the mean there”; ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ,115 the mean as “delimited by λόγος,” “determined by the deliberating that talks something through.” The μέσον for πρᾶξις is the καιρός. This definition becomes essentially clearer when we look more precisely at προαίρεσις, and, in that context, attempt to explicate δόξα more precisely in regard to it.
Why is προαίρεσις generally set in opposition to the four above phenomena? This question must be posed in every interpretation of an Aristotelian analysis because it clarifies the basic character of the phenomenon. Grouping together such phenomena that possess in themselves such concrete aspects depends on their having a definite kinship by virtue of these aspects. The four phenomena must have some concrete content that recommends grouping them together with προαίρεσις. The five phenomena are fully characterized as beingafter something, with the character of having-in-advance, so that what one is after is there in advance in a particular way—προαίρεσις. The toward-which is there from the outset. This being-after something with the character of the in-advance is found in ἐπιθυμία exactly as it is in θυμός. It is fully explicit in the case of wish. A being-after something in the direction of the ἀληθές is also found in δόξα. To opine that the matter is thus and so lies in the view itself. This being-after something—something that I do not yet generally possess, but which already occupies me nevertheless—is the phenomenon that motivates bringing these various phenomena together with προαίρεσις.
We want to briefly carry out the demarcation of the first three phenomena in opposition to προαίρεσις. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός.116 “There is no προαίρεσις, no being-resolved, for living things that do not speak.” Speaking, deliberating, belong to προαίρεσις. Only a resolution that passes through deliberation is a genuine resolution. In Book Ζ, Chapter 2 resolution is characterized as ὄρεξις διανοητική,117 “considering being-after,” a being-after that is determined by thorough consideration, by deliberation. Ἐπιθυμία and θυμός are also found in animals; they are not the same as προαίρεσις since the latter only occurs in living things that speak. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ’ οὔ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ’ ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ’ οὔ. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου.118 “He who lacks self-control acts ἐπιθυμῶν such that he goes off after the matter. But this going-off is not a resolute acting. The self-controlled acts resolutely, but he does not need to be ἐπιθυμῶν. Ἐπιθυμία and θυμός go after a ἡδύ and a λυπηρόν that disposition supports and tones down.” Προαίρεσις goes after the πρακτόν, that which is decisive for a concern in the moment, that which comes into question for it. That is what the resolution brings together. Orientation toward the whole moment belongs to προαίρεσις. Προαίρεσις is not a so-called act; it is a genuine possibility of being in the moment. θυμός δ’ ἔτι
115. Eth. Nic. Β 6, 1107 a 1.
116. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 12 sq.
117. Eth. Nic. Ζ 2, 1139 b 5.
118. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 13 sqq.