ἧττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ.119 Aristotle says about θυμός, “that which is grasped in a state of arousal, in blind passion, has little to do with that which is grasped in clear, lucid resolution.” προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ’ ἐστὶν τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας.120 Furthermore, προαίρεσις is not a βούλησις although it looks that way. The difference lies in that to which they are related. “Προαίρεσις never goes after something that is impossible. [I am resolved to something of which it is certain that it is possible.] If someone wanted to say that he is resolved to an impossibility, we would say that he is foolish. Wishing, on the other hand, can be directed at something that is impossible.” Προαίρεσις is always after the possible, specifically, after something determinately possible that we take up and are able to carry out in the moment. βούλησις, on the other hand, goes after something that is impossible. It can go after the possible too, not if it depends on us but rather on others. For example, we wish “that the actor, or such and such a person, that takes part in a competition, receive the prize.”121 That is possible but is not under our control. Προαίρεσις always goes after something that is under our control. Προαίρεσις leads to the ἔσχατον, to the point that I grasp, that I genuinely institute through action.
We approach the demarcation of δόξα by opposing it to related phenomena: ἐπιστήμη, φαντασία, βουλεύεσθαι, προαίρεσις. We are trying to carry out this demarcation through the contrast with προαίρεσις, which is concretely of fundamental meaning. Such a demarcation presupposes that the phenomena in question have a character that motivates their being brought together. This character is being-after something; that which one is after is anticipated. Δόξα: being-for-something. A particular orientation is found in being-for. This beingafter in δόξα does not have, say, the character of ὄρεξις, of a “striving.” Δόξα is more of a certain yes; it comes to an end and stops. Aristotle brings forward seven differences between προαίρεσις and δόξα:
1. Προαίρεσις and δόξα are distinguished by that toward which they are directed. Προαίρεσις, “resolving-onself” to something, is only directed toward beings with regard to which I can accomplish something. The ἀρχὴ πράξεως must be up to me. Such a being is the theme of προαίρεσις: a συμφέρον, something that comes into question as “conducive” to concern, as dealt with in such a way that I can take it in hand. Δόξα, by contrast, is not only directed toward συμφέροντα, that which can be changed, but also toward that which is ἀεί. I can have a view regarding that which is “always.”122 This distinction is important. It remains to be noted that δόξα is also directed at beings that are always such as they are. Such δόξαι are the basis from which science in general arises.
119. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 18 sq.
120. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 20 sqq.
121. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 24: οἷον ὑποκριτήν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητήν.
122. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 31 sqq.: ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον περὶ τὰ ἀίδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.