speaking itself is not, as ὄρεξις, genuine speaking; it is only speaking insofar as it listens to the speaking. To the extent that it is not genuine speaking, Aristotle designates it as ἄλογον.5 That does not mean that it lacks any relation to speaking, but that it is just not κυρίως;6 ὄρεξις is not primarily speaking. Ἄλογον has a double-meaning in the full determination of the being of human beings:7 (1) not to be speaking in the sense of listening to speaking, (2) not to stand in the context of speaking at all, as θρεπτική, nourishing, reproducing are unrelated to λόγος and are unrelated to it in an entirely fundamental sense. The function of gastric juices has absolutely no relation to the speaking of human beings. Ἄλογον is therefore, on the one hand, determined with regard to θρεπτική; but then it is a being-possibility characterized by the ability-to-listen to speaking itself. Genuine speaking is being λόγον ἔχον κυρίως.
This is the clue to the partitioning of the possible ἀρεταί. There are ἀρεταί, modes of possibilities of being, that are oriented by genuine speaking, deliberating, concrete grasping. Then there are modes of being able to have being at one’s disposal, in which λόγος is also there, but in which the deciding factor lies in the “taking hold,” the προαίρεσις. The first are the ἀρεταί διανοητικαί; the second are ἀρεταί ἠθικαί.8 διανοεῖσθαι: “to think through,” “to suppose in a thorough manner,” “to reckon through.” Ἠθικός does not mean “moral”; one must not superficially hold oneself to words when considering the “ethical virtues.” Ἦθος means the “comportment” of human beings, how the human being is there, how he offers himself as a human being, how he appears in being-with-one-another—the way that the orator speaks, has a comportment in the way he stands with respect to the matters about which he speaks. The partitioning of the ἀρεταί cannot be followed more closely now. Later, we will examine the ἀρεταί διανοητικαί9 since the basic possibility of considering, of scientific research, of the βίος θεωρητικός, and therewith the basic possibility of human existence, is found in their domain. For us to get λόγος in view, it is important that this fundamental division of human being-possibilities, among orientations to λόγος, is seen in its basic possibility of λόγος.
The human being is a being that speaks. This definition is not invented by Aristotle. He says explicitly that with this definition he repeats an ἔνδοξον, a δόξα, that has authority in Greek being-there itself. Already before Aristotle, the Greeks saw the human being as a being that speaks. Even the distinction between λόγον ἔχον and ἄλογον goes back to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι.10 Ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι: for a long time, one puzzled about what that really means. The opinion
5. Eth. Nic. Α 13, 1102 b 29, 34.
6. Eth. Nic. Α 13, 1103 a 2.
7. Eth. Nic. Α 13, 1102 b 28 sq.
8. Eth. Nic. Α 13, 1103 a 4 sq.: λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς.
9. Editor’s note: A detailed interpretation of ἀρεταὶ διανοητικαί is not found in this lecture. But see the reference to the ἕξις of ἀληθεύειν at p. 263 ff.
10. Eth. Nic. Α 13, 1102 a 26 sq.: λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις.