toward the τέλος of a definite λέγειν, judicial discourse. At each moment they are put into use. We must get clear about the determination that characterizes ῥητορική as δύναμις. It will be evident that rhetoric does not offer information about every concrete situation and circumstance, just as medicine does not give information about the medical treatment of Socrates and Callias.53 Rhetoric does not know its way around within a particular case, but rather with regard to cases of this or that type, looking to be this or that way. Rhetoric that analyzes judicial discourse treats cases of this type. Rhetoric itself treats what one debates in life in a customary way, and the manner and mode of talking it through. Its orientation is toward the definite urgency of everyday being-with-one-another, not with regard to every case, but rather with regard to what has a definite standing or prestige: judicial meetings, assemblies, glorification of a hero, and things of that sort.
c) Λόγος Itself as πίστις
α. The Three Forms of Hearer and the Three Types of λόγος to Be Determined from Them: Deliberative Discourse (συμβουλευτικός), Judicial Discourse (δικανικός), and Eulogy (ἐπιδεικτικός)
In Book 1, Chapter 3, Aristotle comes to the basic determination of λόγος that we have have learned thus far. He proceeds from the general orientation that speaking has its τέλος in the “hearer,” in the ἀκροατής. Therein lies the fact that speaking is communication. A discourse has reached its end only when it is taken as communication. On the basis of the distinct ways that a hearer can be, Aristotle determines three distinct types of λόγος. The general structure of λόγος itself is such that discourse consists of three aspects: (1) “the speaker” himself; (2) “that about which” there is speaking, what the speaker exhibits; (3) the πρός ὅν, the hearer “to whom” he speaks. “The τέλος is in the hearer.”54 The λόγοι are to be distinguished by the modes in which, in concrete being-withone-another, the human being in the πόλις can be a hearer. We must examine how πιστεύειν is cultivated through the various types of discourse. What does πιστεύειν mean for the being-with-one-another of human beings? We must get the context in view. The basic determination of the being of human beings is being-with-one-another, borne by λόγος. But what about λόγος as ὁρισμός, the scientific formation of concepts in the being-there of human beings? The Rhetoric serves as a guide for this. We will take up some of its passages.
In rhetoric, the aim is to enter into the possibility of seeing what speaks for the issue in deliberating about something, to be able to see the πίστις. Aristotle distinguishes πίστεις ἄτεχνοι and πίστεις ἔντεχνοι. First, we will treat
53. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 b 30 sqq.: οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τί Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἢ Καλλίᾳ [ . . . ] οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἔνδοξον θεωρήσει.
54. Rhet. Α 3, 1358 a 37 sqq.: σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὅν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστιν, λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν.