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§13. Speaking-Being as Ability-to-Hear [111–113]

κοινοτάτη δύναμίς ἐστι ψυχῆς, καθ᾿ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν.17 “The mode of the ability-to-nourish-oneself is there from the outset, even in other living things, and it is the first and most immediate manner of being-in-the-world. And it is with regard to it that living is there in opposition to all other being-possibilities that are founded in the aforementioned mode.” ἧς ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσθαι.18 “That which comprises this possibility as accomplishment is procreation and τροφῇ χρῆσθαι.” In χρῆσθαι, the relation to the world comes to expression, just as the things of the world are addressed by the Greeks as χρήματα. φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα, ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὑτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ᾗ δύνανται.19 “This being-possibility of bringing into the world is one that belongs most genuinely to the mode of being of living things, to produce another, and precisely in the way that it is, in the mode of its own living, an animal as an animal, a plant as a plant, so that it partakes in being-always and in divinity to the extent that its being-possibility allows this.” Bringing into the world is a determinate mode of being, namely the one that is oriented by the basic idea of being in the Greek sense. In reproduction, a living thing maintains itself in its being by bringing another of its kind into the world. The mode of reproduction is the living thing’s type of always-being-there since being, for the Greeks, means being-present, namely, always-being-present. This passage shows that μετέχειν τοῦ θείου does not mean standing in some religious relation to God. It shows that θεῖον has nothing to do with religion, but is instead a paraphrase of the concept of being in the mode of being-always. Translating θεῖον as “religiousness” is a pure invention.

I have pulled this passage out to make it clear that what we call physiological processes are modes of being that make it possible to genuinely be, to always be there. These being-determinations (θρεπτικόν, γεννητικόν, αἰσθητικόν, νοητικόν, ὀρεκτικόν) are divided up according to λόγον ἔχον—ἄλογον. The definition of the human being as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον turns out to be of much wider significance than it seemed at first:

1. In the definition itself: ζωὴ πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου.

2. The being-possibilities that human beings can have at their disposal are divided up in accordance with this definition.

3. Genuine speaking with the world, the ὁρισμός, is designated as λόγος.

We must try to approach the concrete ground from which this character of λόγον ἔχον springs. We must not be permitted to assume that speaking was fundamental for the Greeks; it must be exhibited concretely. In addition, the λόγον ἔχον is twofold: (1) ἐπιστμονικόν, (2) λογιστικόν;20 that is, speaking in


17. De an. Β 4, 415 a 22 sqq.

18. De an. Β 4, 415 a 25 sq.

19. De an. Β 4, 415 a 26 sqq.

20. Eth. Nic. Ζ 2, 1139 a 12.


Martin Heidegger (GA 18) Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy

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