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how the τέλειον ἀγαθόν is seen from the outset, a role that being-with-oneanother plays in the τέλειον as αὔταρκες.
A definition of εὐδαιμονία: it is not somehow συναριθμουμένη,107 “added together,” a sum. Aristotle says that if, as the determination of the αὔταρκες suggests, a manifoldness of relations constitutes the being-completed of beingthere, then it must be observed that it does not depend on a sum, on a how much, nor is the τέλειον to be taken in this way, nor is the manifoldness of relations to be understood in the sense of a sum. Instead, they are to be understood on the basis of the being in which τέλειον is εὐδαιμονία, on the basis of πρᾶξις. The τέλειον of being-there itself is not a summative ‘what’ that one could assemble (μὴ συναριθμουμένη), but rather a how of the εὖ, εὐζωία, that which constitutes the genuine τέλειον of being-there itself.
Thus we have an entire series of characters of the ἀγαθόν. If we recall the discussion of the βίοι, the results are as follows: (1) the οἰκεῖον and (2) the δυσαφαίρετον are basic determinations of the ἀγαθόν. 3. The being of beingthere itself as ἁπλῶς τέλειον is that which is at home in the most genuine sense in being-there. 4. The determination of the ἀγαθόν as αὔταρκες.
b) The ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαι κατ’ ἀρετήν as the Being-Possibility of Human Beings Which Is Sufficient for the Sense of ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν
After this consideration, Aristotle poses a further question concerning what this ἀγαθόν genuinely is, what it genuinely is for the being of human beings that is sufficient for this sense of the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν so determined. ποθεῖται δ’ ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι [ἀγαθόν].108 “One wishes that a more precise, conclusive answer be given to the question of what ἀγαθόν is.”
Aristotle provides general guidance for investigating the ἀγαθόν: I discover the ἀγαθόν of a being when I see it in its ἔργον.109 There is always an ἔργον in every kind of πρᾶξις. In working itself, the ἀγαθόν as such appears to be discoverable. When I thus inquire into the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, I must direct my view at what the ἀνθρώπινον ἔργον for the being-there of human beings is,110 that concern of human being-there which constitutes the being-there of human beings as such. Is there such an ἔργον ἀνθρώπινον at all?
When we look around at the concrete being-there of human beings, we see definite professions, concerns: builder, shoemaker, and so on. They are the determinations of human being-there that do not apply to every human being as human. In these concerns, human beings are occupied with their hands, they go on foot, in the sense that they see and apprehend that certain parts of this being-there have, at each moment, their definite tasks and being-possibility.
107. Eth. Nic. Α 5, 1097 b 17: μὴ συναριθμουμένην.
108. Eth. Nic. Α 6, 1097 b 23 sq.
109. Eth. Nic. Α 6, 1097 b 26 sq.: ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι.
110. Eth. Nic. Α 6, 1097 b 24 sq.: τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.