The Aristotelian Definition of the Being-There [65–66]

§10. The Being-There of Human Beings as ἐνέργεια: The ἀγαθόν
(Nicomachean Ethics Α 1–4)

Why does the being of the being-there of human beings interest us? Why have we come back around to it? Because we discerned earlier that conceptuality points back toward the being-there of human beings. Conceptuality is a concern of a definite being-possibility of the being-there of human beings. Insofar as we want to grasp Greek conceptuality, we must make being-there intelligible and accessible to us, in its Greek, Aristotelian interpretation. In pursuit of the task of uncovering the being-there of human beings, we have already encountered some being-determinations; we have found the new being-determination of being-with-one-another. We will proceed until we encounter the genuine being-character, the πέρας. We have already encountered this πέρας in the analysis of being-with-one-another. The being of human beings is determined as concern; every care as concern has a definite end, a τέλος. Insofar as the being of human beings is determined through πρᾶξις, every πρᾶξις has a τέλος; insofar as the τέλος of every πρᾶξις, as πέρας, is ἀγαθόν, ἀγαθόν is the genuine being-character of human beings. The ἀγαθόν is a determination of the being of human beings in the world. Therefore, through this analysis of the ἀγαθόν, we will acquire a new clarification of the being-there of human beings, specifically by referring this back to the πέρας, which is to say, to the genuine being-character itself. On the basis of these findings, we will investigate the ἀγαθόν more closely as a being-determination of human beings, a being-character of concern, and so of being-there itself.

In this way, we are investigating the being of the Greek ἀγαθόν. With this purpose in mind, we are taking up particular passages of Aristotle himself, specifically, Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics.

We are asking four questions:

1. Where is the ἀγαθόν explicitly visible as ἀγαθόν? In which mode of being-related to the world is it there explicitly? We are asking about the field in which we see it originally and concretely.

2. Where is the ἀγαθόν of πρᾶξις—the ἀγαθόν of concern as a determination of human beings, the ἀγαθόν of that way of being that is determined as ζῷον πολιτικόν? Where does the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν show up?

3. We are asking about the basic determinations of the ἀγαθόν as such.

4. We are asking about the way of being and the being-possibility of human beings that is sufficient for the structure of the ἀγαθόν to be set forth.

Thus, in short, we are asking: (1) Where do we meet with something like ἀγαθόν? (2) We are asking about the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. (3) We are asking about the general determinations of the ἀγαθόν as such (and so, of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, as will be set forth). (4) Which way of being, which being-possibility of human beings, is sufficient for the ἀγαθόν?

To properly prepare for this consideration, it is important that we remind

Martin Heidegger (GA 18) Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy

Page generated by BasConAriPhiSteller.EXE