interpretation of the αὔταρκες, that the τέλος is such as to determine a being-there as being-with-one-another. The τέλος must be self-sufficient for determining being-with-one-another.
We want to consider these four determinations more closely. The τέλος determined formerly as δι᾽ αὑτό is what one quite generally designates as εὐδαιμονία,54 and this is generally translated as “happiness.” The consideration of the βίοι begins in Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, Chapter 3: “It seems that what one understands by ἀγαθόν, by εὐδαιμονία, that which constitutes the genuineness of the being-there of human beings, has been taken οὐκ ἀλόγως from the βίοι (not in such a way that nothing is thereby exhibited, but rather in precisely such a way that something comes to appearance.”)55 Οὐκ ἀλόγως means, then, that this determination of the τέλος-being of the βίος is on the right path since, in fact, something substantial is exhibited. Aristotle says of the βίος ἀπολαυστικός that it has its τέλος in ἡδονή, and in such a way that those who are resolved to it τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου,56 “come into conversation.” One speaks of them; one joins in; one equates what is common with what is right; and they have the approval of the crowd. Οἰ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμήν.57 “By contrast, the educated and those who go into practical affairs, into a profession, posit the τέλος in τιμή.” They say that in concrete being-there as being-with-one-another, what one ultimately depends on is the “reputation” one has vis-à-vis others. On this point, Aristotle says that with the determination of the τέλος as τιμή, the ἀγαθόν is not with the one who is after reputation, but rather is with those who esteem the others; for they are the ones who have the ἀγαθόν at their disposal, while the others are after τιμή “in order to secure and convince themselves that their being-there is an ἀγαθόν.”58 Thus τιμή is not at all something in my own being-there as such; τιμή is not οἰκεῖον ἀγαθόν. I have τιμή by the grace of others. This is even more transparent in the case of ἡδονή, where Aristotle is not showing that this ἀγαθόν is brought to human beings from without; it is no δυσαφαίρετον, nothing “inevitable.” Even this higher τέλος as τιμή is not a τέλος that would be seen as an ultimate possession in being-there itself. But even the further determination as ἀρετή is κατὰ τούτους.59 “It is possible to be a competent fellow and yet sleep through one’s being-there, have bad luck, fail to succeed”60—two determinations: being-awake and succeeding. Thus further determinations are required if one is to flesh out ἀρετή, “competence.” The possibility that one sleep through one’s life or suffer bad luck requires that ἀρετή be ἐνέργεια, a matter that shows itself
54. Eth. Nic. Α 2, 1095 a 17 sq.: τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν.
55. Eth. Nic. Α 3, 1095 b 14 sqq.: τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν.
56. Eth. Nic. Α 3, 1095 b 21.
57. Eth. Nic. Α 3, 1095 b 22 sq.
58. Eth. Nic. Α 3, 1095 b 27 sq.: ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι.
59. Eth. Nic. Α 3, 1095 b 29 sq.
60. Eth. Nic. Α 3, 1095 b 32 sqq.: δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα.