“having-present” of something without perceiving it directly, the mere “presenting-itself.” It can be true or false like δόξα.100 It has both possibilities, but it has them, in a certain sense, only from without, while δόξα has the possibility in itself. Within the sense of opining itself lies the “can”—true or false. Δυνατόν—ἀδύνατον.
Ἔνδοξον is the manner of being-oriented in which one is oriented toward beings that can also be otherwise. There is the possibility of the view being revised. With respect to beings that always are how and what they are, with regard to ἐπιστήμη, there is no revision. On the other hand, revisability belongs to δόξα in itself; it is assumed of itself. Δόξα is the mode in which the world of being-with-one-another is there. The possibility of a speaking-against-oneanother in being-with-one-another is thereby brought about. That one has this view and another has that view, since beings can be otherwise, is the basic possibility of being-against-one-another. Δόξα is the mode in which we have living there in its everydayness. Living knows from out of itself, not in the way of science, theoretically; that is only a distinct possibility. Δόξα is the mode in which living knows from out of itself. The aim of λόγοι ῥητορικοί, the cultivation of πιστεύειν, is nothing other than the cultivation of a δόξα, of the right view of a matter. For the characteristic aspect of πιστεύειν belongs to δόξα; a certain πίστις, a φάσις, accompanies δόξα itself. Therefore, animals have no δόξα since they have no λόγος; a φάσις is impossible for them. The there for such a being is different.
b) Making-Present of the Context for the Treatment of δόξα
It is important for this consideration that the context of the foregoing be kept in sight, not in the sense of noting the construction of the lecture, but in such a way that the direction of vision toward the appearing phenomena is guided and defined. Human being-there should be made visible on the basis of the basic structure of its being, in order to see the possibility of concept formation on this basis. We determine being-there itself according to its being-character as being-in-a-world, more precisely as being-with-one-another, the having-withone-another of the world, in which one is. This having-with-one-another is a dealing with the world as concern for the world. This dealing has the character of depending on being itself in this being-in-the-world. Εὐδαιμονία is taken into concern. In concern for that with which living deals, it has concern for its own being. Being-with-one-another in the mode of concern possesses the basic determination of speaking-with-one-another; λόγος is a basic phenomenon of κοινωνία. Λόγος has the basic function of making-manifest that within which living as being-in-a-world maintains itself: δηλοῦν. Being-in-the-world is a way of being that has uncovered the world; being-in it is oriented, the in-which is uncovered. Being-in maintains itself in a definite familiarity, on whose basis it constructs its orientation. Ultimately, we want to set forth the phenomenon
100. De an. Γ 3, 428 a 18 sq.