That about which I have a view, and to which I am resolved, is distinguished with regard to the extent of the region of being to which it can be directed.
2. Δόξα goes after the ἀληθές and the ψευδές.123 Δόξα depends upon grasping in its being that which a view is about. Προαίρεσις depends upon how it should be done, what should happen with it, that which is posited in a resolution. Προαίρεσις always aims at a πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. What is posited in a προαίρεσις is πρακτόν according to its essence.
3. Whoever has a view is not otherwise determined in their ἦθος by this having-a-definite-view. This having-a-view about a definite matter is not an “ethical” determination; it does not pertain to changing the general comportment of human beings according to their being. Alternatively, the manner and mode in which I am resolved, that to which I am resolved, what stands in προαίρεσις, is decisive for my being, for the manner and mode in which I am, for my ἦθος.124 Thus δόξα points to a certain indifference with relation to being. Having-a-view presupposes a certain disinterestedness with regard to that which the view is about. This is important for the Greek conception of science.
4. Corresponding to the peculiar being-character of that to which δόξα and προαίρεσις are directed—in the one case the ἀληθές and in the other case the πρακτόν—having-a-view as comporting itself points to a definite seeing, to the manner and mode in which beings are there, in which it deals with beings as beings. Προαίρεσις is directed at the “seizing” and “renouncing” of a matter; δόξα is directed at ἀληθεύειν.125
5. Δόξα and προαίρεσις are distinguished by that which constitutes their genuineness. Δόξα depends on the ὀρθότης, by its approaching the ἀληθές, the being as it is. Προαίρεσις, on the other hand, is not concerned with setting forth beings in their being. It is decisive for προαίρεσις that it be suitably reckoned.126 It does not depend on setting forth all of the being-aspects of a concrete situation, on theoretically describing them; but instead προαίρεσις depends on deliberating correctly, on keeping an eye on what comes into consideration for the πρακτόν. Indeed, that is also an ἀληθεύειν, but one that is essentially distinct from δόξα. Its correctness is oriented to the πρακτόν, while the correctness of δόξα is oriented to the ἀληθές.
6. Δόξα and προαίρεσις are distinguished by their way of standing toward knowing. Δόξα is related to what one does not know precisely, to beings that are still concealed. The point is that δόξα is directed at “what we do not yet
123. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1111 b 33: καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται.
124. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1112 a 1 sqq.: τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθά ἢ τὰ κατὰ ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὔ.
125. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1112 a 3 sqq.: καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς· λαβεῖν δὲ ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν.
126. Eth. Nic. Γ 4, 1112 a 5 sqq.: καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὗ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς.