For such a speaking-being to be a πίστις, means that we become, in ourselves, πίστεις as ἔντεχνοι, accomplished by ourselves. Πίστεις ἄτεχνοι: what speaks for a matter, what cannot be brought about on account of us, but rather is there already, which we, therefore, can put to use—“witnessing,” “torturing,” “documenting.”39 These πίστεις are discussed in Book 1, Chapter 15. There, we find five πίστεις ἄτεχνοι in all: νόμοι, μάρτυρες, βάσανοι, συνθῆκαι (“agreements”), ὄρκος40—in connection with a definite type of discourse, in speaking about what is δίκαιον, in juridical proceedings. These πίστεις are ways of speaking for a matter that is at issue (in such a proceeding), which lies before us.
In contrast to these, there are the πίστεις ἔντεχνοι. Of these ways of speaking-for-something that can be imparted through discourse itself, there are three types, in accordance with a three-fold possibility of taking λόγοι.
1. ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος,41 “in the comportment of the speaker,” in the manner by which the speaker offers and comports himself in his discourse. In this, there is something that can speak for the matter. The one giving the discourse is himself a πίστις in his ἦθος, in his “comportment.”
2. ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως,42 “in the bringing-into-a-disposition,” “in the manner by which the hearer is brought into a definite disposition,” the hearer who also belongs to λέγειν. How the hearer is thereby positioned toward the matter, which position he is in, the manner and mode of bringing-the-hearer-into-a-disposition. In this there lies a πίστις—something that can speak for the matter. The διάθεσις of the hearer determines his κρίσις, his “view,” which he ultimately cultivates as he apprehends the matter.
3. ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ:43 λέγειν itself is πίστις as the basic function of being-there itself. In this way, as was said, information is given about the matter itself. διὰ τὸ δεικνύναι:44 the manner and mode, as was said, the matter-of-factness, or lack thereof, of the speaker himself.
These determinations must be presented more precisely.
Ad 1. Aristotle says that λόγος must be in such a way, discourse must be maintained in such a way, “that it turns the speaker into someone who is trustworthy,”45 who thus has influence in saying that the matter is such and such, that it is so. And Aristotle says explicitly that through the discourse itself, through the manner and mode in which the one who discourses himself speaks, ἦθος must become visible, πίστις must arise out of discourse itself. If we have firm views, then “we trust all the more quickly, and to a greater extent, the decent human beings who make a good impression, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἁπλῶς,
39. Rhet. Α 1, 1355 b 37.
40. Rhet. Α 15, 1375 a 24 sq.
41. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 a 2.
42. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 a 3.
43. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 a 3 sq.
44. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 a 4.
45. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 a 5 sq.: ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα.