imperative. Insofar as the rational essence is something that is open to law in the basic determination of respect, and at the same time is in such a way that its being is by itself oriented toward the end to a certain extent, and so has no further why, this law is in itself the ultimate; the ought is categorical, not hypothetical. For the being of human beings, there is no if, but rather an ultimate then. Since the idea of law comes into play, the foundation and opening up of this context has a different look. The idea of law is oriented toward the lawfulness of nature, by which law is yet further apprehended. However, nature is, here, the manner of being-there, and thus in the sense of φύσις (Aristotle). It is remarkable to observe that Kant apprehends the concept of the law of nature in the further, almost Aristotelian, sense. “Act in such a way that the maxim of your action could be a universal law of nature.”105 The maxim is not supposed to be a law of nature as explicit law, but rather as a mode of being-there per se. Thus the being itself of human beings is what, in the end, constitutes the ἁπλῶς τέλειον of a being that is there. And this ἁπλῶς τέλειον is what one means by the expression εὐδαιμονία. Aristotle gives this popular, ordinary concept a specifically philosophical sense by determining the meaning of εὐδαιμονία on the basis of being-there itself. In the context of this clarification of εὐδαιμονία as ἁπλῶς τέλειον, Aristotle fleshes out this τέλειον in such a way that it is determined as τέλειον of the being-there of human beings. This relatedness that is constitutive of the τέλειον as being-completed comes to expression in the determination of the αὔταρκες: “that good which makes the being-there of human beings completed shows itself to be self-sufficient. [Since the human being, in accord with its own being-possibility, is a living thing that lives in terms of being-with-one-another, a ζῷον πολιτικόν] the determination of the τέλειον as self-sufficient cannot be related to individuals, nor does it apply primarily to those who maintain a solitary life. Instead, being with one’s parents, with children, with one’s wife, friends, and those who are in the πόλις with one, is implicit in being-there itself. A ὅρος must be won from this determinate being-with-one-another, insofar as it is supposed to be a being-there. For if one extends being-with-one-another to friends of friends, and relatives of relatives, and so on, one loses it, goes εἰς ἄπειρον.”106 Genuine being-with-one-another loses itself if it is a reckless being-with-all-human-beings. It is legitimate when it has its definite limit in itself. In this way, the further determination shows
105. Cf. I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Immanuel Kant’s Werke, edited by E. Cassirer, Volume IV, Berlin 1913. p. 279: “Handle so, als ob die Maxime deiner Handlung durch deinen Willen zum allgemeinen Naturgesetze werden sollte.”
106. Eth. Nic. Α 5, 1097 b 8 sqq.: τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δὲ αὔταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν.