The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings [150–152]

the character of δόξα, lies the determination of going-along with the way that the world initially shows itself, the moment of trust in the immediate aspect. Nothing other than this is Thales’ opinion, that ὕδωρ is the πρῶτον, that the genuine ἀρχή of being is “water.” Such a determination is intelligible on the basis of the prevalence of a thoroughgoing trust in that which initially shows itself. That which initially shows itself is taken as what the world initially is, according to Thales.

The one who possesses δόξα belongs necessarily to the determination of δόξα. With an ἐπιστήμη, it does not matter who has it. For a valid proposition, it does not matter who I am; that contributes nothing to the elucidation, to the being-true, of what is known. By contrast, the one having the view is, as such, co-decisive for δόξα. Who has it is of great importance. The matter in itself cannot speak purely for itself. It is concealed; I have a view of it. In δόξα, the matter itself does not only speak for itself to the extent that it is uncovered, but it also speaks for he who has the view, for whom the φάσις, the yes of δόξα holds. Accordingly, the stability of a δόξα is not exclusively grounded in the state of affairs that it conveys, but in him who has the δόξα.

In this structure of δόξα, lies the possibility of its reaching a characteristic authority and stubbornness. One repeats the opinions to others. Repeating does not depend on investigating what is said. What is said is not decisive, but rather that it is he who said it. Behind the authority of δόξα, stand other people, who are peculiarly indefinite, whom one cannot get a hold of—one has the view. This is a characteristic authority, stubbornness, and a force that is found in δόξα itself.

Δόξα is the genuine orientedness of being-with-one-another-in-the-world, that is, of average being-with-one-another. Average: the task of investigating the world is not posited. In δόξα, and on its basis, one has to do with the world in the way that one lives in the world in an everyday manner and has to do with things. One does not have to investigate everything with regard to its concrete content; what others say about it is what one thinks about it.

Thus δόξα is simultaneously set forth as the basis and the motive of discoursing-with-one-another, of negotiating-with-one-another. For although δόξα possesses a kind of stability, that about which one has a view can indeed always still be discussed. It could also be otherwise. Its sense is to leave a discussion open. Λόγος, negotiating something, is constantly latent; in δόξα, bringing-to-language is constantly on the alert. Δόξα is precisely that from which speaking-with-one-another arises, by which it is motivated; and, at the same time, it is also that with which it negotiates. Thus δόξα is the basis, source, and motive for discoursing-with-one-another, in such a way that what is yielded by negotiating itself has the character of a δόξα and therewith takes over the very function of δόξα. Δόξα has the authority and guidance of beingwith- one-another in the world.

I have emphasized that the region of being of δόξα is not limited to that which can also be otherwise; it is also the basis for the mode of grasping