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of human beings, the θεωρεῖν, becomes intelligible. Θεωρεῖν is beingthere’s ownmost possibility since in it being-there reaches its end in such a way that it is transposed into its most genuine possibility, into its ownmost there, as θεωρεῖν constitutes the most genuine ἐντελέχεια of the being of human beings. What was concrete in Greek existence as an existence-tendency is here brought to its most genuine expression, and in such a form that Aristotle makes this existence intelligible on the basis of its genuine sense of being and being-there, and grounds it therein.

The most general and immediate determination of the τέλειον is that beyond which there is nothing to apprehend, in the sense that a being-character comes to expression therein. Τέλειον is not a being as a being, but rather as way of being. Shoes, work tools, and so on, ὑποκείμενα, all of these beings are τέλη only when their being-character is thereby made explicit; that by which a definite handiwork reaches its end genuinely is. The beyond-which-nothing is not being-completed in a negative sense of being-toward-the-end, but is to be taken in the positive sense as constituting the genuine there. The τέλος is in such a way that it maintains the being in its presentness. The sense of being is determined by this being-present.

With this clarified concept of τέλειον, we come to Aristotle’s further consideration with respect to the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. The ἀγαθόν of human being-there must be a πέρας because every being is determined as limit-being. Thus the question is: which character does the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν have qua τέλος? Which determinations arrive at this τέλος itself?

This discussion is carried out on the concrete basis of the being-there of human beings, in the way that it is seen in natural experience, specifically, human being-there as being-with-one-another in the πόλις, being-with-one-another in concern. Human concerns proceed in a guiding connectedness. The τέλη refer, in themselves, to one another, that is, the τέλη are at every moment δι᾽ ἕτερα. This is a being-determination of the τέλη. It is not as though the τέλος is something lying before one, that then finds a definite use. Already, that which the instrument-maker is after has in itself the character of usability for . . . This concern to produce a shoe is determined in itself by the fact that the τέλος is the ability-to-be-worn of the shoe. “Not all τέλη are τέλεια”⁹⁵ in the way that they are encountered in concrete being-there. Not everything with which a concern reaches its end is τέλειον. The ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν becomes τέλειον only in the genuine sense.⁹⁶ It is said of it that it does not go εἰς ἄπειρον,⁹⁷ that the guidedness of the τέλη of πράξεις does not lose itself in the infinite. The discussion of the βίοι, of the τέλη καθ᾿ αὑτά, concluded that there is a manifoldness of τέλη καθ᾿ αὑτά, so that the ἄριστον must be that which is τελειότατον in relation to

95. Eth. Nic. Α 5, 1097 a 27 sq.: οὐκ ἔστιν πάντα τέλεια.

96. Eth. Nic. Α 5, 1097 a 28: τὸ δ’ ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται.

97. Eth. Nic. Α 1, 1094 a 20.