the ἔντεχνοι: that which speaks for something about which we know our way around, which we have appropriated and have at our disposal. These πίστεις touch upon λόγος insofar as λέγειν is that which is in our power. The correctness of this speaking is determined on the basis of that wherein this speaking itself operates. In relation to λόγος, the πίστεις ἔντεχνοι are to be called forth. Speaking is (1) to anyone, with someone; (2) about something, “exhibitive,” δεικνύναι; (3) fulfilled by a speaker. That a person speaks to anyone about something is the phenomenal state of affairs. From this, the three characters of the πίστεις ἔντεχνοι are to be seen: (1) πάθος; (2) contextualized speaking is designated as συλλογισμός, or here as ἐνθύμημα (ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντος ἢ ἐνθυμήματα);55 (3) ἦθος. These three πίστεις are at each moment distinguished according to the type of speaking, and the speaking is distinguished relative to the hearer, and in relation to the πιστεύειν, by what is to be achieved with the hearer.
There must, necessarily, be three forms of hearer: the θεωρός56—terminus technicus for the one who attends a festival, the “onlooker” though not in the sense of one who just sits there, stupidly looking. Rather, it is the one who, at the same time, is κριτής with respect to what he sees, forming an opinion of it: κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελλόντων.57 This κριτής is able to form an opinion “as to what is happening or what should come.” ἔστιν δ’ ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων οἷον ἐκκλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένον οἷον δικαστής.58 “Such a person who forms a judgment about something that is to come is the ἐκκλησιαστής, the one who takes part in the people’s gathering [where that about which there is deliberating has the character of the ‘not yet’, but at the same time the character of an ability-to-be; not in the sense of a pure possibility, but within the circle of concrete possibilities for the one deliberating and for the circumstances.] The judge is to form a view as to what has happened,” ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός,59 “the θεωρός about what now is.”
Consequently, three distinct λόγοι: (1) συμβουλευτικός, “deliberative speaking,” speaking on this side and that side in the people’s gathering; (2) δικανικός, “judicial discourse,” the discourse of accuser and defendant; (3) ἐπι δεικτικός, a “eulogy,” an “exhibiting” that lets the human being be seen in his life, where it is not a matter of judgment in the sense of a court judgment, but rather where the seeing itself has the tendency of exhibiting.60
All three λόγοι have the peculiarity of operating in two directions. (1) Deliberative discourse can be (a) προτροπή, (b) ἀποτροπή,61 “discourse in
55. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 b 1 sqq.
56. Rhet. Α 3, 1358 b 2.
57. Rhet. Α 3, 1358 b 3.
58. Rhet. Α 3, 1358 b 4 sq.
59. Rhet. Α 3, 1358 b 5 sq.
60. Rhet. Α 3, 1358 b 7 sq.
61. Rhet. Α 3, 1358 b 8 sq.