαθόν is there as such, if concern is brought to its end, then the one who is concerned εὖ διάκειται is in a disposition that is characterized as εὖ. Εὖ is a definite how of finding-oneself-disposed, which is cultivated insofar as it is settled for the one concerned. The εὖ is dependent upon the manner and mode of concern for the end.
These various determinations of ἀγαθόν all run together in that the ἀγαθόν is primarily end, τέλος, or more precisely, πέρας. We have already seen πέρας as a fundamental determination of being.
c) The One (Das Man) as the How of the Everydayness of
Being-with-One-Another: The Equiprimordiality of
Being-with-One-Another and Speaking-Being
Being-with-one-another was set forth as a novel character of the being of human beings. It appears in the concrete structure of λόγος itself—λόγος as “speaking,” as it is alive in everydayness; that speaking which is the mode of fulfillment of deliberation, of taking-counsel-with-itself at the time, of concern. As deliberating, an involving oneself in the world is fulfilled, a world that is there in the character of ἀγαθόν, that is, of συμφέρον. In the συμφέρον, the for-which is co-given, the τέλος as something at which and in which concern comes to its end. This συμφέρον is encountered in λογίζεσθαι; λογίζεσθαι has the fulfillment-form of the συλλογισμός, of the conclusion, namely, as ‘ifthen.’ In this way, the world is there as the surrounding world of human beings, wherein they move. It is precisely λόγος that exhibits, makes explicit, conduciveness as such and, on the other hand, the οὗ ἕνεκα. Λέγειν τι κατά τινος, something is meant “as something”; the world is possessed there in the character of the as, posited in a definite respect. On this basis, Aristotle can also say in the same passage: αἴσθησιν ἔχειν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.31 We designate this sight of concern as looking-around. In deliberating, I take a look around myself. However, this looking-around, and what is there in it, are exhibited precisely through the λόγος that is in fact ἀποφαίνεσθαι. The characters of the ‘as such and such’ are brought explicitly into the there. Thus we see here that λόγος fulfills its basic function: ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν;32 it is “to thereby make manifest” the world. This
29. Rhet. Α 6, 1362 a 23
30. Rhet. Α 6, 1362 a 26 sq.
31. Pol. Α 2, 1253 a 14 sqq.
32. Pol. Α 2, 1253 a 14.