the intelligent among them, those who are recognized among them to the highest degree and have a reputation.”81 What is characteristic is that the ἐνθύμημα proceeds from an ἔνδοξον, and indeed not only proceeds from it but also refers back to it again, precisely in the way that the scientific result proceeds from something that is in itself self-evident, and again refers back to a fact that has the same evidence as that from which it proceeds. That which comes forth in the ἐνθύμημα has the same character as that from which it proceeds: it is ἔνδοξον.
Ῥητορική has a kinship with the συλλογισμός of διαλεκτική insofar as the ἔνδοξον are, here, entirely determinate. The ἔνδοξον of ῥητορική pertains to what is of the future, what has already happened, what is present, what is conducive, what is fitting and what is not fitting, the beautiful and the ugly. About such things, people have definite points of view. There are definite δόξαι on the basis of which he who speaks in the assembly speaks, and speaks in such a way that he offers yet another δόξα, in such a way that there emerges a definite δόξα along with the others. For this task of proceeding from the ἔνδοξον and acquiring an ἔνδοξον, there are the two paths of παράδειγμα and of ἐνθύμημα.
We must be cautious with Δεικνύναι, as it is no proof but rather a definite manner and mode of fulfilling speaking. It is putting the matter before one’s eyes. To understand the manner and mode in which λέγειν is itself a πίστις, in which it itself can speak on behalf of itself, it is important to observe the concreteness with which λόγος is employed as deliberative, as judicial discourse and eulogy.
What will become evident are the peculiar aspects of beings: συμφέρον, δίκαιον, καλόν,82 all three with an oppositionality: beneficial or harmful, and so on. Discourse itself moves within an oppositionality. These aspects are determinations of beings, as they are brought to language in an everyday manner. In everyday concern, the συμφέρον, the δίκαιον, and the καλόν come to language—the peculiar characters of encountering what becomes the topic in λόγος ῥητορικός.
At the same time, a definite aspect of temporality appears in these aspects themselves. The one who is deliberating about what is encountered in the environing world is concerned with the μέλλοντα χρόνον, what is not yet there; and specifically what is not there in relation to what is posited in a definite care, but is to be made available within everyday life. Then, what has already happened is at play in discourse: for example, it is brought to language that someone has committed an injustice. And what is there now is at play in discourse. The characters of the being-there of the environing world, how they come to language in everydayness, are characterized, at the same time, in relation to temporality.
81. Top. Α 1, 100 b 21 sqq.: ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις.
82. Rhet. Α 3, 1358 b 22 sqq.