mode of being in being-with-one-another is in speaking-with-one-another. To set forth the possibilities of being-with-one-another is the ἔργον of rhetoric, and because it treats of λέγειν in the mode of ἐνθύμημα and of παράδειγμα, of συλλογισμός and the ἐπαγωγή of dialectic; it approaches dialectic. These assignments show their character of dependence, together with the peculiar being-character in which they operate. One sees how strong the ability-to-see was for the Greeks with respect to the peculiar fact of everydayness. In the time of Aristotle, and before him, rhetoric was assessed entirely differently within the being-with-one-another of human beings. It “disappears, is hidden in the shape of politics.”93 Rhetoric makes the claim to be itself politics, and even “those who speaks against politics” say that, for they want to set ῥητορική in the place of πολιτική, “partly out of lack of education, partly out of boasting.”94 The genuine business of πολιτική, legislating, need not be necessary. In opposition to this, Aristotle emphasizes, in Book 10, Chapter 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, that the whole can be carried out only on the basis of a concrete experience of being-there itself, that one does not come close to this being-there by passing off the formal discipline of rhetoric as what is decisive.95 Thus it requires knowing-the-way-around in everyday being-there for those who wish to be occupied within the circle of the πόλις. The sophists, on the other hand, who also pose as if they want to ascertain something like the possibility of the rightful being-there of the πόλις, “appear to be very far from teaching such a thing. For they do not even know that about which politics is concerned; otherwise, they would not have put rhetoric at the same level as politics or placed it higher than politics, nor would they have come to the opinion that legislating is accomplished by simply culling together what appears good to most people.”96 Here, it thus appears that, in fact, the attempt to give rhetoric the basic function of the genuine understanding of being-there itself was vital. For this reason, sophists are connected with, and in conflict with, philosophers, and philosophers are the rightful sophists—this is what Plato wants to show in his Sophist.
The peculiar position of rhetoric with respect to politics and dialectic is an indication of the peculiarity of that about which it is concerned, and which is not to be taken in the sense of a discipline or τέχνη. Here, it is an involving-oneself, something about-which-we-deliberate. The about-which of rhetoric is the speaking-with-one-another-in-a-deliberative-mode for which there is no τέχνη. That which occurs to everyone in an everyday and accustomed manner is not specific to a trade or occupation. Everyone is in the position of being able to speak with others in the people’s assembly, and everyone has the possibility
93. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 a 27 sq.: ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς.
94. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 a 28 sqq.: καὶ οἱ ἀντιποιούμενοι ταύτης τὰ μὲν δι’ ἀπαιδευσίαν τὰ δὲ δι’ ἀλαζονείαν.
95. Eth. Nic. Κ 10, 1180 b 35 sqq.
96. Eth. Nic. Κ 10, 1181 a 13 sqq.: λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρω ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ’ ἂν ᾤοντο ῥᾴδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων.