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The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings [141–142]

terpretation of the section in question (Nicomachean Ethics Ζ, Chapter 10). Three aspects of δόξα stand out as demarcated in opposition to three related phenomena. Δόξα is contrasted with:

1. βουλεύεσθαι. This is a “seeking,” a ζήτησις,103 a being-after a definite view that I want to achieve. Through deliberating, I want primarily to come to the τέλος of a δόξα; it is not a yes. I only want to appropriate a definite view regarding a set of facts, whereas δόξα is no longer a seeing, but stands at the end of seeing; it is a φάσις.104 But although it is a yes, it is still not a knowing.

2. Demarcation in opposition to ἐπιστήμη: “knowing information” regarding a matter is characterized by the knower’s being situated with regard to the matter such that he is oriented to it, even if it is not there. I know information about a matter; that means that I am securely situated in relation to the matter. Therefore, I only have ἐπιστήμη about beings with the character of ἀεί. The basic presupposition for the possibility of knowing is a presupposition regarding the being which is known—that it is always the same as it is, that it cannot change. Something that is not ἀεί can change. In ἐπιστήμη, I do not need to have the matter actually there. Regarding the ἐνδεχόμενον, there is no ἐπιστήμη, but only δόξα. Still, δόξα is akin to ἐπιστήμη since it is a yes-saying, a φάσις. It is determined in opposition to ἐπιστήμη through the ὀρθότης.105 In δόξα, I do not have the being itself, but rather an orientation in relation to it, which is directed to the ἀληθές. The view has the tendency to intend the being unconcealed in itself. But it is found in δόξα itself that it is only a conception that, as conception, is likely false. With δόξα, the matter can indeed be false— it is not an absolute claim. In the being of being-a-view is found the concession that it can be this way or that way; it can also be otherwise. Δόξα with its ὀρθότης is thereby distinguished from:

3. φαντασία, a determinate “making present”of something that can also be true or false, but in a different sense than δόξα. Aristotle treats of the difference in Chapter 3 of Book 3 of De Anima.106 Since φαντασία can also be false, it is related to δόξα. But how can it be false? Because its turning out to be in fact true or false is added to it, while in δόξα the being-able-to-be-true-or-false is already contained in the formation of the view. Φαντασία is simple having present. Therefore, animals possess φαντασία too, while δόξα is only there where λόγος is. In every view-formation, in every having-a-view, the fact that something speaks for the view is co-given (ἀκολουθεῖν107 and ἕπεσθαι,108 as belonging to the phenomenon). ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής. λείπεται ἄπα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα· γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής. ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μὲν ἕπεται

103. Eth. Nic. Ζ 10, 1142 a 31 sq.: τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν.
104. Eth. Nic. Ζ 10, 1142 b 13 sq.
105. Eth. Nic. Ζ 10, 1142 b 10 sq.: ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης [ . . . ], δόξης δ’ ὀρθότης.
106. De an. Γ 3, 428 a 1 sqq.
107. De an. Γ 3, 428 a 22: δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις.
108. De an. Γ 3, 428 a 20: δόξῃ ἕπεται πίστις.


Martin Heidegger (GA 18) Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy